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From the Enlightenment to the end of the nineteenth century, France experienced 
political change and literary innovation which resulted in new definitions of the 
relationship between mankind and God. Current research in nineteenth century 
French literature has discovered a wealth of diverse and provocative topics within this 
humanist tradition precisely because it was a time of experimentation and change 
which gave birth to new viewpoints on everything from gender roles and sexuality to 
socialism and human rights. This dissertation delves into the evolution of an often 
overlooked element of French life which went hand in hand with social and 
intellectual innovation: religion and spirituality. Under the Catholic monarchy, France 
had traditionally relied on religion as the foundation for a collective morality. 
Enlightenment philosophy challenged traditional religious concepts and France’s 
post-Revolutionary break with the Catholic Church encouraged intellectuals to 
continue exploring new notions of the divine. This dissertation focuses on a number 
  
of spiritual ideas put forward by various writers. While some, such as Chateaubriand, 
Ballanche and Lamennais famously advocated a return to Catholicism, others like 
Mme de Staël and Lamartine used their writings as a means for devising a new 
spiritual direction that would rely less on institutionalized religion and more on the 
conscience. Advancements in science and in the study of history ushered in a new 
awareness of the relationship between the past and the future which inspired 
scientifically minded intellectuals, such as Auguste Comte and Emile Zola, to 
consider themselves as part of a progressive succession of human beings more 
dominated by time and society than by any god. By shedding what they saw as 
outmoded conceptions of the universe, philosophers, poets and novelists alike moved 
to embrace a more progressive spiritual direction incorporating compassion, empathy 
and justice as sources for moral truths. These are concepts that have carried over into 
secular France today as citizens continue to focus on ethical concerns in political 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
From the Enlightenment to the end of the nineteenth century, France experienced 
political change and literary innovation which resulted in new conceptions of 
humanity’s relationship with god. Current research in nineteenth century French 
literature has discovered a wealth of diverse and provocative topics within this 
humanist tradition precisely because it was a time of experimentation and change 
which gave birth to new viewpoints on everything from politics to gender roles and 
sexuality to socialism and human rights. This dissertation delves into the evolution of 
an often overlooked element of French life which went hand in hand with social and 
intellectual innovation: religion and spirituality. Religion has perhaps been 
overlooked by contemporary scholars because occidental nations are overwhelmingly 
living in what Gabriel Vahanian has referred to as a “post-Christian” culture in which 
the question of religion no longer seems relevant to a great majority of intellectuals. 
My research shows, however, that for the intellectual visionaries who sought to 
influence France’s social reconstruction after the Revolution, a solution for the 
reconciliation of modern society and religion was vital. Under the Catholic monarchy, 
France had traditionally relied on religion as the foundation for a collective morality. 
Enlightenment philosophy challenged traditional religious concepts and France’s 
post-Revolutionary break with the Catholic Church encouraged intellectuals to 
continue to explore new notions of the divine. The Restoration and subsequent 
revolutions would continue to fuel new reflections on the place of religion in society. 
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As Susanna Lee has pointed out, secularism was a gradual process which “developed 
as an impression and an idea” (12). This slow but continuous shift in religious 
thought is reflected in the perpetuation of the belief in some kind of God or religious 
system throughout the century even as conceptions of the divine more ever further 
from Christianity.  As the title of this dissertation suggests, rather than abandon 
religion, authors overwhelmingly sought to redefine religious notions in light of 
changing social and political convictions. This dissertation examines a variety of 
essays, novels and poetry concerning religion and spirituality from the late eighteenth 
century to the end of the nineteenth century in an effort to follow the progression 
from a predominantly Christian-based moral religious theory to a more universal 
secular moral philosophy. 
While some, such as Chateaubriand, Ballanche and Lamennais famously advocated a 
return to Catholicism, others like Mme de Staël and Lamartine used their writings as 
a means for devising a new spiritual direction that would rely less on institutionalized 
religion and more on the individual conscience. Advancements in science and in the 
study of history ushered in a new awareness of the relationship between the past and 
the future which inspired scientifically minded intellectuals, such as Auguste Comte 
and Emile Zola, to consider themselves as part of a progressive succession of human 
beings ruled more by time than by any god. By shedding what they saw as outmoded 
conceptions of the universe, philosophers, poets and novelists alike moved to 
embrace a more progressive spiritual direction incorporating compassion, empathy 
and justice as sources for moral truths. These are concepts that have carried over into 
secular France today as citizens continue to focus on ethical concerns in political 
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debates that touch on topics such as welfare programs, immigration, and, of course, 
secularization.  
In recent years, researchers have begun to rekindle an interest in religion in nineteenth 
century literature. Susanna Lee’s 2006 A World Abandoned by God looks at 
secularism as a phenomenon in nineteenth century fiction.  For Lee, “the absence of 
God has proven as versatile an instrument of manipulation and political control as the 
presence of God had been” (15). She nevertheless contends that “Throughout the 
transition to a nonreligious culture, some sense of the divine must remain intact” (15). 
Lee explores this conspicuous religious absence in Stendhal, Flaubert, Barbey, and 
Dostoyevsky but, as we will see, similar observations could be extended to include 
Sand, Zola and even Renan and Michelet. La Société des études romantiques et dix-
neuvièmistes chose to focus on “Les Religions du XIXe siècle” as the topic for their 
2009 conference. The use of the plural in “religions” is indicative of the diversity of 
religious viewpoints presented in the eleven panels presented over three days. In her 
opening remarks to the conference, Sophie Guermès commented on the use of the 
plural “religions,” correctly pointing out that “De fait, l’un des traits dominants du 
XIXe siècle en ce domaine aura consisté en un progressif décentrement manifesté par 
la tentative de penser la diversité en reconstruisant l’histoire religieuse des peuples” 
(2). Guermès cited efforts by Quinet, Michelet, Hugo and others who sought to unify 
humanity by emphasizing the similarities in diverse religious traditions. The new 
religious conceptions invented in the nineteenth century, such as Saint-Simon’s 
Nouveau christianisme and Auguste Comte’s religion positiviste likewise provide 
plurality of thought while sharing common liberal political values. Finally, I am 
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deeply indebted to Paul Bénichou’s incredibly comprehensive four-volume oeuvre 
Romantismes français (1973-1992) which introduced me to many of the authors I 
chose to include here. My work, however, differs from Bénichou’s in that his is a 
broad and almost encyclopedic investigation which encompasses commentaries on 
multiple works by each author intermingled with biographical information. My 
analysis is not meant to be entirely comprehensive. Rather, it seeks to provide a more 
intimate look at specific texts in order to examine detailed examples of each author’s 
religious thought according to specific works at specific moments in time.  
The historical and biographical contexts surrounding these works are complex to say 
the least. The years covered by these chapters are some of the most turbulent in 
French history. The literature produced during these decades interacts with and 
responds to the realities endured by authors who lived through an unstable religious 
and political atmosphere. Prior to 1789, Enlightenment philosophy already questioned 
religion and its relationship with government. Although my first chapter begins with 
the Vicaire savoyard, Rousseau was writing in the philosophical context of his time, 
addressing not only the Church but his fellow philosophes immersed in deism which 
“required that reason first establish the foundation of faith” (Dupré 3). The 
Revolution would subsequently change France’s rapport with religion forever. 
Republicans would interpret Enlightenment philosophy as a basis for new policies on 
religion. According to Charles Gliozzo, Voltaire’s opinion that the clergy should play 
a less mystical and more civil role in society, for example, influenced the 1790 Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy which instituted the democratic election of clergy and 
required clergy to swear allegiance to the nation (275). For Paul Bénichou, eighteenth 
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century deism changed more than just the rapport between Church and State. Deism 
changed individual views on spirituality on a personal level since the philosophy 
encouraged free interpretation (Le Sacre 36-7).  
In 1794, the French state ceased funding religious orders and in 1795 the Constitution 
declared freedom of religious choice while emphasizing the idea that “la loi ne 
reconnaît ni vœux religieux, ni aucun engagement contraire aux droits naturels de 
l’homme” (Durand 11). From year to year, new issues arose, including a popular 
Catholic backlash substantial enough to warrant its own study in Suzanne Desan’s 
1990 book, Reclaiming the Sacred. The post-Revolution religious situation is far too 
intricate to sum up here. What is important to remember as far as we are concerned is 
that this rift in the Church’s social and political status likely introduced the first 
glimmers of opportunity to redefine religion.  
Catholicism would not be restored as the official State religion until Napoleon’s 1801 
Concordat but even then France’s reunification with its longtime religious tradition 
was hardly a return to the monarchical alliance. Napoleon hoped to use religion as a 
means for manipulating the people and winning over monarchists in support of his 
regime (Durand 13). The Emperor’s self-coronation was symbolic of the very real 
political power he intended to wield over the Church. The Concordat, for example, 
states as its first provision that “the Roman Catholic Religion shall be freely practiced 
in France” but  nevertheless asserts that the Premier Consul retains the right to 
nominate “archbishops and bishoprics” (Barbara 254). The Concordat, including the 
state nomination of clergy, remained intact until 1905. The Charter of 1814, which 
accompanied the Restoration of Louis XVIII, upheld social equality and promised 
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freedom of religion even as it declared Catholicism the only official religion of the 
State
1
. The Charter, as we will see in the chapters on Ballanche and Lamennais, was 
ill received by conservative monarchists. Charles X (1824-1830) made strides 
towards a traditional monarchy through socially conservative legislation, such as the 
introduction of the Law of Sacrilege, ultimately increasing protests against the 
Church (Kroen 45). Surprisingly, even clergy were protesting the Restoration policy 
of “oubli,” “a national campaign to undo the major accomplishment of the 
Revolution: the creation of ideological difference” (Kroen 33, 45). Missionaries, for 
example, staged dramatic conversion ceremonies wherein the faithful repented for the 
sins of their eighteenth century relatives (Kroen 45).  
 
The Second Empire forged an alliance with the Church and increased grants and 
stipends to the clergy in hopes that organized religion would promote order amongst 
the people (Plessis 136). This alliance, however, drew criticism from an increasingly 
secular-minded population. According to Alain Plessis, “The rising generation, 
resolutely positivistic, not only spoke out against a Church whose head condemned 
the modern world with intransigence but also refused to support the Empire” (153). A 
return to republican government and the separation of Church and State were already 
imminent. Incidentally, the Second Empire’s cooperation with the Church unraveled 
in the 1860s after Church-led protests concerning the invasion of the Papal States 
prompted the government to revoke special privileges granted to the clergy in 1852 
(Plessis 154). Increasing efforts to dislodge the Republic from its association with the 
                                                 
1
 The full text of the Charte constitutionelle du 4 juin 1814 is available on the official web site of the 




Church finally began to take root under the Third Republic. The 1880s, for example, 
witnessed the passage of laws against “unauthorized congregation” and the 
establishment of public secular education (Ducattillon 81).  
Changes within the Church also inevitably impacted religious thought in the 
nineteenth century. Six different popes reigned from 1800-1900 alone. Especially 
during the last half of the century, under Pope Pius IX, encyclicals spoke out against 
liberalism, denouncing socialism and communism, and proclaimed new dogma such 
as the Immaculate Conception in 1856 and papal infallibility in 1870 (New Advent). 
In 1890, Pope Leo XIII declared (through a speech delivered by French Archbishop 
Lavigerie) that the Church must accept the Republic and renounce its previous 
support for the monarchy in order for Catholicism to survive in France (Ducattillon 
80). Many French Catholic political activists nevertheless refused to give up their 
loyalty to the crown (Ducattillon 80). 
The personal lives and, in particular, the individual spiritual beliefs of each author are 
also relevant to the texts in question. Their biographies reveal diverse religious 
backgrounds including devoted Catholics, Protestants, atheists, and other less 
conventional beliefs such as Victor Hugo’s well-known association with spiritism. By 
the same token, more details on the philosophical influences of the time, such as 
Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, among others, would have better 
explained the origins of many of the lines of thought analyzed throughout the 
following chapters. Unfortunately, due to the limitations necessary to completing the 
dissertation in a timely fashion, I have ignored many of these details which would 
admittedly have fleshed out the circumstances surrounding these texts. As I continue 
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my career, I look forward to enriching this research with the addition of historical and 
biographical material. For the moment, however, my purpose is to analyze the chosen 
texts in comparison to each other. My focus here is almost exclusively on the texts 
themselves which already present a wealth of information. For the most part, I limit 
each chapter to only one or two works per author in order to carefully consider how 
each one relates to movement towards or away from a more humanistic, secular point 
of view. I do mention historical or biographical context when necessary, especially if 
the events are alluded to within the text in question, but more work could be done to 
shed light on these connections in the future. I am likewise aware that I have 
oftentimes isolated individual texts from the author’s complete body of work. 
Obviously, all of these authors penned more than a few works of interest to the topic 
of religion but, again, it was necessary to narrow my scope in order to take a detailed 
approach towards one or two particularly noteworthy pieces.  
The following chapters focus on a number of spiritual ideas put forward by various 
writers spanning over a century of religious and political thought. The texts I have 
chosen range from just before the Revolution to the dawn of the nineteenth century 
which would usher in France’s separation of Church and State in 1905. While a 
completely comprehensive study of the numerous publications concerning religion 
during this time period was an unfeasible task for this project, I nevertheless sought a 
broad scope which would simultaneously allow me to delve into the details of 
individual works. I chose over a dozen authors whose contributions to the ongoing 
discussion on religion capture the spirit of innovation in religious thought throughout 
the nineteenth century. I tend to limit each chapter to only one or two texts per author, 
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examining each work in detail in order to extract the text’s particular impact on 
defining religion. There are two notable exceptions to this general pattern. Chapter 8 
compares the theme of compassion in works by Vigny, Quinet, and Lamartine. I 
grouped these authors together since the obvious parallels in their subject matter 
offered the chance to consider compassion as a romantic theme not limited to a 
particular author. I used a comparable method in chapter 13 which compares Emile 
Zola’s Trois villes to Auguste Comte’s Catéchisme positiviste. Again, the parallels 
were too uncanny to ignore. Studying these two authors together enhances our 
understanding of the increasingly important friction between science and religion 
towards the end of the century. Both of these chapters, however, are divided in such a 
way as to provide an individual analysis of each work within the body of the chapter. 
By the same token, in the chapters focusing on a single author’s work, relevant 
connections to other chapters are made when appropriate.  
In order to better seize the complexity of the debates, the authors represented in this 
dissertation vary from Enlightenment thinkers to ultramontane conservatives and 
from romantic poets to scientists and historians. I also made a conscious effort to 
include an array of textual genres. The analysis of essays alongside poetry and fiction 
frames literary themes concerning religion within their historical contexts and, 
conversely, enriches our understanding of philosophical notions such as liberty and 
justice by considering the ways these ideas have been illustrated in fictional religious 
contexts. A few of the essays, such as Lamennais’ Paroles d’un croyant and Ernest 
Renan’s Vie de Jésus walk the line between essay and fiction, demonstrating the role 
that imagination played in redefining religion. Certain works also challenge our 
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modern conceptions of what it means to be “conservative” and “liberal.” Ballanche’s 
work, for example, completely rejects religious tolerance while admitting the 
necessity to update Christianity according to changing social customs, advocating the 
separation of Church and State as a means for preserving the Church in the event of 
future Revolutions. Saint-Simon, on the other hand, endorses a complete upheaval of 
religion in support of progress and charity but rejects the concept of equality in his 
proposed socio-religious hierarchy. Finally, I am aware that many of the books 
analyzed here, such as Rousseau’s Profession de foi du Vicaire savoyard and 
Chateaubriand’s Génie du christianisme may seem like obvious selections which 
have been thoroughly studied elsewhere. While such works are commonly referenced, 
few of my contemporaries have actually taken the time to read these texts in their 
entirety. Much of the scholarship on library shelves concerning these authors is 
decades old. By considering these works in conjunction with other lesser known 
works, I hope to create new interest in studying them as part of the often ignored 
influence that religious thought generally exercised in society and politics. 
Chapter I begins by introducing the concept of natural religion in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard which serves as a foundational 
theory for many of the nineteenth century works in subsequent chapters. Chapter II 
follows the influence of natural religion on Mme de Staël with a special focus on the 
growing importance of the concept of morality as the common thread between 
literature and religion. Chapter III, “Negotiating the Dream of a Universal Religion in 
Mme de Staël’s Corinne” analyzes the author’s attempt to reexamine a number of 
spiritual themes discussed in De la littérature in a fictional context. Chapter IV, 
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“Society, Morality and Sentiment versus Individualism, Opinion and Reason in 
Pierre-Simon Ballanche’s Essai sur les institutions sociales,” considers Ballanche’s 
theory that social progress advances according to a divine plan. Ballanche also offers 
an alternative perspective on sentiment compared to Mme de Staël. While Du 
sentiment echoes various liberal themes, such as humanity and unity, the 
ultramontane seeks to unify by excluding conflicting opinions, thereby imposing one 
tradition on the many rather than encouraging individuals to open their minds to 
diversity. Chapter V, “Injustice as God’s Will in Joseph de Maistre’s Soirées de 
Saint-Pétersbourg," examines the most extreme conservative attitudes towards 
religion in society, exposing a dubious sense of morality which provoked a liberal 
counterattack in defense of compassion and charity for the underprivileged classes. 
Chapter VI considers one of the most influential liberal innovators, Henri de Saint-
Simon, and his focus on education in the sciences to support social progress in his 
1825 Nouveau Christianisme. Chapter VII, “Between History and Progress: 
Lamennais from De la religion to Paroles d’un croyant,” follows saint-simonian 
inspired themes of fraternity and liberty in Lamennais’ transition from ultramontane 
to anti-catholic. Chapter VIII, “Fallen Angels in Restoration France: The Case for 
Compassion in Éloa, Ahasvérus and Cédar ou la chute d’un ange” delves into the 
growing fixation on compassion as the most paramount moral concept in religion and 
society. Chapter VIII, “George Sand’s Spiridion and the Doctrine of L’Évangile 
éternel,” examines her fictional representation of spiritual ideas introduced in essays 
by saint-simonian and romantic authors, in particular the concept of the Évangile 
éternel which proposes a balance of wisdom and love as the ultimate path to spiritual 
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evolution. Chapter X, “Hugo’s ‘Dream Pope’: Religion versus Republican Ideals in 
Le Pape,” follows Hugo’s pope character through a revelatory dream which unites 
him with the people who reveal the sanctity of liberty, equality, and fraternity. 
Chapter XI continues the theme of compassion in Ernest Renan’s fictional depiction 
of the historical Jesus in his Vie de Jésus. Chapter XII moves towards the more 
scientifically minded writings of Jules Michelet whose critiques of the negative 
effects of superstition and mysticism target the role of women in the family in his 
1864 Bible de l’humanité which reworks ideas already touched upon in his 1845 Du 
prêtre, de la femme, de la famille. Chapter XIII closes the century with the struggle to 
finally reconcile religion and science in Auguste Comte’s Catéchisme positiviste and 
Emile Zola’s Trois villes. 
In the course of my research and in the writing of this text, the choice of appropriate 
terminology to express the ideas surrounding these often complex religious notions 
sometimes proved to be surprisingly challenging. In particular, I struggled to come to 
terms with distinguishing “religion” from “spirituality” and “God” from the “Infinite” 
or the “Eternal.” In an era in which multiple voices were redefining religion for 
themselves, the words often seem to mean different things to different authors. Within 
my analyses of the texts, I tend to repeat the terminology originally employed by the 
author. In general, however, when I choose the word “religion,” it is meant to evoke 
the very broad notion of religious systems. I use the term “spirituality” in in reference 
to less structured religious notions. By the same token, I tend to employ the word 
“God” to refer to the supreme being of a particular religious system while the 
13 
 





Chapter 2: The Conscience as Truth in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Profession de 
foi du vicaire savoyard 
 
The nineteenth century religion of humanity grew out of “la religion de l’homme” or 
the concept of natural religion proposed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Although 
Bernard M.G. Reardon dismisses Rousseau’s religious thought as “no more than a 
réchauffé of the prevalent deism” of the time, Rousseau’s influence as the voice of 
said deism is unrivaled (27). In his Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard, published in 
1762 as part of the fourth book of Émile ou l’éducation, Rousseau describes an ideal 
of spirituality based in morality which continues to resound for decades to come. As 
Arthur M. Melzer points out, “Rousseau’s religious writings – once so famous and 
now virtually ignored – are crucial for understanding the whole phenomenon of post-
Enlightenment religiosity, which is, of course, still very much alive today, in our 
surprisingly pious age” (344). Through the vicar’s profession, Rousseau redefines 
what it means to be a holy man by redefining both the concept of faith and the source 
of divine authority. One might say that he turns religion “outside-in” by affirming that 
introversion is the path to truth. The man who is in touch with his feelings, in contrast 
to the man who follows prescribed ritual or social obligations, has better access to his 
own conscience. While Christianity traditionally used ritual as a means for creating 
social unity, the natural religion in the Vicaire Savoyard questions the durability of 
such bonds and suggests that such a religion cannot produce faith. Faith, for the vicar, 
is something that one feels and not something that one thinks. For Rousseau, the 
outside world is not only superficial, it is illusory. The retreat into the self is a step 
toward truth. Furthermore, every man who seeks to follow this path to faith can do so 
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without the necessity of an intermediary, without swearing anything to an 
organization. It is a religion free from the ties of money or prestige. Personal religion 
liberates man from social restrictions. It puts the power of faith in the hands of each 
individual who is clear-minded enough to hear his inner voice. 
Rousseau’s choice to structure his Vicaire Savoyard as the story of a young man 
receiving aid and advice from a good natured priest adds to his argument by 
providing an example to accompany his philosophy. The priest character allows 
Rousseau to criticize Christianity from the perspective of someone who is actually in 
the Church. Looking back on his life, the priest does not credit the Church for 
teaching him morality. His comments on the Church give evidence that even the 
clergy are not required to truly be in touch with God. Clergyman is a professional 
function  that one performs like any other and, in this case, one that was accepted not 
because of a spiritual calling but out of financial desperation. 
Assurément ni mes parents, ni moi, ne songions guère à 
chercher en cela ce qui était bon, véritable, utile, mais ce qu'il 
fallait savoir pour être ordonné. J'appris ce qu'on voulait que 
j'apprisse, je dis ce qu'on voulait que je disse ; je m'engageai 
comme on voulut, et je fus fait prêtre. Mais je ne tardai pas à 
sentir qu'en m’obligeant de n'être pas homme, j'avais promis 
plus que je ne pouvais tenir. (24) 
 
 
The clergyman’s emphasis on the idea that he was made into a priest highlights the 
fact that the transformation was actually performed on him by others, externally. It is 
an illusion. He is still a human regardless of his promise to renounce worldly desires. 
In addition to costing him his manhood, the Church creates moral dilemmas for him 
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because of the contradictions he discovers between his conscience and Church 
practice. 
Voyant par de tristes observations renverser les idées que 
j'avais du juste, de l'honnête, et de tous les devoirs de l'homme, 
je perdais chaque jour quelqu'une des opinions que j'avais 
reçues; celles qui me restaient ne suffisant plus pour faire 
ensemble un corps qui pût se soutenir par lui-même, je sentis 
peu-à-peu s'obscurcir dans mon esprit l'évidence des principes ; 
et, réduit enfin à ne savoir plus que penser, je parvins au même 
point où vous êtes… J'étais dans ces dispositions d'incertitude 
et de doute, que Descartes exige pour la recherche de la vérité. 
(26-7) 
 
Doubt is thereby established as the path to truth. Consequently, faith cannot exist 
without the experience of doubt, of experimentation, which replaces received 
knowledge (from the Church doctrine) with subjective knowledge. Through 
meditation on the vices of others, however, the vicaire arrives at understanding that 
what is most important in life is seeking truth (27).  
Before any explanation of the priest’s faith is made, the reader is able to observe the 
positive effects on the priest’s compassion towards the young man and the benefits 
that his charity had on him. The Vicaire Savoyard takes Rousseau’s natural religion 
out of the realm of the hypothetical and puts it into use in a believable situation. The 
young man’s story is a coming of age tale about the journey of self-awareness. In his 
Confessions, Rousseau reveals that the vicar was modeled after two clergymen that he 
knew as a young man who he recognized as key figures in his own moral foundation, 
Monsieur Gaime et Monsieur Gâtier. Describing the lessons of morality that he 
learned from Monsieur Gaime, he writes: 
Il me fit un tableau vrai de la vie humaine, dont je n'avais que de 
fausses idées; … Il amortit beaucoup mon admiration pour la 
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grandeur, en me prouvant que ceux qui dominaient les autres n'étaient 
ni plus sages ni plus heureux qu'eux. Il me dit une chose qui m'est 
souvent revenue à la mémoire: c'est que si chaque homme pouvait lire 
dans les cœurs de tous les autres, il y aurait plus de gens qui 
voudraient descendre que de ceux qui voudraient monter. Cette 
réflexion, dont la vérité frappe, et qui n'a rien d'outré, m'a été d'un 
grand usage dans le cours de ma vie pour me faire tenir à ma place 
paisiblement. Il me donna les premières vraies idées de l'honnête, que 
mon génie ampoulé n'avait saisi que dans ses excès. Il me fit sentir que 
l'enthousiasme des vertus sublimes était peu d'usage dans la société ; 
qu'en s'élançant trop haut on était sujet aux chutes; que la continuité 
des petits devoirs toujours bien remplis ne demandait pas moins de 
force que les actions héroïques ; qu'on en tirait meilleur parti pour 
l'honneur et pour le bonheur, et qu'il valait infiniment mieux avoir 
toujours l'estime des hommes, que quelquefois leur admiration. (85-6) 
 
r 
Here, Rousseau reveals (from M. Gaime) that the social order itself is an external 
illusion. The holy man has insight into human nature which reveals that the social 
order is already reversed at the internal level of human consciousness. This discourse 
also establishes the idea that man should, rather than seek harmony in the afterlife, 
ideally seek to unify with his fellow men on Earth. Though he admits that Gaime 
spoke less candidly than his vicaire savoyard, the passage reveals two valuable 
lessons learned from the clergyman: first, that a high social position is not a measure 
of one’s happiness or self-worth; and second, that the small gestures of morality in 
everyday life are more valuable than useless grandiose gestures.  
Though his mention of Gâtier is brief, he highlights his great sensitivity and amicable 
teaching style:  
Il était blond, et sa barbe tirait sur le roux: il avait le maintien ordinaire 
aux gens de sa province, qui, sous une figure épaisse, cachent tous 
beaucoup d'esprit; mais ce qui se marquait vraiment en lui était une 
âme sensible, affectueuse, aimante. Il y avait dans ses grands yeux 
bleus un mélange de douceur, de tendresse et de tristesse qui faisait 
qu'on ne pouvait le voir sans s'intéresser à lui. […] Son caractère ne 
démentait point sa physionomie ; plein de patience et de complaisance, 
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il semblait plutôt étudier avec moi que m'instruire, il n'en fallait pas 
tant pour me le faire aimer;… (114) 
 
 
The Vicaire Savoyard incorporates the practical moral lessons that Rousseau 
describes in the lessons of Monsieur Gaime and combines that morality with 
Monsieur Gâtier’s friendly teaching style and sensitive personality. His memories of 
these two men, however, are only part of the foundation for the personage of the 
vicar. The philosophy that Rousseau communicates through the priest goes beyond a 
simple moral lesson and becomes a critique of organized religion on the whole while 
proposing an entirely different system of spirituality. 
 
By having the vicar appeal to the young man as an equal, religion becomes 
accessible. Instead of commanding that the young man repent or lecturing him, he 
makes himself the young man’s friend, thereby bringing God to a human level.  
Il commença par gagner la confiance du prosélyte en ne lui 
vendant point ses bienfaits, en ne se rendant point importun, en 
ne lui faisant point de sermons, en se mettant toujours à sa 
portée, en se faisant petit pour s'égaler à lui. C'était, ce me 
semble, un spectacle assez touchant, de voir un homme grave 
devenir le camarade d'un polisson, et la vertu se prêter au ton 
de la licence, pour en triompher plus sûrement. (12) 
 
 
Willingly becoming an equal with the young man also challenges the idea that one 
man can have more of a connection with God than another. It essentially challenges 
the hierarchy of the Church separating laymen from clergy. By closing that gap, the 
vicar takes a step toward the equality of men – a necessary foundation for justice. The 
vicar teaches not through sermons but by providing his friend with a good example of 
the benefits of a moral lifestyle, with work and, ultimately with an inner sense of self-
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worth. “Pour garantir le jeune infortuné de cette mort morale dont il était si près, il 
commença par réveiller en lui l'amour-propre et l'estime de soi-même" (13-4). The 
clergyman makes morality accessible to the young man by allowing him to first make 
a personal connection with himself.  
 
For Rousseau, one of the major flaws of religion is that it does not separate morality 
from rituals and superstition. Followers of an organized religion must accept not only 
the moral lessons of a religion but also a set of rituals and laws that must be accepted 
along with them. For Rousseau, the problem with religion is that theologians have not 
admitted that there are mysteries of the universe that man can never know. After 
meditating, the narrator makes his first conclusion: “Le premier fruit que je tirai de 
ces réflexions fut d'apprendre à borner mes recherches à ce qui m'intéressait 
immédiatement; à me reposer dans une profonde ignorance sur tout le reste, et à ne 
m'inquiéter, jusqu'au doute, que des choses qu'il m'importait de savoir" (32). Limiting 
his spiritual beliefs to only things that he can know and only questions that are truly 
important, he makes his first step toward discovering truth. The one thing that man 
can know is the truth that he feels in his conscience. In order to understand others, the 
vicar suggests that man should first study himself. 
 
Mais qui suis-je ? Quel droit ai-je de juger les choses, et qu'est-
ce qui détermine mes jugements? S'ils sont entraînés, forcés 
par les impressions que je reçois, je me fatigue en vain à ces 
recherches, elles ne se feront point, ou se feront d'elles-mêmes, 
sans que je me mêle de les diriger. Il faut donc tourner d'abord 
mes regards sur moi pour connaître l'instrument dont je veux 




The first lesson that the Vicaire Savoyard teaches the young man is to have 
compassion for others, even those who are better off than he. Rather than envy others, 
he teaches him to pity them: “Emu de compassion sur les faiblesses humaines… il 
voyait partout les hommes victimes de leurs propres vices” (18). Compassion 
becomes an essential value in humanist religious thought throughout the nineteenth 
century. As we will see in later chapters, conservatives such as Joseph de Maistre 
spoke out against the trend towards compassion while more liberal writers such as 
Edgar Quinet, Saint-Simon, later Lamennais, and Jules Michelet insisted upon 
compassion as essential to Justice. The vicar recognizes that his own poverty was a 
blessing, providing him with a simple life free from vice in which he was able to 
conserve “toute la clarté des lumières primitives” (25). It is precisely the formation of 
his conscience, however, that keeps him in doubt of Church practices which he 
recognizes to be unnatural and which sparks his search for the truth (26-7). The 
endurance of false religious practices is a result of man’s inability to accept doubt: “il 
aime mieux se tromper que de ne rien croire” (27). He goes on to show, however, that 
traditional religion only served to create more doubt (29). The mysteries of the 
universe cannot be solved from outside sources. They must be approached from 
within: “Je pris donc un autre guide, et je me dis: consultons la lumière intérieure, elle 
m’égarera moins qu’ils ne m’égarent, ou du moins, mon erreur sera la mienne” (32).   
In Praise of Introversion: Deifying the Internal Voice 
In order to confirm the authority of the self, he argues first that feeling is something 
inside the self that is motivated by stimuli outside the self; second, that ideas are 
outside the self and separate from these feelings (they are one of the stimuli on 
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feelings); and third, that perception and judgment are separate and one should not 
confuse them (36-38). Truth is in the things themselves, not in how one judges those 
things and, therefore, the less human judgment there is on something, the closer one 
is to its truth. Rousseau opposes “judgment” with “justice.”  In the Social Contract, 
Rousseau defines justice as divine in origin (“Toute justice vient de Dieu”) but warns 
that governments often do not know how to properly receive and interpret it and thus 
justice as we know it is perverted (39). Judging characterizes religion since people are 
judged by the Church or by the angry God created by the Church. Instead of 
associating God with judgment, we will see that the Vicaire savoyard associates God 
with justice.  
The vicar’s most distinguishing quality is that he is an accomplished introvert in tune 
with his conscience. This, and not his position as a priest, is what makes him a 
spiritual authority. Rousseau’s vicar is less mystical and more practical-minded than 
the typical clergyman, rejecting miracles and even the revelations of the Bible in 
favor of a spirituality rooted in reason. Reasoning is based on knowledge and he 
argues that sentiment is the knowledge that allows him to make reasonable 
conclusions about God. Feeling God becomes positive proof of his existence: “Je 
crois donc que le monde est gouverné par une volonté puissante et sage; je le vois, ou 
plutôt je le sens…" (61). The self is the first thing that one must be able to know in 
order to hear the inner voice, the true “word” of God. A revelation revealed by 
another cannot communicate truth. 
The true holy man, according to the vicar’s example, is he who is in touch with the 
inner voice and not necessarily he who follows accepted doctrine. Still, this man is 
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shown to be participating in society, according to society’s prescribed social norms. 
On the inside, however, he remains unaffected by outside influences.  
Though the concept of a prophet to interpret God’s word is discouraged in the Vicaire 
Savoyard, Rousseau does explain that some men are more in tune with their inner 
voice than others. Those who are too removed from nature do not hear the voice even 
though it speaks inside every man: “S'il parle à tous les cœurs, pourquoi donc y en a-
t-il si peu qui l'entendent? Eh ! c'est qu'il nous parle la langue de la nature, que tout 
nous a fait oublier" (112). The vicar makes an important distinction between senses 
and sentiment: “La conscience est la voix de l’âme, les passions sont la voix du 
corps” (96). An overindulgence of the senses, according to the vicar, leads to a 
dulling of sentiment. Outside stimuli cause the conscience to retreat. Conscience itself 
is described as an introvert: “La conscience est timide, elle aime la retraite et la paix” 
(109). Man’s unhappiness springs from self-conflict. Man’s internal inclination to do 
good is in conflict with his external inclination to do wrong. The point of this conflict, 
however, is to add “la gloire de la vertu” to inner goodness. Without this virtue, man 
would be “like the angels” – he would not have the satisfaction of earning his faith 
(118). 
 
Universal Religion: Unity Through Individuality 
Just as the vicar says that there is no use trying to conceive of eternity, he also 
believes that there is no sense in focusing on the circumstances of creation. 
Rousseau’s natural religion is focused on living in the present and, above all, living in 
harmony with others. All man needs to know is that God created everything. This is 
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knowledge he can feel by observing the world around him (92). Earthly harmony is 
proof that God (defined as a “superior will”) created earth. From the viewpoint of “la 
suprême intelligence,” “toutes les vérités ne sont … qu’une seule idée” (95). He also 
reasons that a God who would make only one veritable religion would be a tyrant 
since all men cannot know which one religion is true (134-5). Rousseau extends the 
concept of oneness to verify that what an individual feels to be true must be a 
universal truth, reasoning that because truth is universal, what is truth for one man 
must be truth for all. The vicar uses this reasoning to prove that there is no use in 
claiming allegiance to one single human religion because the foundation of all 
religions is the same: man instinctively admires morals (100-4). “Si l’on n’eût écouté 
que ce Dieu dit au cœur de l'homme, il n’y aurait jamais eu qu’une religion sur la 
terre” (130). He also reasons that God is not concerned with ceremony:  
 
Ne confondons point le cérémonial de la religion avec la 
religion. Le culte que Dieu demande est celui du cœur ; et 
celui-là, quand il est sincère, est toujours uniforme. C'est avoir 
une vanité bien folle, de s'imaginer que Dieu prenne un si 
grand intérêt à la forme de l’habit du prêtre, à l'ordre des mots 
qu'il prononce, aux gestes qu'il fait à l'autel , et à toutes ses 
génuflexions. (130) 
 
In this passage, we are struck by a problem with the definition of religion. Some may 
define religion as the performance of these ceremonies. In Catholicism, the rituals 
themselves are sacred. Religion is thus in the process of being reimagined as 
spirituality, as a belief in a higher being without subscribing to the rituals put into 
place by an institution. Though reason is an important path to truth, Rousseau also 
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dismisses any thoughts that do not originate in the conscience. Truth cannot be found 
purely through philosophy. It must originate in the heart (95). 
The vicar furthermore insists that God would not be so unreasonable as to expect 
everyone on earth to be informed of a revelation from just one corner of the world. 
The “faith” of the Vicaire Savoyard introduces the idea of individuals being united 
through an internal feeling or goodness that is felt in the individual but is not separate 
from humanity and, in fact, ultimately links humanity because the internal truth is 
universally consistent. Because this feeling links people together, it leads to acts of 
charity and compassion. The retreat to organized religion, which was hitherto the 
route to harmony, pulls man away from a religion of the few (of one pastor or one 
prophet) and draws him toward a religion of the whole of humanity. The only worthy 
sentiment is one that fosters unity (68). 
Liberty is not simply freedom from others but freedom from outside ideas that stifle 
the self, inhibiting the individual from unifying with humanity through his conscience 
(75). Man’s desire for things outside of the self is the source of his unhappiness. Real 
happiness is only found within: “mais pour chercher un bien-être imaginaire, nous 
nous donnons mille maux réels” (80). 
Abstraction and Doubt 
According to the vicar, the problem with belief in God is that God is usually 
explained in the abstract and man has difficulty conceiving of abstract concepts such 
as eternity. By taking the focus off of Church dogma and notably off of revelations, 
he removes elements of Christian doctrine that inevitably induces doubt. By moving 
spirituality inward, he creates a situation in which man can directly access God 
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without the mediating factors that create doubt. Rousseau could have done this by 
making the vicar a protestant who preaches a protestant Christianity in which the 
concept of God is more “personal” than in Catholicism. After all, protestant 
denominations did allow the people to read the Bible for themselves and limit ritual. 
Instead, however, Rousseau suggests that the Bible itself, being a revelation written 
by other men, is already a compromise of the true natural religion that God proclaims 
inside each human being.  
The vicar bases his insistence on the existence of God on the idea that a will must be 
the source of laws of the universe (45-7). This is his first article of faith, expressed in 
a rather Cartesian manner that supports his emphasis on reasoning. The vicar explains 
that abstraction cannot be conceived well enough by the human mind to be believed. 
For Rousseau, abstraction cannot produce faith. His second article of faith backs this 
up by using the harmonious structure of the universe as proof that some intelligent 
being must have put it in order. He famously uses an open watch as his analogy for 
the structure of the universe:  
Je suis comme un homme, qui verrait, pour la première fois, une 
montre ouverte, et qui ne laisserait pas d’en admirer l’ouvrage, 
quoiqu’il ne connût pas l’usage de la machine, et qu’il n’eût point vu 
le cadran. Je ne sais, dirait-il, à quoi le tout est bon, mais je vois que 
chaque pièce est faite pour les autres; j’admire l’ouvrier dans le détail 
de son ouvrage, et je suis bien sûr que tous ces rouages ne marchent 
ainsi de concert que pour une fin commune, qu’il m’est impossible 
d’apercevoir. (55-6) 
 
Rousseau’s main point here is that one need not know something works in order to 
realize that it works for a purpose or know that someone must have created it. His 
method of finding truth is to observe and then to evaluate those observations using 
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sentiment. The outside is filtered through the inside. His religion is not taught from 
the outside but felt from the inside (67). Man’s duality is a conflict between this 
internal quest for truth and the external stimuli of sensations – between soul and body 
(68). 
Rousseau puts morality above religion, which explains why the divinization of the 
conscience is so necessary. According to the vicar’s reasoning, “l’être 
souverainement bon, doit être aussi l’être souverainement juste” (81). Justice is the 
law of an all-knowing God. The world is well-ordered and “love of order... is called 
justice” (82). The vicar perceives that God’s words written on his soul are “sois juste 
et tu seras heureux” (82). The vicar’s natural religion focuses on life on earth, on 
being a just person in the present. He posits that among the many mysteries that man 
must admit to not being able to know, man cannot know anything about eternity or 
about the future of his soul since abstraction is beyond his capacity of understanding.  
Ne me demandez point, ô mon bon ami ! s'il y aura d'autres 
sources de bonheur et de peines; je l'ignore, et c'est assez de 
celles que j'imagine pour me consoler de cette vie et m'en faire 
espérer une autre. Je ne dis point que les bons seront 
récompensés ; car quel autre bien peut attendre un être 
excellent, que d'exister selon sa nature ? Mais je dis qu'ils 
seront heureux, parce que leur auteur, l'auteur de toute justice 
les ayant fait sensibles, ne les a pas faits pour souffrir ; et que 
n'ayant point abusé de leur liberté sur la terre, ils n'ont pas 
trompé leur destination par leur faute ; ils ont souffert pourtant 
dans cette vie, ils seront donc dédommagés dans une autre. Ce 
sentiment est moins fondé sur le mérite de l'homme, que sur la 
notion de bonté qui me semble inséparable de l'essence divine. 
Je ne fais que supposer les lois de l'ordre observées, et Dieu 
constant à lui-même. (87-8) 
 
Here, we understand that man’s recompense for being just will be reaped in the here 
and now. Unlike in the system of Grace, man is rewarded according to his good 
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deeds. “Goodness” is truly divine. Jules Michelet’s Bible de l’humanité continues to 
explore this link between recognition of good deeds and justice in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, as we will see in a later chapter. The vicar’s reasoning that a 
superior being must be just leads him to have faith in the fair judgment of God. 
Understanding God as a good and just being removes potential doubt in the moral 
system he imposes. 
Because Rousseau removes the possibility of eternal damnation, the consequences of 
one’s actions must be redefined. Though he denies eternal damnation – or at least 
asserts that it is not reasonably conceivable – he warns that the consequences of one’s 
actions will be reckoned with in this life. Hell is created by people who have no 
connection to their inner voice, to their conscience, and they are therefore existing in 
the absence of God. If God is the force that creates goodness and goodness is created 
in the hearts of men, it follows that those who hear the inner voice are already with 
God and those who do not are in hell on earth. Hell is the absence of God. 
Ne me demandez pas non plus si les tourments des méchants 
sont éternels, et s’il est de la bonté de l'auteur de leur être de les 
condamner à souffrir toujours; je l’ignore encore, et n'ai point 
la vaine curiosité d'éclaircir des questions inutiles. Que 
m'importe ce que deviendront les méchants? Je prends peu 
d'intérêt à leur sort. Toutefois j'ai peine à croire qu'ils soient 
condamnés à des tourments sans fin. Si la suprême justice se 
venge, elle se venge dès cette vie. Vous et vos erreurs, ô 
nations, êtes ses ministres. Elle emploie les maux que vous 
vous faites, à punir les crimes qui les ont attirés. C'est dans vos 
cœurs insatiables, rongés d'envie, d'avarice et d'ambition, qu'au 
sein de vos fausses prospérités les passions vengeresses 
punissent vos forfaits. Qu'est-il besoin d'aller chercher l'enfer 





Rewards and punishments for behavior are delivered in this life, not in an abstract 
afterlife. Living in the present allows man to take responsibility for his own actions in 
life. He converses with God instead of praying to him. God has already given him 
power over his actions through his conscience (122). 
Rejection of Revelation 
Towards the end of the Profession, after not having mentioned the Bible or 
Christianity specifically throughout most of the text, the vicar finally speaks out 
against revelation and so-called miracles which he believes are not the work of God. 
“Témoignages humains” actually obscure divine authority by pulling the focus away 
from God’s true voice inside man and accepting the words of other men as truth (136-
7). The main problem with revelation is that it is external information that pulls man’s 
focus away from the true voice of God speaking within the self.  
The vicar rejects miracles as an invention: “je crois trop en Dieu, pour croire à tant de 
miracles si peu dignes de lui” (141). To prove his point, he follows this assertion with 
a dialogue between an “inspiré" and a “raisonneur.” The dialogue serves to discredit 
two main ideas: first, that there is a religious elite in the eyes of God and second, that 
revelation is positive proof to support religious dogma. The raisonneur debunks the 
prophet’s claims to authority. Revelation is supposed to add positive proof to back up 
religious doctrine but the “raisonneur” shows that second-hand knowledge cannot 
create the proof necessary to produce faith. Again, the source of faith should be 
personal experience through feeling. He furthermore denies that any ultimate truth 
could be exclusively found in books since books are not available to all of the people 
of the world and language barriers add to the impossibility of correctly translating 
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God’s will. God’s will needs no translation because it speaks personally to each man 
(158-9). 
As he concludes, the vicar brings his argument back to the example of himself. His 
new faith allows him to better deliver the mass presumably because it infuses the 
mass with truth that is not inherently in the ritual (179). He also redefines blasphemy 
to mean the denial of the conscience. Though he has obviously blasphemed against 
the Church by professing an alternate faith, he does not recognize that action as 
blasphemy since the Church has ceased to be the voice of God for him. Instead he 
proclaims: “je ne blasphèmerai point contre la justice divine,” emphasizing God’s 
association with justice (182). He proposes less religion and more charity (185), 
values that the nineteenth century liberals continued to pursue using religious themes. 
Interestingly, he does not advocate a social upheaval to usher in a religious 
revolution
2
. He simply proposes that the new cult be discreetly practiced within the 
limits of the law (184). For Rousseau, religion is personal, inherently internal. 
Defending his Vicaire savoyard against Church scrutiny, Rousseau explains in his 
letter to Monseigneur Beaumont: “Tels sont, Monseigneur, mes vrais sentiments, que 
je ne donne pour règle à personne, mais que je déclare être les miens, et qui resteront 
                                                 
2
 In Du Contrat social, Rousseau divides religion into “la religion de l’homme” and “la religion du 
citoyen.” The former is associated with “le droit divin naturel” and the latter with “son culte extérieur 
prescrit par des lois” (146). A third category, “la religion du prêtre,” is described as a religious 
institution which is at odds with the governmental institution submitting citizens to “les devoirs 
contradictoires,” pitting their public and private loyalties against each other (147). For Rousseau, 
religion should be neither controlled by the state nor at odds with the state but rather existing in 
tolerant harmony. For this reason, a religious revolution would be contrary to sociability. He criticizes 
the pure “religion de l’homme” as dangerously anti-social and “la religion du citoyen” as insincere, 
“un vain cérémonial” (148). His solution is a simplified civil religion which provides both an external 
socializing structure and room for liberal personal interpretation: “Il y a donc une profession de foi 
purement civile dont il appartient au souverain de fixer les articles, non pas précisément comme 
dogmes de religion, mais comme sentiments de sociabilité, sans lesquels il est impossible d’être bon 
citoyen ni sujet fidèle” (151-2). 
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tels, tant qu’il plaira, non aux hommes, mais à Dieu, seul maître de changer mon cœur 
et ma raison: car aussi longtemps que je serai ce que je suis, et que je penserai comme 
je pense, je parlerai comme je parle” (Lettre 57). Rather than impose a certain 
doctrine, Rousseau encourages spiritual change through doubt on an individual basis 
which will ideally come together as a people unified in reason: “il suit que c’est un 
grand bien à faire aux peuples dans ce délire, que de leur apprendre à raisonner sur la 
Religion: car c’est les rapprocher les devoirs de l’homme, c’est ôter le poignard à 
l’intolérance, c’est rendre à l’humanité tous ses droits” (Lettre 71). Civil justice and 
natural religion form an alliance of truth in the human heart which needs no 
sanctioning from the Church or State: “un cœur juste est le vrai temple de la divinité” 
(189). In all religion, according to the vicar, the foundation of morality is loving one’s 
neighbor as himself and loving God above all things. In the end, doing good and 
forgetting one’s own desires for the benefit of society as a whole are the keys to 
happiness: “c’est en s’oubliant qu’on travaille pour soi” (198). 
Conclusion 
This ultimate goal of religion in service of humanity and the reshaping of religion to 
support justice are the overarching themes which we will see addressed in literature 
throughout the nineteenth century. Rather than argue for a secular state, nineteenth 
century liberals overwhelmingly opt to redefine religion in favor of contemporary 
ideals, echoing Rousseau’s fear that “L’oubli de toute religion conduit à l’oubli des 
devoirs de l’homme” (10). A number of themes in the Vicaire savoyard thus resurface 
in the nineteenth century. The concept of unity through individuality, of knowing 
others by becoming acquainted with the self, is especially notable in fictional works 
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concerning religion throughout the nineteenth century. Although Chateaubriand 
refuses to be compared to Rousseau, his Atala and René both attest to a need to 
explore the individual conscience before one can accept Christianity. George Sand’s 
Spiridion and Emile Zola’s Trois villes, on the other hand, both recognize self-
discovery as a necessary step in the systematic evolution of modern spirituality. As 
part of the overarching trend towards individualism in modern times, analytical 
doubt, as seen in the Vicaire savoyard,  is increasingly valued as a tool for casting off 
superstition and discovering universal truths. Scientifically minded writers, such as 
historians Ernest Renan and Jules Michelet, present doubt as a path to positive 
thinking. Nevertheless, even the most liberal intellectuals continue to recycle Catholic 
structures and insist on some sort of spiritual system as a necessary component to 
society. Consequently, revelation, which was adamantly rejected in the Vicaire 
savoyard, remains in various forms as a means for supporting agendas from the social 
theories of Saint-Simon and early Lamennais to Ernest Renan’s historical convictions 
in his Vie de Jésus. According to Jeremiah Alberg, Rousseau’s approach to religion 
required him to discount the Bible in order to invent a new religious system (72). “If 
the Scriptures are gone, a new Christ, a new Church, and in fact, a new Trinity 
become necessary” (73). The following chapters of this dissertation trace the 
nineteenth century effort to fulfill this perceived need for a new religious outlook. In 
the following chapter, we will see that Mme de Staël continues with Rousseau’s 
conscience-based religious theory as well as the promotion of modeling and imitation 
of exemplary moral figures (in the tradition of the Imitation of Christ) as a means for 




Chapter 3:Morality as the Common Ground between Literature and Religion in 
Mme de Staël’s De la littérature 
 
Post-Revolution, Mme de Staël’s youthful admiration of enlightenment ideals were 
doubtless put in check by her disappointment with the chaos and violence of 1790s 
France. Staël nevertheless retained her enthusiasm for liberty and her positive outlook 
on human nature. These were themes which originally attracted her to the works of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As Mme de Staël explains in her 1798 avertissement to the 
second edition of the Lettres sur les ouvrages et le caractère de J.-J. Rousseau, she 
had been excited about the possibilities of a republican France when she originally 
penned the letters a decade earlier. Looking back, she remarks, “Il faut, je le pense, 
persister dans l’amour de la liberté, malgré les sacrifices cruels qu’elle a coûtés; mais 
on a besoin de prouver que l’on exprimait ce sentiment à l’époque où il était inspiré 
par l’humanité la plus pure et la plus courageuse” (i). 1798 was incidentally the year 
that Mme de Staël began her monumental De la littérature dans ses rapports avec les 
institutions sociales. In De la littérature, the author considers her experiences during 
the Revolution and the Terror as motivation for focusing public attention on the 
immediacy of the problem of morality. Mme de Staël calls for the introduction of 
sentiment in literature in order to establish a moral society. Sentiment would balance 
reason to create a logical but compassionate society. In her third letter on Emile, the 
young Mme de Staël had admired the faith in the conscience and effort to unify 
reason and instinct in Rousseau’s Vicaire savoyard (Lettres 60). Ten years later in De 
la littérature, Mme de Staël expresses an evolved understanding of these themes on 
the eve of the nineteenth century.  
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Without proposing any specific religion to enforce morality, De la littérature 
emphasizes the general necessity of being in touch with the soul and listening to the 
conscience. She makes a point, nevertheless, to continuously return to the idea of 
religion throughout the work in order to dispel the confusion between religion (which 
she sees as a positive influence on society compatible with reason) and superstition or 
fanaticism. For Mme de Staël, it seems that religion has a necessary role in society 
but she has not yet come to a definitive conclusion on what form religion should take. 
Balancing Religion and Reason 
Like Rousseau, Mme de Staël considers internal human goodness to be connected to 
the truth since it naturally evokes sentiments of justice, pity and humanity. Mme De 
Staël’s proposal for a moral society could be considered a middle ground between 
royalists and liberals. As a protestant, she does not champion a Catholic agenda but 
she does insist on morality as a cornerstone of society and is not opposed to the 
concept of religion as a moral stabilizer. She still values liberty, often using the 
relatively new American nation as an inspirational example, but openly recognizes 
the flaws in republicanism. Mme de Staël’s views on religion in De la littérature are 
presented in the context of rebuilding a nation’s moral foundation through its 
literature. Although her definition of religion is left noticeably vague, the author 
explains in her preface to the second edition, she believes that religion cannot be 
eradicated from a properly functioning society. Religious morality has always been a 
method of improving human society (60). For Mme de Staël, religious morality has 




Ce système ne peut être contraire aux idées religieuses. Les 
prédicateurs éclairés ont toujours représenté la morale 
religieuse comme un moyen d’améliorer l’espèce humaine; j’ai 
tâché de prouver que les préceptes du christianisme y avaient 
contribué efficacement. Il n’est donc aucune opinion, excepté 
le gouvernement despotique, qui puisse s’avouer contraire à la 
perfectibilité de l’espèce humaine. Quels sont donc les dangers 
qu’un esprit raisonnable et indépendant peut redouter d’un tel 
système ? (61) 
 
In the first discourse, the opening paragraph declares that the book’s purpose is to 
examine the influence of religion and morals on literature as well as the influence of 
literature on morals and laws (65). Throughout the text, which alternates between a 
discussion of aesthetics and a discussion of morality, Mme de Staël links the two 
concepts through sentiment. Virtue and beauty are inseparable and inspire similar 
feelings in human beings: “La parfaite vertu est le beau idéal du monde intellectuel. Il 
y a quelques rapports entre l’impression qu’elle produit sur nous et le sentiment que 
fait éprouver tout ce qui est sublime, soit dans les beaux arts, soit dans la nature 
physique”  (67). Beautiful literature even inspires repugnance for “vile things” (69). 
Mme de Staël champions the idea that esprit can be a replacement for superstition in 
modern religion. Though enlightenment ideas were blamed for the terror after the 
French Revolution, she defends philosophy by pointing out that it was actually the 
lack of enlightenment in leadership that allowed the terror. Superstition and 
fanaticism took over the country. Reason, however, in cooperation with morality, is 
the key to true progress. “Encourager l’esprit dans une nation, … c’est faire prospérer 
la morale” (70). She describes the end of the eighteenth century as notably deficient 
in compassion, suggesting that a lack of sentiment caused the downward spiral of 
French society. In a “civilisation sans lumières…ils se sentent indifférent aux 
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malheurs des autres” (72). In accordance with Rousseau, her main critique of science 
is that it does not take sentiment into account and thereby leads to cold calculations 
that encourage amorality (79). The progress of science can most benefit society when 
it is balanced by the progress of morality. 
For Mme. de Staël, western religion has two opposing forces: sentiment and 
superstition. She sees morality as compatible with the progress of the sciences but 
superstition is the shadow of religion that has traditionally stifled progress. In order to 
keep the beneficial aspects of religion, a separation of morality and superstition is 
necessary. Rather than throw out the entire concept of religion in favor of a purely 
secular philosophy of morality, De la religion examines the past to determine which 
parts of religion have historically benefitted society and which parts have held society 
back. Though she does not propose a new religion or religious reforms, she suggests 
that some form of personal religion or natural religion will foster enlightenment. 
Mme de Staël’s vision of humanity is as a progressive process: the human race 
perfects through progress. Morality is necessary to support progress (62).  
Les lumières de l’expérience et de l’observation n’existent-
elles pas aussi dans l’ordre moral, et ne donnent-elles pas aussi 
d’utiles secours aux développements successifs de tous les 
genres de réflexions ? Je dirai plus, les progrès des sciences 
rendent nécessaires les progrès de la morale ; car, en 
augmentant la puissance de l’homme, il faut fortifier le frein 
qui l’en empêche de l’abuser. (62) 
 
Despite her belief that abstract ideas risks confusing the masses, Mme de Staël 
defends the role of abstract ideas in the advancement of knowledge. All meditation, 
for her, promotes progress and some good concepts can be born of flawed institutions 
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(174-6). She shows that the study of theology, for example, actually helped to 
advance the progress of science.  
Les dogmes spirituels exerçaient les hommes à la conception 
des pensées abstraites ; et la longue contention d’esprit 
qu’exigeait l’enchaînement des subtiles conséquences de la 
théologie rendait la tête propre à l’étude des sciences exactes. 
Comment se fait-il, dira-t-on, qu’approfondir l’erreur puisses 
jamais servir à la connaissance de la vérité ? C’est que l’art du 
raisonnement, la force de méditation qui permet de saisir les 
rapports les plus métaphysiques, et de leur créer un lien, un 
ordre, une méthode, est un exercice utile aux facultés 
pensantes, quel que soit le point d’où l’on part et le but où l’on 
veut arriver. (174-5) 
Though superstition and fanaticism made the institution of Christianity imperfect, she 
argues that “la spiritualité des idées chrétiennes” inspired the genius of Bossuet, 
Rousseau and various eighteenth century English and German writers (182). 
Including Rousseau in this group is somewhat provocative since he certainly was not 
appreciated by the Church. Public burnings of Emile were staged by Church officials 
in 1762 on charges of blasphemy (Rousseau and the Original Sin 773). Nevertheless, 
for Mme de Staël, it is still the sentiment that counts and religious ideas can be 
appreciated for their philosophical value regardless of the judgment of organized 
religious institutions. Mme de Staël chooses to focus on religion’s role in fostering 
philosophy throughout history. For her, religion and philosophy share an essential 
common goal: humanity. “Enfin ce que la morale de l’évangile et la philosophie 
prêchent également, c’est l’humanité” (185). She defines philosophy as a science that 
considers both political and religious institutions as well as human sentiment and the 
natural rights of man (187).  
Il faut rappeler ici de nouveau le sens que j’ai constamment 
attaché au mot philosophie dans le cours de cet ouvrage. 
J’appelle philosophie, l’investigation du principe de toutes les 
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institutions politiques et religieuses, l’analyse des caractères et 
des événements historiques, enfin l’étude du cœur humain, et 
des droits naturels de l’homme. Une telle philosophie suppose 
la liberté, ou doit y conduire. (187) 
 
Religion is a part of philosophy, not separate from it or against it. She recognizes that 
superstition and fanaticism have suppressed philosophy and the arts but that royal 
governments opposed such movements and preserved the arts and sciences. In the 
case of Galileo’s persecution, for example: “Le fanatisme est ennemi des sciences et 
des arts, aussi bien que de la philosophie; mais la royauté absolue ou l’aristocratie 
féodale protègent souvent les sciences et les arts, et ne haïssent que l’indépendance 
philosophique” (188). Again, imperfect institutions can still yield some benefits to 
society. In this case, feudalism showed a more progressive attitude towards the arts 
than French republicanism. Mme de Staël also credits Christian monks as being the 
most accomplished literary scholars of feudal times. When speaking of the negative 
effects of Christianity, she does not use the term “Christianisme” or “religion.” She 
uses the terms “superstition” and “fanatisme” instead. Two opposing forces in the 
Church simultaneously encouraged and objected to intellectual development: “Ainsi 
donc les mêmes causes qui faisaient renaître les lettres en Italie, s’opposaient au 
développement de la raison naturelle" (187). 
 
Literature and History as Inspiration 
For Mme de Staël, the definition of literature includes morality. “Je comprends dans 
cet ouvrage, sous la dénomination de littérature, la poésie, l’éloquence, l’histoire et la 
philosophie, ou l’étude de l’homme moral” (90). Philosophy is not just a science of 
reason. Sentiment is key to its foundation: “L’alliance des sentiments avec les 
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sensations est déjà un premier pas vers la philosophie” (91). Throughout much of the 
nineteenth century, other progressive thinkers such as Saint-Simon, Fourrier, and 
even Auguste Comte will likewise use sentiment as the foundation for all other 
human progress. Sentiment is a built-in mechanism for discovering truth. In an 
argument similar to Rousseau’s watch analogy in the Vicaire Savoyard, Mme de Staël 
carries over the concept of a “divine guide” in the creation of literature: “Il me semble 
qu’une main divine conduise l’homme dans les recherches nécessaires à son 
existence” (94).  
De la littérature looks to the past as a guide for France’s future. As she explains in 
the beginning of the second part of the text :  
Mes conjectures sur l’avenir seront le résultat de mes 
observations sur le passé. […] Il me reste maintenant à 
examiner, d’après l’influence que les lois, les religions et les 
mœurs ont exercée de tous les temps de la littérature, quels 
changements les institutions nouvelles, en France, pourraient 
apporter dans le caractère des écrits. Si telles institutions 
politiques ont amené tels résultats en littérature, on doit 
pouvoir présage, par analogie, comment ce qui ressemble ou ce 
qui diffère dans les causes modifierait les effets.” (299-300) 
 
As Céri Crossley explains in French Historians and Romanticism, nineteenth century 
intellectuals would continue to reference the past in order to make informed 
projections on the future. France’s rejection of its own past after the Revolution 
sparked a renewed interest in the lessons of history. “No other nation had gone so far 
in attempting to eliminate and eradicate the sense of the past” (4). Liberal intellectuals 
between 1815 and 1830 follow Mme de Staël’s lead in the development of human 
unity through a rediscovery of shared history (Crossley 4-5).  
39 
 
Through the example of past cultures in De la littérature, Mme de Staël is able to 
make a general critique on the rapport between art and religion throughout history. 
She first examines the case of the Greeks whose paganism aided their perfection in 
the arts because man was inspired by gods who were close to humankind but still 
above them (98). Because of the lack of sentiment in pagan religion, Mme de Staël 
asserts that the moderns have advanced beyond the ancients in terms of morality. 
Morality is thus associated with sentiment and not strictly with justice. As we will see 
in later chapters of this dissertation, positivist philosophies towards the end of the 
century reject sentiment and wholly embrace justice based solely in reason as the 
enforcer of morality. In particular, the absence of women in Greek intellectual life 
denied Greek society the sentimental power that inspires the unity of humanity. Mme 
de Staël offers the Greek concept of love as an example. Love was defined not as 
unity with another human being but rather as an illness inflicted on men by the gods 
(100). Moreover, she concludes: “Les Grecs n’ont jamais exprimé, n’ont jamais 
connu le premier sentiment de la nature humaine, l’amitié dans l’amour” (100). 
Consequently, the lack of sentiment has a negative effect on Greek style: “La 
privation absolue d’une telle affection se fait apercevoir, non seulement dans la 
peinture de l’amour, mais dans tout ce qui tient à la délicatesse du cœur” (101).  
Mme de Staël in contrast praises Roman society for fostering nostalgia and also for 
the “invention” of affection towards women (149-50). Nevertheless, she points out 
that epicureanism and the dogma of fatalism seriously denatured heartfelt sentiment 
(151). She suggests that Christianity was finally responsible for the establishment of 
morals in antiquity: “Le système d’Epicure, le dogme du fatalisme, les mœurs de 
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l’antiquité avant l’établissement de la religion chrétienne, dénaturent presque 
entièrement ce qui tient aux affections du cœur" (151). She goes on to claim that 
Christianity, scientific discoveries and philosophical enlightenment combined are 
responsible for the abolishment of Barbary in Rome (162).  
Unity and Perfectibility 
The chief benefit of Christianity, according to Mme de Staël is that it harmonized 
society by preaching a doctrine of unity. Mme de Staël challenges those who believe, 
like Chateaubriand and Ballanche, that the human mind has regressed since ancient 
times. She insists that humans have advanced over the centuries “et pour la 
propagation des lumières, et pour le développement des faculté intellectuelles” (163-
4). The idea of self-sacrifice found in Christianity was necessary to succeed as 
conquerors (164). Christianity was one of the key elements in the progress of reason 
in her view because the “rewards and punishments” dogma of pre-Christian society 
was only created to encourage or punish actions in war – not to establish morality as a 
foundation for a peaceful society (165). She distinguishes Christianity from other 
world religions by claiming that Christianity better developed the “virtues and 
faculties” of the soul (167). She also credits Christianity with the unification of 
people from the north and midi into nations that blended “the energy of the north” 
with the “enlightened minds” of the midi (168-9). Christian peoples enjoyed domestic 
tranquility and were ennobled by sympathy and pity for others (170).  
Even in non-Christian societies, Mme de Staël recognizes the value of religion as a 
guide for the natural inclinations of the soul: “Des idées religieuses positives, soit 
chez les mahométans, soit chez les juifs, soutiennent et dirigent dans l’orient les 
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affections de l’âme” (203). Comparing eastern and northern melancholy, however, 
she does find that the melancholy of the north leads to more suffering, which in turn 
provides deeper self-discovery: 
Ce n’est pas ce vague terrible qui porte à l’âme une impression 
plus philosophique et plus sombre. La mélancolie des orientaux 
est celle des hommes heureux par toutes les jouissances de la 
nature ; ils réfléchissent seulement avec regret sur le rapide 
passage de la prospérité, sur la brièveté de la vie. La 
mélancolie des peuples du nord est celle qu’inspirent les 
souffrances de l’âme, le vide que la sensibilité fait trouver dans 
l’existence, et la rêverie, qui promène sans cesse la pensée, de 
la fatigue de la vie à l’inconnu de la mort. (203) 
 
Mme de Staël recognizes the protestant religion of the north as having removed 
superstition but still envisions an even more perfect religion that would be directed 
purely by morality and not by worldly interests. Here, she recalls Rousseau’s religion 
of the conscience but her call to action for the creation of this new religion is perhaps 
even more passionate than Rousseau’s. Whereas Rousseau argued to keep religion 
simple and close to the heart, it was ultimately a personal, internal affair capable of 
quietly working within the Catholic system. Mme de Staël’s evocation of “la nature 
humaine” demonstrates the wide-reaching possibilities of such a spiritual change on 
the population on the whole, not simply as individuals but as members of the human 
race:  
Mais je le demande aux penseurs éclairés, s’il existe un moyen 
de lier la morale à l’idée d’un Dieu, sans que jamais ce moyen 
puisse devenir un instrument de pouvoir dans la main des 
hommes, une religion ainsi conçue ne serait-elle pas le plus 
grand bonheur que l’on pût assurer à la nature humaine! À la 
nature humaine tous les jours plus aride, tous les jours plus à 
plaindre, et qui brise chaque jour quelques-uns des liens formés 




Mme de Staël, like many enlightenment philosophers, considers England as a country 
that has achieved a relatively harmonious social balance. She explains, for example, 
that England is better suited to comic theater than other countries because the 
government is founded on “la confiance générale” rather than on force (234-5). When 
the government is founded on the confidence of the people, it has no reason to fear its 
own people. She also notes that the English have preserved “nature” as the remaining 
aspect of northern religion in their culture. The man who is inspired by nature 
receives moral and religious impressions that unite him with the future:  
L’aspect du ciel et de la terre, à toutes les heures du jour et de 
la nuit, réveille dans notre esprit diverses pensées; et l’homme 
qui se laisse aller à ce que la nature lui inspire, éprouve une 
suite d’impressions toujours pures, toujours élevées, toujours 
analogues aux grandes idées morales et religieuses qui unissent 
l’homme avec l’avenir. (236) 
 
Mme de Staël praises the English for encouraging solitude which in turn leads to 
philosophical progress: “Quelle sublime médiation que celle des Anglais! comme ils 
sont féconds dans les sentiments et les idées que développent la solitude!” (237). She 
also suggests that different languages may express certain ideas more profoundly than 
other languages, foreshadowing the romantic idea of an original language that has 
perhaps degraded into imperfect human languages. Sentiment is the universal 
language: “Mais n’est-ce point assez de savoir parler la langue des affections 
profondes; faut-il attacher beaucoup de prix à tout le reste?” (237). 
In her analysis of German literature, Mme de Staël states that German religious and 
political thought is even more independent than that of the English, partly due to the 
fact that there is no longer a dominant religion in Germany (257). Instead, “ils 
adoptent successivement toutes les sectes mystiquement religieuses” which has 
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enabled them to lead the world in expressions of deep sentiment from “l’homme 
passionné” (258). For Mme de Staël, Goethe’s Werther is the best example of 
profound sentiment. The imagery she uses to describe the feelings produced by such 
works evokes a mystical or spiritual experience. Nevertheless, she does so without 
using an overtly religious vocabulary or direct references to religion. She describes 
how they make the reader feel, however, in a mystical language.  
Ces expressions vous raniment, vous transportent, vous 
persuadent un moment que vous allez vous élever au-dessus de 
tous les égards factices, de toutes les formes commandées, et 
qu’après une longue contrainte, le premier ami que vous 
retrouverez, c’est votre propre caractère, c’est vous-même. 
(262) 
 
The goal in mysticism, then, is to get in touch with the self, with an inner power. 
Following her insistence on the importance of solitude in the development of English 
literature, she continues in the second part to try to show how conscience accessed 
through solitude can also enlighten French literature (300). In order to unite with the 
people, one must first journey inside the self:  
Il faut écarter de son esprit les idées qui circulent autour de 
nous, et ne sont, pour ainsi dire, que la représentation 
métaphysique de quelques intérêts personnels ; il faut tour à 
tour précéder le flot populaire, ou rester en arrière de lui : il 
vous dépasse, il vous rejoint, il vous abandonne ; mais 
l’éternelle vérité demeure avec vous. (300) 
 
Again, without insisting on the reestablishment of organized Christianity, she makes a 
link between good taste, good ideas and durable impressions that would make up the 
soul of a nation (312). The suffering that France was already experiencing would be 
the gateway to healing the nation once that emotion could be harnessed into profound 
sentimental expression: “Ce que notre destinée a eu de terrible force à penser; et si les 
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malheurs des nations grandissent les hommes, c’est en les corrigeant de ce qu’ils 
avaient de frivole, c’est en concentrant, par la terrible puissance de la douleur, leurs 
facultés éparses” (312). The call to sentiment is, in a way, a call to a new religion akin 
to the one proposed by Rousseau in his Vicaire Savoyard in which conscience is a 
source for the divine. Mme de Staël continually emphasizes the influence of women 
as an important element in human progress. Women possess a natural moral 
superiority which was valued by the ancien régime but which is no longer valued 
under the republic. 
Sous la monarchie, l’esprit chevaleresque, la pompe des rangs, 
la magnificence de la fortune, tout ce qui frappe l’imagination, 
suppléaient, à quelques égards, au véritable mérite ; mais dans 
une république, les femmes ne sont plus rien, si elles n’en 
imposent pas par tout ce qui peut caractériser leur élévation 
naturelle. (315) 
 
Women are associated with imagination and enchantment. Christianity’s 
incorporation of these “female” elements renders it valuable in the history of the 
advancement of society. For Mme de Staël, one of the main benefits that the 
establishment of Christianity brought to western culture was a new sense of equality 
for women that did not exist in ancient society. Christianity brought men and women 
together by making marriage a sacrament (171). Ancient religion was founded on 
force but Christianity, according Mme de Staël, was founded on sympathy (172). 
Later nineteenth century writers, such as Michelet and even Zola, criticize 
Christianity for what they consider a feminization of western culture that is allegedly 
contrary to reason. Mme de Staël, however, clearly considers Christianity’s link with 
femininity to be an attribute. For her, feminine influence through Christianity greatly 
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advanced western culture. Female-inspired sentiment brought people together and 
made them aware of humanity. The “invention” of love for women was responsible 
for the moderns’ philosophical freedom because women encouraged internal 
reflection (181). The introduction of female influence on thought shifted the focus of 
philosophy from the public to the private sphere creating a more intimate and 
sympathetic outlook on humanity in general (180-2). Moderns, she concludes, thus 
became more advanced in morality than their ancestors by excelling in the application 
of Christian love (182-4). 
Religion and Hope 
For Mme de Staël, even paganism offers something that complete atheism does not: 
hope. She explains: “lorsqu’on croit au surnaturel, l’impossible n’existe pas; ainsi 
l’espoir n’est jamais totalement détruit” (106). The Greeks recognized sentiment as 
being related to the divine: “les héros agissent toujours par l’ordre des dieux… Il 
existait un dogme religieux pour décider de chaque sentiment” (108). Their religion, 
she reasons, gave them “un esprit sage et modéré” even if they were not as personally 
in touch with sentiment as the moderns (112). 
Mme de Staël believes that the new republican nation should produce literature that 
promotes hope. She insists that fiction must move people, not just amuse them. Mme 
de Staël’s vision of the ideal role of literature in society is not unlike the role of 
prophetic texts throughout time – it should inspire men by touching “les émotions de 
l’âme” (342). Voltaire’s syle, for example, is too negative for a nation which needs to 
inspire “l’amour du bien et des hommes” (344). According to Mme de Staël, virtue 
and vice were badly defined in the eighteenth century. Especially in comedy, trickery 
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was a virtue and vice was hailed as “grande pensée” (347). In the future, comedies 
must set a more responsible example: “il faut que la comédie s’attache à faire sentir 
avec talent que l’immortalité du cœur est aussi la prevue des bornes de l’esprit…” 
(347). She suggests that a Voltarian cult of esprit is to blame for the lack of heart in 
nineteenth century reasoning (347). By reestablishing good taste, the nation will 
reestablish goodness itself : “Ce qui est vraiment beau, c’est ce qui rend l’homme 
meilleur…” (351). 
Mme de Staël’s vision for the republic is one in which leaders champion morality in 
order to persuade the people to follow them through trust rather than through force. 
The people need to see the morality in their magistrates (328). Though she established 
earlier in the text that abstract ideas have their place in the advancement of 
philosophy, she argues in the second half of the book (in agreement with Rousseau 
this time) that the people generally do not understand abstract ideas and therefore 
their leaders must convince them through actions that gain their confidence.  
Vous ne pouvez attacher le peuple à l’idée même de la vertu, 
qu’en la lui faisant comprendre par les actions généreuses et le 
caractère moral de quelques hommes. On croit assurer 
davantage l’indépendance d’un peuple, en s’efforçant de 
l’intéresser uniquement à des principes abstraits ; mais la 
multitude ne saisit les idées que par les événements ; elle 
exerce sa justice par des haines et des affections : il faut la 
dépraver pour l’empêcher d’aimer ; et c’est par l’estime de ses 
magistrats qu’elle arrive à l’amour de son gouvernement. (329) 
 
Abstract ideas, which she describes as “les dogmes ou les systèmes métaphysiques,” 
can even create fanaticism because one becomes passionate about an image generated 
by the idea. Enthusiasm for a mental image drives one to defend that image and 
ultimately to believe it, regardless of whether or not it is real (372). Superstition is 
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shown to be a received idea rooted in imaginary fears. Its source is outside of the self. 
Sentiment, on the other hand, is an inherent truth that springs from within the self. 
For Mme de Staël, sincere expression will bring forth morality. She criticizes verse as 
being too restrictive and praises the advancement of prose (355). Writers should look 
to the examples of J.J. Rousseau and Bernardin de Saint-Pierre who, according to 
Mme de Staël, have created a new genre of poetry which she describes as blending 
nature and sentiment (358). Keeping religious sentiments grounded in nature allows 
one to unite with the world around him in a real way. When nature itself is considered 
mystical, there is no need to invent superstitions in a misguided effort to uphold 
religion: “Tout se lie dans la nature, dès qu’on en bannit le merveilleux” (359). The 
eternal can be found in reality. She cites Kant, stating that the pleasure in eloquence, 
for example, comes from the ability to “reculer les limites de la destinée humaine” 
through the sublime beauty of language (360). She describes melancholy as having a 
similar ability to imagine the infinite (361). The ideal religion would be able to keep 
the hope inspired by the infinite but remove the superstitions that too often 
accompany it. Superstition would ideally be replaced by philosophy (363). For Mme 
de Staël, religion can, after all, be reasonable: “Les idées religieuses ne sont point 
contraires à la philosophie, puisqu’ils sont d’accord avec la raison” (363).  
Modern philosophy must balance morality and reason: “La philosophie maintenant 
doit reposer sur deux bases, la morale et le calcul” (374). According to Mme de 
Staël’s line of reasoning, the terror was due to a post-revolution absence of sentiment. 
Cold calculation was mistakenly favored over morality. People claimed that killing a 
few would benefit the majority but pity was removed from that calculation (374).  
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La philosophie maintenant doit reposer sur deux bases, la morale et le 
calcul. Mais il est un principe dont il ne faut jamais s’écarter ; c’est 
que toutes les fois que le calcul n’est pas d’accord avec la morale, le 
calcul est faux, quelque incontestable que paraisse au premier coup 
d’œil son exactitude. 
L’on dit que dans la révolution de France, des spéculateurs barbares 
avaient pris pour bases de leurs sanglantes lois, des calculs 
mathématiques, dans lesquels ils avaient froidement sacrifié la vie de 
plusieurs milliers d’individus, à ce qu’ils regardaient comme le 
bonheur du plus grand nombre. (374) 
 
The most valuable human sentiments, such as pity, courage, and humanity, are 
naturally occurring in man. They do not require calculation: “Les idées religieuses qui 
plaisent tant aux âmes pures, animent et consacrent cette élévation spontanée, la plus 
noble et la plus sure garantie de la morale” (378). Mme de Staël associates these 
sentiments with internal religion. She quotes Seneca who argues that there is an inner 
god, not unlike the inner voice described by Rousseau’s Vicaire Savoyard: “Dans le 
sein de l’homme vertueux, disait Sénèque, je ne sais quel Dieu; mais il habite un 
Dieu” (378). Man does not need new religious systems, he simply needs to fortify his 
natural love of morality: “La morale doit être considérée dans l’homme, comme une 
inclination, comme une affection dont le principe est dans notre être, et que notre 
jugement doit diriger” (379). The whole point of religion is to reinforce morality and 
if we are to establish a secular society, morality should be deified.  “La consolante 
idée d’une providence éternelle peut tenir lieu de toute autre réflexion; mais il faut 
que les hommes déifient la morale elle-même, quand ils refusent de reconnaître un 
Dieu pour son auteur” (380). This “deification” of morality is an idea which steadily 




Having established the dominant role that morality should play in a republic, Mme de 
Staël concludes by returning to the importance of style as a vessel for encouraging 
morality. Even while promoting sentiment, order prevails in the spirit of reason. In 
good style, images, sentiments and ideas must be in harmony (381). Good style attests 
to “les qualités de l’âme” of a nation’s magistrates (389). 
Ce style de l’âme, si je puis m’exprimer ainsi, est un des 
premiers moyens de l’autorité dans un gouvernement libre. Ce 
style provient d’une telle suite de sentiments en accord avec les 
vœux de tous les hommes honnêtes, d’une telle confiance et 
d’un tel respect pour l’opinion publique, qu’il est la preuve de 
beaucoup de bonheur précédent, et la garantie de beaucoup de 
bonheur à venir. (390) 
 
Again, although she does not insist on any particular religion to dominate the nation, 
she continually argues that the concept of religion should not be completely removed 
from the national identity. Using the example of George Washington’s eulogy, she 
demonstrates how an evocation of providence can ennoble a nation and bring people 
together (390).  
For Mme de Staël, eloquence is something more than an aesthetic pleasure when it 
serves to “defend liberty, protect innocence, and fight oppression” (390). She reminds 
readers that eloquence should be used to elevate the conscience, not fan the fires of 
fanaticism as leaders did after the Revolution (396). Moving people by appealing to 
their hearts will encourage an enlightened society instead of a “despotisme 
raisonneur” (396). According to Mme de Staël, people avoid talking about morality 
since the Revolution because they are afraid of their own immorality or of offending a 
public that is all too aware of its moral trespasses in recent history. She insists that the 
topic must nevertheless be addressed in order to progress as a nation.  
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Ce que les anciens appelaient l’esprit divin, c’était sans doute 
la conscience de la vertu dans l’âme du juste, la puissance de la 
vérité réunie à l’éloquence du talent. Mais de nos jours, tant 
d’hommes craignaient de se livrer à la morale, de peur de la 
trouver accusatrice de leur propre vie ! (397) 
Here, “l’esprit divin” is defined as the unification of justice and virtue, truth and 
artistic expression. In the final pages of De la littérature, Mme de Staël concludes by 
reiterating the importance of sentiment in the formation of the nation, the importance 
of melancholy in fostering eloquence, and the necessity of eloquence in order to 
communicate truth and earn the trust of the people (404). She makes a plea for 
religious tolerance, which she believes will further enlightenment (409). Moreover, 
she argues for the benefits of enthusiasm and exaltation in order to develop the soul 
and, consequently, morality: “Il faut à toutes les carrières un avenir lumineux vers 
lequel l’âme s’élance ; il faut aux guerriers la gloire, aux penseurs la liberté, aux 
hommes sensibles un Dieu" (411). In the romantic era and throughout the nineteenth 
century, "les hommes sensibles" will continue the search for such a god. 
Conclusion 
In De la littérature, Mme de Staël proposes a balance of sentiment and reason which 
would allow elements of natural religion to flourish in modern society. In particular, 
she advises a reinforcement of the conscience through literature. Reason would 
banish the superstition which holds humanity back from progress but sentiment 
would allow the growth of virtues like compassion and justice. For Mme de Staël, 
sentimental literature should play a role in drawing human society towards these 
virtues which are commonly associated with religion. 
Mme de Staël avoids endorsing a specific religion and instead opts for a historical 
approach which analyzes religious and moral systems of the past in order to 
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reconsider the place of religion in the present. She values Christianity chiefly for its 
promotion of sentiment which De la littérature identifies as a result of female 
influence on religious philosophy in ancient Rome. Although she praises Christianity 
for unifying European people by promoting noble virtues such as domestic tranquility 
and self-sacrifice, the author insists on the perfectibility of religion which in turn 
denies the infallibility of Christian dogma. According to the theory of perfectibility, 
humanity will ideally move towards a religion based purely on morality and thus free 
from abstract ritual. Mme de Staël envisions an internal moral religion which would 
support the growth of society from the inside-out, from the self to society. A shift in 
spiritual focus to the self and the home reconnects man with the most basic elements 
of humanity.  Again, Mme de Staël reiterates that female influence on philosophy is 
key to this shift in focus. Religion and literature are united in the task of providing the 
people with hope. Literature, she says, should model the virtues which nourish a 
moral society. Eloquence must therefore serve the betterment of humanity by 
encouraging sentiments which grow the conscience in order to advance to a morality-
based civilization. Mme de Staël’s own novels are models of the inspirational 
eloquence she promotes in De la littérature. In the next chapter, we will examine the 





Chapter 4: Negotiating the Dream of a Universal Religion in Mme de Staël’s 
Corinne 
 
In De la littérature, Mme de Staël considered the spiritual influences of Northern and 
Southern European peoples in order to envision a more universal idea of religion that 
would promote morality and support the growth of a young nation. De la littérature 
imagines the possibility of literature as a tool for guiding France through the 
nineteenth century. In Corinne, Mme de Staël makes this possibility a reality. Using 
Corinne and Oswald as representatives of two conflicting cultures rooted in two very 
different forms of Christianity, Corinne reexamines a number of spiritual themes 
discussed in De la littérature. The novel allows Mme de Staël to put the two cultures 
in dialogue with each other, each one alternately falling in love with and feeling 
alienated by the other. The addition of associating each spiritual tradition with a 
gender allows the author to exaggerate the “masculine” preoccupation with reason in 
the north and the “feminine” inclination toward superstition in the south. While both 
cultures are touched by sentiment, neither can benefit from sentiment until social 
limitations have been trespassed. Mme de Staël shows that the crossing of perceived 
social boundaries is possible through the transformative power of female sentiment 
coupled with the ability to self-reflect and self-critique. Although Oswald is in touch 
with his melancholy, he is limited by jealousy and ethnocentrism and therefore is 
incapable of using his sentiment to benefit humanity. Corinne, however, is able to use 
the feminine gift of adaptation to rise to a new level of consciousness. Solitude allows 
Corinne to feel pain, to push her distress beyond the present and to shed the 
presumption that the sole purpose of feminine genius is to provide entertainment for 
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men and feed the coquettish ego. Corinne embraces religion at the end of her life as a 
means of breaking free from social constraints on the soul. Sacrificing her own 
desires for the good of others and even sacrificing her own identity, she advances to 
join a larger community – “the universe”- which exists outside of time and space. 
While Oswald recognizes that he and his lover are from different “cults” and wishes 
Corinne belonged to his, Corinne sees the similarities rather than the differences in 
their spiritual origins: “Notre âme et notre esprit n’ont-ils pas la même patrie?” (239).  
 
Separation and Universality: Making Religion Whole 
The separateness suffered by Oswald and Corinne throughout the novel is not only a 
romantic disconnection. It is also an ideological division caused by the lack of 
unification among all people of differing faiths. The two main characters show a 
common need for unity and even for spirituality but the methods by which they seek a 
connection with the divine, the ways in which they process the concepts of 
spirituality, society, sentiment and the human experience are so different that Corinne 
and Oswald are unable to recognize the common roots of their religions – namely 
conscience, giving back to humanity, and taking one’s place in human history. Their 
respective spiritual and philosophical traditions have discovered pieces of universal 
truths but neither has achieved the fusion necessary to create a truly universal 
religion.  
Almost everything about Corinne evokes universality. Corinne is naturally adept at 
foreign languages, effortlessly blending into English, Italian and French society (49). 
As Simon Balayé points out in the preface to his 1985 edition of the novel, Corinne is 
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at once “une image glorieuse de l’Italie” and “à demi-italienne, à demi-anglaise” (17). 
Her personage “réunit harmonieusement en sa personne le génie du nord et celui du 
Midi” (17). Her talents are above any that might simply have been formed by 
education. The narrator implies that her genius is, in fact, divine: “on sentait que ce 
n’était pas la société, que c’était plutôt le ciel même qui avait formé cet être 
extraordinaire” (51). Her poetry, described as “divine verses,” flows from her in 
multiple forms and in multiple languages. She aspires to speak not only to Italy but to 
act as an intercessor or poet-prophet to the world: “Je suis poète lorsque j’admire, 
lorsque je méprise, lorsque je hais, non par des sentiments personnels, non pour ma 
propre cause, mais pour la dignité de l’espèce humaine et la gloire du monde” (57).  
Throughout Corinne, as in De la littérature, Mme de Staël makes a point of linking 
various religions without singling one out as particularly superior. Never in the book 
does she specifically cite any denomination of Christianity or any other religion as 
definitively true. Instead, she tries simply to trace the ongoing need for some kind of 
religion as a response to the natural human inclination toward sentiment. As in De la 
littérature, history plays an important role in executing this discovery. Corinne’s 
history of Rome begins with the city’s ancient pagan mythological influences and 
ends with Christian art. All of Rome’s religious influences are treated with equal 
importance. Christianity is only given special attention because of its insistence on 
sentiment. The Christian “truths” that Corinne focuses on have little to do with the 
story of Jesus. For her, the real value in Christianity is its message of love and 
recognition of human suffering. At Saint Peter’s Basilica, the narrator explains: 
La prière seule, l’accent du malheur, de quelque faible voix 
qu’il parte, émeut profondément dans ces vastes lieux. Et 
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quand sous ces dômes immenses on entend de loin venir un 
vieillard dont les pas tremblants se trainent sur ces beaux 
marbres arrosés par tant de pleurs, le culte de la douleur, le 
Christianisme, contient le vrai secret du passage de l’homme 
sur la terre.  (74) 
 
Saint Peter’s Basilica is described as a blend of Christianity and paganism implying 
that Christianity is not necessarily a superior religion but it is a religion that 
approaches a certain sentimental universality. According to Corinne, “Et en effet 
Saint-Pierre est un temple posé sur une église. Il y a quelque alliance des religions 
antiques et du christianisme dans l’effet que produit sur l’imagination l’intérieur de 
cet édifice. Je vais m’y promener souvent, pour rendre à mon âme la sérénité qu’elle 
perd quelquefois” (74-5). It is the palingenesis of religious traditions that Corinne 
finds soothing in Christianity, not the doctrine itself. Corinne is able to appreciate a 
feeling produced in the imagination on the idea of religion rather than the practice of 
any specific religion.  
Oswald too conserves a hint of the spirit of universality in his religious reflections. 
Though he will not kneel with the Catholics because it is not his “cult,” he does 
recognize that all religions address common human needs through prayer: “Hélas! en 
effet, est-il une invocation à la pitié céleste qui ne convienne pas également à tous les 
hommes?” (251). Still, as a protestant, he considers ceremony in general as a 
hindrance in the personal relationship between man and god since ritual is an artifice 
that ignores natural sentiment. Presumably voicing Oswald’s feelings, the narrator 
explains: “la régularité des cérémonies d’une cour introduite dans un temple gêne le 
libre élan du cœur, qui donne seul à l’homme l’espérance de se rapprocher de la 
divinité” (253). Corinne addresses the differences in their religion as if they were 
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differences in personality: “La différence de nos religions, mon cher Oswald, 
continua Corinne, est cause du blâme secret que vous ne pouvez vous empêcher de 
me laisser voir. La vôtre est sévère et sérieuse, la nôtre est vive et tendre” (258). In 
Oswald’s “severe and serious” English Protestantism, the moral focus is primarily on 
man’s sense of duty. Oswald’s sense of duty is clearly illustrated in his preoccupation 
with living his life according to his father’s rules. In Oswald’s culture, reason trumps 
imagination. Italian Catholicism, according to Corinne, promotes imagination through 
the arts thereby encouraging love, hope and faith:  
Notre religion, comme celle des anciens, anime les arts, inspire 
les poètes, fait partie, pour ainsi dire, de toutes les jouissances 
de notre vie, tandis que la vôtre, s’établissant dans un pays où 
la raison dominait plus encore que l’imagination, a pris un 
caractère d’austérité morale dont elle ne s’écartera jamais. La 
nôtre parle au nom de l’amour, la vôtre au nom du devoir. 
(258) 
 
Corinne’s religion proposes a blend of life, art and the divine (262). She makes a plea 
to Oswald to join her: “Cher Oswald, laissez-nous donc tout confondre, amour, 
religion, génie, et le soleil et les parfums, et la musique et la poésie” (262). For 
Corinne, religion is whatever one desires it to be, as long as those desires are pure and 
beautiful: “il n’y a d’athéisme que dans le froideur, l’égoïsme, la bassesse” (262). For 
Oswald, divinity is found in reason and enthusiasm (262). His concept of religion 
puts nothing between man and god, diminishing the ability to incorporate art and 
nature into religion : “De quelque manière que vous considériez les pompes 
extérieures, et les pratiques multipliées de votre religion, croyez-moi, chère amie, la 
contemplation de l’univers et de son auteur sera toujours le premier des cultes” (263). 
Nevertheless, when both Oswald and Corinne witness a papal ceremony on Easter 
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Sunday, both feel the same enthusiasm and conclude: “tous les cultes se ressemblent” 
(264). Religious sentiment, regardless of the specific religion, unites people when 
individualism and fanaticism are removed.  
Both Protestants and Catholics in Corinne blend romantic love with notions of god. 
Although Oswald considers Corinne’s blend of love and religion as a characteristic 
typical of Italian women, even Oswald’s father uses romantic love as an anchor for 
religious sentiment. In his writings, his father states that man can become closer to 
god through his relationship with “une épouse fidèle” (191). Oswald’s father’s core 
belief that the world is fleeting and simply en route to Providence echoes Corinne’s 
insistence that there is something more to human existence than duty alone (193). For 
Oswald’s father, religion links generations through traditions. It is a link between 
fathers and their children (193). As something that is unphased by the passage of 
time, religion is a source of everlasting hope (193).  
Perhaps the most noticeable blend of religious imagery and romantic love in Corinne 
can be found in the use of angelic references surrounding loved ones. Corinne sees 
Lord Nelvil as “un être angélique” until he finally becomes the source of her 
disillusion with romantic love (410).  Instead of playing the role of the guardian 
angel, he is transformed in the image of a warrior angel, heading into battle against 
his lover: 
Je le trouve coupable envers moi; mais quand je le compare 
aux autres hommes, combien ils me paraissent affectés, bornés, 
misérables! Et lui, c’est un ange, mais un ange armé de l’épée 
flamboyante qui a consumé mon sort. Celui qu’on aime est le 
vengeur des fautes qu’on a commises sur cette terre, la divinité 




Corinne’s reference to Oswald as a warring angel eerily recalls a moment in the 
beginning of the novel when superstitious old women mistake Lord Nelvil for the 
archangel, Saint Michael, the patron saint of soldiers. Corinne is thus associated with 
superstition long engrained into her culture through religious symbolism. 
Oswald makes few references to Corinne as angelic but his references to Lucile as an 
angel are too numerous to list. Oswald’s first impressions of Lucile highlight her 
“figure vraiment angélique” and “pureté céleste” (418). Lucile speaks very little, 
mostly due to traditional English social constraints that bar women from engaging in 
intelligent conversation. Because of her silence, Oswald is easily moved by the 
slightest vocalization from “cette figure angélique qui ne semblait pas faite pour les 
affections de la terre” (421). Oswald even dreams of Lucile appearing to him as an 
angel (422). His inability to know Lucile on an intimate level increases her 
mysteriousness and produces the illusion of a divine aura around an otherwise 
ordinary human being. Moreover, as a model of obedience, Lucile fulfills the ideal of 
Oswald’s “culte du devoir.” Whereas Corinne is an earthy “goddess,” likened to Dido 
and Helen, Lucile is removed from humanity and seemingly above nature. Lucile’s 
angelic persona is derived primarily from her physical beauty and mastering of 
demure English social graces, “sa céleste modestie” (483). Corinne, in contrast, is 
referred to as divine because of her genius and goodness. Corinne’s “expression de 
bonté céleste” surfaces when she speaks “avec une grâce et une élégance qu’il n’avait 
rencontrées dans aucune autre femme” (485). Corinne is perceived as divine because 
of what she does, unlike her sister who is perceived as divine because of what she 
refrains from doing. After Lucile prays to Corinne at their father’s grave, Corinne 
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seems moved to become the kind of “dieu de bonté” that she believes in since the 
beginning of the novel. Instead of waiting for an abstract god of destiny to arrange 
their troubles, Corinne takes matters into her own hands and makes personal 
sacrifices for the good of the others. She moves ever closer to Immanuel Kant’s 
“religion of good life-conduct”
3
 (Kant 71). Although Lucile is most often described 
as the angelic one, she struggles with her own selfishness and jealousy and is 
therefore unable to appreciate Corinne’s sacrifice until the end. Corinne’s sentiments 
are too advanced to be readily understood. In Corinne’s Dernier chant, she seems to 
welcome the “angel of death” as a replacement  for Nelvil, the “ange armé”: 
Quand les desseins de la Providence sont accomplis sur nous, 
une musique intérieure nous prépare à l’arrivée de l’ange de la 
mort. Il n’a rien d’effrayant, rien de terrible; il porte des ailes 
blanches, bien qu’il marche entouré de la nuit; mais avant sa 
venue, mille présages l’annoncent. (524) 
 
Inspired by her sister’s example, Lucile is able to become the intercessor in the end 
between Oswald and Corinne. Finally touched by the power of painful sentiment, 
Lucile too sheds her own individual concerns, “Lucile allait de l’un à l’autre: ange de 
paix entre le désespoir et l’agonie” (526). Women are therefore blessed with the 
power of spiritual mobility. 
                                                 
3
 In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant explains: “All religions... can be divided into 
religion of rogation (of mere cult) and moral religion, i.e. the religion of good life-conduct. According 
to the first, the human being either flatters himself that God can make him eternally happy (through 
the remissions of his debts) without any necessity on his part to become a better human being; [...] 
According to moral religion, however (and, of all the public religions so far known, the Christian alone 
is of this type), it is a fundamental principle that, to become a better human being, everyone must do 
as much as it is in his powers to do; and only then, if a human being has not buried his innate talent, if 
he has made use of the original predisposition to the good in order to become a better human being, 
can he hope that what does not lie in his power will be made good by cooperation from above.” 
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Michel Brix has suggested that Corinne recalls Plato’s definition of love as “un être 
intermédiare assurant la liaison du fini et de l’infini” (86). This intermediary quality, 
which also suggests a sort of saintly intercession on the part of love, can be observed 
in the portrayal of the loved one as angelic. Brix goes on to argue, however, that “En 
tant que chemin vers l’amour divin, l’amour humain doit être à l’image de ce dernier: 
absolu, pur, idéal, sans tache. Il n’est pas permis de d’attacher à une créature céleste 
pour elle-même; il faut aimer en celle-ci la créature céleste. L’ange, par essence 
intouchable” (87). Later in this chapter, however, we will see that Corinne’s true 
celestial nature only shines through when she is no longer perfectly beautiful or 
infallible. She is most angelic when she is human, sacrificial, and humble.  
 
Women and the Arts in Italian Spirituality 
Corinne herself (especially in the beginning of the book when she is most effectively 
in command of her poetic power blended with feminine mystique) is an object of 
female worship, a living example of “le culte de la dame.” The excitement and 
anticipation in the Roman crowd waiting for Corinne’s arrival at the beginning of the 
novel is incomprehensible to Oswald who has never seen such attention given to a 
woman. Churches ring their bells and the city canons are set off to celebrate 
Corinne’s arrival. According to the Romans, “c’est une divinité entourée de nuages” 
(25).  Although female adoration is presented as a typical Italian ritual, Corinne far 
surpasses the average Italian lady. She is larger than life, possessing, according to 
Oswald, “toutes les charmes qui caractérisent les différentes nations” (136). 
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Gender roles in Italy are shown to be reversed. In Italy men are criticized for 
infidelity while women are free to keep multiple lovers (133). In a letter to Corinne, 
Oswald accuses Italian men of being feminized, even enslaved by their female 
conquerors (139). Interestingly, the same critique is proposed by Jules Michelet 
several decades after the publication of Corinne. After complaining that Italians’ 
elaborate funeral ceremonies have destroyed veritable sentiments toward death, he 
hones in on the sexual role reversal that he feels has equally destroyed Italian love: 
Enfin, et c’est là surtout ce qui détruit l’amour, les hommes 
n’inspirent aucun genre de respect aux femmes; elles ne leur 
savent aucun gré de leur soumission, parce qu’ils n’ont aucune 
fermeté de caractère, aucune occupation sérieuse dans la vie. Il 
faut, pour que la nature et l’ordre social se montrent dans toute 
leur beauté, que l’homme soit protecteur et la femme protégée, 
mais que ce protecteur adore la faiblesse qu’il défend, et 
respecte la divinité sans pouvoir, qui, comme ses dieux 
Pénates, porte bonheur à sa maison. Ici l’on dirait, presque, que 
les femmes sont le sultan et les hommes le sérail. 
Les hommes ont la douceur et la souplesse du caractère des 
femmes. (138-9) 
 
Corinne, however, is far from being “la divinité sans pouvoir.” Her universal appeal 
has the power to bring people together.  
The adoration that Corinne receives in Roman society is a result of her expertise in 
the arts: “À chaque instant on la nommait, on racontait un trait nouveau d’elle, qui 
annonçait la réunion de tous les talents qui captivent l’imagination. L’un disait que sa 
voix était la plus touchante d’Italie, l’autre que personne ne jouait la tragédie comme 
elle, l’autre qu’elle dansait comme une nymphe et qu’elle dessinait avec autant de 
grâce que d’invention” (24). One of the major lessons that Corinne attempts to reveal 
to Oswald throughout their exploration of Rome is that Italians welcome the 
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intermingling of art and religion. Art feeds the Italian soul: “Il y a tant d’âme dans 
nos beaux-arts, que peut-être un jour notre caractère égalera notre génie” (75). 
For Corinne, the major virtue of Christianity as a religion is that it highlights 
sentimentality, especially love and melancholy, through its art. She appreciates Pagan 
art but finds that it is more concerned with the physical than with the spiritual. The 
narrator’s explanation of the combination of pagan and Christian art themes found at 
the Vatican museum illustrates the contrast well: “Ils allèrent d’abord au musée du 
Vatican, ce palais des statues où l’on voit la figure humaine divinisée par le 
paganisme, comme les sentiments de l’âme le sont maintenant par le christianisme” 
(197).  According to Corinne, sculpture therefore is the best medium for paganism, a 
physical religion, while painting best suits the sentimental leanings of Christianity. In 
painting, Corinne appreciates elements of visual art which are consistent with Mme 
de Staël’s style in the literary arts. Corinne values the overall impression of a work 
rather than the minute details of the story itself. Fabienne Bercegol asserts that in the 
creation of her characters, Mme de Staël insists more on the sincerity of their 
expressions than on their physical appearance (46). Corinne glimpses “l’âme 
immortelle” not just in the religious subject matter of Christian painting but in the 
colors and technique: 
La sculpture ne saurait présenter aux regards qu’une existence 
énergique et simple, tandis que la peinture indique les mystères 
de recueillement et de la résignation, et fait parler l’âme 
immortelle  à travers de passagères couleurs. Corinne soutenait 
aussi que les faits historiques, ou tirés des poèmes, étaient 
rarement pittoresques. Il faudrait souvent, pour comprendre de 
tels tableaux, que l’on eût conservé l’usage des peintres du 
vieux temps, d’écrire les paroles que doivent dire les 
personnages sur un ruban qui sort de leur bouche. Mais les 
sujets religieux sont à l’instant entendus par tout le monde, et 
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l’attention n’est point détournée de l’art pour deviner ce qu’il 
représente.  
Corinne pensait que l’expression des peintres modernes, en 
général, était souvent théâtrale, qu’elle avait l’empreinte de 
leur siècle, où l’on ne connaissait plus, comme André 
Mantegna, Pérugi et Léonard de Vinci, cette unité d’existence, 
ce naturel dans la manière d’être, qui tient encore du repos 
antique. Mais à ce repos est unie la profondeur de sentiments 
qui caractérise le christianisme. (206-7) 
 
For Corinne, the superiority of master painters comes from the fact that they offer a 
tableau on which one can meditate whereas “les tableaux d’effet” are striking only at 
first but gradually lose their power (208). The painter, like the poet, channels 
inspiration from a higher power. His “saint enthousiasme” gives him the strength to 
work through terrestrial tribulations through his art (208). The passage recalls 
Chateaubriand’s commentary on painting in the third part of the Génie du 
christianisme. For Chateaubriand, Christian art in particular inspires man with the 
concept of the “beau idéal,” encouraging the artist to attempt to depict scenes which 
are more perfect than pure nature, to express man’s nostalgia for his lost state of 
perfection. Christian art, he says, is more virtuous than art based on pagan mythology 
because it inspires man to better himself. For Corinne, however, the value of religious 
subject matter in art is that it is universally understood and therefore contributes to 
human unity. It is the emotion evoked by the scene rather than the moral of the story 
which is truly valuable. 
Even contemplation of pagan religious art produces valuable religious sentiment 
capable of bringing one closer to humanity through the appreciation of beauty: 
Corinne fit remarquer à lord Nelvil ces salles silencieuses où 
sont rassemblées les images des dieux et des héros, où la plus 
parfaite beauté, dans un repos éternel, semble jouir d’elle-
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même. En contemplant ces traits et ces formes admirables, il se 
révèle je ne sais quel dessein de la divinité sur l’homme, 
exprimé par la noble figure dont elle a daigné lui faire don. 
L’âme s’élève par cette contemplation à des espérances pleines 
d’enthousiasme et de vertu; car la beauté est une dans 
l’univers, et, sous quelque forme qu’elle se présente, elle excite 
toujours une émotion religieuse dans le cœur de l’homme. 
(197) 
 
For Corinne, a society’s ability to create inspirational religious art is an indicator of 
its connection to the soul. Perhaps even more importantly, the beauty of religious art 
produces a combination of hope, enthusiasm and virtue that is the source of religious 
feeling. No one element produces religious feeling. It must be the product of 
harmony. In the passage above, harmony is made possible through beauty. The 
narrator contrasts Roman statues with those of the Egyptians, noting that Egyptian art 
failed to capture man’s likeness because the society itself failed to forge a sense of 
human harmony: 
Une autre salle renferme les monuments tristes et sévères des 
Egyptiens, de ce peuple chez lequel les statues ressemblent 
plus aux momies qu’aux hommes, et qui par ses institutions 
silencieuses, roides et serviles, semble avoir, autant qu’il 
pouvait, assimilé la vie à la mort. Les Egyptiens excellaient 
bien plus dans l’art d’imiter les animaux que les hommes, c’est 
l’empire de l’âme qui semble inaccessible. (201) 
 
In Oswald’s mind, however, one cannot give form to thought (209). For him, only the 
vague dreaminess of music can be “purely religious” (209). For Oswald, music moves 
the soul with enthusiasm, inspires noble feelings and is capable of expressing pure 
emotion without artifice. He seems in agreement with Chateaubriand that art depicts 
the most beautiful representation of pure nature. 
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La musique double l’idée que nous avons des facultés de notre 
âme; quand on l’entend, on se sent capable des plus nobles 
efforts... elle a l’heureuse impuissance d’exprimer aucun 
sentiment bas, aucun artifice, aucun mensonge... il semble 
qu’en écoutant des sons purs et délicieux on est prêt à saisir le 
secret du créateur, à pénétrer le mystère de la vie. (238) 
 
No other form of expression, save “le regard de ce qu’on aime,” is capable of 
producing such an effect on mankind (238). Harmony is the key to music’s ability to 
move the soul. Attending a vocal concert, both Oswald and Corinne are struck by the 
music: 
La justesse admirable de deux voix parfaitement d’accord 
produit... un attendrissement délicieux, mais qui ne pourrait se 
prolonger sans une sorte de douleur: c’est un bien-être trop 
grand pour la nature humaine, et l’âme vibre alors comme un 
instrument à l’unisson qui briserait une harmonie trop parfaite. 
[...] On dit qu’un prophète, en une minute, parcourut sept 
régions différentes des cieux. Celui qui conçut ainsi tout ce 
qu’un instant peut renfermer avait sûrement entendu les 
accords d’une belle musique à côté de l’objet qu’il aimait. 
(238-9) 
 
It is music itself here which seems to produce the impression of the divine. For 
Chateaubriand, the music is made beautiful by the religion which inspires it. For 
Mme de Staël, however, it is not the religious affiliation which renders the music 
beautiful but the harmony itself. Just as the voices are in harmony, Oswald and 
Corinne find themselves coming into harmony as well. Music is a tool for human 
unification through the soul since everyone is capable of making a personal 
connection with the melody: “le vague de la musique se prête à tous les mouvements 
de l’âme, et chacun croit retrouver dans cette mélodie, comme dans l’astre pur et 
tranquille de la nuit, l’image de ce qu’il souhaite sur la terre” (239). 
The Heavenly Father 
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Italy is described as a place on Earth that is closer to god, partly because of its idyllic 
climate. Other countries, according to Corinne, feel abandoned by God but “ici nous 
sentons toujours la protection du ciel” (39). Corinne believes in a good, all-powerful 
god protector in an immortal universe. Describing Italy, she explains: “Ici l’on se 
console des peines même du cœur, en admirant un dieu de bonté, en pénétrant le 
secret de son amour; les revers passagers de notre vie éphémère se perdent dans le 
sein fécond et majestueux de l’immortel univers” (40). Her description of God 
emphasizes his goodness and strength as well as his rapport with the fecund and 
feminine universe. The divine is a part of the daily for the Italian people. Corinne’s 
conception of god is akin to the good-natured male protector that Oswald believes she 
is seeking, “la protection d’un ami, protection dont jamais une femme, quelque 
supérieure qu’elle soit, ne peut se passer” (28).  
Oswald’s “dieu de bonté,” however, is his recently deceased father whom he 
considers to be a morally superior being (perhaps because Oswald himself could not 
live up to his father’s moral demands, which were socially motivated). Oswald is 
repentant, constantly seeking to reunite with the invisible father through good deeds. 
In doing so, however, he ignores his natural sentimental inclinations toward Corinne. 
Oswald dreams of unifying himself with Corinne and his past with his future: “que 
serait-ce donc s’il pouvait à la fois retrouver les souvenirs de sa patrie, et recevoir par 
l’imagination une vie nouvelle, renaître pour l’avenir, sans rompre avec le passé!” 
(44). 
Raised in “la maison paternelle,” in a sort of “cult” of paternity, Oswald loved his 
father above all else (295). Oswald’s world was one of masculine reason. Previous 
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women in his life were unable to deliver him from his melancholy and he points out 
that only the company of a male friend was able to save him from his depression 
(297). The women in his life were false, “soignée” and manipulative. Their emotions 
were insincere (300-12). Oswald, especially after having been duped by a woman 
who caused him to fall from grace with his father, places his faith firmly in “la bonté 
paternelle” (315). Oswald is unable or unwilling to recognize that his own will has 
caused events that he chalks up to fate, most notably his separation from Corinne 
which he attributes to “les êtres célestes” (316). Advice from his father, especially 
after his father’s death, takes on the importance of a biblical message. His father 
particularly criticized Oswald’s tendency to live in the present as an individual (317). 
He stressed the importance of solitude and contemplation in order to connect with the 
conscience (319). His father’s ideas are not so out of touch with Corinne’s spiritual 
beliefs after all in that both of them encourage a deeper connection with humanity 
through contemplation. 
When Corinne explains her process of intercession through the Virgin Mary, Oswald 
admits that he too uses his own deceased father as an intercessor with god (388). 
Corinne explains that praying directly to god would seem too imposing for her. 
Oswald agrees:  
Je ne la fais pas non plus toujours cette prière directe, répondit 
Oswald; j’ai aussi mon intercesseur, l’ange gardien des enfants, 
c’est leur père; et depuis que le mien est dans le ciel, j’ai 
souvent éprouvé dans ma vie des secours extraordinaires, des 
moments de calme sans cause, des consolations inattendues; 
c’est aussi dans cette protection miraculeuse que j’espère, pour 




 Corinne understands Oswald’s feelings but responds with a surprising reflection on 
the importance of taking ownership of one’s own beliefs and having the courage to 
question those beliefs:  
On croit confusément à une puissance surnaturelle qui agit à 
notre insu, et se cache sous la forme des circonstances 
extérieures, tandis qu’elle seule est l’unique cause de tout. Cher 
ami, les âmes capables de réflexion se plongent sans cesse dans 
l’abîme d’elles-mêmes, et n’en trouvent jamais la fin! – 
Oswald, lorsqu’il entendait parler ainsi Corinne, s’étonnait 
toujours de ce qu’elle pouvait tout à la fois éprouver des 
sentiments si passionnés, et planer, en les jugeant, sur ses 
propres impressions. (389) 
 
Here it is as if Corinne already foresees her future disillusion with her idolization of 
Oswald as well as certain inadequacies in her own religion which fails to reach the 
depths of sentimentality. 
 
The Question of Morality 
Religion for Corinne is not so much a moral reinforcement (as it seems to be for 
Oswald) but rather a connection with the eternal and consequently with the entirety of 
humanity. Religion for Corinne is a way to connect the self with all that surrounds it, 
with everything that is bigger than the self. Corinne describes Saint Peter’s Basilica, 
with its seamless mélange of mythological references and Christian art, as a temple of 
universal religion – not just Roman Catholic Christianity (77-8). Religion serves to 
put man in his place, reducing individual human importance in the service of a greater 
good, even in cultures that tend to value ritual and relics over profound religious 
meditation: “Voyez comme l’homme est peu de chose en présence de la religion, 
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alors même que nous sommes réduits à ne considérer que son emblème matériel!” 
(78).  
Awareness of “eternity” and universality is produced by Rome itself as a city of ruins 
which serve as a reminder “qu’il y a dans l’homme une puissance éternelle, une 
étincelle divine, et qu’il ne faut pas se lasser de l’exciter...” (85-6).  At the Coliseum, 
the greatness of architecture and art in general impresses a spiritual feeling on the 
spectator even though the place itself is completely devoid of a moral lesson. Oswald 
finds it difficult to admire the Coliseum since it was historically a place where 
immorality reigned – including the sacrifice of Christians. “Oswald ne se laissait 
point aller à l’admiration qu’éprouvait Corinne... il ne voyait dans ces lieux que le 
luxe du maître et le sang des esclaves, et se sentait prévenu contre les beaux-arts, qui 
ne s’inquiètent point du but, et prodiguent leurs dons à quelque objet qu’on leur 
destine” (91).  
For Corinne, however, religion and morality are not synonymous. Christianity’s best 
quality is not simply its moral code but the “enthusiasm
4
” it inspires. Corinne 
understands Christianity to be first and foremost a cult of sentiment with a message of 
love (260). Love for her is divine, a “remnant” of man’s “celestial heritage” (260). 
The divine can exist outside of morality and the definition of morality varies from 
culture to culture:  
Ne portez point, dit-elle à lord Nelvil, la rigueur de vos 
principes de morale et de justice dans la contemplation des 
                                                 
4
 Enthusiasm, as a philosophical term, has long been associated with man’s connection to the divine. 
Peter Fenves’ article, “The Scale of Enthusiasm,” provides a succinct but informative history of the 
term. Mme de Staël’s definition of enthusiasm was likely comparable to Immanuel Kant’s definition. 
Kant distinguished “enthusiasm” from fanaticism by explaining that enthusiasm leads to great actions 
while fanaticism is delusional and destructive behavior (Fenves 123). According to Fenves, 
“’Enthusiasm’ names the condition under which moral feeling turns into effective action (123). 
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monuments d’Italie; ils rappellent pour la plupart, je vous l’ai 
dit, plutôt la splendeur, l’élégance et le goût des formes 
antiques, que l’époque glorieuse de la vertu romaine. Mais ne 
trouvez-vous pas quelques traces de la grandeur morale des 
premiers temps dans le luxe gigantesque des monuments qui 
leur ont succédé? (91)  
 
For Oswald, virtue and divinity are inseparable and sentiment is their source. Virtue 
is the product of celestial power working inside man to subjugate “l’homme mortel” 
(92). Corinne does not disagree with him but she does recognize that the ancients 
approached the divine in their devotion and sacrifice, regardless of their moral 
trespasses. She criticizes modern man for his individualism:  
Nous vivons dans un siècle où l’intérêt personnel semble le 
seul principe de toutes les actions des hommes; et quelle 
sympathie, quelle émotion, quel enthousiasme pourrait jamais 
résulter de l’intérêt personnel! Il est plus doux de rêver à ces 
jours de dévouement, de sacrifice et d’héroïsme qui pourtant 
ont existé, et dont la terre porte encore les honorables traces. 
(102)  
 
According to Corinne, suffering is one of the most effective ways for man to access 
the divine (105). Nevertheless, she fervently rejects fanaticism, as in the example of 
vestals buried alive (114). Religious tolerance is continuously mentioned as being 
especially important to Corinne who dreams of a religion of universal harmony (114-
5). Harmony is true morality: “L’homme est une partie de la création, il faut qu’il 
trouve son harmonie morale dans l’ensemble de l’univers” (114-5). Corinne’s concept 
of morality is that which serves to bring humanity together as a whole or bring man 
closer to the divine source that harmonizes humanity. Oswald’s definition is more 
concrete. His rules are black and white, with clear lines between good and evil while 
Corinne’s view of the universe includes more subtle shades of grey justified by their 




Defining the Sacred 
Early in the novel, Mme de Staël examines ritual as an external manifestation of a 
sentiment shared across multiple faiths but which differs from religion to religion 
(13). In an example provided early in the text, “Le culte grec, le culte catholique et le 
culte juif existent simultanément et paisiblement dans la ville d’Ancône. Les 
cérémonies de ces religions diffèrent extrêmement entre elles; mais un même 
sentiment s’élève vers le ciel dans ces rites divers, un même cri de douleur, un même 
besoin d’appui” (13). The vision of religious harmony through tolerance and a 
common human need is beautiful but pages later Mme de Staël shows how fragile 
harmony can be when superstition infects the minds of the people. As in De la 
littérature, Mme de Staël repeats the theme of superstition throughout the novel to 
show how contrary superstition can be to harmony. Upon his arrival in Italy, Oswald 
witnesses a horrifying scene in which superstition completely upsets the harmony of 
the city of Ancône when villagers blame a fire on the Jewish population and attempt 
to leave the Jews for dead (15).  This episode sets up Italian superstition as one of the 
most nefarious result of imagination unchecked by reason. 
Even Corinne is superstitious despite her intelligence because superstition is assumed 
to be a typical Italian character trait. Her own superstitions appear as one of the 
negative influences blocking her unity with Oswald. As the happy couple is travelling 
to Naples, Corinne cannot resist the draw of superstition which casts a shadow on 
their joy: 
...je me disais que ces moments que je passais avec vous à 
présent étaient les plus heureux de ma vie: et comme je 
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tournais mes regards vers le ciel pour l’en remercier, je ne sais 
par quel hasard une superstition de mon enfance s’est ranimée 
dans mon cœur. La lune que je contemplais s’est couverte 
d’une nuage, et l’aspect de ce nuage était funeste. J’ai toujours 
trouvé que le ciel avait une impression, tantôt paternelle, tantôt 
irritée, et je vous le dit, Oswald, ce soir il condamnait notre 
amour. (276) 
Oswald’s perspective on ritual is informed by his protestant cultural background and 
he tends to liken it to superstition. He questions the effectiveness of ritual in religion 
claiming that Italian Catholic ritual is not consistent with morality and is solely 
external. In his own life, however, social customs are as ritualistic and seemingly 
arbitrary as religious ritual and may even be compared to superstition.  
Corinne defends religious ritual as a means of creating a constant rapport with the 
divine. She admits that rituals are impractical but explains that their impracticality is 
exactly what makes them valuable – ritual serves as a vital link to the “invisible 
world” which has its place in daily life: “les pratiques religieuses sont plus 
nécessaires que vous ne pensez; c’est une relation constante avec la Divinité; ce sont 
des actions journalières sans rapport avec aucun des intérêts de la vie, et seulement 
dirigées vers le monde invisible” (260). Mme de Staël juxtaposes the extremes of 
Italian ritual and superstition with long passages detailing the flat and unsentimental 
world of English women (351-2). England itself is even described as an infertile 
landscape (359). Passionate people, in contrast, have a stronger connection with the 
divine, even if they do not understand that connection or lack the ability to deepen it 
(376).  
Both Oswald and Corinne contemplate the sublime in nature. Here, their spiritual 
tendancies are united but their interpretations differ. Corinne recognizes in her 
Dernier chant that “le sublime en tout genre est un reflet de la divinité” (524). At 
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Mount Vesuvius, for example, Corinne explains that volcanoes actually gave poets 
the concept of Satan and hell because the erupting lava is a naturally occurring 
landscape that is contrary to Providence (321). Hell, in Corinne’s mind and 
presumably for Italians in general, is concrete. It is a place. For Oswald, however, 
hell is his own intangible sentimental torment (322). Both of them, however, see hell 
reflected in the volcano.  
Just as Corinne and Oswald can glimpse eternity in the sublime, “le malheur” takes 
on a sublime quality on a smaller scale for the individual. For Corinne, “le génie dans 
le malheur”provokes a mystical vagueness. Taking the world out of focus actually 
unites it through “un vertige qui confond tous les objets” (339). Towards the end of 
the novel, Corinne harnesses her sorrow as a means of provoking spiritual 
enlightenment. Her voyage to England is a self-sacrifice that marks the beginning of 
her transformation from a goddess of the arts to a martyr for the promotion of 
harmony (439). It is also perhaps a sort of death for her, foreshadowing her actual 
death. In England, she is the nameless and invisible spectator of society (444). 
Corinne’s spiritual awakening coincides with a loss of self-interest in her love for 
Oswald and Lucile. Sacrifice of the self for the good of the other is truly noble. 
Making peace with the North, Corinne suddenly appreciates England as a 
“respectable country” and renounces her quest for “personal glory” (448). Lord Nelvil 
becomes a cult figure for her and she is willing to sacrifice everything for him: “c’est 
lui qu’il faut conserver” (448). She makes a plea to god to spare him: “Pardonnez-lui, 
mon Dieu! quand je ne serai plus” (448). Corinne soon recognizes, however, that her 
beloved, much like the paternalistic god figure, plays a conflicting role in her life. He 
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is “ou le protecteur le plus sûr, ou le maître le plus redoutable” (451). God is either 
the origin of justice or the unfeeling enforcer of injustice. In Corinne’s 
disappointment with Oswald’s infidelity, she reflects upon the instability of ideas 
gleaned purely from emotion and wonders how two people who once believed their 
love to be ordained by God can suddenly become strangers (474). Questioning her 
own sentiment and belief systems allows her to begin discovering a new way of 
being. Released from the idolization of her lover, Corinne is finally able to seek a 
higher authority. A visit to her own father’s tomb motivates her to sacrifice herself for 
the well-being of her sister. Both sisters pray to their father (and Lucile, in addition, 
prays to Corinne) (458). Corinne concludes that “l’autorité paternelle tout entière 
condamnait son amour” (459). Corinne transforms from a goddess in her own right to 
a humble human being, asking god for aid and going to church to pray for Oswald 
and Lucile (462). Corinne comes to believe that god chose for her to suffer and that 
her suffering makes her special, “une exception à l’ordre universel” (467). Through 
her suffering, Corinne becomes truly alone (471). It is consequently through her 
solitude that she then finds enlightenment. 
Although Oswald surmises that Corinne has come to the end of her genius, he fails to 
recognize that the genius of her spirituality is the beginning of something new for 
Corinne, even as she lay dying. Corinne’s most advanced accomplishment as a human 
being is her ability to adapt. Throughout the novel, she easily adapts to new situations 
and continuously keeps an open mind but in the end she advances to a complete 
transformation of selflessness that elevates her to a saintly status. Feeling betrayed by 
her faith in Oswald, the object of her “cult” of love, she realizes that “il n’est pas 
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celui que je croyais” (510). Doubt is thus the path to truth, just as the author had 
suggested in De la littérature. Corinne soon finds refuge in the “universal” 
spirituality that she has been contemplating all along. At first, her rejection of the 
world is individualistic, as a means of protecting herself. In her final letter to Oswald, 
she explains that religion was a comfort to her because it was outside of all things 
Earthly which she associates with her love for Oswald.  
Que serais-je devenue sans le secours céleste? Il n’y a rien dans 
ce monde qui ne fût empoisonné par votre souvenir. Un seul 
asile me restait au fond de l’âme, Dieu m’y a reçue. [...] Se 
rendre digne de l’immortalité est, je me plais à le croire, le seul 
but de l’existence. Bonheur, souffrances, tout est moyen pour 
ce but; et vous avez été choisi pour déraciner ma vie de la terre: 
j’y tenais par un lien trop fort. (514) 
 
Oswald’s most remarkable role in her life was therefore not as an idolized lover but 
as a catalyst for the doubt which leads to enlightenment. The pain produced by the 
loss of Oswald is what turns Corinne into a true prophet pursing “une prière 
habituelle, une rêverie religieuse qui a pour but de se perfectionner soi-même” (515). 
As she explains in her Dernier chant, darkness allowed her to see the light: “Déjà la 
nuit s’avance à mes regards; mais le ciel n’est-il pas plus beau pendant la nuit? Des 
milliers d’étoiles le décorent. Il n’est de jour qu’un désert. Ainsi les ombres éternelles 
révèlent d’innombrables pensées que l’éclat de la prospérité faisait oublier” (523). 
On her deathbed, Corinne is perhaps still far from spiritual perfection. Her last 
gesture is, after all, an indication to Oswald that she sees the same cloud passing over 
the moon that sparked her superstition en route to Naples. Oswald’s fate, however, is 
presented as unremarkable in the short paragraph that is devoted to the rest of his life. 
The reader is left to compare Corinne’s emotionally charged death with Oswald’s 
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bland domestic existence regulated by duty. The narrator’s disinterest in what became 
of Oswald emphasizes the idea that acts of great sentiment do make an impression on 




In Corinne, Mme de Staël is able to use the novel as a tool for illustrating the 
hypotheses expressed in De la littérature concerning religion and morality in society. 
Through the personages of Corinne and Oswald, she provides both negative and 
positive examples of situations where spirituality, art, and social progress intersect. 
She furthermore uses gender as a means for categorizing opposing cultural and 
spiritual tendencies. She associates northern austerity with masculinity and creativity 
with femininity. Conversely, masculinity is also associated with the religious 
simplicity she favors in De la religion. Femininity is associated with a higher 
susceptibility to superstition. Associating gender with the North and South, however, 
allows Mme de Staël to use gender as a means for uniting the contrasting cultures. 
Corinne herself is representative of an idealized universality since her talents and 
knowledge transcend cultural boundaries. The protestant’s minimalist religious 
ceremony, for example, is appealing to Corinne despite her professed catholic faith 
because she ultimately seeks sincerity above all things. 
As in De la littérature, Corinne’s focus on history, especially on the history of 
Christianity, highlights the idea that religions might be able to unite through the 
universal power of sentiment. The heroine is comforted by the concept of religious 
77 
 
palingenesis because it reassures her that spiritual sentiment is universal. As the novel 
progresses, we come to understand that this metamorphosis of religion is still in 
process. Corinne accepts that spirituality is subjective and even malleable. Oswald’s 
Protestantism, in contrast, is notably limited to his specific cultural context. Morality 
too is defined differently in the two cultures. Oswald’s morality focuses primarily on 
duty while Corinne tends to focus on love and hope. Both Protestants and Catholics, 
however, are depicted as blending romantic love with the idea of the divine. The lover 
tends to ascribe angelic or god(dess)-like qualities to the beloved.  
Although Oswald ascribes divine beauty to the feminine, he associates religiosity 
with masculinity. The Englishman retains a holy reverence for his deceased father, 
regarding him as a saint-like intercessor, emphasizing the paternalistic moral rules by 
which he lives. Corinne’s interpretation of God is much more open, focusing rather 
on a morality which is less defined by the immediate and more centered on the 
greater good, on helping humanity. For Corinne, religion is associated with love. The 
divine can therefore exist outside of definitions of morality which vary from culture 
to culture. Mme de Staël clearly rejects superstition as a dangerous influence which 
leads to intolerance. Corinne does, however, defend ritual as serving a vital purpose. 
Ritual provides a link between daily life on Earth and the “invisible world” of the 
divine. Both characters are united, however, in recognizing nature as sacred. 
Because women in Corinne are associated with both sentiment and imagination, Mme 
de Staël combines these qualities in Corinne who illustrates their divine power. 
Corinne is regarded by her own people as a goddess-like figure of adoration. Corinne 
personifies the feminine influence on Roman culture and religion described in De la 
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littérature. Mme de Staël’s concept of sentiment would become one of the defining 
elements of nineteenth century romanticism. As we will see in later chapters, 
however, sentiment would continue to be associated with spirituality while its 





Chapter 5: Society, Morality and Sentiment versus Individualism, Opinion and 
Reason in Pierre-Simon Ballanche’s Essai sur les institutions sociales 
 
The works of Pierre-Simon Ballanche offer an alternative interpretation of the 
concept of sentiment in contrast to the writings of Mme de Staël. Ballanche echoes 
the desire for sentiment, harmony, and unity expressed by the author of De la 
littérature and Corinne but his conclusions dramatically conflict with Mme de Staël’s 
spirit of tolerance. Whereas Mme de Staël avoids naming one religion or one tradition 
as the ultimate source of truth, Ballanche clearly favors Christianity as the only 
plausible religion for France. Corinne’s dream of a universal religion was a melding 
of various traditions into one but Ballanche’s Essai sur les institutions sociales seeks 
to encourage the opposite. Ballanche wants to unify by excluding conflicting 
opinions, thereby imposing one tradition on the many rather than encouraging 
individuals to open their minds to multiple traditions. 
In Ballanche’s 1801essay, Du Sentiment, the poet establishes the idea that morality 
and esthetics are related because they are both products of sentiment. On the surface, 
his argument mirrors Mme de Staël’s association of sentiment with morality and the 
arts. Ballanche argues that scholarly poetry has diluted poetic sentiment by focusing 
on form rather than feeling. He calls for a return to a more natural approach to poetry. 
Une étude plus sûre et plus vraie, c’est celle de la nature, celle 
des grands maîtres qui nous ont précédés, et surtout celle du 
cœur humain. 
Toutes les considérations m’ont porté à croire que ce pourrait 
être un bon ouvrage, qu’une poétique dégagée de tout 
l’appareil scolastique, une poétique où l’on démontrerait, en 
remontant à l’origine de nos facultés et de nos affections, que 
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la morale et les principes des arts d’imitation ont une source 
commune, le sentiment... (7).   
 
Du Sentiment defines sentiment as “la puissance morale qui juge par instinct... ce qui 
conforme aux lois de notre nature considérée sous le triple rapport de notre animalité, 
de notre personnalité, et de notre spiritualité,” the combination of which is “notre 
humanité” (17). For Ballanche, the concept of sentiment is an innate knowledge of 
the existence of God. Sentiment is the product of individual meditation: “J’appelle 
sentiment cette conviction intime de l’existence d’un Dieu et de l’immortalité de 
l’âme” (19). In Du Sentiment, Ballanche associates individuality with “personnalité,” 
the part of humanity dealing with the conscience, while “animalité” refers to the 
physical senses and “spiritualité” refers to the soul (12). Interestingly, his later works, 
Essai sur les institutions sociales (1818) and Palingénesie sociale (1827-1829), focus 
sharply on the unification of society and reject individuality altogether. Essai sur les 
institutions sociales avoids any suggestion that individual meditation might provide a 
path to spiritual wisdom.  
 
“La force des choses” 
Ballanche’s God rules through “la force des choses,” a favorite reference throughout 
the Essai. Rather than convince his public by explaining God’s reasoning, 
Ballanche’s argument rests on the assumption that man must not try to understand 
God’s plan. Individual opinions are harmful to society. Time honored traditions and 
social systems cannot be critiqued. Their merit lies in the amount of time that they 
lasted (101). Ballanche essentially proposes to create faith by discouraging doubt. In 
this sense, Ballanche’s argument is very similar to early Lamennais. Ballanche 
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encourages a view of history that assumes that everything happened according to 
God’s plan, through “la force des choses,” implying that man is not free to choose his 
destiny – life simply happens to him (101). Mme de Staël, in contrast, created a 
scenario in Corinne which positively portrayed the main character’s rejection of 
social constraint. Ballanche’s vision of human history as palingenesis nevertheless 
impressed notable romantic contemporaries such as Jean-Jacques Ampère, Saint-
Beuve, and even the Saint-Simonians, because it hypothesized “the liberation of 
humanity” (Reardon 597). According to Michael F. Reardon: 
If any single contribution from Ballanche’s thought could be 
selected as widely influential, it would be his vision of human 
history – the historical process as an intellectual movement 
working for the liberation of humanity, passing through set 
stages of development, which Ballanche described with his 
organic metaphor of palingenesis, and resulting in a society 
bound together by a real brotherhood. His vision found favor 
because it was presented to a climate of opinion receptive to 
forms of historicism that attempted to reconcile the traditions 
of the Old Europe with the new ideas of the revolutionary age 
and presented a view of the progress of man and society. (597) 
 
Despite Ballanche’s belief in an eventual movement towards this rather utopian 
brotherhood in the vague future, however, he condemned attempts by his 
contemporaries to enact political changes which would upset the social hierarchy in 
the present. A vocal critic of the Charter of 1814, Ballanche depicts the disruption of 
social class structure as contrary to God’s plan.
5
 For Ballanche, society was created 
by God and exists to preserve traditions. The social class system is therefore depicted 
as integral to God’s plan for humanity. According to Ballanche, Christianity is 
evolving but social change can only safely occur in due time. Change unfolds 
                                                 
5
 According to Michael F. Reardon, Ballanche did initially support the Charter of 1814 as a suitable 




according to a divine plan unbeknownst to man. Article 1 of the Charte promises 
equal rights to all Frenchmen, thereby usurping this divine plan. Ballanche confirms 
that equality is inevitable but humans do not have the right to assert it through law. 
God will grant equality to men when it is time for men to be equal. It will come not as 
a law but as a revelation. As the author explains in the essay’s preface: “L’égalité par 
le christianisme, c’est-à-dire le christianisme achevant son évolution dans la sphère 
civile, fait le fond de l’ouvrage suivant” but what actually follows is an argument 
against the pursuit of equality (12). The essay touches on politics, language, and art as 
it explains “revelations” on the rapport between religion and society. 
Despite his insistence on Christianity, Ballanche uses surprisingly little biblical 
citation to back up his claims that Christianity is evolving. Instead, he establishes 
from the first chapter that the authority of his assertions on the topic springs from an 
internal truth revealed to him not by himself but by : “... je suis réduit à ne consulter 
que mes propres impressions [...] car je n’ai pas laborieusement étudié ces traditions: 
elles me sont apparues bien plus que je ne les ai cherchées: je pourrais presque dire 
qu’elles se sont trouvées en moi” (20). This internal truth, however, seems more 
rooted in tradition than in the rousseauist conscience. He continues throughout the 
text to describe the present as a state of spiritual and cultural limbo in which the 
French have rejected their past traditions but have yet to propose a new way of life. 
Furthermore, Ballanche believes that the rupture between morality and intelligence 
has resulted in disharmony. Instead of working together, “l’être moral” must compete 
with “l’être intelligent” (23). By the same token, immovable “mœurs” clash with the 
popularity of ever-changing progressive opinions (23). Ballanche bemoans the rise of 
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the opinion which he sees as a false substitute for traditional morals. He argues first 
that morals are threatened by opinions and then makes a similar argument that poetry 
is threatened by prose. These arguments recall the conflict between sentiment and 
reason previously discussed in Du Sentiment. Sentiment, morality, and poetry are 
shown to share a common foundation in universal truth. Reason, opinions, and prose 
represent the perceived threat of individual intellectuals working towards social 
change. 
Society versus Equality 
Starting from the second chapter, the Essai establishes that man is inseparable from 
society. Society is described as a whole organism in which individuals are useless on 
their own (37, 39). Man is tied to humanity and ideas must move from generation to 
generation: “L’individualité n’est point, pour lui, dans ce monde” (41). All steps in 
history, even errors, lead to truth and movement of ideas is key to the progress of 
human intelligence but, once again, these steps must be taken in due time according 
to a mysterious divine plan (40).  
Ballanche sets out to prove that social morals and political laws evolve at different 
rates, creating social disharmony. He attacks freedom of the press, guaranteed in 
article eight of the Charte, as a prime example. Politically, people believe they want 
freedom of the press, he says, but their morals are still too sensitive (97). Ballanche 
agrees that France’s morals must eventually become accustomed to freedom of the 
press but claims for the moment that, for the moment: “nos mœurs sont trop exquises 
et trop susceptibles” (97). Freedom of the press would compromise the sensibilities of 
women, the alleged guardians of conservative values, thereby endangering any 
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remaining traditions (97). Ultimately, the argument against social change through 
legislation boils down to an argument against equal rights. Ballanche insists that 
nineteenth century France is not prepared to accept equality among men because 
French morals are inherently aristocratic (98)
6
. For Ballanche, equality is “antisocial” 
– it is contrary to the social order allegedly ordained by God (98). This is one of the 
rare moments when Ballanche quotes the Bible in an attempt to support the necessity 
of a social hierarchy: “Il y a plusieurs demeures dans la maison de mon père” (98). 
Ballanche’s stance against individualism also proves to be very different from Mme 
de Staël’s. Mme de Staël seems to see all people as being in service of each other for 
the greater good of humanity. For Ballanche, the individual must be suppressed in 
support of a more arbitrary, less defined goal. Instead of promoting the sacrifice of 
individual desires for the good of fellow men, Ballanche encourages individuals to 
make sacrifices to the social system itself, which he considers sacred: “Le génie 
antisocial, le fils de la terre, doit être étouffé par le génie de la civilisation, par 
l’enfant des dieux” (100). Ballanche’s argument is significantly less compassionate 
than Mme de Staël’s since it abstains from putting a face on humanity and reduces the 
individual to an insignificant tool in the grand scheme of the divine plan.  
By establishing the idea that French society is actually a religious institution, 
Ballanche is able to build an argument claiming that anti-religious actions are equal to 
antisocial actions. This would mean that the elimination of religion was somehow 
hurting society.  
                                                 
6
 Paul Bénichou notes that in the preface of Ballanche’s 1830 Œuvres, the author expresses regret for 
not having recognized the potential of “l’égalité par le christianisme, c’est-à-dire le christianisme 
achevant son évolution dans la sphère civile” and specifically for having misused this quote in support 
of inequality (Le Temps 85). 
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Toutes les révolutions politiques se mêlent ou se lient à une 
révolution religieuse; celle qui agite en ce moment l’Europe 
fait une seule exception à ce principe général: l’impulsion 
qu’elle a reçue a été plutôt antireligieuse; ainsi nous ne devons 
pas nous étonner si, dans la plupart de ses phases, elle a été 
antisociale. (111) 
 
Ballanche insists that French morals are inherently Catholic and cannot even be 
expected to adapt to protestant-style religion, perhaps a reference to articles five and 
seven of the Charte which respectively guarantee religious freedom and promise state 
funding for any Christian religion. Protestantism, he argues, is a religion based on 
reason and devoid of the ceremony that excites sentiment and imagination. French 
morals, on the contrary, must have an “external” religion: “nos mœurs sont 
catholiques parce que nous tenons à un culte extérieur, à des signes sensibles de notre 
croyance” (112). In Chateaubriand’s esthetic argument for the conservation of 
Catholicism in France, tangible aspects of religion are similarly presented as 
inspirations for the best works of art. Ballanche, like Chateaubriand, rejects 
Protestantism on the grounds that its simplicity fails to inspire religious sentiment: 
“Une religion aride, dépouillée de cérémonies, enfin une foi métaphysique ne peut 
nous convenir” (Essai 112). As we saw in the last chapter, Mme de Staël, as a 
protestant, embraced this simplicity as pure, as closer to moral religion. 
 
Irreligion and Individuality 
In Du Sentiment, Ballanche praises the rise of melancholy as a boon to the arts: “C’est 
l’amour, c’est la mélancholie qui ont inspiré nos premiers poètes” (118). He even 
credits the success of the novel to the positive influence of “la sensibilité des 
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femmes” (118). The Essai, however, flatly rejects melancholy as dangerously 
antisocial. In the Essai, Ballanche blames modern melancholy on the loss of religion 
claiming that a man without faith feels especially alone because he has been separated 
from his ancestors, a vital element of the social whole (116). Chateaubriand’s René 
famously reiterates such sentiments. Ballanche too begrudges Rousseau for having 
inspired young people with “une fausse direction à la sensibilité” which glorified the 
“beau idéal” instead of instilling traditional religious sentiments (119). Ballanche 
foresees that the loss of Christianity will result in a reversal of social progress (120). 
For him, religion is necessary for curbing dangerous passions and consoling all 
classes of society (123). The Essai goes on to argue that the myth of the good savage 
is a destructive view of human history because it glorifies the power of the individual. 
The “savage” is a solitary figure surviving on instinct. For Ballanche, such a man 
would be a degeneration of the man made by God, made to live in society (153). To 
concede the existence of a pre-social human being would also be conceding that man 
must have undergone some process of evolution. Ballanche denies man’s possible 
evolution from solitary to social on the basis that God made everything and “saw that 
it was good” (154). Man, therefore, required no evolution to achieve perfection. He 
furthermore insists that man was created complete with a “social sense” and language 
explaining that this “social sense” allows humans to be moral and intelligent beings 
(154). He backs up this idea by pointing out that, in the Bible, man differs from 




Although Du Sentiment defines sentiment itself as “la puissance morale qui juge par 
instinct,” the Essai insists that man has no instincts. On the contrary, man possesses 
liberty and will. In his essay, Ballanche is careful not to use the term “instincts” when 
referring to humans. Humans are unable to know anything on their own and must 
learn all things from society (187). In agreement with Bonald, Ballanche concurs: 
“L’instinct des animaux ne peut troubler l’harmonie générale; les facultés de 
l’homme peuvent la troubler. L’homme n’a point d’instinct; il a une liberté et une 
volonté. L’absence d’instinct dans l’homme fait qu’il a besoin de tout apprendre” 
(187). Ballanche’s insistence on man’s absence of instinct conflicts directly with 
Rousseau and Mme de Staël who value the wisdom gained from sentimental 
impressions produced in solitary meditation. Though Ballanche explains that religion 
must be established in society through religious sentiment, society is the source of 
this sentiment – not the individual. Sentiment is created from external, not internal, 
sources. Love for one’s country, for example, is explained as an attachment to 
external elements such as the soil and institutions of that country (193). 
Ballanche repeatedly stresses the idea that God wanted man to live in society and not 
as an individual. Societies were meant to form “un seul tout” (196). Solitude is 
equivalent to death: “Si l’homme laisse envahir son domaine par la solitude, la nature 
reprend ses premiers droits; et l’homme est de nouveau frappé par la mort” (191). 
Ballanche does admit that man is sometimes drawn to rebel against society but he 
makes no attempt to justify rebellion (197). Solitude is unnatural and destructive: “La 
solitude ne vaut rien à l’homme, parce qu’elle n’est pas son état naturelle” (198). Man 
is not free to choose whether or not he wants to be part of society. Society was not 
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created by individuals; it was imposed on man by God (199). Ballanche reiterates that 
the “homme sauvage” is not a true portrait of primitive man. On the contrary, it is a 
“degeneration” because the savage, as an individual, consumes without producing and 
is powerless without society (199). 
 
Language and Social Progress 
The Essai eventually focuses primarily on “la parole,” language, as a gage for social 
progress. According to Alan J.L. Busst’s La Théorie du langage de Pierre-Simon 
Ballanche, the question of the origin of human language posed no real threat to 
Christian thought in the nineteenth century since any argument for human invention 
could be explained away by claiming “divine revelation.” The most conservative 
Catholics, however, such as de Maistre, Lamennais, and Bonald, continued to argue 
for the divine origin of language as a means for opposing equality (Busst 5). 
“L’interdépendance, généralement acceptée, de la pensée et de la parole, et le lien 
manifeste entre l’origine de la société et l’origine de la parole, devaient logiquement 
mener les traditionalistes à en conclure que l’homme n’avait jamais été privé de la 
parole, et que celle-ci, loin de s’être lentement améliorée, avait été parfaite dès le 
début” (Busst 5). Ballanche aims to defend the superiority of the spoken word over 
the written word, ultimately arguing that language was not invented by men. He 
believes language was a revelation from God which allowed people to form societies 
according to God’s plan. Ballanche’s approach is not immediately accessible to the 
reader since he insists on gradually revealing the purpose of his argument, perhaps 
mirroring the way that he supposes God must be revealing his own plan to humanity. 
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The author’s approach blends his social agenda with his religious beliefs making 
commentaries on language and the arts along the way. As Busst points out, Ballanche 
was unique amongst his ultramontane contemporaries in that he walked the line 
between conservative and progressive. He recognized that there was a pressing need 
to reconcile divine providence with human liberty (6). 
A large portion of the Essai is devoted to Ballanche’s version of the history of “la 
parole” because the poet insists that society cannot exist without language (Essai 
199). Language is the key to the future of society (203). According to Ballanche, man 
was traditionally completely dependent on God and on society (as a vehicle for God’s 
will) for all spiritual and intellectual fulfillment: “L’homme n’a jamais trouvé 
l’inspiration en lui-même; il l’a toujours puisée hors de lui, ou dans la révélation 
directe, ou dans les traditions religieuses et sociales, ou dans l’imitation” (205). 
Ballanche claims that God still speaks to man through his creations (206). God’s 
word is assumed to be eternal but man’s language is limited because he is incapable 
of expressing himself as an individual: “l’homme est un être collectif” (206). Because 
language is passed down from God to humanity, Ballanche defines language as a 
revelation (207). 
Puisque l’institution du langage vient de Dieu, malheur à celui 
qui prostitue la parole! 
Le type des idées et les sentiments de l’homme repose dans le 
langage qui lui a été donné par Dieu même; et il connaît ses 
rapports avec Dieu et avec ses semblables par la parole. 
La transmission du langage est une révélation sans cesse 
existante, où tous les hommes sont tour-à-tour prophètes et 
initiés, les un à l’égard des autres, et dans les générations 
successives. 
Les langues sont donc une révélation générale qui ne quitte 
jamais les sociétés humaines; elles sont aussi une révélation 
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continue pour tout le genre humain depuis l’origine des choses, 
et qui durera jusqu’à la fin des temps. (207) 
 
This transmission of language from God to man recalls the Catholic doctrine of Jesus 
as the “Word” and of his reception of the “Word” from the Father. The “Word,” in 
Christian tradition, is the “truth” or innate knowledge of God
7
. Ballanche has 
established this truth as sentiment and thus associates it with both the Catholic 
definition of the “Word” and literal human language. Ballanche’s obsession with “la 
parole” eventually leads into a discourse on the merits of poetry versus prose. Poetry, 
according to Ballanche, is the original divine language: “La parole primitive, révélée 
à l’homme, est la poésie” (208-9). He goes on to claim that allegory is the expression 
of universal thought (209). Poetry is essential to inspiring religious sentiment: “Le 
sentiment moral, le sentiment religieux, le sentiment de l’infini: telle est l’impression 
générale qui doit résulter de toute poésie” (210). His definition of poetry, however, 
refers exclusively to the spoken word. The spoken word is the only language that he 
considers “alive” (210). Ballanche claims that God himself only communicates 
through the spoken word (210). He goes on to suggest that the decadence of poetry 
began with its separation from music and criticizes authors of written works for 
allowing a certain distance between themselves and their words (223). He accuses 
writers of anonymity. Even if one knows the writer’s identity, the writer is 
nevertheless absent as his words are being read. Ballanche likens the written word to 
a courtisane abandoned by her protector and unable to defend herself against the 
                                                 
7
 John 1:1 and 1:14 most often cited as the basis for the association of knowledge of God with the 
“Word.” Lemaître de Sacy’s Bible translates the passages as: “1. Nous vous annonçons la parole de la 
vie, qui était dès le commencement, que nous avons ouïe, que nous avons vue de nos yeux, que nous 
avons regardée avec attention, et que nous avons touchée de nos mains.”/ “14: Je vous écris, petits 
enfants, parce que vous avez connu le Père. Je vous écris, jeunes gens, parce que vous êtes forts, que 
la parole de Dieu demeure en vous, et que vous avez vaincu le malin esprit” (1590-1). 
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reader (224-5). Because poetry was meant to be heard rather than read, Ballanche 
asserts that modern people have confused its form with its essence. The result, he 
says, is a poetry of convention, a secularization of divine art (226).  
Ballanche uses the debate over the origins of language as a means for proving that 
God must have created society whose foundation rests on the human ability to 
communicate. He divides men into two camps: those who believe it possible to think 
without language and those who believe that thoughts cannot exist without language 
(126). Those who believe language is necessary to thought have a high regard for 
social laws and believe that God made language and society. Those who believe that 
thought can be separate from language allegedly also believe that the liberty of a 
people comes from its laws and not from its history: “les uns placent la raison des lois 
de la société dans la société même, et les autres dans l’homme” (129). According to 
this theory, disharmony occurs between these two categories of people not because of 
a conflict of interests but rather because of miscommunication: some people still 
speak the “divine” language while others speak a “mortal” language (131). According 
to Ballanche, spoken language was once divine. The written word, however, formed 
man-made institutions and created confusion in languages. He explains that it was 
then that two conflicting languages were born: poetry and prose. Poetry, according to 
Ballanche, was the divine source for communication – the original language – while 
prose was simply the written word created by man (139-40). Poetry then is the 
literary equivalent to morality and prose is dismissed as an equivalent to opinion. In 
Du Sentiment, Ballanche had already polarized reason and sentiment by insisting that 
reason merely exists in thoughts while sentiment translated into actions. Reason was 
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described as riddled with human error and ultimately unproductive while “le 
sentiment produit cette morale universelle qui est indépendant des gouvernements et 
des opinions” (Du Sentiment 53). Reason is subject to the mind of an individual, “une 
sagesse spéculative et isolée,” while sentiment is portrayed as a universal source of 
wisdom since its origins are supposedly divine (53). 
 
God’s Will and Political Change 
Ballanche supposes that God assigned specific missions to different peoples in 
different eras and that these peoples had a “presentiment” of their mission (Essai 44). 
God supposedly prepared for Christianity by sowing the seeds of Christian ideology 
in the traditions of primitive societies (46). Continuing in this vein, Ballanche 
rewrites French history so that it too fits into the mold of a divine plan. All people and 
all leaders, according to Ballanche, have a secret purpose ordained by God. Viewed 
from this perspective, the French people are transformed into a sort of “chosen 
people” and the Revolution as well as the Empire are absolved as mistakes that served 
as stepping stones in a divine plan. Paul Bénichou explains in his Le temps des 
prophètes that Ballanche likened Louis XVI to a Christ figure whose death was a 
necessary sacrifice in order to usher in modern progress (77). French history since 
1801 provides Ballanche with examples to support his arguments for a unified 
Christian society. The differences between Du Sentiment and Essai sur les institutions 
sociales might also serve as a reminder of the rapport between religion and politics. 
As the French political system changed, so did Ballanche’s concept of the divine. 
Using Bonaparte as an example, he repeatedly tries to show that a leader with only a 
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few years of social support behind him is inferior to the likes of the Bourbon kings 
whose centuries-old traditions unify the public (26, 28). He furthermore interprets 
public acceptance of the Emperor as a social move back towards religious tradition: 
“Ne l’avons-nous pas vu, en effet, au moment où il saisit les rênes du gouvernement, 
relever les autels de la religion, et élargir les routes qui ramenaient de la terre de 
l’exil? Ne l’avons-nous pas vu fouiller dans les fastes de la monarchie, et ordonner 
des cérémonies expiatoires pour les cendres violées de Saint-Denis?” (33). In 
Ballanche’s interpretation of recent history, the people were driven not by a thirst for 
glory but by a need for social and religious traditions. Ballanche eventually suggests 
that the fall of the Empire is the ultimate proof that Christian morality triumphs over 
“la puissance du génie et celle de la force” (258). Napoleon’s failure serves as another 
example of the collective power of society and the lasting influence of God’s eternal 
word: “Bonaparte a voulu peser sur nous avec le pouvoir qui a précédé le 
christianisme; et nous, nous l’avons jugé avec les idées morales que le christianisme a 
données au monde” (258). He concludes that society rejected Bonaparte because 
social institutions can only be founded on Christianity (259). He argues that political 
leaders are in charge of the spiritual well-being of their people and goes on to explain 
that it was a mistake to question the divine right of kings (26). He does, however, 
conclude that the separation of church and state could benefit the Church by 
disassociating it from political revolutions. Lamennais would later lodge a similar 
argument in his De la religion. Although Ballanche’s stance on social institutions is 
clearly reactionary and conservative compared to Rousseau and Mme de Staël, he 
does stand out among conservative authors of the era since he admits that France 
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cannot go backwards: change is inevitable. Morals ideally evolve in due time so that 
they clash less with public opinion. Addressing the nineteenth century clash between 
morals and opinions, he ponders a separation between the Church and secular affairs. 
Il manque à notre Charte ce que nous ne pouvons y ajouter, 
c’est qu’elle soit assimilée au peuple français par une lente et 
continuelle intussusception, s’il est permis de parler ainsi, qui 
est l’œuvre nécessaire des traditions. Il lui faut enfin, sinon 
l’accord des mœurs et des opinions, du moins une telle 
indépendance entre ces deux forces, qu’elles ne puissent plus 
se rencontrer pour se combattre; car nos mœurs ne sauraient 
s’avancer au niveau de nos opinions; et l’on ne voudra pas 
souffrir que les opinions rétrogradent pour marcher d’un pas 
égal avec les mœurs. N’oublions pas que maintenant, comme 
j’ai déjà eu d’occasion de le remarquer, le principe intellectuel 
a pris l’ascendant sur le principe moral, pour la direction de la 
société. (93) 
 
Ballanche recognizes that the separation of Church and state may actually be 
beneficial to society in that it would prevent the Church from being targeted in 
political revolutions (255). He adds that religion should not need political support 
since it is a power in its own right. Asking for political support for religion casts 
doubt on religion’s power (255). He asks that people not seek the help of religion in 
matters concerning secular institutions because religion may be held accountable for 
the failure of those institutions. Society evolves but religion must stay constant: “Le 
mouvement des esprits, qui est l’opinion, peut soulever la société, mais il faut que la 
religion reste immobile comme Dieu même” (255). 
Ballanche asserts that the current social changes are also not a part of God’s plan 
since no new social institutions have been created by God to replace those that were 
abandoned. Since he insists that society is inherently Christian, he rejects secular laws 
as “anti-social” (59). In Du Sentiment, Ballanche had already juxtaposed sentiment 
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and law, establishing the concept that man’s natural penchant for morality is superior 
to man-made regulations: “Il est en nous une puissance forte que le despotisme des 
lois humaines, que l’empire des cultes superstitieux ou immoraux, une puissance qui 
veille encore sur nous, quand la frêle barque de notre raison est ballottée par la 
tempête des passions: c’est la puissance du sentiment” (48). In the Essai, the power of 
sentiment as truth felt in the individual is replaced by the power of morality, a truth 
upheld by social tradition. The message is nevertheless similar. Realizing the 
impossibility of restoring religion to its previous place in society, Ballanche hopes 
people will at least accept the idea that the Church’s dogmas were true because 
people believed them to be true for such a long time (65). The lack of new religious 
institutions increases the need for personal religious sentiment: “La société doit être 
de nouveau sous la protection des sentiments religieux, qui heureusement ont 
survécu, et qui doivent servir à rallier tous les sentiments sociaux” (67). Like Mme de 
Staël, Ballanche seeks to instill religious sentiment through literature but argues that 
old styles of literature no longer reach modern people: “La morale elle-même a 
besoin d’emprunter un autre langage pour être entendue” (70-1). Ballanche advises 
modern “romantic” authors to learn from the mistakes of classic authors who limited 
their literature to a handful of authors stifled by too many rules (75). Nevertheless, he 
sees the inclusion of past ideas as essential to modern literature: “consentons à croire 





In the end, Ballanche suggests that the nineteenth century should be awaiting a 
revelation: “Toutes les fois que la société a cessé d’être gouvernée par les traditions, 
le besoin d’une révélation s’est toujours fait sentir” (253). The need for revelation 
surfaces, he says, because man has a “sentiment intime” which reassures him that 
God continues to watch over him. It is like a collective conscience, “comme la 
conscience des peuples” (253). According to Ballanche, the fact that moderns are not 
waiting for a revelation, however, is a unique situation in the history of the world. 
Ballanche attempts to explain that people are no longer waiting for a revelation 
because Christianity, the ultimate revelation, is already among the people. There is 
nothing new to discover in the way of religion: “c’est parce que le christianisme est la 
perfection même des institutions religieuses, et que le genre humain ne peut avoir que 
le sentiment de ses besoins réels” (253). For Ballanche, the living word of God is still 
on Earth: “la parole a conservé toute sa puissance et toute sa fécondité dans la sphère 
des idées religieuses” (254). Therefore, whereas many philosophers and poets, 
including Mme de Staël, felt that there was some new wisdom to be found and 
changes to be made in the way people practice religion and the lessons that they take 
away from it, Ballanche seems to believe that religion does not need a new direction. 
It simply needs a restoration to its proper place of influence in society.  
Ballanche closes his essay with a brief appeal to conserve traditions in order to save 
literature and the arts. His basic argument is that it is impossible to reject all cultural 
traditions and expect the literary tradition to survive (261). Ballanche launches into an 
argument insisting that French literature must remain above all “French” despite 
being influenced by a variety of European literatures. He subsequently praises the 
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superiority of the French language (262). Whereas Mme de Staël promoted an 
inclusive multicultural approach to literature that would lead the nation to connect 
with sentiment in order to strengthen the conscience, Ballanche fears new directions 
in literature almost as much as he fears religious reform. His main concern is the 
conservation of poetry. True poetry, for Ballanche, comes from genuine sentiment. 
Ballanche accuses modern writers of abandoning truly poetic topics concerning 
French history and embracing the “riantes créations de la Grèce” (266). He hopes that 
France will become a haven for poetry:  
N’imitons point les anciens mais faisons comme eux [...] La 
poésie, sans cesser de se consacrer à célébrer les attributs de 
Dieu, doit entrer davantage dans les affections de l’homme, et 
surtout dans la liberté morale; car, comme nous le dirons tout-
à-l’heure, le règne du fatalisme va finir aussi dans les royaumes 
de l’imagination, et cela seul change beaucoup toutes les 
données poétiques. (271, 274-5) 
 
Despite hints of classicism that he perceives in Chateaubriand’s work, he praises his 
friend for having created the kind of poetry that he hopes France will embrace: “M. 
de Chateubriand s’est élevé à la dignité de l’épopée, et ce ne sera pas moi qui 
contesterai à son bel ouvrage le nom de poème” (275). Ballanche maintains that there 
must be in society for the arts: “Les arts de l’imagination doivent rester la noble 
décoration de la société” (278). 
The Essai concludes with a consideration of the “Conséquences de l’émancipation de 
la pensée dans la sphère des idées politiques.” He states that the era of Charlemagne, 
which has characterized most of the history of France, has just ended and a new era is 
beginning (279). In this new era, Ballanche alleges that morality and intellectualism 
are no longer one (279). He hopes for an end to war and conquests of glory, juries 
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instead of duels, and an end to capital punishment (280). The new social order would 
be an expression of God’s will: “Dieu ne s’explique souvent sur la société que par 
l’ordre social lui-même” (281). He foresees that society’s wishes for peace and 
equality will eventually be fulfilled if it is God’s will however society must first 
realign itself with Christianity:  
Ce qu’on a appelé la force des choses constitue aussi, je le sais, 
une sorte de fatalité; mais lorsque la société nouvelle sera 
définitivement assise sur ses véritables bases, la force des 
choses viendra de moins loin, aura moins d’intensité, et les 
rênes seront plus flottantes. (287) 
    
Conclusion 
Ballanche’s definition of sentiment contrasts with reason rather than harmonizing 
with reason as Mme de Staël had suggested. He seeks to discourage religious doubt 
and encourage blind faith. For Ballanche, sentiment is an innate knowledge of the 
existence of God. This differs from Rousseau’s conscience and Mme de Staël’s 
sentiment in that it does not simply verify moral truths but focuses instead on 
verifying Christian dogma such as the immortality of the soul. Whereas Rousseau and 
Mme de Staël were concerned with the conscience as a guide for one’s actions 
towards fellow humans, Ballanche is concerned with using the concept of sentiment 
to define man’s relationship with the heavens rather than man’s relationship with his 
fellow man.  
For Ballanche, God rules through “la force des choses,” an unstoppable, 
unquestionable force which cannot be understood by man. Because of their incapacity 
to comprehend it, he asserts that humans should not try to question this force. People, 
he says, should simply have faith in God’s judgment. In the Essai sur les institutions 
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sociales, the author uses this argument to oppose the equality proposed by the Charter 
of 1814. Ballanche argues that it is not man’s place to impose social regulations 
because society was actually created by God. This implies that God also created 
human inequality.  
Ballanche categorizes liberal thinking as opinion-based and blames “opinions” for 
modern social changes, such as religious tolerance, which clash with traditional social 
mores which he believes to be of divine origin. He establishes sentimentality, 
morality, and poetry as founded in universal truth and criticizes reason, opinion, and 
prose as dangerous inventions of radical intellectuals. The vague is thus valued over 
the concrete. The Essai establishes that man is inseparable from society and that 
society is a divine institution. Anti-religious actions are therefore equated with 
antisocial actions. Ballanche furthermore insists, against the Charter’s tolerance of 
Protestantism, that Catholicism is the only plausible religion in French society 
because France needs external religion in order to reinforce religious sentiment which 
upholds society. 
In contrast to Du sentiment, which praises melancholy as a constructive influence on 
the arts, the Essai rejects the idea that morality can be attained through instincts. 
Rather, he insists that society is the institution through which man is destined to 
acquire his moral code. For Ballanche, God meant for men to live in society and 
solitude is a corruption of God’s intended plan for man. Ballanche supports his 
interpretation of God as the creator of society by insisting that God created language 
so that man could communicate with society. Thus, he privileges poetry over prose 
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and sentiment over reason. Sentiment, he explains, springs from pure truth while 
reason is the product of subjective human opinion.  
For Ballanche, political change throughout history demonstrates the power of God’s 
will. Napoleon’s fall is used as an example of God’s plan working through the 
collective power of society. Even when mistakes are made, however, (and Ballanche 
considers the Revolution to be such a mistake) Ballanche views all historical events 
as stepping stones in God’s plan. He is unique amongst his conservative 
contemporaries in that he at least accepts that human progress is inevitable. Morals do 
evolve. Nevertheless, Ballanche contends that changes must come in due time, as 
God wills it, and not by political decree.  For this reason, Ballanche proposes a 
separation of church and state in order to save the church from being swept into 
political revolutions.  
Ballanche ultimately asserts that a “revelation” is necessary to restore religion to its 
proper place of influence in the nineteenth century. He closes his essay with an appeal 
to artists and authors to move towards conserving religious traditions through their 
work.  Ballanche expresses hope for a new social order in France to accompany the 
contemporary era in which morality and intellectualism have drifted apart. The only 





Chapter 6: A Step Backwards into Eden: The Problem with Progress in 
Chateaubriand’s Génie du christianisme 
 
In contrast to Mme de Staël’s concept of perfectibilité and Ballanche’s palingénésie, 
Chateaubriand’s Génie du christianisme turns away from the notion of progress 
altogether in favor of the idea that man’s perfection would be found not in his future 
but in his past. Published in 1801, on the heels of Mme de Staël’s De la littérature 
and Ballanche’s Du sentiment, the Génie is a lengthy consideration of the place of 
religion in society, art and literature. While De la littérature and Du sentiment 
certainly differ in their spiritual views, Mme de Staël and Ballanche nevertheless 
shared the basic idea that humanity does improve with time and that progress is 
imminent. Chateaubriand, on the other hand, suggests that Christianity does not move 
forward with the times. Rather, salvation can be found in Christianity because it is the 
path that leads backwards into Eden by nullifying original sin. Fabienne Bercegol 
suggests in her Chateaubriand: Une poétique de la tentation that Chateaubriand, 
inspired by saint Augustine, sees Christianity as a way of glimpsing man’s “vérité 
idéale,” or the perfection man held before the Fall (45). Thus, as with the artistic 
“beau idéal,” there is a sense of longing for unachievable spiritual perfection in the 
Génie, especially in Atala and René which hints at a certain dissatisfaction with 
religion. There is a disconnect between the comfort which religion should ideally 
grant humanity and the inability of religion to actually provide that comfort in the 




While Mme de Staël argued that religion and reason can be compatible, the author of 
the Génie du christianisme attempts to champion Christianity as the preferable 
alternative to Enlightenment philosophy which he describes as fruitless and even 
destructive. Chateaubriand’s Lettre à M. de Fontanes sur la deuxième édition de 
l’ouvrage de Mme de Staël, published in the Mercure de France in December 1800, 
criticizes Mme de Staël for approaching literature from a perspective that is not 
overtly Christian. He is particularly bothered that the author of De la littérature 
promotes the concept of perfectibilité, the idea that man is becoming more spiritually 
evolved from generation to generation. Chateaubriand refuses to concede to a  
spirituality that is not Christian and his approach to Mme de Staël’s work denies that 
eloquence or “génie” could possibly exist outside the bounds of his own religion. He 
is baffled by Mme de Staël’s attempt to harmonize religion and philosophy: “On peut 
remarquer, mon cher ami, d’un bout à l’autre de l’ouvrage de Mme de Staël, des 
contradictions singulières. Quelquefois elle paraît presque chrétienne, et je suis prête 
à me réjouir. Mais l’instant d’après, la philosophie reprend le dessus” (1271). He 
admits that some of her work contains truths but ultimately generalizes the text as “un 
mélange singulier de vérités et d’erreurs” – that is to say, a blend of things that he 
believes and does not believe (1271). In reality, Mme de Staël does not disagree that 
Christianity was a great source for morality but her focus is clearly on the conscience. 
Chateaubriand does not define morality in terms of good deeds toward humanity. 
Instead, he focuses on “génie,” criticizing Staël for her style while largely ignoring 




Despite his rejection of Mme de Staël’s religious philosophy in general, 
Chateaubriand’s Christianity shares a sentimental quality which is not altogether 
different from Mme de Staël’s enthusiasm. His alleged conversion story, recounted in 
the Mémoires d’outre-tombe, serves as a telling example of the ideal religious 
experience according to Chateaubriand. While his allegiance is to traditional 
Catholicism, he still manages to describe faith as springing from the heart and stresses 
the simplicity of his emotions which retain an air of innocence: “ma conviction est 
sorti du cœur: j’ai pleuré et j’ai cru” (Dupuis 59). 
 
Innocence, Ignorance, and Faith 
 
Chateaubriand’s response to De la littérature in the letter to Fontanes helps us 
understand a key point repeated throughout the Génie du christianisme: religious faith 
is contingent upon innocent ignorance and therefore philosophy must be excluded 
from religion. According to the book on philosophy in the second part of the Génie: 
“La vraie philosophie est l’innocence de la vieillesse des peuples, lorsqu’ils ont cessé 
d’avoir des vertus par instinct, et qu’ils n’en ont plus que par raison: cette seconde 
innocence est moins sûre que la première; mais, lorsqu’on peut y atteindre, elle est 
plus sublime” (803). Philosophy that falls outside of this narrow ideal of wisdom, 
however, is uniformly discarded as sophism. Early on in the Génie, Chateaubriand 
argues that mystery actually creates beauty and happiness. Ignorance is a virtue: 
“L’innocence, à son tour, qui n’est qu’une sainte ignorance, n’est-elle pas le plus 
ineffable des mystères? L’enfance n’est si heureuse que parce qu’elle ne sait rien, la 
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vieillesse si misérable, que parce qu’elle sait tout;...” (472). Chateaubriand glorifies 
the preservation of innocence and ignorance as a means for cultivating pure sentiment 
and virtue. He contrasts these states of purity with science and philosophy, arguing 
that certain things are meant to be left unknown. The chapters that follow are 
eloquent homages to the various mysteries and sacraments of Christianity. Man’s 
inability to comprehend the divine is repeatedly cited as the reason for which he 
should not attempt to understand it. For example, in the case of the Holy Trinity, the 
author reinforces the idea that man is forever ignorant of the divine, thus philosophy 
is futile: “C’est une très méchante manière de raisonner que de rejeter ce qu’on ne 
peut comprendre. À partir des choses les plus simples dans la vie, il serait aisé de 
prouver que nous ignorons tout, et nous voulons pénétrer dans les ruses de la 
Sagesse!” (474). Regarding the Redemption, he concurs: “Ne le demandons pas à 
notre esprit, mais à notre cœur, nous tous faibles et coupables, comment un Dieu peut 
mourir” (480). As for the Incarnation, Chateaubriand focuses on the Virgin Mary’s 
innocence as a vessel for the birth of the savior: “Marie est la divinité de l’innocence, 
de la faiblesse et du malheur. [...] et le cœur du nouveau-né qui ne comprend pas 
encore le Dieu du ciel, comprend déjà cette divine mère, qui tient un enfant dans ses 
bras” (487). 
 
The glorification of innocence and ignorance goes hand-in-hand with the 
demonization of science and philosophy: “les siècles savants ont toujours touché aux 
siècles de destruction” (142). The third part of the Génie includes a chapter on 
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astronomy and mathematics in which Chateaubriand praises the spiritual merits of the 
beaux arts over the sciences:  
 
En effet, plusieurs personnes ont pensé que la science entre les 
mains de l’homme dessèche le cœur, désenchante la nature, 
même les esprits faibles à l’athéisme, et de l’athéisme au 
crime; que les beaux-arts, au contraire, rendent nos jours 
merveilleux, attendrissent nos âmes, nous font pleins de foi 
envers la Divinité, et conduisent par la religion à la pratique 
des vertus. (807) 
 
Likening man to “the manifestation of God's thoughts” while associating nature with 
God's imagination “rendu sensible,” he implies that man’s imperfections are due to 
his intellectual tendencies (558). Sciences “rendent compte de tout à l'esprit, sans 
rendre compte de rien au cœur” (553). True Christianity for Chateaubriand can only 
be found in the Church. Nevertheless, a significant portion of the Génie focuses not 
on the teachings of Jesus or the Catholic saints but rather on his own versions of the 
Old Testament creation story. In fact, the two short stories, Atala (1801) and René 
(1805), published in the Génie, reveal hints of dissatisfaction with the impotence of 
religion in the face of strong human sentiment and the inability of religion to restore 
man to his edenic state of happiness. Chateaubriand’s depiction of Christianity is 
ultimately as a harsh and unforgiving religion but the sacrifices made to its God, the 
very misery that it inflicts on humankind, is the source of its beauty. Beauty and truth 
are intertwined: “Où est donc la beauté de la peinture? dans la vérité” (249). Although 
Chateaubriand criticizes Mme de Staël for alleged contradictions between religion 
and philosophy, the contrast between paradise (what Christianity promises) and life 
on Earth (what a Christian person actually experiences) is for Chateaubriand the very 
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essence of Christian aesthetics. In book two of the second part of the Génie, the 
author links the unrequited longings produced by Christianity to the artistic concept 
of the “beau idéal”: “Le cœur humain veut plus qu’il ne peut; il veut surtout admirer: 
il a en soi-même un élan vers une beauté inconnue, pour laquelle il fut créé dans son 
origine. La religion chrétienne est si heureusement formée, qu’elle est elle-même une 
sorte de poésie, puisqu’elle place les caractères dans le beau idéal...” (672). 
 
Primitive Man vs. Perfectibility 
In contrast to Mme de Staël’s perfectibilité, Chateaubriand insists that man has 
undergone a process of moral degeneration since primitive times (534). He highlights 
the disharmony between reason and passion as proof of man’s moral erosion:  
Quand il atteint au plus haut degré de civilisation, il est au 
dernier échelon de la morale: s’il est libre, il est grossier; s’il 
polit ses mœurs, il se forge des chaînes. [...] On dirait que le 
génie de l’homme, un flambeau à la main, vole incessamment 
autour de ce globe, au milieu de la nuit qui nous couvre; il se 
montre aux quatre parties de la terre, comme cet astre nocturne, 
qui, croissant et décroissant sans cesse, diminue à chaque pas 
pour un peuple la clarté qu’il augmente pour un autre.  
Il est donc raisonnable de soupçonner que l’homme, dans sa 
constitution primitive, ressemblait au reste de la création, et 
que cette constitution se formait du parfait accord du sentiment 
et de la pensée, de l’imagination et de l’entendement. (535) 
 
Civilization and morality are, for Chateaubriand, in an antithetical relationship. This 
description of man, helplessly scrambling in the dark for knowledge he will never 
have, emphasizes man’s disharmony which contributes to his ongoing lack of 
stability. As his knowledge increases, his morality decreases. Man is doomed never to 
be whole, unlike primitive man who lived in a state of perfect balance between 
sentiment and reason. It follows that the cause of this process of degeneration was 
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original sin. God meant for humans to progress but Adam’s mistake disrupted the 
progress that might have been:  
Adam était à la fois le plus éclairé et le meilleur des hommes, 
le plus puissant en pensée et le plus puissant en amour. Mais 
tout ce qui est créé a nécessairement une marche progressive. 
Au lieu d’attendre la révolution des siècles des connaissances 
nouvelles, qu’il n’aurait reçues qu’avec des sentiments 
nouveaux, Adam voulut tout connaître à la fois. (535) 
 
 
Here Chateaubriand appears to agree with Ballanche that progress must be made in 
due time. His description of Adam’s trespass recalls Ballanche’s warning that social 
change should not be forced before God has prepared people to accept such changes. 
An important difference between Ballanche and Chateaubriand, however, is that 
Ballanche still views the present as being part of God’s plan and accepts even human 
errors as stepping stones to the future. Everything happens for a reason. For 
Chateaubriand, however, God’s plan for progress was disrupted after the fall. He 
imagines an amazing world of what could have been if man had not been forced from 
Eden and refers to the fall as accidental, implying that it should never have happened 
and was not in God’s plan:  “Tel fut l’accident qui changea l’harmonieuse et 
immortelle constitution de l’homme” (536). Man’s only hope is to have faith in 
Christianity as a portal to a lost state of perfection: “La religion chrétienne, bien 
entendue, n'est que la nature primitive lavée de la tache originelle” (599). 
Chateaubriand explains progress as a sort of illusion: the universe itself is not actually 
changing but its inhabitants change and therefore the static universe is reflected 
differently through the eyes of ever changing populations. Thus, God reunites “la 
durée absolue” of nature and “la durée progressive” of man (559). The “graces” of the 
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world are “always the same but renewed” (559). Therefore, it is no surprise that 
Chateaubriand interprets world religions as misconstrued glimpses of the one true 
religion. 
 
Although he acknowledges in the Génie that world religions share some truths, 
Chateaubriand champions Christianity as the true religion because it is allegedly the 
most unified, the most harmonious. He compares religion to a painting: “Pour 
découvrir l’original d’un tableau au milieu d’une foule de copies, il faut chercher 
celui qui, dans son unité ou la perfection de ses parties, décèle le génie du maître. 
C’est ce que nous trouvons dans la Genèse, originale de ces peintures, reproduites 
dans les traditions des peuples” (529).  
 
Against Philosophy and Science 
 
The third book of the Génie is dedicated to a study of the scriptures. Again, the 
author’s method is to compare world religions in an attempt to show that all religions 
contain some basic truths: 
Il est impossible de croire qu’un mensonge absurde devienne 
une tradition universelle. Ouvrez les livres du second 
Zoroastre, les dialogues de Platon et ceux de Lucien, les traités 
moraux de Plutarque, les fastes des Chinois, la Bible des 
Hébreux, les Edda des Scandinaves; transportez-vous chez les 
nègres de l’Afrique, ou chez les savants prêtres de l’Inde: tous 
vous feront le récit des crimes du dieu du mal; tous vous 
peindront les temps trop courts du bonheur de l’homme, et les 




A similar argument is applied to scientists and philosophers. In book four of the first 
part, for example, Chateaubriand argues that the story of Moses was likely true since 
various learned men believed in it: “D’abord, il est un peu téméraire de vouloir nous 
persuader qu’Origène, Eusèbe, Bossuet, Pascal, Fénelon, Bacon, Newton, Leibniz, 
Huet, et tant d’autres étaient ou des ignorants, ou des simples, ou des pervers parlant 
contre leur conviction intime. Cependant ils ont cru à la vérité de l’histoire de Moïse” 
(538). Just pages later, however, Newton and Leibniz are accused of taking part in the 
downfall of the modern world as fathers of a movement towards science and against 
religion. Chateaubriand is careful to distinguish Copernicus, Tycho-Brahé, Kepler, 
and Leibniz as believers in God but depicts them as the last of their kind. The 
knowledge they uncovered inspired modern scientists to search for truth outside the 
bounds of Christianity: "leurs successeurs, par une fatalité inexplicable, s’imaginèrent 
tenir Dieu dans leurs creusets et dans leurs télescopes, parce qu’ils y voyaient 
quelques-uns des éléments sur lesquels l’Intelligence universelle a fondé les mondes" 
(550). Chateaubriand’s simplified portrayal of scientists recalls the legend of Faust. 
Men began with good intentions but scientific achievement tempts them into thinking 
that humanity wields some power over God. 
 
 
Chateaubriand likewise criticizes eighteenth century religious philosophers for 
allegedly pandering to the sophists. The enlightenment argument for Christianity, he 
explains, is that the religion was good because it came from God. For Chateaubriand, 
however, Christianity is inherently excellent and needs no apology. His reasoning is 
therefore the reverse. Christianity is excellent, therefore it must have come from God. 
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Assuming the religion itself to be good regardless of its origins removes any doubt of 
the Church’s infallibility: 
  
Les défenseurs des chrétiens tombèrent dans une faute qui les 
avait déjà perdues : ils ne s’aperçurent pas qu’il ne s’agissait 
plus de discuter tel ou tel dogme, puisqu’on rejetait absolument 
les bases. En partant de la mission de Jésus-Christ, en 
remontant de conséquence en conséquence, ils établissaient 
sans doute fort solidement les vérités de la foi ; mais cette 
manière d’argumenter, bonne au dix-septième siècle, lorsque le 
fond n’était pas contesté, ne valait plus rien de nos jours. Il 
fallait prendre la route contraire: passer de l’effet à la cause, ne 
pas prouver que le christianisme est excellent, parce qu’il vient 




For Chateaubriand, the false path taken by eighteenth century religious philosophers 
seems to mirror Adam’s sin. Once again, reason spoils faith and when one follows 
reasoning outside of the confines of dogma. It is dangerous to put the concept of God 
above the religion that represents him. Taking God out of context opens the doors to 
spiritual interpretation thereby mingling human error with the divine. Rather than 
seek a new personal connection with the divine, the Génie du christianisme aims to 
return to the foundations of religion: dogma and ritual. Evidently, Chateaubriand sees 
his work as a correction of theosophical errors which he believes derailed Christian 
thought in the eighteenth century. 
 
Despite his warnings that individual religious interpretation risks tainting Christian 
wisdom, Chateaubriand takes the liberty of rewriting portions of the Old Testament 
so that the scriptures respond to recent scientific discrepancies with Christian 
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tradition. Chateaubriand essentially transforms God into a fictional character in order 
to elaborate on God's reasoning. Addressing, for example, the discovery of tropical 
animal remains in cold climates, the author explains: “il voulut imprimer sur ce globe 
des traces éternelles de son courroux” (554). Mountain ranges exist “pour marquer 
son triomphe sur les impies, comme un monarque plante un trophée dans le champ où 
il a défait ses ennemis” (554). Emphasizing man’s ephemeral nature, the author writes 
that God is motivated to leave traces of his work on Earth because he knows how 
forgetful men can be: “sachant combien l'homme perd aisément la mémoire du 
malheur, il en multiplia les souvenirs dans sa demeure” (555). Although none of this 
is actually found in the Bible, Chateaubriand asserts his story as truth.  
 
Throughout the entire second book of the first part of the Génie, devoted to “Vertus et 
lois morales,” the author again takes liberties in re-writing biblical events. In the first 
chapter, he examines “vices et vertus selon la religion,” attacking pride (orgueil) 
which he asserts is the number one vice according to the Church: “C’est le péché de 
Satan, c’est le premier péché du monde” (512). His version of the history of morality 
in the Christian world reads like scripture:  
Avant Jésus-Christ, l’âme de l’homme était en chaos; le Verbe 
se fit entendre, aussitôt tout se débrouilla dans le monde 
intellectuel, comme à la même Parole, tout s’était jadis dans le 
monde physique: ce fut la création morale de l’univers. [...] 
Dès lors on vit s’établir une admirable balance entre les forces 
et les faiblesses; la religion dirigea ses foudres contre l’orgueil, 
vice qui se nourrit de vertus: elle le découvrit dans les replis de 
nos cœurs, elle le poursuivit dans ses métamorphoses; les 
sacrements marchèrent contre lui en une armée sainte, et 
l’Humilité, vêtue d’un sac, les reins ceints d’une corde, les 
pieds nus, le front couvert de cendre, les yeux baissés et en 




The biblical tone of Chateaubriand’s writing adds a sense of religious authenticity to 
his message while the use of allegory provides a touch of wonderment. In the above 
passage, he insists upon the balance which supposedly existed in primitive times, a 
theme found throughout the Génie, usually in the context of “harmony.” His 
personification of the sacraments as soldiers in defense of humility adds a sense of 
purpose to Catholic ritual. Moreover, the personification of humility as a martyr-like 
saint further glorifies Chateaubriand’s stance against knowledge in favor of faith. In 
doing so, he praises humility as the path of the faithful and spurns activities outside 
the sphere of humility, such as the quest for knowledge.  
 
Hope and Faith: External vs. Internal Spirituality 
 
Chateaubriand contrasts faith and hope as external and internal phenomena, 
respectively:  
 
La foi a son foyer hors de nous; elle nous vient d’un objet 
étranger; l’espérance, au contraire, naît au dedans de nous, pour 
se porter au dehors. On nous impose la première, notre propre 
désir fait naître la seconde; celle-là est une obéissance, celle-ci 
est un amour. Mais comme la foi engendre plus facilement les 
autres vertus, comme elle découle directement de Dieu, que par 
conséquent étant une émanation de l’Éternel, elle est plus belle 
que l’espérance! (516).  
 
He argues that faith (which he deems external) is the more beautiful religious path 
because it comes directly from God to man whereas hope is born within man. This, he 
says, is why the Church values faith over hope. For Chateaubriand then, the 
113 
 
importance of faith over hope signals that religion is something that one ideally 
absorbs from the outside-in. This idea of external religion contrasts directly with 
Rousseau and Mme de Staël who argued that true spirituality comes from a voice 
inside the self, from the conscience. For Mme de Staël, hope would be the guiding 
light of the nation, inspiring the people to glimpse the possibilities of society beyond 
the challenges of the present. Hope, she says, would inspire morality through trust in 
fellow men rather than through the force of the law. While Chateaubriand is certainly 
concerned with morality, he diminishes the authority of the conscience by 
consistently insisting on the authority of external religious sources. The second 
chapter of part one, book six does address the conscience but Chateaubriand redefines 
the conscience within the framework of Christianity and asserts that the Church is a 
perfected external conscience meant to correct the internal conscience which man has 
lost: “Toujours prêt à avertir le pécheur, le Fils de Dieu avait établi sa religion comme 
une seconde conscience, pour le coupable qui aurait eu le malheur de perdre la 
conscience naturelle, conscience évangélique, pleine de pitié et de douceur, et à 
laquelle Jésus-Christ avait accordé le droit de faire grâce, que n’a pas la première” 
(607). He goes on to add that modern conscience is actually just a fear of the laws 
(which are also external), completely denying the possibility that man might have any 
internal source for morality. 
 
In keeping with his rejection of internal spiritual pursuits, Chateaubriand cites his 
stance against solitude as one of his main reasons for writing Atala (1801) and René 
(1805), the two moral tales originally published in the Génie. In the original preface 
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to Atala, he makes a point of distancing himself from Rousseau, noting that he rejects 
Rousseau’s admiration for pure nature (19). Given the painstakingly detailed 
descriptions of gorgeous wild nature scenes that follow in the story, it is difficult to 
believe that Chateaubriand genuinely finds nature to be so ugly. It is well known that 
as a young man, prior to the Revolution, Chateaubriand admired Rousseau and his 
spiritual philosophy was closer to Enlightenment deism (Berchet 154). With 
Chateaubriand’s change in political affiliation, however, his spiritual philosophy also 
changed. The wild American landscapes in René and Atala hint at a preoccupation 
with the virgin Edenic setting. As Eric Gans points out, “Rousseau’s nature was that 
of familiar lands; nor was it particularly individualized. (...) That of Bernardin de 
Saint-Pierre was exotic, but it remained confined to the colonial island of Mauritius. 
Chateaubriand thus had the opportunity to raise the ante by exploring an exotic 
landscape foreign to him and to European civilization, one inhabited by savages” 
(569). Chateaubriand’s virgin landscape provides an opportunity for man to begin 
again, free of the corruptions of contemporary society. 
 
The negative aspect of nature for Chateaubriand is linked to nature’s association with 
solitude and with the danger of unregulated passion. Although he praises nature for its 
harmony, the author depicts wild nature as a power dangerously unchecked by the 
limits of society. Solitude leads to philosophy which destroys religion. In his letter to 
M. de Fontanes, he asserts that in the language of native Americans, the word for 
“philosophy” is akin to the word for “solitude” which Chateaubriand associates with 
emptiness: “Le mot philosophie, dans le langage de l’Europe, me semble 
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correspondre au mot solitude, dans l’idiome des Sauvages. Or, comment la 
philosophie remplira-t-elle le vide de vos jours? Comble-t-on le désert avec le 
désert?” (1279). Establishing philosophy as useless, Chateaubriand advocates a return 
to religion as the only cure for the mal du siècle. Rather than move forward, he says, 




In the prologue to Atala, Chateaubriand’s descriptions of America’s unspoiled 
wilderness often recall the Old Testament creation story. Amid the lush and fertile 
backdrop of the New World, this landscape is like a window into Earth’s idyllic past: 
“Une multitude d’animaux placés dans ces retraites par la main du Créateur, y 
répandent l’enchantement et la vie” (35). He further links the New World to Eden 
through a telling of a Native American version of the Fall and the great flood during a 
traditional ceremony, reinforcing the universality of the book of Genesis (52). Setting 
Atala and René in the New World allows the works to play out against vast, solitary, 
virgin spaces. The setting immediately pulls the reader away from Western society 
and the Church as if to begin by clearing out all preconceptions of Christianity. The 
new landscape is akin to the spiritual and political tabula rasa one might have 
perceived in the unknown future of religion in nineteenth century France.  
 
Beginning with a simple tribal culture allows Chateaubriand to return to Eden and 
recreate the Fall himself. It also allows him to consider the role of religion on a basic 
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level, stripped of the political and economic complications of modern European 
society. Even in the wilderness, man is not truly alone. Society and ritual, the 
cornerstones of religion, are universally ever present. For example, when Chactas 
walks through the forest with Atala, the two are supposed to be alone, “l'âme de la 
solitude soupirait dans toute l'étendue du désert,” but the couple is actually 
surrounded by social rituals concerning love, mating, and fertility (46). The author 
recounts these rituals in a style reminiscent of the Song of Songs. It is as if Atala and 
Chactas are walking through a series of living Old Testament scenes being acted out 
around them. The people performing these rituals are ghost-like and do not interact 
with Atala and Chactas at all but the two are nevertheless enchanted by these external 
ceremonies that mirror their internal passions: “Déjà subjugués par notre propre cœur, 
nous fûmes accablés par ces images d’amour et de maternité, qui semblaient nous 
poursuivre dans ces solitudes enchantées” (47). Chactas refers to some of the players 
in this scene as “Génies,” linking these elements of nature and the native people with 
the divine: “Le Génie des airs secouait sa chevelure bleue [...] Nous aperçûmes à 
travers les arbres un jeune homme, qui, tenant à la main un flambeau, ressemblait au 
Génie du printemps, parcourant les forêts pour ranimer la nature” (46). These scenes, 
however, recreate an Old Testament atmosphere so that the author can reconstruct the 
circumstances of the fall of man using Chactas and Atala as his own Adam and Eve. 
In Chateaubriand’s version, however, Christianity steps in to prevent the fall: “Qui 
pouvait sauver Atala? Qui pouvait l’empêcher de succomber à la nature? Rien qu’un 
miracle, sans doute; et ce miracle fut fait! La fille de Simaghan eut recours au Dieu 
des chrétiens; elle se précipita sur la terre, et prononça une fervente oraison, adressée 
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à sa mère et à la reine des vierges” (48). Here we are reminded of his insistence in the 
Génie that the Fall was a preventable accident. This scene impresses upon Chactas the 
power of Christianity to control human passions. Chactas’ feelings of love for Atala 
transform into admiration for the religion which she represents. Rather than taste the 
fruit of knowledge, he basks in her innocent ignorance: “Ah! Qu’elle me parut divine, 
la simple Sauvage, l’ignorante Atala, qui à genoux devant un vieux pin tombé, 
comme au pied d’un autel, offrait à son Dieu des vœux pour un amant idolâtre!” (48). 
As the author explains in his 1826 preface to the Essai sur les Révolutions, by 
liberating man from his passions, Christianity becomes a source for freedom: “le 
christianisme porte pour moi deux preuves manifestes de sa céleste origine: par sa 
morale, il tend à nous délivrer des passions, par sa politique, il a aboli l’esclavage. 
C’est donc une religion de la liberté: c’est la mienne” (Dupuis 79). 
 
As someone who has had little exposure to Christianity, Chactas serves as a narrator 
who is able to convey his experience with Christianity to the reader from a 
completely fresh perspective. In this way, Chateaubriand reacquaints readers with an 
otherwise all too familiar religious tradition and is able to manipulate their perception 
of it through comparisons with primitive society. Chactas is amazed by Father 
Aubrey's Christian charity which is unheard of among tribal societies. He is 
impressed that Christian charity falls equally on all people (64). Aubrey is a hermit, 
and so he too is a solitary figure, but unlike the other solitary characters he lives 
according to the external cult. For Aubrey, religion conquers all matters of the heart. 
He practices strict Catholicism with no hint of personal interpretation. In comparison 
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with Rousseau's Vicaire Savoyard, for example, Aubrey believes in Catholic law and 
ceremony and does not temper religion with personal philosophy. In the original 
preface to Atala, Chateaubriand makes a point of contrasting his fictional priest with 
the likes of a Vicaire Savoyard: “Quant au missionaire, j’ai cru remarquer que ceux 
qui jusqu’à présent ont mis le prêtre en action, en ont fait ou un scélérat fanatique, ou 
un espèce de philosophe. Le père Aubrey n’est rien de tout cela. C’est un simple 
chrétien ... en un mot, c’est le prêtre tel qu’il est” (20). Although Aubrey allows the 
native people to keep their simple way of life, the religion he brings to them is 
standard interpretation. Father Aubrey is an example of the concept of the imitation of 
Christ. He lives not according to personal philosophy but in emulation of what he 
believes is perfection. His entire existence is ritualistic rather than philosophical. The 
priest does not engage with God, he does not question him. He simply admires God 
(67). Aubrey's communication with the people “blends God into all of his discourses” 
(70). While Aubrey is performing the mass, exterior objects in nature transform into 
ceremonial objects: a rock becomes the altar, wild grapes provide the sacrificial wine 
(71). The setting supports a passage which appears later in the Génie which asserts 
that Christian nature scenes, unlike those in polytheistic mythology, are occupied 
completely by “une Divinité immense” (720). In a chapter on Gothic churches, 
Chateaubriand adds: “Les forêts ont été les premiers temples de la Divinité” (801). 
Père Aubrey, as a representative of God on Earth, becomes the instrument of this 
transformation. The conquering of nature through ritual is equivalent to the 
conquering of human emotion through faith. Chactas is awestruck by the 
transformation: “O charme de la religion! O magnificence du culte chrétien! […] 
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J'admirais le triomphe du Christianisme sur la vie sauvage...” (71). Christianity here 
has triumphed over nature. Religious law has suppressed instinct. Aubrey's success in 
converting the native people is in part due to the fact that he restricts their laws to the 
foundations of Christianity. He simply encourages them to love, pray, and, of course, 
participate in Christian ceremony (72).  Father Aubrey's consistent following of 
Catholic doctrine leaves no room for actions inspired by human passions: “Qu'il est 
faible celui que les passions dominent! Qu'il est fort celui qui se repose en Dieu!” 
(73).  
 
In accordance with Chateaubriand’s condemnation of unchecked enthusiasm, Père 
Aubrey's lack of personal emotion counters Chactas who is completely driven by 
human passions. The priest informs Chactas that man has no right to judge God. 
Aubrey instead preaches hope to Chactas as an internal substitute for passion: 
“Chactas, c'est une religion bien divine que celle-là qui a fait une vertu de 
l'espérance” (76). Thus, even if hope is inferior to faith, one must have hope in order 
to cultivate faith. Speaking out against Atala's interpretation of Christianity and the 
influence of her mother and the missionary who guided them, Aubrey emphasizes the 
dangers of enthusiasm when it meddles with religion: “Vous offrez tous trois des 
dangers de l'enthousiasme, et du défaut des lumières en matière de religion” (81). For 
Mme de Staël, in contrast, enthusiasm was the most remarkable aspect of 
Christianity. Enthusiasm, however, is a creative power. For Chateaubriand, one does 




Like Ballanche, Chateaubriand considers Christianity to be a regulator of sentiment. 
In the Génie, he describes Christianity as the ultimate source for harmony: “Il 
(L'Évangile) est à nos sentiments ce que le goût est aux arts” (599). Atala herself is a 
blend of “savage” society and Christian religious values. Consequently, her 
misguided spirituality prevents her from enjoying harmony. Her personality reflects 
this clash of conflicting influences. She is at once virtuous yet passionate, 
melancholic but with a divine smile (41). Although Atala professes to be a Christian, 
her distance from Christian society leads to misinterpretation of Christian doctrine. 
Christianity is supposed to unite people but in Atala's case, her religion separates her 
from her fellow man. As a Christian, she believes she is unable to unite with Chactas: 
“Ma religion me sépare de toi pour toujours...” (44). Atala's interpretation of her own 
religion is that it is sometimes more of a curse than a blessing. She refers to the vows 
that she made to her mother as a “malédiction” (75). Atala misinterprets Christianity 
because she does not share it with anyone. In the wilderness, she has no external cult. 
Forced to interpret Christianity as an individual, she cannot understand it. It is her 
misunderstanding of the religion that leads to her tragic end. Having inherited religion 
from her mother, she has additionally inherited a “feminine” Christianity driven by 
passions rather than by dogma. This is perhaps a negative interpretation of the 
“feminine” Christianity that we experience as a positive development in the works of 





René, first published in the 1805 edition of the Génie du christianisme as the sequel to 
Atala, revisits the theme of solitude. The introduction of a French main character 
allows Chateaubriand to specifically target the influence of solitude on European 
culture. An excess of passions and imagination
8
 is blamed for the separation between 
modern man and his environment. The author begins the original preface to René with 
a passage from the Génie in which he stresses the dangers of a solitary existence: “On 
habite, avec un cœur plein, un monde vide; et sans avoir usé de rien, on a désabusé de 
tout” (112). He again attacks Rousseau for promoting solitude and adds Goethe to the 
list of culpable authors whose works have inspired a rash of suicides (114). It is 
notable that these two authors in particular are also mentioned in Mme de Staël’s De 
la littérature as perfect examples of sentimental literature.  
 
As the story unfolds, however, Chateaubriand’s initial promise to demonstrate the 
usefulness of Christianity is arguably lost amid the title character’s overwhelming 
melancholy. As Maurice Regard points out in his introduction to the Pléiade edition, 
Chateaubriand himself admits in the Mémoires d’outre-tombe that René failed to 
deliver its intended impact on his contemporaries: “Si René n’existait pas, je ne 
l’écrirais plus; s’il m’était possible de le détruire, je le détruirais. Une famille de René 
poètes et de René prosateurs a pullulé: on n’a plus entendu que des phrases 
lamentables et décousues” (107). Whereas Atala more clearly counteracts solitude 
                                                 
8
 Imagination and enthusiasm are again “feminine” qualities which we see depicted as positive 
creative powers according to Mme de Staël but which Chateaubriand shows to be destructive. Jules 
Michelet, who in no way agrees with a Christian agenda, nevertheless will agree with Chateaubriand 
on this point later on in the century. Michelet will however associate Christianity in general with 
feminization while Chateaubriand sees Christianity as a masculine power and femininity as a product 
of unchecked human emotions. 
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with religion, René combines solitude and religion through nostalgia. Both, however, 
require a step back in time. Describing his nostalgia for church bells, René’s solitary 
meditations actually strengthen his bonds with his religion and his heritage: “Tout se 
trouve dans les rêveries enchantées où nous plonge le bruit de la cloche natale: 
religion, patrie, et le berceau et la tombe, et le passé et l'avenir” (120). René also 
describes monasteries as places where men go to escape life, a sort of living death in 
solitude that is completely contrary to Chateaubriand’s anti-suicide stance. René 
envies those with religious vocations, not because they have found God but because 
they have escaped the trials of life: “Heureux ceux qui ont fini leur voyage sans avoir 
quitté le port” (121). Monasteries are described as places of complete solitude.  
 
Moreover, Amélie's vow ceremony includes the Office of the Dead, emphasizing the 
parallels between suicide and religious vocation. According to the preface to René, 
religion is the antidote to suicidal melancholy, yet the story depicts religious life as a 
kind of suicide in itself. Amélie, lying on the altar, further strengthens this connection 
with her prayer: “Dieu de miséricorde, fais que je ne me relève jamais de cette couche 
funèbre, et comble de tes biens un frère qui n'a point partagé ma criminelle passion!” 
(139). Chateaubriand actually defends suicide in the Génie, in the case of Paul et 
Virginie, when it is an expression of Christian devotion and Amélie’s self-sacrifice 





In René’s case, however, religion seems to provide him with very little comfort. The 
title character only succeeds in conquering his passion with stronger passions. His 
suicidal tendencies cease once he finally experiences true misery (141). René admits 
that the monastic atmosphere actually caused him pain: “Je ne sais comment toutes 
ces choses qui auraient dû nourrir mes peines, en émoussaient au contraire l'aiguillon” 
(142). Later in the Génie, Chateaubriand explains that there is a type of modern 
Christian who should have gone into the monastery but who instead has become 
consumed by worldly desires (715-16). Renée is perhaps a literary example of this 
problem. Amélie, in contrast, finds peace in her sacrifice and in the purity and routine 
of religious life (142). While Amélie's satisfaction with religious life does support the 
idea that the regulations of the external cult provide comfort, the fact that she has 
chosen a symbolic death which removes her from society brings into question 
Chateaubriand's distain for anti-social behavior. In response to this evident 
contradiction, Chateaubriand adds a scene with the scornful Father Souël who warns: 
“La solitude est mauvaise à celui qui n'y vit pas avec Dieu” but even then, the author 
cannot help but betray Souël's hard line by adding that the priest does not show his 
true compassion for René: “Il portait en secret un coeur compatissant, mais il montrait 
au-dehors un caractère inflexible” (144). The priest suppresses his internal sentiments 
and externally only expresses the stance of the church. As for Amélie, the “burning 
chastity” that she experiences is a similar act of repression (142). Ceremony allows 
her to channel sinful passions into religious zeal. Christianity thereby allows emotion 
to flourish within the limits of its framework. Amélie’s zeal recalls other passionate, 
often female, mystics such as Teresa of Avila, who used Christian adoration as a 
124 
 
means for channeling passion into religion. As Chateaubriand explains in the Génie, 
“la religion chrétienne est elle-même une sorte de passion qui a ses transports, ses 
ardeurs, ses soupirs, ses joies, ses larmes, ses amours du monde et du désert” (707). 
 
Rather than completely dissuade readers from embracing a solitary lifestyle, Atala 
and René show that solitude is only productive when it is carried out as part of a 
religious commitment. Chateaubriand does not choose to include examples of how 
religion might enhance normal daily life. He chooses instead to show how lack of 
religion can render a person unhappy and how misunderstanding of religion (or 
religious ideas interpreted outside of the guidance of the Church) can lead to tragedy. 
Religion serves as an escape from daily life in these stories – not as a way of living. 
Despite his intentions to glorify Christianity, the author communicates a mixed 
message alternately sympathizing with and condemning the solitary figure. Moreover, 
Chateaubriand fails to illustrate the importance of sentiment in Christianity since he 
focuses more on the damnation of enthusiasm than he does on the development of 
Christian sentimentality. Christianity is not depicted as a religion of compassion but 
rather as a religion of rules to be followed – not in harmony with one’s feelings but 
despite them.  
 
Unlike Rousseau and Mme de Staël who promote the “inner voice” as a source for 
divine truth, René's comparable “murmurs” from within are simply a product of his 
“sensations fugitives” and the effect is confusion, not truth (129). He even describes 
himself as being possessed by the “demon” of his heart (130). Comfort comes from 
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outside the self: “une voix du ciel semblait me dire: 'Homme, la saison de ta 
migration n'est pas encore venue” (130). René, perhaps like the eighteenth century 
philosophers that Chateaubriand condemns, knows religion without feeling it. He 
claims that his heart loved God but his feelings, thoughts, and actions prove 
contradictory to the religion he professes: “J’étais plein de religion, et je raisonnais en 
impie; mon cœur aimait Dieu, et mon esprit le méconnaissait” (131). Although 
Atala’s Father Aubrey was able to triumph over the “vie sauvage,” René’s modern 
intellectual melancholy holds out against faith since he remains steeped in 
individualism. Even after realizing his fault, René does not turn to Christianity as a 
source of healing. He confesses but never repents. 
 
Although religion seems to remain as the only reliable source of comfort for mankind 
in René, Chateaubriand does not describe Christianity as a warm and loving religion 
but rather as a power which inspires awe. Both René and Amélie waiver with the 
weight of human sentiment as they enter Amélie's vow ceremony but religion 
“triumphs” over them. Reminiscent of Chactas’ admiration for Atala’s celestial 
transformation, René is won over by the great beauty he sees in his sister at the very 
moment when she becomes inaccessible to him (138). It is this conflict between great 
joy and great sorrow that makes Christianity so beautiful according to Chateaubriand: 
“Formée pour nos misères et pour nos besoins, la religion chrétienne nous offre sans 
cesse le double tableau des chagrins de la terre et des joies célestes; et, par ce moyen, 
elle fait dans le cœur une source de maux présents et d’espérances lointaines, d’où 
découlent d’inépuisables rêveries” (715). René echoes this sort of Christian sublime 
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when he exclaims in reference to the ceremony: “O joies de la religion, que vous êtes 
grandes mais que vous êtes terribles!” (139). Throughout the vow ceremony, 
references to joy and sorrow intertwine. If Chateaubriand had truly intended to glorify 
Christianity as a unifier of humanity, this ceremony might have provided the perfect 
moment to demonstrate that religion can sooth pain and produce joy through spiritual 
bonds. Instead, the passage focuses on the sensational ceremonial details which turn 
morbidly cult-like with the descriptions of the darker elements of the ceremony such 
as torches, veils and the funeral altar. Even when the ceremony overtakes his senses, 
René is not so much conquered by religion as he is charmed by the effect it has on his 
sister. His outburst at the close of the ceremony implies that the separation between 
heaven and Earth makes Christianity divisive, not harmonious: “Chaste épouse de 
Jésus-Christ, reçois mes derniers embrassements à travers les glaces du trépas et les 
profondeurs de l’éternité, qui te séparent déjà de ton frère!” (140). 
 
Reinforcing the idea that man’s spiritual path to harmony must lead backward, René 
reveals that his voyage to the New World was a search for poet-prophets and the 
elements of the harmonious religious ideals that would have characterized primitive 
times: “Je recherchai surtout dans mes voyages les artistes et ces hommes divins qui 
chantent les dieux sur la lyre, et la fidélité des peuples qui honorent les lois, la 
religion et les tombeaux” (123). In the end, however, René's yearning for truth is 
never satisfied. Something more is left to be discovered: “Cependant qu'avais-je 
appris jusqu'alors avec tant de fatigue? Rien de certain parmi les anciens, rien de beau 
parmi les modernes " (124). He longs for the aesthetic perfection of the ancients to 
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enhance modern reason. René’s perception of the Revolution is that it lost the beauty 
of genius, religion, and morality: “De la hauteur du génie, du respect pour la religion, 
de la gravité des moeurs, tout était subitement descendu à la souplesse de l'esprit, à 
l'impiété, à la corruption” (126). Thought won out over sentiment. He describes 
himself as feeling “isolated” in his own country and church as a place where people, 
especially the impoverished, come to be healed and to find serenity (126-7).  
Nevertheless, there is ultimately a haunting separation between René and his religion. 
It is his religion after all that separates him from his sister Amélie, his feminine ideal. 




Chateaubriand, like Ballanche, denies in his Génie du christianisme that any 
enlightenment or genius could possibly be derived from non-Christian religions. For 
Chateaubriand, Christianity’s greatest achievement is æsthetic rather than moral. His 
criticism of Mme de Staël’s De la littérature shows that, at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, he is more preoccupied with the question of art in society than he is with the 
conscience or morality. Chateaubriand, like Ballanche and de Maistre, associates 
religious faith with innocence which often leads to a glorification of ignorance as the 
path to salvation. From this point of view, philosophy poses a threat to faith. 
Chateaubriand extends this fear of knowledge to scientists who he believes have 
encouraged a culture of atheism. Chateaubriand ultimately seeks to distance 
Christianity from recent philosophy and return to dogma and ritual as the foundations 
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of religion. Chateaubriand takes liberties in his own writing which at times give the 
impression that he is rewriting biblical passages to support his point of view, using 
God as a fictional character in in order to illustrate his power through hypothetical 
scenarios.  
 
Chateaubriand privileges faith above hope because, he says, faith comes from God 
while hope comes from man. Unlike Rousseau and Mme de Staël, Chateaubriand 
denies the authority of the conscience. He argues instead that Christianity provides an 
external conscience which replaces an internal conscience forever lost to man since 
primitive times. Philosophy and solitary meditation are deemed “empty.” Christianity, 
for Chateaubriand, is the only solution for the looming malaise of his era. 
 
Atala and René allow the author to express his stance against solitude and conscience-
based religion through the intimate details described through fiction. In Atala, 
Chateaubriand reimagines Genesis-like scenes, presenting Chactas and Atala as his 
own Adam and Eve. Atala, unlike Mme de Staël’s sage Corinne, is closer to the 
divine thanks to her innocent ignorance. At the same time, Chateaubriand’s portrayal 
of Chactas serves as a means for rediscovering Christianity through the eyes of a 
newcomer, from a completely fresh perspective. The author especially highlights the 
benefits of living according to the external cult which he portrays as charitable and 
constructive through the personage of the good Père Aubrey. He also uses Aubrey as 
a means for stressing the idea that external religion serves as an antidote to internal 
conflict. Religion in René combats destructive human emotions. Father Aubrey’s 
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presence is a reminder that Christianity ideally suppresses nature and combats or 
absorbs dangerous passions. 
 
René continues the condemnation of solitude also found in Atala. Solitude is 
described as dangerous and incongruent with leading a stable life. Solitude is only 
acceptable in the text when it is complimented by external religion as a regulator of 
life, as in the case of René’s sister, Amélie. Christianity is presented as a necessary 
framework within which passions can be expressed and controlled in a limited and 
organized forum. Ultimately, however, the author fails to provide practical positive 
examples of religion which are readily applicable to normal daily life. Even Amélie, 
who is comforted by her religious routine, is nevertheless unable to survive. From the 
start, the monastic lifestyle is depicted as symbolic suicide since it isolates the 
penitent from loved ones and society in general. In the end, Chateaubriand sends a 
mixed message to his readers about Christianity. In the Génie, he presents 
Christianity as the unique path to personal salvation but in Atala and especially in 
René, Catholicism is depicted as contrary to human sentiments which the author 
renders too beautiful and sympathetic to be unequivocally condemned. 
Chateaubriand’s Christianity is not a personal religion but rather an awe-inspiring 
power to be obeyed. If anything, René’s inability to make peace with his sister makes 
the laws of Christian society seem divisive, not harmonious. Both Ballanche and 
Chateaubriand share a sense of pity for the wicked and of hope for salvation. In the 
following chapter, we will see that Joseph de Maistre, who shares theses authors’ 
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opinions on Christian supremacy, rejects any notion of sentiment in his portrayal of 




Chapter 7: Injustice as God’s Will in Joseph de Maistre’s Soirées de Saint-
Pétersbourg 
 
In 1821, under the Bourbon Restoration, Joseph de Maistre’s Soirées de Saint-
Pétersbourg revives the turn of the century conservative argument that society must 
be anchored in a strong Catholic monarchy. De Maistre’s work, in line with earlier 
anti-Enlightenment philosophers such as Herder and Burke, seeks to diminish man’s 
importance as an individual in favor of constructing a worldview in which humanity 
is subjected to the higher law of an absolute God (Sternhell 247-8). De Maistre 
attacks science and philosophy as sources of human degeneration since they turn men 
away from God. For him, the Grand Siècle of Louis XIV made France great because 
there was a balance of “la religion, la valeur et la science” (Tome V, 18-19). The Age 
of Reason, however, toppled this delicate balance. Eighteenth century philosophy 
allegedly attempted to “detach” man from God by discouraging prayer and 
encouraging critical thinking (Tome V, 282). De Maistre agrees with Ballanche and 
Chateaubriand that reason and religion cannot be in harmony: “Dès que l’homme 
s’appuie que sur sa raison, il cesse de prier, en quoi il a toujours confessé" (Tome IV, 
310). Furthermore, as in Ballanche’s Essai, the only legitimate prayer according to de 
Maistre is the prayer that asks for God’s will to be done (Tome IV, 314). Prayer 
therefore cannot alter the course of the universe which is directed by God’s will, 
unknown to and unchangeable by man. For de Maistre, man must not only passively 
accept the fate that befalls him, he must also actively encourage God to deliver that 
fate regardless of the consequences. De Maistre ultimately employs this line of 
reasoning as a means for denying human rights which he argues are contradictory to 
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society. Human unity, he says, cannot occur through any written constitution. From 
this point of view, human unity is only possible when Christianity imposes itself as 
universal law (Tome IV, 127). By replacing human law with divine law, de Maistre 
constructs a worldview in which humans are destined to be powerless against their 
sovereign rulers, free thought is blasphemy, and the concept of justice is replaced by 
blind faith in providential grace. 
Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg takes the form of a series of conversations between 
three men over the course of eleven evenings. The main character, simply referred to 
as le Comte, is a thinly veiled representation of de Maistre himself. His companions, a 
Russian Sénateur and a young French Chevalier, engage the Count in conversation 
centered mostly on the intersection of religion and society. The three men seem to 
represent a microcosm of high society composed of noblemen, lawmakers and 
military officers. Throughout the dialogues, the Senator and the Chevalier take on 
subordinate roles in the conversation centered mainly on the Count’s philosophy. 
Enjoying a perfect evening in the grand setting of Saint Petersburg, the Chevalier 
wonders if “un de ces hommes pervers, nés pour le malheur de la société” would 
appreciate this moment as much as he and his friends (5-6). This question, which 
simultaneously targets the morality and aesthetics of progressive thinkers, serves as 
the foundation for the conversations to follow. One’s ability to appreciate beauty is 
assumed to be influenced by his religious beliefs. Starting from this simple statement, 
de Maistre builds a divisive formula which follows throughout the conversations, 
consistently characterizing Enlightenment philosophers and scientists as enemies of 
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religion. Following this line of reasoning, progress is assumed to be a menace to 
society. 
Defending the Doctrine of Original Sin 
Since Rousseau’s Vicaire savoyard, the Catholic doctrine of original sin remained of 
central concern to religious thought. The concept of the Right of Man rests on the 
idea that men are created equal. The very notion of inalienable rights for mankind 
seems to nullify the idea that man is born cursed. De Maistre defends the doctrine of 
original sin as a means of refuting what he sees as one of the foundations of 
Enlightenment atheism: the idea that if God exists, he is unreasonable or unjust. In 
order to prove the verity of original sin, the Count endeavors to show that humans 
have degenerated since primitive times. Ballanche had previously made a comparable 
argument centered around the origins of language. As we saw in the last chapter, 
Chateaubriand denies perfectibility but, in contrast to de Maistre, did not insist on 
distinguishing between “primitive man” and “savages” in his fiction which 
romanticized America’s indigenous landscape and people as edenic. He first 
examines Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s assumption that “sauvages” (understood in the 
text as referring to indigenous American people) are analogous to primitive man. For 
the Count, primitive people and “savages” are actually opposites. The so-called 
“savage” is completely detached from civilization but primitive man was born into 
civilization by God’s will. Rousseau “a constamment pris le sauvage pour l’homme 
primitif, tandis qu’il n’est et ne peut être que le descendant d’un homme détaché du 
grand arbre de la civilisation par une prévarication quelconque, mais d’un genre qui 
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ne peut plus être répété, autant qu’il m’est permis d’en juger; car je doute qu’il se 
forme de nouveaux sauvages” (63).  
Rather than view primitive man as the originator of an unfinished human race which 
would improve over time (recall Mme de Staël’s theory of perfectibilité), de Maistre 
insists that man began as a more perfect being whose proximity to God granted him a 
special comprehension of universal truths. Since primitive times, man has therefore 
progressively degraded as a result of some “accident” or “crime” (63-6). According to 
this presumption, the sciences too were supposedly at their peak in primitive times 
and knowledge has since faded (75). This “accident” was the original sin. For de 
Maistre, one must accept the idea of transmission of sin in order to have faith in God 
because man “ne peut pas être méchant sans être mauvais, ni mauvais sans être 
dégradé, ni dégradé sans être puni, ni puni sans être coupable” (71). Original sin 
conveniently renders all men “guilty” and therefore potentially worthy of any 
punishment or malady that befalls them at the hand of God. Original sin, according to 
the Count, is the most universal concept known to humanity (71). 
The interpretation of native cultures in the Soirées is therefore markedly less 
sympathetic and more overtly racist compared to the portrayals of Native Americans 
in Chateaubriand’s works. Chateaubriand, in contrast to de Maistre, makes clear 
parallels between primitive and “savage” people, showing “savages” to be close to 
universal traditions, possessing a certain amount of wisdom despite what 
Chateaubriand saw as misguided spiritual beliefs and social practices. De Maistre, 
however, denies that “savage” people are human. In a warped look back on history, 
the Count describes missionary priests as having been too charitable to Native 
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Americans. In order to avoid violence, he claims, the priests made the natives seem 
human: “Le prêtre miséricordieux les exaltait pour les rendre précieux; il atténuait le 
mal, il exagérait le bien” (83). For de Maistre, the “savage” is evil by nature whereas 
the European is a degenerated ancestor of primitive man who was naturally good (84-
5). 
God as the Origin of Language and Thought 
De Maistre uses the presumed inferiority of “savage” native people as a means for 
emphasizing the supposed superiority of primitive people. Modern man is so inferior 
to primitive man that modern man is like a savage in comparison (85). Like 
Ballanche, de Maistre places a great deal of importance on language and on proving 
the existence of God through the “miracle” of language. Although de Maistre 
consistently upholds that man could not have invented language, he does assert that 
primitive man succeeded in inventing words (95). According to the Count, the fact 
that man now borrows words rather than inventing them is an indication of modern 
man’s inferiority (95). He describes languages as being almost like living beings in 
themselves, declaring war on other languages in order to take over their words (103). 
He further posits that the origin of ideas is the same as that of language: “...la 
question de l’origine des idées est la même que celle de l’origine de la parole; car la 
pensée et la parole ne sont que deux magnifiques synonymes; l’intelligence ne 
pouvant penser sans savoir qu’elle pense, ni savoir qu’elle pense sans parler, puisqu’il 
faut qu’elle dise: je sais” (120). Thus, if language came from God and language is 
synonymous with thought, humans would owe their intelligence to God. From this 
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point of view, human intelligence would therefore necessarily be inferior to God’s 
intelligence. 
Human Justice versus Divine Justice 
De Maistre maintains that man is intellectually inferior to God as a means for refuting 
Enlightenment concepts of justice which, despite their diversity, shared a “reliance on 
reasoning and the invoking of the demands of public discussions” (Sen xvii). By 
denying man’s intelligence, de Maistre attempts to nullify human reasoning and the 
right to participate in government. He goes to great lengths, for example, to dispute 
John Locke’s On Human Understanding. Most of the sixth dialogue is devoted to 
refuting Locke whose protestant upbringing is the foundation for his errors according 
to de Maistre: “le protestantisme avait aplati cette tête” (Tome IV, 330). Locke is an 
obvious target for de Maistre’s criticism since, as with Rousseau, attacking Locke 
also assails the ideas that became the foundation for the human rights he opposes. He 
portrays Locke as the dupe of his own misguided reasoning: “Si Locke, qui était un 
très-honnête homme, revenait au monde, il pleurerait amèrement en voyant ses 
erreurs, aiguisées par la méthode française, devenir la honte et le malheur d’une 
génération entière” (368).  
Like Chateaubriand, de Maistre discounts the concept of justice altogether by 
reaffirming that providence holds to a principle of justice that mortals are incapable 
of understanding (160). Even babies may be judged for crimes rooted in original sin 
(160). Although de Maistre never mentions predestination in the Soirées de Saint-
Pétersbourg, one can infer from his comments on providential justice and original sin 
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that certain people are simply destined to be punished, regardless of their actions on 
Earth:  
La seule différence qu’il y ait entre les deux justices, c’est que 
la nôtre laisse échapper des coupables par impuissance ou par 
corruption, tandis que si l’autre paraît quelquefois ne pas 
apercevoir les crimes, elle ne suspend ses coups que par des 
motifs adorables qui ne sont pas, à beaucoup près, hors de la 
portée de notre intelligence. (Tome IV, 160) 
 
 Additionally, de Maistre claims that men have no real definition for what they call 
virtue since perception of virtue is determined by “la passion du moment” (167). Man 
is furthermore described as being devoid of a conscience. For de Maistre, humans are 
driven solely by pleasure and shame (187). Chateaubriand, too, depicted man as ruled 
by emotions but his portrayal of those emotions through his characters was notably 
charitable. Chateaubriand clearly sympathizes with the plight of being human. Both 
arguments nevertheless lead to the idea that man is incapable of self-governance. One 
apparently needs religion as a regulator of personal behavior. Arguing that man lacks 
the internal mechanism for self-regulation makes the concept of liberty seem not only 
unnecessary but foolish. By completely denying man’s individual potential to better 
himself and by upholding the image of an all-knowing God versus and ever-ignorant 
human population, de Maistre creates a need for both religious and political spheres 
to be controlled by external powers, the Church and the Monarchy.  
 
Denial of Human Compassion through an Unsympathetic Absolute God 
De Maistre’s refutation of both human justice and conscience rationalizes a complete 
lack of compassion for individuals. Because man cannot understand God’s justice 
system, the severity of its punishments must go unchallenged: “car le domestique qui 
138 
 
est pendu pour avoir volé un écu à son maître n’est pas du tout innocent” (189). 
Arguing against Voltaire, the Count claims that the victims of the 1755 Lisbon 
earthquake must have somehow deserved their fate (224). He ends the third dialogue 
with a model for human acceptance of God’s law. The Count tells the story of a girl 
with cancer who continues to worship God with perfect love and obedience (192). 
Reminiscent of Chateaubriand’s Génie, de Maistre depicts innocence as the ultimate 
wisdom. The girl receives her strength from her simplemindedness
9
. While the girl’s 
courage is certainly inspiring, de Maistre exploits the story as a stratagem to promote 
unwavering faith and discourage any sort of reflection or free thought that might put 
religious dogma into question. Concluding the story, he seizes the opportunity to 
promote blind faith and reprimand philosophers who dare to think independently 
from Christian tradition:  
Or, ce que nous voyons ici on l’a toujours vu, et on le verra 
jusqu’à la fin des siècles. Plus l’homme s’approchera de cet 
état de justice dont la perfection n’appartient pas à notre faible 
nature, et plus vous le trouverez aimant et résigné jusque dans 
les situations les plus cruelles de la vie. [...] Qui donc a donné à 
ces téméraires le droit de prendre la parole au nom de la vertu 
qui les désavoue avec horreur, et d’interrompre par d’insolents 
blasphèmes les prières, les offrandes et les sacrifices 
volontaires de l’amour? (Tome I, 193)  
 
De Maistre teaches that Christians should have pity in their hearts but not allow 
sentiment to influence philosophy: “Au reste, la pitié est sans doute un des plus 
nobles sentiments qui honorent l’homme, et il faut bien se garder de l’éteindre, de 
l’affaiblir même dans les cœurs; cependant lorsqu’on traite des sujets philosophiques, 
                                                 
9
 In realist and naturalist works by authors like Flaubert and Zola, such characters are 




on doit éviter soigneusement toute espèce de poésie, et ne voir dans les choses que les 
choses mêmes” (229). Conveniently ignoring the human connection embedded in a 
religion whose savior is represented as human, de Maistre argues that Christianity 
cannot share human emotion because it does not come from humans – Christianity is 
undisputable, “immuable” (231). In some ways, Chateaubriand already suggested the 
unsympathetic nature of Christianity when he too claimed that man is incapable of 
understanding God’s logic and portrayed priests as following Church dogma despite 
their personal feelings. De Maistre’s assertion, however, seems to go one step further 
by deemphasizing emotional connections with providence. In Chateaubriand, 
sentiment still serves as a connection with the invisible world and in Atala the priest 
insists that the heavens have mercy on the souls of well-intentioned people despite 
their actions. De Maistre makes no such exceptions. Humans deserve the misfortunes 
that befall them, creating a relationship with God in which they are bound to adore a 
God who acts as an adversary (231). One can only be eligible for grace in the afterlife 
by obediently suffering through God’s enigmatic justice system (237).  
The Count explains his theory of “réversibilité” in an attempt to justify man’s 
otherwise unjust suffering through a glorification of self-sacrifice: “Le juste, en 
souffrant volontairement, ne satisfait pas seulement pour lui, mais pour le coupable 
par voie de réversibilité” (Tome IV, 90). According to de Maistre’s notion of 
“reversibility,” God’s justice includes the sacrifice of the innocent as a means of 
atonement for the sins of humanity. In his Éclaircissement sur les sacrifices, de 
Maistre explains that “l’histoire nous montre l’homme persuadé dans tous les temps 
de cette effrayante vérité: Qu’il vivait sous la main d’une puissance irritée, et que 
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cette puissance ne pouvait être apaisée que par des sacrifices” (284). While 
perpetuating the image a fire and brimstone angry God scenario, de Maistre still 
maintains that a just God acting in an unjust way is absurd. He reiterates that the 
solution to the unexplainable actions of God must lie in human inability to understand 
higher reasoning (Tome V, 105). Following this line of reasoning, one must continue 
to pray to God even if God seems unjust. The Count goes so far as to suggest that one 
should actually pray more to a God who seems unjust in order to receive grace (Tome 
V, 105). Requiring the adoration of an unsympathetic God demands the self-sacrifice 
of the faithful. 
  
Blind Faith: Divine Right and Sacrifice 
According to the Count’s dialogue, criticism of God’s justice is a relatively new 
phenomenon. He asserts that philosophers crafted the concept of an unjust God in 
order to draw people away from religion (Tome V, 107). He criticizes learned men 
for pushing society towards science and stepping in to teach morality, claiming that 
they were not qualified to do so. According to de Maistre, it is the government, not 
the savants, who is tasked with moralizing the people:  
...il faut avoir perdu l’esprit pour croire que Dieu ait chargé les 
académies de nous apprendre ce qu’il est et ce que nous lui 
devons. Il appartient aux prélats, aux nobles, aux grands 
officiers de l’état d’être les dépositaires et les gardiens des 
vérités conservatrices; d’apprendre aux nations ce qui est mal 
et ce qui est bien; ce qui est vrai et ce qui est faux dans l’ordre 
moral et spirituel: les autres n’ont pas droit de raisonner sur ces 
sortes de matières [...] Quant à celui qui parle ou écrit pour ôter 
un dogme national au peuple, il doit être pendu comme un 




Reminiscent of Chateaubriand, de Maistre charges the philosophes with the sin of 
“orgueil” for attempting to raise their place in society and assert new ideas in the 
public arena (Tome II, 108). 
As a royalist, de Maistre asserts that sovereignty is not determined by the will of the 
people: “La souveraineté est toujours prise, jamais donnée” (Tome II, 116). 
According to the ninth dialogue, the best governments are those with the fewest laws 
and, moreover, any written constitution is rejected as illegitimate (Tome II, 116). De 
Maistre’s idea of sacrifice supports the sacrifice of the few for the good of the many 
(Tome II, 120). The innocent suffer for their fellow men:   
Lors donc que le coupable nous demandera pourquoi 
l’innocence souffre dans ce monde, nous ne manquerons pas de 
réponses, comme vous l’avez vu; mais nous pouvons en choisir 
une plus directe et une plus touchante peut-être que toutes les 
autres. – Nous pouvons répondre: Elle souffre pour vous, si 
vous voulez. (Tome II, 213) 
 
The Count admits that Christian scripture does not explain why this sacrifice is 
necessary but again resorts to the idea that some things are not meant to be known: 
“ce silence est sage” (Tome II, 122). He indicates that a variety of nations throughout 
time have accepted the idea of the sacrifice of the innocent and concludes that this 
idea was put into man’s head by God himself (Tome II, 125). Following de Maistre’s 
reasoning that God’s justice cannot be understood by humans, “innocent” seems to be 
yet another term that is indefinable by men. God knows people from the inside: “Mais 
Dieu qui voit tout, Dieu qui connaît nos inclinations et nos pensées les plus intimes 
bien mieux que les hommes ne se connaissent matériellement les uns les autres, 
emploie le châtiment comme manière de remède, et frappe cet homme qui nous paraît 
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sain pour extirper le mal avant le paroxysme” (Tome V, 131). Such a God knows if 
people are wicked even if they have not performed a bad deed and has the authority to 
punish people not according to what they have done but according to who they are 
and what they have the potential to do (Tome II, 131). God punishes as a remedy and 
as a precaution (Tome II, 131). He does not bother punishing hopeless cases, thereby 
explaining away why some of the worst crimes go unpunished (Tome II, 131).  
For de Maistre, the secret laws of spirituality are never meant to be investigated: 
“Parcourez le cercle des sciences, vous verrez qu’elles commencent toutes par un 
mystère. (...) Il n’y a donc aucune loi sensible qui n’ait derrière elle ... une loi 
spirituelle dont la première n’est que l’expression visible; et voilà pourquoi toute 
explication de cause par la matière ne contentera jamais un bon esprit” (Tome II, 179-
80). De Maistre insists that all of the best scientists were religious and “le scepticisme 
irréligieux” is fruitless (Tome II, 181). From his perspective, religion is the “mother” 
of science and the only good science is that which is based on religion (Tome II, 186). 
He claims that science either turns men evil or renders them useless (Tome II, 187). 
According to the Count, the term illuminé refers specifically to those who seek to 
destroy Christianity through science or philosophy (Tome II, 228-9). God’s attitude 
towards humans is described as that of a father to an ignorant child: he puts certain 
concepts out of reach because they are too dangerous for humans to handle (Tome II, 
188). All of this adds up to an argument favoring the general intellectual and 
emotional repression of human beings: “La conclusion légitime est qu’il faut 




Joseph de Maistre’s Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg reinforces the conservative 
criticism of progress expressed by Ballanche and Chateaubriand, notably the concept 
as God’s will as supreme and a refusal of perfectibility. De Maistre sets himself apart 
from his fellow ultramontanes, however, by focusing squarely on a defense of 
original sin which flagrantly denies human rights. Whereas Ballanche and 
Chateaubriand still recognized the power of sentiment in their works and associated 
religion with heart and soul, de Maistre’s doctrine is a cold calculation. God, for him, 
is an unwavering judge of man. 
De Maistre begins his argument in support of original sin by first distinguishing 
“primitive man” from the “savage.” Primitive man, he says, was perfect before the 
Fall. Original sin then rendered all men guilty, he says, and brought on the 
unrelenting punishment of man by God. For de Maistre, original sin is a “universal” 
concept. He unifies humanity not by promoting any harmonious brotherhood but 
rather by asserting that humans are universally subject to the whims of God. This 
does not, however, make men equal from his point of view. De Maistre dismisses 
“savages,” or indigenous non-European peoples, as lesser men. He asserts that some 
races are naturally evil while others are simply degenerated relatives of primitive 
man. This assertion, which he does not support with any biblical evidence, makes 
universal brotherhood impossible and completely negates de Maistre’s theory that 
original sin must apply to all people. 
Like Ballanche, de Maistre insists on God as the creator of human language and 
thought.  Humans, he says, owe their intelligence to God and thus are inferior to the 
divine intelligence that is God. De Maistre thus completely discounts the possibility 
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that man might hope to understand God’s reasoning. The author employs this assail 
against human intelligence to discount modern concepts of human justice. De 
Maistre’s portrayal of modern man as devoid of a conscience and ruled solely by 
pleasure and shame supports the idea that humans are incapable of self-governance. 
The philosophy espoused by the Count of the Soirées creates a need for society to be 
controlled by external powers, the Church and the Monarchy. The author’s refusal to 
recognize the authority of human justice and his denial of the human conscience 
culminates in support for a divine justice system which sanctions harsh punishments 
delivered by God’s unquestionable law. The Count’s anecdotal evidence glorifies the 
innocent ignorance promoted by Chateaubriand. De Maistre praises innocent 
ignorance in an effort to encourage blind faith and discourage doubt. De Maistre, 
unlike Chateaubriand, shows no sympathy for human intentions. God’s judgment is 
described as pitiless and the author urges men to follow his example. 
De Maistre takes original sin one step further with his concept of “reversibility” 
which asserts that God’s justice sanctions the sacrifice of the innocent to atone for the 
sins of humanity. Again, the author uses the supposed human inability to comprehend 
God’s reasoning as support for the idea that God actually is just despite the fact that 
his justice is perceived as unjust by humankind. In the same way that man cannot 
understand God’s justice, he explains, it is also useless for him to attempt to 
understand the universe through science when it is not based on religion. In an age of 
exciting scientific discoveries, however, de Maistre’s stance against secular science 
was attempting to buck the trend towards progress.  More liberal thinkers, such as 
Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon and his followers, would take a completely different 
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approach to reconciling science and religion by basing religion on science rather than 




Chapter 8: Religion, Education and Social Order in Saint-Simon’s Nouveau 
Christianisme 
 
Although philosophers and poets began the conversation on religion’s role in society, 
industrialist Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon would arguably make one of the most 
lasting impressions on nineteenth century religious thought. Saint-Simon’s Nouveau 
Christianisme offered a model for a progressive religion which placed fraternity at the 
center of society’s moral obligations and championed the concept of harmonizing 
religious beliefs with science, industry and the arts. In short, he sought to bring 
religion in step with modern progress in order to preserve morality and advance 
intellectual development, thus creating an environment in which men could 
conceivably live peacefully together in liberty. The Nouveau Christianisme was the 
inspiration for later Saint-Simonians who, under the authority of Barthélemy Prosper 
Enfantin, would develop a short-lived organized religion based on Saint-Simon’s 
theory of class structure. In this dissertation, I chose to focus on Saint-Simon’s 
Nouveau Christianisme rather than Enfantin’s writings since the Nouveau 
Christianisme continued to serve as the most fundamental text for Enfantin’s 
followers.  
Mme de Staël had already suggested the idea that the arts could strengthen religious 
sentiment and reduce superstitions by supporting truth, beauty and virtue in De la 
littérature. Saint-Simon’s 1825 Nouveau Christianisme, Dialogues entre un 
conservateur et un novateur also sought to quell superstition by recommending a 
Christianity free of mysticism, focused solely on efforts to improve living conditions 
for the working classes. He hoped to achieve this end through modernization of 
147 
 
Christian thought. His method was to first look to Christianity’s past as a reminder 
that the Gospel existed before the Church and that the Church is a manmade 
institution subject to various faults which he says grew in time. Saint-Simon was, 
according to Sainte-Beuve, influenced by Ballanche’s concept that Christianity 
evolves with the times (Reardon 598). Saint-Simon, however, asserts that the Church 
is an imperfect institution. He thus separates the philosophy of Christianity from the 
Church which represents it. Concentrating his focus on what he believes to be the one 
true message of primitive Christian teachings – “love thy neighbor” – Saint-Simon’s 
vision for the future is to restore the message of fraternal love as the one and only 
Christian doctrine. He proposes education in the sciences and arts as the means for 
freeing humanity from theology which he believes has polluted the human 
imagination with unnecessary superstitions, pitting religious ritual and ceremony 
against the essential message of brotherhood.  
 
A New Social System 
As early as 1803, Saint-Simon proposed a reorganization of the French social system 
in his Lettres d’un habitant de Genève. In the Lettres, he recommends that especially 
talented men, “hommes de génie,” should guide the government and be given 
complete liberty to cultivate knowledge (129). His system divides society into three 
classes with liberal intellectuals and artists as the most powerful citizens, followed by 
the bourgeoisie and finally the working class. The author of the Lettres proposes that 
the classes support each other in order to stabilize society and improve the overall 
quality of living for all of humanity. Saint-Simon suggests for example that business 
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owners support knowledge through financial sacrifices which would benefit 
intellectuals and artists. He urges business owners to consider themselves as“les 
régulateurs de la marche de l’esprit humain” (143). In 1825, Saint-Simon would 
propose religious reforms in his Nouveau christianisme which would serve to 
improve the living conditions of the lower classes, ostensibly in an effort to restore 
Christianity to its original objective. In 1803, however, his reasons for social 
organization are clearly more practical. His argument to the propriétaires is that 
social reorganization will safeguard the nation against revolution: “tôt ou tard les 
savants, les artistes et les hommes ayant des idées libérales, réunis aux non-
propriétaires, vous feraient faire de force; souscrivez tous, c’est le seul moyen que 
vous ayez pour prévenir les maux dont je vous vois menacés” (143). Addressing the 
working classes, he argues that supporting artists and intellectuals will create more 
opportunities for education and ultimately a better quality of life for all (144). 
Lettres d’un habitant de Genève envisions society as a physiological system, ordered 
by concrete laws and dominated by positive science: 
Mes amis, nous sommes des corps organisés; c’est en 
considérant comme phénomènes physiologiques nos relations 
sociales que j’ai conçu le projet que je vous présente, et c’est 
par des considérations puisées dans le système que j’emploie 
pour lier les faits physiologiques que je vais vous démontrer la 
bonté du projet que je vous présente. (148) 
 
 The author asserts that subjective influences on the sciences, which are to become 
the guiding force for society, should be removed: “il faut que les physiologistes 
chassent de leur société les philosophes, les moralistes et les métaphysiciens, comme 
les astronomes ont chassé les astrologues, comme les chimistes ont chassé les 
alchimistes” (148). Saint-Simon groups philosophers, moralists, and metaphysicians 
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together into the same category of useless influences. Thus far, we have seen that 
Mme de Staël sought to harmonize religion and philosophy while the ultras insisted 
upon the superiority of Christian doctrine over secular philosophy. Saint-Simon, in 
contrast, rejects both theology and philosophy in favor of science. Faith and reason 
are trumped by positive research. 
Science and Prophecy 
In both the Lettres and in Nouveau christianisme, Saint-Simon insists on limiting 
humanity’s aspirations to one single goal. The statement of this goal, however, 
changes from 1803 to 1825. For the author of the Lettres, scientific progress is clearly 
the one principle goal of humanity: “Enfin vous n’avez pas encore bien remarqué 
qu’il n’existe qu’un seul intérêt commun à tous les hommes, celui du progrès des 
sciences” (43). His Nouveau christianisme, however, leaves no doubt that religion’s 
sole task in society is to improve the quality of life of the working classes. The two 
goals are not necessarily disconnected. A large part of Saint-Simon’s message to 
religious leaders revolves around the idea that religion should remove unnecessary 
mysticism and acknowledge scientific progress. Despite his scientific convictions, 
one of the letters from 1803 attempts a prophetical approach to the idea of religious 
reform to support the proposed social order. The author of the letter, claiming to have 
heard the voice of God, recounts divine proclamations which include a renouncement 
of the Roman Catholic Church and God’s plan to take religious power out of the 
hands of incompetent men: 
Tous ceux qui ont établi des religions en avaient reçu de moi le 
pouvoir; mais ils n’ont pas bien compris les instructions que je 
leur avais données; ils ont tous cru que je leur avais confié ma 
divine science; ... ils ont tous négligé la partie la plus 
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essentielle de leur mission, celle de fonder un établissement qui 
fît suivre à l’intelligence humaine la route la plus courte pour 
se rapprocher indéfiniment de ma divine prévoyance; ils ont 
tous oublié de prévenir les ministres de mes autels que je leur 
retirerais le pouvoir de parler en mon nom quand ils cesseraient 
d’être plus savants que le troupeau qu’ils conduiraient, et qu’ils 
se laisseraient dominer par le pouvoir temporel” (155). 
 
Saint-Simon’s God reproaches religion for speaking in his name, implying that this is 
the authentic voice of the almighty. God’s solution, according to the letter, is to place 
Isaac Newton in charge of “la direction de la lumière et le commandement des 
habitants de toutes les planètes” (155). God chooses science to represent him on earth 
proclaiming “le conseil de Newton me représentera sur la terre” (155). Saint-Simon’s 
image of the scientist, then, is a far cry from Chateaubriand’s depiction of faustian 
researchers trying to capture God in their microscopes. Rather than demystify religion 
in order to embrace science, Saint-Simon’s early approach seems to be a 
sanctification of science itself in an attempt to imitate the grandeur of religion. 
Scientists become the new priests with Newton as their messiah.  
In the forward to Nouveau christianisme, Saint-Simon sets his work apart from the 
extraordinary prophecies in the Lettres by simply explaining his conviction that 
“l’espèce humaine n’est point condamnée à l’imitation” (104). “Imitation” has long 
been a staple of Catholic doctrine
10
. For Saint-Simon, religion can reach beyond 
tradition. The purpose of new Christianity for Saint-Simon in 1825 is solely to protect 
the underprivileged working classes from exploitation and injustice. In essence, Saint-
Simon chooses to frame a secular problem (social inequality) in a religious context in 
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 The Imitation of Christ, published in 1418 and attributed to Thomas À Kempis, is according to the 
Catholic Encyclopedia “[w]ith the exception of the Bible, ... perhaps the most widely read spiritual 




an effort to emphasize the moral dilemma in the social strata and prove that organized 
religion has not fulfilled a useful social function. He perceives social inequality as a 
problem which has been perpetuated by the Church which he believes promotes banal 
ceremony over moral reflection. Rather than argue for a purely secular scientific 
reasoning, Saint-Simon opts to reform the focus of Christianity. He suggests that the 
clergy concentrate solely on the Christian promise to “love thy neighbor,” alleging 
that Christianity has degraded since the first century and proposing that the faithful 
return to charity as the one and only religious truth.  
A New Christianity for the Nineteenth Century 
Saint-Simon’s avant-propos to Le Nouveau christianisme reminds readers of the 
timeliness of the Saint-Simonian movement. The author begins by highlighting the 
political situation in 1825 France, most notably the “lois de sacrilège” recently 
implemented by the Charles X monarchy
11
. Saint-Simon also situates his essay amidst 
an era of religious multiplicity. He explains that the nineteenth century had already 
seen a proliferation of protestant denominations but none have succeeded in capturing 
the true moral message of Christianity, despite their good intentions. The author 
establishes his audience as “tous ceux qui... regardent la religion comme ayant pour 
objet essentiel la moral” and those who seek to perfect morality and spread it to all 
social classes “en lui conservant un caractère religieux” as well as those who 
recognize the sublime and the divine in early Christianity, “la supériorité de la morale 
sur tout le reste de la loi” (102-3). Morality thus emerges as the most important focus 
                                                 
11
 The law defined sacrilege as “an attack upon the consecrated host used in the celebration of the 
mass and made this a capital crime” (Hartman 22). According to Mary S. Hartman, a number of 
conservatives, including Bonald and Chateaubriand, opposed the bill to due its use of the death 
penalty. The law was amended and the death penalty was removed from it before it passed in 1825. 
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of religion, setting the stage to dismiss religious traditions which do not directly 
support this fundamental objective. The choice to focus on morality is interesting 
given the fact that the voice of “God” in the Lettres expressed disapproval of 
religion’s fixation on “une ligne de démarcation entre le bien et le mal dans les 
actions les plus minutieuses de la vie de l’homme” (155). Nouveau christianisme 
insists that the cult and the dogma must serve “divine morality” (103). Saint-Simon is 
thereby able to redefine morality outside of existing manmade perimeters, refuting 
philosophers and theologians alike. Divine morality functions according to God’s 
laws rather than according to man’s laws. In this case, God’s law is defined as a 
message of love towards men. Saint-Simon’s divine morality is in some ways recalls 
de Maistre’s divine justice. While the two philosophies are extreme opposites, both 
invalidate man-made laws in favor of divine law.  
The essay itself is structured as a dialogue between “un conservateur et un novateur.” 
Establishing that the “novateur” believes in God, and that Christianity is a religion of 
divine origin, the “conservateur” begins by attacking the concept of the perfectibility 
of religion since the divine is inherently perfect (107-8). The “novateur” agrees that 
God’s works are not perfectible but maintains that the clergy can improve their 
understanding of God’s message. According to the “novateur,” early Christian 
doctrine was incomplete and cannot be considered definitive religious law (113). 
Theology, like any science, requires research and experimentation: “La théorie de la 
théologie a besoin d’être renouvelée à certaines époques, de même que celle de la 
physique, de la chimie et de la psychologie” (108).  
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 Nouveau christianisme aims to prove that an effort to support the poor would benefit 
the whole of society (115). New Christianity, he says, will unite all institutions under 
this one principle:  
La nouvelle organisation chrétienne déduira les institutions 
temporelles, ainsi que les institutions spirituelles, du principe 
que tous les hommes doivent se conduire à l’égard les uns des 
autres comme des frères. Elle dirigera toutes les institutions, de 
quelque nature qu’elles soient, vers l’accroissement du bien-
être de la classe la plus pauvre. (113) 
 
For Saint-Simon, the role of the clergy should be strictly limited to the propagation of 
this message: “La religion doit diriger la société vers le grand but de l’amélioration la 
plus rapide possible du sort de la classe la plus pauvre” (117). Any religion that does 
not work solely to help the poor is labeled as heresy (118). Saint-Simon’s “novateur” 
interprets the history of the Roman Catholic Church in order to conclude that the 
Church remains in power through ruse rather than through legitimate divine sanction. 
He concludes that Roman Catholicism is a degeneration of the true Church. Although 
the accusation of degeneration recalls similar allegations charged by protestant 
reformers, Saint-Simon’s argument in the context of the early nineteenth century 
religious debate is notable because ultramontane writers such as Chateaubriand and 
de Maistre used the argument of degeneration to challenge those who promoted 
perfectibility. They upheld that man’s moral degeneration has made him incapable of 
ruling himself freely and that man is dependent on religion as a moral guide. Saint-
Simon turns the tables on the degeneration/perfectibility argument by asserting that it 
is not man who has degenerated but the Church itself. He shifts the focus of religion 
from being Church-centered to being human-centered and establishes the idea that if 
man has not progressed, it is because religious superstitions have held him back. 
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Saint-Simon structures the innovator’s argument as a series of accusations against 
both the Catholic and protestant Churches. At the heart of these accusations is the 
idea that religious leaders are not sufficiently educated and are therefore ill equipped 
to lead their people.  
Catholic Heresies 
The “novateur” in the Nouveau Christianisme first accuses the Pope and his Church 
of heresy on the basis that it does not guide the people to the true Christian path 
(121). All aspects of religion, the dogma and the cult, should be focused on 
improving the living conditions of the lower classes (122). He critiques Catholic 
doctrine for being too vague, alleging that the Church places too much emphasis on 
mysticism and not enough on moral principles. On the subject of works written on the 
doctrine by theologians he comments:  
...les idées de morale se trouvent en petit nombre dans ces 
écrits, et elle ne forme point corps de doctrine; elles sont 
clairsemées dans cette immense quantité de volumes qui se 
composent essentiellement des répétitions fastidieuses de 
quelques conceptions mystiques; conceptions qui ne peuvent 
nullement servir de guide, et qui sont au contraire de nature à 
faire perdre de vue les principes de la sublime morale du 
Christ. (123) 
 
Saint-Simon faults the Catholic system for teaching people that they cannot progress 
spiritually without following a clergy which, he says, is no more enlightened than its 
congregation (124). 
His second overarching accusation is that the Pope and the Church improperly 
educate the clergy (124). He notes that theology is the only science taught in 
seminaries and that the focus on theology distracts people from the message of 
charity which ought to be the goal of Christianity (125). Again referencing Catholic 
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history, Saint-Simon’s “novateur” cites the reign of sixteenth century Pope Leo X 
(the same Pope who ruled during Martin Luther’s protestant reformation) as a 
defining moment in the Church's degeneration (126). Interestingly, Saint-Simon’s 
criticism here is not uniquely centered on morality. He chooses to concentrate again 
on education. Under Leo X, in the heart of the renaissance, the clergy “n’a plus 
cultivé que la théologie” and lay scholars and artists surpassed religious leaders “dans 
les beaux-arts, dans les sciences exactes, et sous le rapport de la capacité industrielle” 
(126).  
His third accusation against the Pope is that he upholds governmental actions which 
are more destructive to the lower classes than those of any monarch. Saint-Simon 
blames this partly on insufficient education of the clergy (127). The concept of 
charity in this unenlightened system, he says, has backfired on the poor. Rather than 
create opportunities to permanently improve their standard of living, the Church has 
been content to give insufficient handouts:  
Les pauvres, étant nourris par charité, sont mal nourris; ainsi 
leur existence est malheureuse sous le rapport physique. 
Ils sont encore plus malheureux sous le rapport moral, 
puisqu’ils vivent dans l’oisiveté, qui est la mère de tous les 
vices et de tous les brigandages dont ce malheureux pays est 
infesté. (129) 
 
The novateur’s final accusation against the Church charges that both the creation of 
the Inquisition and the Jesuit order are contrary to the spirit of Christianity. For Saint-
Simon, the true values of the Church are kindness, goodness, charity and loyalty 
(129). He notes that heresies punished by the Church generally targeted trespasses 
against the dogma or the cult, which, compared to the moral obligations of the 
Church, ought to be considered as “fautes légères” (130-1). Concerning the Jesuits, 
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who have traditionally taken charge of matters of education in the Catholic system, 
Saint-Simon charges the religious order with overemphasizing cult and dogma over 
morality (131). He literally demonizes the Jesuits in order to communicate the depth 
of his disapproval: “Les missionnaires actuels sont de véritables antéchrists, 
puisqu’ils prêchent une morale absolument opposée à celle de l’Évangile” (132). 
Lamennais will later launch a comparable demonization of Catholic officials in his 
Paroles d’un croyant. 
For Saint-Simon, lay people played the most prominent roles in promoting progress 
in modern times since the fifteenth century. He cites innovative men from 
Christopher Columbus to Raphaël, Michelangelo, Newton and Kepler, spanning a 
variety of arts and sciences to emphasize the scope of their influence on humanity 
(132-3). His conclusion, graced with the weight of such legendary figures, is a strong 
argument in favor of progress through secular thought:  
Les laïques avaient donc acquis une supériorité positive sur les 
ecclésiastiques, en même temps que les sciences réputées 
profanes avaient dépassé les limites dans lesquelles se 
trouvaient renfermées les conséquences tirées par l’Église des 
principes de morale divine fondés par Jésus. Le pape et les 
cardinaux ne possédaient plus la capacité suffisante pour 
diriger le clergé chrétien, et le clergé chrétien ne se trouvait 
plus en état de conduire la masse des fidèles. (133) 
 
Protestant Heresies 
Not content to simply critique Roman Catholicism, the second half of Saint-Simon’s 
religious dialogue accuses protestant leaders of heresy as well, setting his own 
ideology apart from potential comparisons with other reformers. Again reaching back 
into Catholic history in an attempt to explain Martin Luther’s intentions, he reiterates 
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the idea that Catholic politics became mundane at the end of the fourteenth century 
rendering the Church useless to society (134). As Lamennais would later also claim in 
his Paroles d’un croyant, Saint-Simon exposes an alleged “pacte impie” between the 
Church and the European monarchies to use religion as an arbitrary power to support 
the interests of wealthy aristocrats (135). One of the major changes made in Church 
policy, he says, was the shift in support of “l’aristocratie de la naissance” to the 
detriment of “l’aristocratie des talents” (137). Returning to his criticism of Pope Leo 
X as the root of Catholic moral demise, he emphasizes Leo’s aristocratic background, 
alleging that the pope valued his noble birth over his clerical position (137-8). Saint-
Simon concedes that the Renaissance pope did protect artists and scholars but that he 
protected them for the wrong reasons – as a prince, not as a pope (138). According to 
the dialogue, arts and sciences under Leo X were cultivated for personal pleasure and 
egotistical pomp (138).  
Un véritable pape aurait profité de l’essor que l’esprit européen 
prenait à cette époque dans toutes les directions importantes, 
pour combiner les efforts des savants, des artistes et des chefs 
des grandes entreprises industrielles, avec les intérêts du clergé 
et avec ceux des pauvres, contre les prétentions héréditaires du 
pouvoir temporel, dont l’origine est impie, ainsi que je l’ai dit 
plus haut, puisque ses droits primitifs ont été fondés sur le droit 
de conquête, c’est-à-dire sur la loi du plus fort. (138-9) 
 
Saint-Simon respectfully recognizes Martin Luther’s reformation as a two-part 
process: a critique of “la religion papale” and the establishment of a religion which 
would be distinctly different from Roman Catholicism (140). The problem with 
protestant Christianity, he says, is that the second goal was never achieved. Protestant 
religion, he says, continues to commit comparable heresies against New Christianity’s 
one true doctrine, the improvement of the working classes. For Saint-Simon, one of 
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the gravest mistakes made by Luther was the decision to remove the influence of the 
beaux arts on religion. Reminiscent of Mme de Staël, the novateur expresses the 
conviction that art enriches religious sentiment (142). Saint-Simon contends that 
without a focus on the poor, protestant dogma remains incomplete (142). His first 
accusation against protestant leaders is “d’avoir adopté une morale qui est très 
inférieure à celle qui peut convenir aux chrétiens dans l’état actuel de leur 
civilisation” (142). A truly reformed religion would embrace progress and, ultimately, 
foster the evolution of religious thought beyond the boundaries of primitive Christian 
gospel.  
In the context of the protestant reformation, Saint-Simon proceeds with an analysis of 
religious history which centers on social organization (143). For Saint-Simon, 
religion serves a practical social purpose as the source for moral authority. His 
argument is in opposition to Chateaubriand, who argued for the preservation of 
Catholicism in order to conserve the arts and feed the imagination through the 
perpetuation of innocent ignorance. Yet, while his Nouveau Christianisme shares 
Mme de Staël’s vision that the arts should provoke religious sentiment and that 
religion should become compatible with reason, the Nouveau Christianisme does not 
suggest (as Mme de Staël does) that religion should influence the arts in return in any 
sort of mystical sense. He limits religion to strict moral practicality, distancing it from 
the romantic concept of spiritual sentiment. 
Saint-Simon returns to a discussion on early Christianity in order to critique 
protestant misconceptions of the early Christian doctrine that serves as a foundation 
for their faith. Repeating his insistence on Jesus’ one true mission to aid the poor, the 
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“novateur” establishes that first century society was divided simply into two classes, 
masters and slaves and the master class was further divided into patricians and 
plebeians (144). According to Saint-Simon, Jesus’ mission was primarily to 
reorganize society. This point of view removes all mysticism from the Christian 
religious mission, transforming Jesus into a sort of industrial manager not unlike 
Saint-Simon himself. The “novateur” attributes the lack of religious and moral system 
to the existence of too much diversity in religious beliefs in Biblical times, recalling 
nineteenth century religious plurality: “Il n’existait pas encore de système religieux, 
puisque toutes les croyances publiques admettaient une multitude de dieux, qui 
inspiraient aux hommes des sentiments différents, et même opposés les uns aux 
autres” (144). Religion, according to Saint-Simon, needed to be simplified into one 
concept. Saint-Simon asserts that morality as we know it had not yet even been 
invented before the first century A.D. He describes patriotic feelings as the precursor 
to philanthropy, which was non-existent before Christianity (145). Similarly, science 
remained in a primitive stage since the dimensions of the planet had yet to be 
revealed (145). “En un mot, le Christianisme, sa morale, son culte et son dogme, ses 
partisans et ses ministres, ont commencé par se trouver complétement en dehors de 
l’organisation sociale, ainsi que des usages et des mœurs de la société” (145). 
Christianity’s purpose then, according to Saint-Simon, was put society into order. His 
new Christianity proposes to once again reorder society in the modern era as a 
continuation of Jesus’ first attempt. 
For Saint-Simon, Luther’s reformation missed the mark because he did not 
acknowledge the fact that significant progress had been made in the development of 
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Christian doctrine by the sixteenth century. Saint-Simon takes advantage of the 
opportunity to correct Luther, using what Luther should have said as a forum for 
explaining Nouveau christianisme. The “novateur” tells his opponent that Luther’s 
reformation was incomplete. If Luther was to truly reform Christianity, he would 
have acknowledged that Christian theory had been sufficiently developed and that the 
Church should focus its efforts on applying the doctrine on earth: “Le véritable 
Christianisme doit rendre les hommes heureux, non-seulement dans le ciel, mais sur 
la terre” (147-8).  Happiness thus emerges as a more specific goal of the New 
Christianity. The “novateur” goes on to reveal the political component of his 
message: that a true reformer would require the Church to use its power to positively 
influence kings, declaring that their royalty is only legitimate when the institution 
supports the well-being of the poor against the wealthy (149). He also includes a 
message of peace. The Church, according to Nouveau christianisme, has a 
responsibility to hinder wars and to promote social strength through unity, (151). This 
united effort, he repeats, is again the rehabilitation of the impoverished (152). He 
adds that the promise of heaven as a recompense for good deeds has proven 
insufficient for modern clergy and the paths which lead to heaven (mainly rituals and 
ceremonies) are useless and arbitrary because they do not serve morality in the 
present (152). 
Finally, the “novateur” insists that Luther might have pointed out that the Catholic 
Church failed to recognize a “grande crise intellectuelle” (154). Religion might have 
been preserved by working with instead of against innovation. He warns that policies 
which continue to promote mysticism at the expense of progress in government and 
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in the arts and sciences as well as in industry will eventually backlash as educated 
people are bound to turn against an uninformed religion. Religion must therefore join 
the progress which inevitably advances in step with society. Religion, according to 
Saint-Simon cannot be removed from the social context. Unlike Ballanche, however, 
he asserts that social action can and must be taken in order to move humanity 
forward. Luther’s major fault was that he chose regression over progression as the 
path to truth. According to the dialogue, Luther attempted to establish a religion 
which was outside of the social context of the times. He focused too much on the past 
and not enough on the present and future, creating a dangerous disharmony: “au lieu 
de prendre les mesures pour accroître l’importance sociale de la religion chrétienne, il 
(Luther) a fait rétrograder cette religion jusqu’à son point de départ; il l’a replacée en 
dehors de l’organisation sociale...” (15). 
Saint-Simon’s second accusation against protestants is simply “d’avoir adopté un 
mauvais culte” (158). According to the “novateur,” Luther’s religion relied too 
heavily on fear as a moral regulator and not enough on the promise of pleasure (160). 
Ever the industrialist, Saint-Simon asserts that social improvements encourage 
advancement in intellectual and manual work (159). Arguing that the beaux arts are a 
necessary tool for stimulating people, he details the ways in which poets, painters, 
musicians, and architects can cultivate religious sentiment in the people (160). Luther, 
he reasons, could not move the people because he did not support the arts (160). He 
further accuses Protestants of having adopted a corrupt dogma (165). Modern religion 
should promote philanthropy and nothing else. The dogma, then, would ideally be 
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considered as “une collection de commentaires” which exists to help followers apply 
religion to their daily lives (166). Again, religion is limited to that which is useful.  
Saint-Simon clinches his opposition to Lutheran Christianity by reiterating the idea 
that religion is like a science which must continue to be developed. He compares 
Luther’s insistence on strictly following the Bible to the idea that mathematicians or 
scientists would limit their studies to early works. What Jesus gave his apostles, 
according to Saint-Simon, was “le germe du Christianisme,” the potential to develop 
a religion (168). From this perspective, Christianity was never meant to be a static 
and infallible institution (168). The innovator sees protestant fixation on the Bible as 
distracting from the moral mission of religion in society. He alleges that Biblical 
studies promote metaphorical ideas over positive ideas, compromise the purity of 
one’s imagination with stories of vice (such as bestiality and incest) and promote an 
unrealizable concept of equality (169-70). As in the Lettres d’un habitant de Genève, 
he asserts once again that the government should be led by those who are most 
capable in the sciences and the arts (170). Associations distributing the Bible should 
be putting their efforts into the development of philanthropy instead (170). 
The novateur brings the dialogue to a close with the idea that Nouveau christianisme 
will “rajeunir le Christianisme,” bringing people to a state of morality which they 
cultivate and protect themselves – not one that is forced upon them by an institution 
(178-9). New Christianity unites artists, intellectuals and industrial leaders with the 




Beginning with his 1803 Lettres d’un habitant de Genève, Claude-Henri de Saint-
Simon proposes a reorganization of the social system supposedly supported by 
religious revelation. Society would be divided into three classes: artists and 
intellectuals, business owners, and the working class. In his vision of a harmonious 
society, the three classes are mutually beneficial to each other and function as one 
body with each organ dependent upon the other. The Lettres stresses the importance 
of pursuing progress in the sciences. He casts philosophers, moralists, and 
metaphysicians out of society in order to make room for progressive scientific 
thinking. In the Lettres, Saint-Simon blends religion and science in revelatory 
passages in which God presents a new spiritual order, declaring Isaac Newton his 
representative on Earth. 
In his 1825 Nouveau Christianisme, the author continues his effort to reorganize 
society, this time with an enhanced focus on improving lower class living conditions. 
The purpose of “New Christianity” is to protect the lower classes from injustice. 
Saint-Simon readjusts Christianity’s focus, insisting upon “love thy neighbor” as its 
central doctrine. For Saint-Simon, Christianity has degenerated over the centuries. He 
proposes a return to charity as the unique religious truth. 
The Nouveau Christianisme is certainly concerned with morality but Saint-Simon 
carefully distances his concept of morality from traditional Christian moral 
philosophies by redefining morality as “divine morality.” By invalidating man-made 
moral laws, Saint-Simon is able to claim love as the supreme universal law. The 
“novateur” in the dialogues of the Nouveau Christianisme emphasizes the idea that 
theology is a science and it follows that, like all sciences, it must be constantly 
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refined. New Christianity refines the religion by narrowing its focus such that the 
unique goal of Christianity is to cultivate fraternity among men. He proposes to 
accomplish this goal through charity towards the impoverished classes. For Saint-
Simon, the Catholic Church’s failure to provide lasting support for the poor is proof 
that it has strayed from Christianity’s ultimate goal. The Church is thus considered to 
be a degeneration of the early Christian Church. This point of view on degeneration 
contrasts with Chateaubriand and de Maistre who decried the degeneration of man but 
upheld infallibility of the Church. Saint-Simon targets insufficient education of clergy 
as a major obstacle in the Church’s ability to properly lead the people. 
The “novateur” establishes Catholics as heretics who have sinned against the true 
purpose of Christianity. They too, he says, have failed to improve the living 
conditions of the lower classes. He criticizes Catholic doctrine for focusing too 
heavily on mysticism and not enough on the true divine moral principle. He also cites 
insufficient education of the clergy as a major flaw in the Church. The Church’s anti-
progress stance has backfired such that lay scientists, scholars, and artists have 
surpassed the Church in their abilities. He also charges that the pope upholds 
government actions contrary to Christianity’s mission to support the poor. Finally, he 
alleges that the creation of the Inquisition and the Jesuit order are contrary to the 
spirit of Christianity whose values are kindness, goodness, charity, and loyalty. Saint-
Simon contrasts the ineffectiveness of the clergy with the advancements in the arts 
and sciences made by lay people in recent times. 
While Saint-Simon recognizes Martin Luther’s reformation as well-intentioned, he 
criticizes protestant Christianity for never having established a religion which would 
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be distinctly different to Roman Catholicism. Protestant Christianity, like 
Catholicism, fails to concentrate on the one true doctrine according to New 
Christianity: the improvement of working class conditions. Protestants also removed 
the beaux-arts from Christianity. For Saint-Simon, the arts serve as a vital tool for 
provoking religious inspiration. Saint-Simon is especially disappointed that 
Protestants do not embrace the concept of religious evolution. He criticizes protestant 
misconceptions of early Christian doctrine which he says have served to build a false 
foundation for their faith. Most notably, he cites the protestant failure to recognize 
Jesus as a social innovator. Christianity’s purpose, he says, was to reorder a 
disordered world by limiting religion to one simple concept based upon fraternity. 
New Christianity is presented as a continuation of this original Christian mission. 
For Saint-Simon, religion should serve the purpose of making people happy in the 
present on Earth rather than perpetuating vague promises of happiness in the afterlife. 
Ultimately, people will want to be moral under the influence of Nouveau 
Christianisme. He suggests that when religion is centered on the needs of the people, 
there is no need for moral laws to be enforced by a religious institution. Following 
Saint-Simon’s death, however, his writings would inspire the Saint-Simonian 
movement led by Prosper Enfantin. The Saint-Simonians would transform the 
Nouveau Christianisme message of love into a veritable religion and a powerful 
influence on intellectual circles in 1830s France. As Claire Moses has shown in 
Feminism, Socialism, and French Romanticism, the Saint-Simonian emphasis on love 
coupled with an insistence on the separation of social classes is especially notable for 
having inspired an 1830s feminist movement based on difference rather than on 
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equality. These feminists promoted the popular romantic stereotype of the sentimental 
female to their advantage (22). Moses sums up their reasoning with a powerful quote 
from the Saint-Simonian publication, the Tribune: “In a religion that is completely 
about love, the most loving becomes the most capable” (29). George Sand’s 
Spiridion, which we will address in a later chapter, echoes the Saint-Simonian idea 
that humanity was entering a new phase of Christianity which would be less focused 
on doctrine and more focused on feeling. Saint-Simonians expected that this “phase 







Chapter 9: Between History and Progress: Lamennais from De la religion to 
Paroles d’un croyant 
 
Hugues-Félicité Robert de Lamennais was among the most reactionary conservatives 
of the 1820s fighting to fully restore France’s connection with the Roman Catholic 
Church. His early writings assert that a stable society must be built on a solid 
foundation of history, traditional social hierarchy, and complete obedience to the 
Church. Upon Louis XVIII’s restoration to the throne in 1814 and throughout the 
reign of Charles X, Lamennais called for Church intervention in French politics as a 
means for stabilizing France and reestablishing a true Catholic monarchy under the 
Vatican’s control.  
By the 1830s, however, Lamennais was inspired to propose a spiritual renovation of 
the Church itself. His 1830 journal L’Avenir was founded on the idea that Church and 
State should be separated in order to preserve the liberty of the clergy (Le Guillot 
407). Ballanche had already expressed a similar view in favor of the separation of 
church and state in his 1818 Essai sur les institutions sociales. Lamennais’ personal 
correspondence from August 1830 confirms his new mission: 
On doit souhaiter et demander une émancipation complète [sic] 
; plus d’intervention civile dans la nomination des évêques et 
des curés, dans l’éducation ecclésiastique, en un mot dans rien 
de ce qui intéresse directement la religion. L’Église ne payera 
jamais trop cher ces libertés indispensables à la conservation de 




Lamennais furthermore recognized that republican politics would be the future of 
France and that Catholicism must learn to coexist with republican principles if faith is 
to be preserved :  
En politique il est évident que, sous une forme ou une autre, la 
république seule est aujourd’hui possible. Le nom n’y fait rien. 
On doit donc pencher pour tout ce qui tend à l’établir avec le 
moins de secousses possibles, et pour tout ce qui est conforme 
à son esprit, afin de ne pas provoquer inutilement des luttes 
terribles et des passions violentes. Surtout qu’on oublie les 
Bourbons; leurs plus chauds amis n’ont rien à faire de mieux 
que de les abandonner à la Providence. (Le Guillot 408) 
 
Cooperation from the Vatican never came, however, and two papal encyclicals
12
 were 
specifically written as warnings to Lamennais, expressing disapproval of the 
veneration of humanity in l’Avenir. The first, Mirari vos (1832), does not name 
Lamennais specifically but sternly reminds authors that the Church resists innovation 
: “Indeed these authors of novelties consider that a ‘foundation may be laid of a new 
human institution,’ and what Cyprian
13
 detested may come to pass, that what was a 
divine thing ‘may become a human church’” (Mirari vos). Lamennais, who likewise 
once feared that sacredness might diminish under lay influence, increasingly sought 
to humanize the Church. Paroles d’un croyant would finally propose a religion for 
and by the people. In 1834, Singulari nos specifically targets Lamennais in the 
subtitle “On the Errors of Lamennais.” Singulari nos openly acknowledges 
Lamennais’ break with Church doctrine: “We have learned of the pamphlet written in 
                                                 
12
 Mirari vos, Pope Gregory XVI, August 15, 1832 and  Singulari nos, Pope Gregory XVI, July 25, 1834 
13
 Pope Gregory XVI is referring to third century martyred bishop, Saint Cyprian of Carthus. In a letter 
criticizing the schismatic “antipope,” Novatian, Cyrprian wrote that this bishop “in spite of God's 
tradition, in spite of the combined and everywhere compacted unity of the Catholic Church, is 
endeavouring to make a human church, and is sending his new apostles through very many cities, 
that he may establish some new foundations of his own appointment”(“To Antonianus about 
Cornelius and Novatian.”Web. 03 March 2013. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/050651.htm>). 
The reference implies that Lamennais will spark a Church schism.  
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French under the title Paroles d'un croyant, for it has been printed by this man and 
disseminated everywhere. [...] Though small in size, it is enormous in wickedness” 
(Singulari nos).  
Lamennais’ transformation from ultramontane activist to religious visionary is a 
dramatic illustration of the changing spiritual climate in France during the 
Restoration. In the writings of this one man, we can observe an intellectual shift from 
the conservative doctrines of Chateaubriand, Ballanche, and de Maistre to the 
spiritual innovations and utopian manifestos of Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. As 
R.L. White points out in her study of Lamennais’ 1830 journal L’Avenir, Lamennais’ 
shift in political and religious sympathies has all too often been dismissed as simply a 
result of mental instability (11). A closer analysis of his thought process, however, 
reveals that his principal goal is constant: to preserve religion despite politics and to 
fortify society through a common faith (White 11). Though attitudes towards religion 
were evolving as the population increasingly rejected superstition and embraced 
positivism, religion continued to be recognized as a necessary component to a 
morally sound society. The challenge was to adapt religion in such a way that it 
would retain its moral code while synchronizing with social and political trends. For 
Lamennais, the common thread between his early and later writings is a desire to 
peacefully unify the nation through shared religious beliefs. This chapter will 
examine two essays which capture the essence of Lamennais’ conflicting stances on 
religion in society. De la religion considérée dans ses rapports avec l’ordre politique 
et civil (1825) captures the conservative ideals of le premier Lamennais while Paroles 
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d’un croyant (1833) summarizes the main objectives of the author’s religio-political 
renovation.  
 
Unity through the Church in De la religion 
Throughout De la religion, the present is characterized by “le dogmatisme individuel” 
and “le scepticisme social” which contribute to the disunity of humanity (68). 
Lamennais criticizes eighteenth century philosophy for tearing down the old regime 
without offering an alternative doctrine on which a new regime could be built (109). 
A present dominated by individualism seemed to prevent a universal view of society 
which would incorporate ancestors and offspring. In order for unity to exist, he 
reasoned that the past, present, and future must be in harmony. In the first chapter of 
De la religion, Lamennais begins by reminding the public of the traditional role of 
religion under the ancien régime. He explains that, since ancient times, religion has 
been the cornerstone of human law: “Les anciens législateurs voyaient en elle la loi 
commune, source des autres lois; la base, l’appui, le principe régulateur des Etats 
constitués selon la nature ou la volonté de l’Intelligence suprême” (1). For 
Lamennais, a Christian foundation made the monarchy infallible (4). He therefore 
considered the Constitutional monarchy established by Louis XVIII as a degeneration 
of the monarchy’s former perfection because it gave power to the people in matters 
which he considered to be divine. Although the Restoration allegedly reestablished 
the traditional social order, Lamennais was dissatisfied with the Charte and the power 
wielded by parliament. Parliament, for Lamennais, lacks not only religious authority 
but also the centralization and the historical heft necessary to a successful government 
171 
 
(17). From the conservative viewpoint, Ruins are all that is left of society: “Des gens 
ont imaginé de démolir la maison de leur père pour rebâtir dans les nues, et ils 
s’étonnent d’être entourés de ruines” (243). Using the king as a figurehead, he says, 
provides only the illusion of historical legitimacy : “Le roi est un souvenir vénérable 
du passé; l’inscription d’un temple ancien, qu’on a placée sur le fronton d’un autre 
édifice tout moderne” (17). Although the Charte declared France to be a Catholic 
nation, Lamennais  laments the added promise of freedom of religion (32). His fear of 
protestant religions goes hand in hand with his fear of individualism. While an 
absolute Catholic monarchy provides only one unified truth, the protestant system 
allows individuals to define truth according to individual interpretation, “chaque 
individu crée la vérité ou la détermine selon son jugement,” resulting in “vérités 
contradictoires” (42). 
For Lamennais, the Church historically provided a valuable point of centralization for 
Christian nations. He argues that it was actually Jesus himself who established the 
bond between Christianity and the monarchy (125-6). From this point of view, the 
monarchy, established in the Church, must serve the Church through obedience to its 
sovereign Pope: “Si donc Jésus-Christ a établi le régime monarchique dans l’Église, 
si le pape y est souverain, attaquer son autorité, limiter son pouvoir, c’est détruire 
l’Église; c’est essayer de substituer un gouvernement humain, un gouvernement 
arbitraire, à celui qu’elle a reçu de Jésus-Christ” (125).  
As an individual who is one with the Church, the Pope represents Christian 
unification: “Point de pape, point d’Eglise” (122). Throughout De la religion, the 
author repeats that the Church was meant to be “une, universelle, perpétuelle” (141, 
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160). Lamennais’ argument to reinstate the authority of the Church is likewise a plea 
to restore the value of European history. Catholic society, he claims, has “Des liens 
que l’homme n’a point formés, et qu’il ne peut rompre” (85). Divine bonds cannot be 
broken whereas human bonds are subject to human passions and opinions. Lamennais 
also asserts that it is impossible to teach morality without religion. He criticizes 
attempts to adopt a secular moral code lacking traditional religious clout, “comme si 
bien croire n’était pas le fondement de bien vivre” (92). De la religion allows no 
room for religious freedom because Lamennais believed at the time that multiplicity 
of religions and personal interpretation were doomed to weaken the Church’s strong 
central organization. Like de Maistre and Chateaubriand, early Lamennais sought to 
create harmony not through acceptance but through exception. De la religion predicts 
that religious tolerance will be the downfall of Christianity: “Et ce sera sous le 
prétexte des libertés religieuses qu’on essaiera de nous faire un nouveau 
christianisme” (97). He argues that social collapse would soon follow: “Point de 
christianisme, point de religion, ..., et par conséquence point de société” (141).  
Individualism and democracy are akin to each other in De la religion in that both are 
subject to the whims of the present and neither is grounded in the eternal. Lamennais 
laments individualism in modern spirituality. He specifically addresses the concept of 
religion as a personal feeling : “on réduit la religion à un sentiment indéfinissable qui, 
suivant les temps et les pays, se manifeste sous différentes formes” (136). De la 
religion consistently categorizes democracy as unstable and associates it with the 
ephemeral whims of the public as impressionable, passion-driven individuals : “La 
caractère de la démocratie est une mobilité continuelle; tout sans cesse y est en 
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mouvement; tout y change; avec une rapidité effrayante, au gré des passions et des 
opinions” (17). As a system created by man, he argues that democracy can only be as 
stable or as perfect as its necessarily imperfect mortal creators. The monarchy, in 
contrast, is a system created by the Supreme Being and therefore is perfectly stable 
and everlasting. Lamennais depicts democracy as a system riddled with human error, 
especially pride, and insists that mediocrity rather than talent reigns over a democratic 
nation (18). The democratic nation is therefore assumed to be a nation of instability 
while the monarchical nation, in contrast, is anchored by both a divine blessing and 
the test of time: “pour opérer les grandes choses, le temps est indispensable” (18). For 
example, the recent rise of the bourgeoisie opens society to the corrupting influence 
of money. Greed encourages men to live exclusively in the present, severed from the 
traditions of the past and the future of humanity. For Lamennais, an overemphasis on 
the present negatively affects family bonds, the traditional foundation of society: 
“Nulle prévoyance pour les siens, nulle pensée de l’avenir; le présent est tout pour 
l’homme concentré dans l’abjection des sentiments personnels, et les lois et les 
mœurs tendent de concert à l’anéantissement de la famille” (20).  
De la religion rejects any law sanctioned solely by the state. Civil marriage, for 
example, is dismissed as “concubinage légal, une véritable prostitution” (51). 
Historically, the Church connected major life events to the eternal through 
ceremonies and sacraments. Lamennais worries that secularization will limit people 
to a strictly positivist analysis of life events. Literal interpretations of birth, marriage, 
and death are, for Lamennais, stripped of all beauty and hope:  
Jamais avant le dix-huitième siècle, il n’exista de société 
publique systématiquement athée, de législation qui se 
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combattît elle-même en renversant la base des devoirs; qui, 
dépouillant l’homme de sa grandeur, et le ravalant au rang des 
brutes, ne lui montrât dans la naissance qu’un accroissement de 
l’espèce, dans le mariage qu’un bail à la vie, dans la mort que 
le néant. (51-2) 
 
Religion adds a layer of meaning to ordinary life and strengthens spiritual bonds, 
uniting the people through mysticism. For Lamennais, religion is the only social 
element which promotes reflection beyond the physical: “la religion, fondement des 
devoirs, est aussi l’unique source des idées spirituelles, et de tout ce qui élève au-
dessus des sens” (59). Religious ceremonies and sacraments traditionally linked the 
present to the eternal. Lamennais explains that this link disappears when the Church 
ceases to reign. He uses England as an example:  
En cessant de reconnaître l’autorité suprême, et même toute 
autorité réelle dans l’ordre religieux, le peuple avait perdu la 
notion de la souveraineté dans l’ordre temporel. Il ne pouvait 
plus comprendre ce que c’est qu’un monarque, il ne pouvait 
surtout plus souffrir un pouvoir au-dessus du sien. Le trône, 
pour lui, ce fut un fauteuil, comme l’autel n’était plus qu’une 
table. (7) 
 
For Lamennais, the Revolution disrupted not only the French government system but 
natural law since the beginning of time: “la révolution qu’on a confondue et que l’on 
continue de confondre avec ce qui n’en fut qu’une horrible circonstance, n’est en 
réalité que le renversement des doctrines qui, depuis l’origine du monde, ont été le 
fondement des sociétés humaines” (71-2). He expresses fear that French Catholicism 
will end up being forced to conform to the state rather than conforming the State to 
the Church (74). Again, he cites the novelty of doubt as a main point of weakness: 
“qu’un peuple rejette systématiquement de ses lois tout principe spirituel... c’est un 
phénomène nouveau sur la terre” (75). Without religion, Lamennais foresees a 
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fruitless generation which is “agitée, tourmentée,” lifelessly wandering, “ces ombres 
errantes qui cherchent un tombeau” (258). For him, some form of spiritual 
regeneration is necessary to the survival of humanity. 
 
Lamennais ends with the implication that any society which resolves to lose faith is 
likewise inflicting a sort of mass suicide: “ils ont résolu de mourir” (301). In an 
ultimate profession of faith in the Church, Lamennais expresses confidence that no 
government or society can survive without the Church’s guidance. He predicts that 
the Church will rise again – even if primitive society must begin anew, restarting time 
with a fresh generation of mankind. Rather than believe that society might be 
evolving, Lamennais sees social change as a road to destruction. Like the great flood 
in the Old Testament, God’s plan to renew the Earth would be in spite of humanity. 
Man is depicted as a bystander in God’s plan. Humanity is powerless once it strays 
from the divine path – and seemingly worthless in the eyes of Lamennais’ angry God 
who would sacrifice humanity for the unity of the Church: 
Que si les gouvernements aveuglés sans retour persistent à se 
perdre, s’ils ont résolu de mourir, l’Eglise gémira sans doute, 
mais elle n’hésitera pas sur le parti qu’elle doit prendre: se 
retirer du mouvement de la société humaine, resserrer les liens 
de son unité, maintenir dans son sein, par un libre et courageux 
exercice de son autorité divine, et l’ordre de la vie, ne rien 
craindre des hommes, n’en rien espérer, attendre en patience et 
en paix ce que Dieu décidera du monde. (301) 
 
Yet, Lamennais’ imminent spiritual evolution is glimpsed in a short passage in the 
conclusion to De la religion. He reveals that religion’s strength is dependent upon the 
faith of its believers. Several times throughout the essay, Lamennais mentions that 
society cannot exist without the support of religion. Here, he further posits that 
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religion cannot exist without the support of society. Religion exists only when people 
believe in it: 
On ne change point en quelques années l’esprit des peuples, 
c’est l’œuvre du temps; et jusqu’à ce que cet esprit ait changé, 
il est impossible que la société chrétienne renaisse. Elle est le 
fruit, non de la violence, mais de la conviction; sa base est la 
foi et non pas l’épée. Elle existe quand on y croit, elle cesse 
d’être quand on cesse d’y croire, et jamais les lois ne la 




Humanity Unified Against the Church in Paroles d’un croyant 
 
 
In the years following De la religion, Lamennais would gradually develop the 
concept that belief is central to the survival of religion. By 1828, Lamennais began to 
recognize that Church officials could conceivably abuse their “infallible” authority 
(White 23). At around the same time, he came to realize that the triumph of liberalism 
is inevitable.  Letters dating from 1829 reveal Lamennais ultimate resolution: “rendez 
le libéralisme chrétien” (White 24). By 1833, Lamennais repeatedly embraces hope 
and love as the true path to progress in Paroles d’un croyant: “Espérez et aimez. 
L’espérance adoucit tout, et l’amour rend toutes choses possibles” (Paroles vi). In 
Paroles d’un croyant, order is not forced on society through existing structures. 
Rather, everything is said to happen for a reason according to a divine plan, including 
the reign of evil before the reign of God (10-11). In this way, hope can be salvaged 
despite distressing circumstances. Lamennais’ concept of a divine plan is similar to 
Ballanche’s but his message is ultimately completely contrary to that of the Essai sur 
les institutions which depicted activism as contrary to God’s intended timing. The 
rather brief chapters of Paroles d’un croyant include sections written as prophecies, 
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parables and some persuasive essays. Although the styles vary, the work as a whole is 
noticeably more intimate than De la religion. Rather than presenting readers with 
received information in an authoritarian tone as he did in De la religion, Paroles d’un 
croyant shows the author to be one of the people, experiencing their trials with them. 
Some of the prophecies allow for personal testimony to be presented as sentimental 
inspiration. The author moves out of the realm of dogma and into the realm of 
feeling. In the following passage, for example, Lamennais captivates the reader by 
acknowledging common human fears as he recounts a prophetic dream: 
Et je tressaillis, non de crainte ni de joie, mais comme d’un 
sentiment qui serait un mélange inexprimable de l’une et de 
l’autre. 
Et l’Esprit me dit: Pourquoi es-tu triste? 
Et je répondis en pleurant: Oh! Voyez les maux qui sont sur la 
terre. (42) 
 
With this, Lamennais echoes the general plight of his countrymen, acknowledging 
that common experience and common sentiment bind them as human beings. 
Lamennais’ new concept of religion in Paroles d’un croyant approaches the spiritual 
models of Rousseau and Mme de Staël. The source of religion can be found inside the 
self and through generous acts of human bonding rather than through rigid Church 
doctrine. Nevertheless, Lamennais makes an effort to preserve the mysticism he 
previously admired in the Church. Instead of removing religion, he alters its source 
and its history while retaining the purpose of unifying, moralizing, and strengthening 
human bonds with the eternal. In place of a clear external religion, Paroles d’un 
croyant describes a hidden, internal religion. The world that one sees with his eyes is 
not real: “Le monde réel est voilé pour vous” (111). Introversion is the key to lifting 
the veil: “Celui qui se retire au fond de lui-même, l’y entrevoit comme dans le 
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lointain” (111). By allowing individuals to take control of their religious beliefs, 
Lamennais shifts the source of religious authority from the unified Church and State 
to the unified people. The people, he notes, were the original supporters of Christ 
(113). His interpretation of Christianity consequently becomes gentler. Faith must be 
felt, not forced: “La foi est la fille du Verbe: elle pénètre dans les cœurs avec la 
parole, et non avec le poignard” (118). 
Much of Paroles d’un croyant is written as a prophecy, detailing the poet’s visions of 
the past and the future. For Lamennais, history remains an important foundation for 
truth. Lamennais alters his previous historical assertions in order to support his new 
agenda. A prophetic writing style allows the author to claim a historical foundation 
for new ideas and subsequently link those ideas directly to divine authority. His 
approach alters the perception of the present, allowing Lamennais to reverse his 
previous stance on change as destructively regressive and embrace innovation as 
divinely progressive. Lamennais guides the reader on a voyage through time in an 
effort to reveal new truths: “Et je fus transporté en esprit dans les temps anciens, et la 
terre était belle, et riche, et féconde; et ses habitants vivaient heureux, parce qu’ils 
vivaient en frères” (8). By beginning with a new interpretation of Genesis, Lamennais 
is able to restart time and adjust history in order to directly link fraternity to the divine 
and the monarchy to the root of all evil: “Et je vis le serpent... Et après avoir écouté la 
parole du serpent, ils se levèrent et dirent: Nous sommes rois” (8). The monarchy is 
thus born of a pact with evil, not with the divine as Lamennais had supposed in De la 
religion. A voice reveals to the poet that the reign of the serpent will be followed by 
the reign of God, therefore the end of the monarchy will mark the beginning of a new 
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truly Christian era: “Et je compris qu’il devait y avoir un règne de Satan avant le 
règne de Dieu. Et je pleurai, et j’espérai” (10). This new era would be a rebirth of 
humanity:  
Et la vision que je vis était vraie, car le règne de Satan s’est 
accompli, et le règne de Dieu s’accomplira aussi; et ceux qui 
ont dit: Nous sommes rois, seront à leur tour renfermés dans la 
caverne avec le Serpent, et la race humaine en sortira; et ce 
sera pour elle comme une autre naissance, comme le passage 
de la mort à la vie. Ainsi soit-il. (11) 
 
History remained important to Lamennais as the foundation for future social and 
religious institutions but Paroles d’un croyant would need to somehow alter the 
historical assertions made in De la religion in order to support the author’s revised 
agenda. Lamennais revisits the concept of a second creation, for example, but 
completely reverses his prior stance on Church authority. At the end of De la religion, 
the author predicts a second creation will occur which will save the Church and 
condemn humanity. In Paroles d’un croyant, the second creation has the opposite 
purpose. In De la religion, humanity has allegedly degenerated due to a detour from 
the divine plan. In Paroles d’un croyant, this same social evolution actually becomes 
the divine plan. Amazingly, Lamennais shifts from a degenerative view of humanity 
in accordance with de Maistre to a completely opposite progressive theory not unlike 
Mme de Staël’s “perfectibilité.” In De la religion, the author accuses the people of 
dissidence:  
...des erreurs et des passions, diverses selon les époques, mais 
qui toujours tendaient à rompre l’unité politique en ébranlant 
l’unité religieuse, altèrent peu à peu l’esprit de la société 
européenne, la détournèrent de sa direction, et en arrêtèrent les 
progrès avant qu’elle eût atteint son parfait développement. 




Paroles d’un croyant reverses the charges, acquitting the people and accusing 
religious and political leaders of manipulating the people through false doctrines. 
Revolution is now part of God’s plan: “Quelque chose que nous ne savons pas se 
remue dans le monde: il y a là un travail de Dieu” (3).  For Lamennais in 1833, 
Christianity will live on forever but the Church is destined to fall. The second coming 
of Christ, according to Paroles d’un croyant, will not be to save the Church from the 
people but rather to save the people from an ever more corrupt Church. 
From chapter thirteen, Paroles d’un croyant endeavors to reinterpret the history of 
Catholic monarchies. The prophetic vision exposes kings as devil worshippers who 
set out to dupe the people, spreading false Christianity as a means for destroying true 
Christianity (52-3). The seven crowned men, as founders of monarchies, curse the 
Christian doctrine of liberty as they perform satanic rituals complete with an upside-
down cross and a blasphemous communion, drinking blood from a human skull. 
Together they vow to abolish Christianity, science, and thought which make up a sort 
of trinity of truth (53). Here, it is notable that Lamennais asserts that religion is 
actually supported by science and philosophy. 
Despite major adjustments to his religious philosophy, unity would remain just as 
imperative to the success of the new nation in Paroles d’un croyant as it did in De la 
religion. Unity is not only achieved through human equality but also through equal 
consideration of the past, present, and future. Prophecy allows the author to make 
assertions on all three stages of time and unify them through his visions. Lamennais 
recounts a prophetic dream allegedly sent to him by God in which a divine being 
telepathically communicates prophecy to him (41). He describes a vision in which he 
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could simultaneously observe the past, present, and future in unison (42). Similarly, 
humanity also appeared to him as a whole, as one unified being: “Et la race humaine 
me paraissait comme un seul homme” (42).  
In Paroles unity leads to liberty, “Le jour donc où vous serez unis sera le jour de 
votre délivrance” (124). In Lamennais’ reinterpretation of human history, Jesus’ 
greatest accomplishment was the granting of liberty to the people. The monarchs 
curse Christ because the path of faith and thought taught by true Christian doctrine 
leads to the liberty they oppose: “La foi et la pensée ont brisé les chaînes des 
peuples...” (63). Whereas Lamennais had previously argued that kings must have 
been appointed to their thrones by divine privilege and that people have no right to 
choose their leader, Paroles d’un croyant insists: “ce sont les peuples qui font les rois, 
et les peuples ne sont pas faits pour les rois” (82). Liberty allows the people to unify 
against tyranny. 
The unity that Lamennais formerly proposed depended upon a social hierarchy 
headed by the Church. In 1825, Lamennais considered democracy and social 
evolution as exclusively incompatible with national unity: “Ce sont deux principes 
qui se combattent sans relâche dans l’État: un principe d’unité et de stabilité, un 
principe de division et de changement perpétuel” (De la religion 19). De la religion 
depicts the pope as the ultimate unifier:  
[l’Église] n’est pas une, s’il n’existe point de centre d’unité, si 
la souveraineté ne réside point immuablement dans un seul; 
elle n’est pas universelle, si ce souverain, ce pouvoir un n’est 
pas universel puisque là où le pouvoir s’arrête, là s’arrête la 
société; elle n’est pas perpétuelle si ce pouvoir un et universel 
n’est pas perpétuel aussi, puisque là où le pouvoir finit, là finit 




Paroles d’un croyant reverses the previous social structure, usurping the pope’s role 
as unifier and establishing universal equality as the foundation for unity. De la 
religion warns against egalitarianism, claiming that the erasure of class distinctions 
would lead to financially motivated immorality (De la religion 19-20). Paroles d’un 
croyant continues to warn against the danger of the “insatiable desire to acquire and 
possess” material goods but the link between greed and social equality is erased 
(Paroles d’un croyant 122).  Justice and charity replace social hierarchy as the means 
for preserving society against greed (Paroles d’un croyant 122). The monarchs divide 
their people to inhibit communication and seek to inspire obedience through tyranny 
(53). In Lamennais’ altered historical revelation, monarchs ruled by inspiring “une 
justice inexorable,” not through divine right (57). For Lamennais in 1833, there are no 
class distinctions and men interact as equals, as brothers: “chacun s’aimera dans son 
frère” (104). His vision is not just one of French unity but of world unity: “Et chacun 
s’aimera sans son frère, et se tiendra heureux de le servir; et il n’y aura ni petits, ni 
grands, à cause de l’amour qui égale tout, et toutes les familles ne seront qu’une 
famille, et toutes les nations qu’une nation” (104). Because of his emphasis on unity, 
Lamennais’ condemnation of individualism is also among the few themes that remain 
constant between 1825 and 1833 (14). De la religion envisioned a society unified 
through service to the Church. Paroles d’un croyant sees men unified in service to 
each other in accordance with God’s will: “La loi de Dieu est une loi d’amour, et 
l’amour ne s’élève point au-dessus des autres, mais il se sacrifie aux autres” (19).  
Paroles d’un croyant highlights the sacred origins of work according to Christian 
tradition. Lamennais asserts that work is a part of God’s plan for man. Those who do 
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not work are judged to be sinners. When the hardest working people are placed at the 
top of the social hierarchy, aristocrats fall in rank. As exploiters of good working 
people, the bourgeoisie are at the very bottom. Here, Lamennais differs from Saint-
Simon who placed sentimental people at the top of the social hierarchy but otherwise 
maintained a traditional class structure with the working class at the bottom. 
Reminiscent of Rousseau, Lamennais attacks the leisurely ruling class as a source for 
social vice: “les vices les dévorent, et si ce ne sont les vices, c’est l’ennui” (28). 
Working people benefit from a moral “treasure.” Generosity and compassion are 
likewise elevated to the most honorable traits in humankind (28). In later chapters, we 
will see that work remained important later in the century to writers such as Ernest 
Renan and Jules Michelet who argued that work ethic must be preserved in a positive, 
masculine religion. 
Ultimately, Paroles d’un croyant moves toward a reconsideration of the meaning of 
the word “patrie,” or fatherland. The monarch father figure is replaced by God. 
Lamennais moves from an idyllic history of Christian Europe in De la religion to an 
almost fantastical ideal vision of a future heaven on Earth in Paroles d’un croyant. 
“La cité de Dieu
14
” distinguishes itself from “la cité de Satan” because it is a place 
where brotherhood reigns: “chacun aime ses frères comme soi-même” (154). 
According to the poet’s vision, Satan reversed human understanding of values by 
inventing war and glorifying personal honor, fidelity to royalty and obedience to the 
law (157). Honor, Fidelity, and Obedience were invented by Satan as idols for 
misleading the people. Lamennais claims that obedience to authority thereby falsely 
                                                 
14
 The City of God is likely a reference to Saint Augustine’s work by the same title in which rejected 
the authority of corrupt kings embracing God as the one true ruler. (“The City of God.” Web. 03 
March 2013. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/050651.htm>). 
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replaced love of humanity (157). Justice and charity are the cornerstones of the true 
religion: 
Le règne de Dieu, je vous le dis encore, c’est le règne de la 
justice dans les esprits et de la charité dans les cœurs: et il a sur 
la terre son fondement dans la foi en Dieu et la foi au Christ, 
qui a promulgué la loi de Dieu, la loi de charité et la loi de 
justice. (169) 
 
Distracted by the illusion of the physical world, man is a wanderer on Earth searching 
for a homeland that cannot be found in this world: “La patrie n’est point ici-bas; 
l’homme vainement l’y cherche” (181)
15
. Lamennais’ final vision in Paroles reveals 
the true nature of the universe as the poet glimpses man’s veritable homeland. He 
sees three oceans, one of “force,” one of “lumière,” and one of “vie” (186). They are 
all three simultaneously separate but unified: “une même unité, indivisible, absolue, 
éternelle” (186). These three oceans correspond to the trinity, “le Père, le Fils, 
l’Esprit” (186). The Father is infinite, “au dedans de l’infini, un avec elle” (187). The 
Son is described as “une parole,” the word which defines the infinite being (187). The 
Spirit is the feeling shared between the Father and the Son: “l’amour, l’effusion, 
l’aspiration mutuelle du Père et du Fils” (187). For Lamennais, God’s creation is like 
an island in the ocean of the great Infinite Being (188). “La patrie” is brotherhood 
with humanity creating harmony with the supreme being that envelops it. The poet 
leaves readers with the hopeful prophecy that man’s true homeland lies outside the 
borders of politics and dogma in a heavenly state of peaceful harmony: “Et je sentais 
ce que c’est que la patrie: et je m’enivrais de lumière, et mon âme emportée par des 
                                                 
15
 Interestingly, this is reminiscent of the Indian concept of “maya” which basically views the physical 
world as an illusion. 
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flots d’harmonie, s’endormait sur les ondes célestes, dans une extase inénarrable” 
(189). 
Conclusion 
Although Lamennais’ early writings established him as an ultramontane in agreement 
with the likes of Bonald, Ballanche, and de Maistre, his later writings envision a 
renovation of the Church which would include separation of church and state as well 
as encouraging Church cooperation with French republicans. By 1833, Lamennais 
completely broke free from Church dogma and proposed his own type of “new” 
Christianity (reminiscent of Saint-Simon’s) with a focus on fraternity in Paroles d’un 
croyant.  
In De la religion, Lamennais asserts that enlightenment philosophy promoted 
individualism and focused too heavily on the present. From his point of view, this 
focus on the self and on the present prevented people from unifying with the past and 
future, with their ancestors and offspring. In order to unify humanity, Lamennais 
reasons that the past, present, and future must be equally represented in religion. 
Lamennais sees Christianity as historically foundational for European society. The 
Catholic priest was scandalized by Louis XVIII’s constitutional monarchy because it 
violated traditional barriers between the mundane and the divine. Lamennais, like 
Ballanche, also feared the freedom of religion established in the Charter. Lamennais’ 
harsh rejection of Protestantism in De la religion seems related to his rejection of 
individualism. One of his main criticisms of Protestantism is that it allows individuals 
to interpret religion for themselves. De la religion focuses on the pope as the only 
hope for the unification of all Christian nations. 
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De la religion likewise associates democracy with individualism because both are 
supposedly rooted in man’s desires in the present and detached from past traditions. 
Democracy is thus the opposite of the eternal. Following this line of reasoning, 
democracy is assumed to be less stable than the monarchy which rests on the 
foundation of eternal religion. De la religion insists that religion bonds people 
together in a way that secular ceremonies cannot because they lack the weight of 
mysticism. For Lamennais, faith is necessary to life and widespread loss of faith is 
equivalent to mass suicide.  
The author concludes De la religion with the conviction that the Church will rise 
again to reclaim control over humanity. At this time, Lamennais rejected social 
change as destructive. He compares the nineteenth century to the era preceding the 
Old Testament’s great flood. Nevertheless, a short passage in the conclusion of De la 
religion alludes to the idea that religion can only exist when it has followers, 
suggesting that perhaps the people do have some control over their own religion and 
foreshadowing Lamennais’ spiritual evolution in Paroles d’un croyant. 
Paroles d’un croyant, in dramatic contrast to De la religion, recognizes that Church 
officials could potentially abuse their power and considers liberalism as an inevitable 
force in society. For Lamennais in 1833, social change is a part of a divine plan. He 
uses personal testimony to support claims that sentiment is central to religion. 
Lamennais embraces internal conscience-based religion over ritual and Church 
doctrine. In opposition to his previous rejection of individual religious interpretation, 
Paroles d’un croyant encourages a shift in authority from the iron rule of the Church 
to the strength of the people unified through their hearts. 
187 
 
Lamennais adopts a prophetic writing style in Paroles in order to support his new 
ideas with some semblance of divine authority. He uses revelation to expose 
previously unknown divine “truths” which conveniently reverse his previous 
ultraconservative agenda in De la religion. Lamennais shifts, for example, from a 
degenerative theory of humanity to a progressive theory comparable to Mme de 
Staël’s “perfectibility.” Paroles d’un croyant blames Church officials for the 
degeneration of Christianity and demonizes them as devil worshippers. He associates 
the true spirit of Christianity with liberty, science, and philosophy - all liberal ideals. 
Despite their differences, Paroles d’un croyant and De la religion both concur that 
unity is central to the success of a new nation. In De la religion, Lamennais is 
preoccupied with the unity of time and generations of humanity. In Paroles d’un 
croyant, the unity of humanity is intertwined with the concept of liberty. Liberty 
allows the people to unify against tyranny and unification, in turn, preserves liberty. 
A certain condemnation of individualism is thus upheld in the Paroles even though 
the philosophy behind it differs significantly from the anti-individualism expressed in 
De la religion. Whereas De la religion thought of humanity as ideally unified through 
the Church, Paroles d’un croyant sees humans as unified through devotion to one 
another. A “law of love,” again reminiscent of Saint-Simon, trumps all other doctrine. 
This law extends to a work ethic in which individuals do their part to support 
humanity as a whole.Lamennais ultimately associates Christianity with justice and 
charity, rejecting the popular social values, honor, fidelity, and obedience, as 
inventions of Satan. In the closing pages of Paroles d’un croyant, Lamennais strives 
to redefine the meaning of “patrie” to include the entire universe. His final revelation 
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envisions creation as floating within God. The divine is not limited to the Church. 
Rather, it is all around us. Lamennais’ insistence on unity, liberty, charity and 





Chapter 10: Fallen Angels in Restoration France: The Case for Compassion in 
Éloa, Ahasvérus and Cédar ou la chute d’un ange 
 
Alfred de Vigny’s 1824 poem, Éloa; Edgar Quinet’s 1833 drama Ahasvérus; and 
Alphonse de Lamartine’s 1838 poem La Chute d’un ange each depict the fall of an 
angel who connects with another non-angelic being through the temptation of 
sentiment. Influenced by the various concept of sentiment as defined by writers such 
as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mme de Staël, Chateaubriand and Pierre-Simon Ballanche 
as well as the Nouveau Christianisme of Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon, a new wave 
of poets in the 1820s and 1830s dreamed of a God who would be more in touch with 
the changing needs of humanity and somehow refute an ancient dogma that was 
increasingly inconsistent with modern realities.  For Vigny, Quinet and Lamartine, 
who all lived through the fall of the Empire and the various phases of the Restoration 
from Louis XVIII to Louis-Philippe, a lack of human compassion seemed to blame 
for the misfortunes suffered by various groups of people under the changing regimes. 
A moral foundation seemed necessary to any sustainable society but modern France 
was in need of a new more compassionate kind of religion that would go hand in hand 
with a new more compassionate kind of government. Examining the faults that they 
perceived in nineteenth century French society, each of these authors chooses to use a 
biblical setting as the background for reconsidering an individual’s connection with 
the divine and also with society. 
In Éloa, Ahasvérus and Cédar ou la chute d’un ange, the figure of the fallen angel 
allows the authors to critique religious beliefs that have traditionally been held as 
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God’s laws and weigh them against the value of compassion for humankind. Before 
the fall, all three of these angels might be categorized as guardian angels whose work 
includes the safeguarding of humanity. The guardian angel in particular “may be seen 
as an attempt to overcome the remoteness and impersonality of God” (Grosso 128). 
Through the experience of the fall, the angel has a chance to begin a new existence 
outside of the heavenly kingdom in cooperation with humanity. Rousseau’s Savoyard 
priest had already taught that without virtue man, “like the angels,” would not have 
the satisfaction of earning his faith (118). In these tales, the angels seek to be like man 
so that they too can experience the glory of sacrifice. As we will see, God is 
overwhelmingly depicted as an absent father. In contrast, the figure of the fallen angel 
in these three works is distinguished by a noble sense of compassion, self-sacrifice 
and the desire for companionship.  
Éloa 
Labeled a “mystère” in the subtitle and introduced by a quote from Genesis
16
, Alfred 
de Vigny’s Éloa ou la sœur des anges begins with the birth of the angel on Earth in 
the time when Jesus, “le Médiateur,” “sauvait ses habitants” (23). Vigny’s use of the 
distant past as a setting for the poem is not unique. As we will see in Quinet and 
Lamartine, the use of the past allows Vigny to situate his poem outside of the realm 
of modern society. Their choice to confront a mythical past in order to build a better 
future was a part of a general movement on the part of intellectuals at this time to 
confront the abandonment of French history after the revolution (Crossley).  
Éloa is the product of a tear shed by Jesus for Lazarus, the famous moment in John 11 
when “Jesus wept.” In Vigny’s poem, the Holy Spirit then breathed life into the tear 
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 “C’est le serpent, dit-elle, je l’ai écouté, et il m’a trompée.” 
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in order to form an angel. She is therefore part human and part holy. The description 
of Éloa emphasizes this half human and half divine nature. She has a physical body 
that is draped in angelic clothing, implying that her sensual mortality lurks beneath 
the surface of a divine beauty that is seemingly perfect. Like Jesus, she is a medium 
between the divine and the terrestrial. Vigny extends her dual nature to the conflict 
between her being and her gender: “C’est une femme aussi, c’est une Ange 
charmante” (25).  
The circumstances of Éloa’s birth link her to the origins of Christianity which focused 
on charity and pity. A return to the origins of Christian belief was a much debated 
topic in the 1820s and 1830s, especially in the context of supporting the lower classes 
in an industrial society. Though the liberals under the Restoration were by no means a 
homogenous group, liberals generally believed in equality as defined by the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man (Jardin 79). Notable theorists like Saint-Simon and 
Fourrier would extend this theme to the idea of civilizations based on love and 
compassion for fellow men. Though Vigny may not have been directly associated 
with these movements, their popularity demonstrates the general intellectual current 
toward a compassionate society circa 1824 that may have influenced Vigny’s 
preoccupation with the concept of pity. In his forward to Journal d’un poète, Louis 
Ratisbonne asserts that Vigny’s “muse” was “la pitié.” Ratisbonne considered Éloa to 
be the incarnation of this muse and adds “et il faut avouer qu’aucun poème ne 
renferme, sous le vêtement diaphane des chastes vers, un plus bel idéal d’amour et de 
la pitié” (13). Given the feminine form that Vigny used to express pity, however, how 
can he reconcile it with his “mâle religion de l’honneur”? Vigny’s journal suggests 
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that he wanted to make pity an honorable trait, thereby adding masculine power to it. 
The weak are not those who offer pity but rather those who receive it
17
. Though we 
may agree with Ratisbonne’s interpretation of Éloa as a creature who offers pity, 
Vigny also portrays her as someone who has made a mistake in a moment of 
weakness and who could be the object of pity for some higher power. An honorable 
God might have had mercy on Éloa’s feminine weakness for Lucifer. Throughout the 
1830s, Vigny’s journal shows that he continued to develop the integration of 
sentiment and honor that he began in Éloa. In 1835, he comments “J’aime humanité. 
J’ai pitié d’elle” (97) and in 1836 his plan for Daphné reveals that he sought to 
“Diviniser la conscience” (107). An entry written shortly thereafter concerning a 
conversation with fellow romantic author, Adolphe Dittmer, explains: “Dittmer vient 
me voir. […] Il pense comme moi que l’honneur est la conscience exaltée, et que 
c’est la seule religion vivante aujourd’hui dans les cœurs mâles et sincères. Mon 
opinion porte ses fruits” (107). Éloa is completely driven by her conscience, by an 
inner power that propels her to act on how she feels rather than acting on what she is 
expected to do according to the angelic “society.” This active aspect of her character 
is perhaps the “male” aspect, linked to her connection with Jesus and her role as an 
angel, a being that is typically masculine in the Bible. 
Born of Jesus’ own struggle between faith in the divine and human emotion, Éloa 
seems destined to feel pity and spread consolation. Lucifer, as the most miserable of 
creatures in the universe, is naturally the creature to whom she is most attracted to as 
a benefactor of the gift of consolation. She gives him consolation perhaps because he 
                                                 
17
 In an 1824 entry in the Journal he writes: “Tous les crimes et les vices viennent de 
faiblesse. Ils ne méritent donc que la pitié!” (32). 
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needs it the most. Éloa is above all a feeling being. One of the worst parts about 
Lucifer’s damnation is that he becomes an unfeeling being, unable to experience joy 
or sorrow. Éloa’s Satan is in the Old Testament tradition in which Satan “has no 
private reasons for tempting man, nor special joy in causing his fall” (Jung 25). Satan 
is essentially still living in an Old Testament world where pity does not affect 
celestial law and consolation is not God’s mission. As a being who was created from 
Jesus’ compassion, Éloa enters Satan’s realm as a representative of Christian 
principles. Just as Jesus offered charity to social outcasts, Éloa too feels pity rather 
than disdain when she hears of Lucifer’s story.  
   Et l’on crut qu’Éloa le maudirait; mais non, 
   L’effroi n’altéra point son paisible visage, 
   Et ce fut pour le Ciel un alarmant présage. 
   Son premier mouvement ne fut pas de frémir, 
   Mais plutôt d’approcher comme pour secourir; 
   La tristesse apparut sur la lèvre glacée 
   Aussitôt qu’un malheur s’offrit à sa pensée ; 
   Elle apprit à rêver, et son front innocent 
   De ce trouble inconnu rougit en s’abaissant ; 
   Une larme brillait auprès de sa paupière. 
   Heureux ceux dont le cœur verse ainsi la première ! (27) 
 
Lucifer’s role as tempter, however, is to inspire desire in others primarily through 
manipulating their emotions through reveries. Éloa first experiences temptation as an 
awareness of a desire that is foreign to the heavenly environment. Like a poet affected 
by ennui, she loses the ability to be moved by pleasures appealing to the senses such 
as perfume, spices and even music “car rien n’y répondait à son âme attendrie” (27). 
Paradise is described as a land of beautiful structure, not unlike the classical aesthetic 
of the Ancien Régime. Éloa, when faced with the choice to conform to this restrictive 
perfection or float freely in search of something new, chooses individual freedom 
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over conformity. The angel ventures out of the heavens hoping to become a 
consolation to others and indeed her closeness to Earth is described as having a 
healing power on the world that is capable of reversing human misery. Vigny 
emphasizes the fact that Éloa is unique in her willingness to approach the boundaries 
of heaven: “Jamais les purs Esprits, enfants de la lumière,/ De ces trois régions 
n’atteignent la dernière./ Et jamais ne s’égare aucun beau Séraphin/ Sur ces degrés 
confus dont l’Enfer est la fin." The majority of the angels specifically fear the 
possibility of disobeying God by having pity on Satan : “Et même en lui prêtant une 
oreille attendrie,/ Il (an angel) pourrait oublier la céleste patrie…[…]/ Voilà pourquoi, 
toujours prudents et toujours sages,/ Les Anges de ces lieux redoutent les passages" 
(30).  
Éloa is distinguished by an unusual willingness to risk her own salvation, reminding 
us of Vigny’s preoccupation with the magnanimity of self-sacrifice. In Vigny’s 
Journal d’un poète, the plans for several works include the continual reworking of the 
idea that man is greater than God in the sense that he is capable of sacrificing his life 
for a principle (Journal 165, 250).  Although Éloa’s motivation is chiefly described as 
curiosity (perhaps reflecting the nineteenth century spirit of experimentation), she 
does end up having an effect on the worlds she approaches and is surprised to learn 
that she has power over mortals. Her presence has a positive effect: 
  
  S’il arrivait aussi qu’en ses routes nouvelles 
  Elle touchât l’un d’eux des plumes de ses ailes, 
  Alors tous les chagrins s’y taisaient un moment, 
  Les rivaux s’embrassaient avec étonnement ; 
  Tous les poignards tombaient oubliés par la haine ; 
  Le captif souriant marchait seul et sans chaîne ; 
  Le criminel rentrait au temple de la loi ; 
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  Le proscrit s’asseyait au palais de son Roi ; 
  L’inquiète Insomnie abandonnait sa proie ; 
  Les pleurs cessaient partout, hors les pleurs de la joie ; 
  Et surpris d’un bonheur rare chez les mortels, 
  Les amants séparés s’unissaient aux autels. (31) 
   
 
As the angel moves farther and farther out into unknown realms of the universe, it 
seems to her that there is more to the universe than the heavens she knows: “Telle, au 
fond du Chaos qu’observaient ses beaux yeux,/ La vierge, en se penchant, croyait voir 
d’autres Cieux” (32). In her solitude, she contemplates these strange new places and 
finds them to be harmonious. It is in this moment of contemplation that Lucifer 
appears to “la Vierge Éloa.” Lucifer’s temptation is above all an emotional seduction 
that takes advantage of the virgin’s excess of sentiment which leaves her vulnerable 
to dreamy idealism. Describing himself, Lucifer remarks: “Je suis celui qu’on aime et 
qu’on ne connait pas” (35). His very being is a recipe for ennui in that he defines 
himself as the essence of unfulfilled longing. Although he admits that his temptations 
are made of illusion, the demon sees his role as that of a “consolateur” who charms 
people into forgetting their real world troubles (38). Between Satan and Éloa, then, 
Vigny describes two kinds of consolation. There is the consolation produced by Éloa, 
emanating from her sentimental power of compassion and made possible through 
sacrifice. Satan’s escapist diversions console man not through the spirit but through 
the imagination. Éloa’s form of consolation might be seen as occurring thanks to a 
closer rapport with humanity and universal truths while Satan consoles man 
temporarily by separating him from unpleasant truths.  
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According to the text, Éloa’s sin begins when she allows her initial feelings of pity for 
the fallen angel to be eclipsed by feelings of desire which are chiefly motivated by the 
pride resulting from flattery. Her weakness is tied to her femininity. At the beginning 
of the last section of the poem, La chute, “Pudeur” is considered the first step toward 
evil. Vigny depicts Pudeur as a product of the fall from Eden, a replacement for true 
Innocence. Innocence was something personal that came from within whereas pudeur 
was a rule enforced by God. Her true sin in this moment is not her association with 
Satan but rather the fact that she gives up her natural internal innocence and replaces 
it with the art of modesty : 
  D’où venez-vous, Pudeur, noble crainte, ô Mystère 
  Qu’au temps de son enfance a vu naître la terre, 
  […] 
  Au charme des vertus votre charme est égal, 
  Mais vous êtes aussi le premier pas du mal ; 
  D’un chaste vêtement votre sein se décore, 
  Ève avant le serpent n’en avait pas encore ; 
  Et si le voile pur orne votre maintien, 
  C’est un voile toujours, et le crime a le sien ; 
  Tout vous trouble, un regard blesse votre paupière, 
  Mais l’enfant ne craint rien et cherche la lumière. 
  Sous ce pouvoir nouveau, la Vierge fléchissait, 
  Elle tombait déjà, car elle rougissait ; (38) 
   
Another key factor in the Angel’s fall is that she falls willingly. In the above passage 
it is clear that Éloa acts as an individual relying on her own senses rather than on 
dogma for guidance. Knowing that she is going against God’s will, she proclaims to 
Lucifer “Je suis à toi” (38). Éloa’s act of defiance might also be seen as a protest 
against God’s unwillingness to forgive Lucifer. God’s kingdom is an absolute 
monarchy and God’s lack of pity on his subjects suggests a sort of spiritual tyranny. 
As Maurice Descotes points out, Vigny was especially troubled by the tyranny he 
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recognized in Napoléon’s reign despite his obsession with military glory. Vigny’s 
disappointment in the fall of the Empire he fervently supported as a young man 
caused him to reevaluate his idol (Descotes 137). Though Vigny would not develop 
Napoleon as a personage in fiction until Servitude et grandeur militaires (1835), Éloa 
develops the theme that a hero is someone who has compassion. Discussing Vigny’s 
reconsideration of Napoléon, Descotes explains: “Le tyran est insensible à la pitié – 
cette vertu si chère à Vigny. […] Qui n’a pas de coeur reste insensible au code de 
l’honneur – autre thème de prédilection de Vigny” (139). 
Lucifer (who has already established himself as the unknowable ideal) proclaims that 
Éloa is his ideal: “Toi seule me parus ce qu’on cherche toujours… Il me fut révélé 
que je pouvais aimer” (39). Lucifer adds that he feels her presence in nature (his own 
accomplice in illusion inflicted on others) and proceeds to compare her to God. Éloa 
does not recoil but is instead seduced by flattery. Tainted by “pudeur,” she blushes, 
contemplates her “immortel amant” with pride and proceeds to lift her veil. 
Furthermore, Éloa confuses beauty and goodness. 
   Puisque vous êtes beau, vous êtes bon, sans doute; 
   Car sitôt que des Cieux une âme prend la route, 
   Comme un saint vêtement, nous voyons sa bonté 
   Lui donner en entrant l’éternelle beauté. (41) 
 
Near the end of the poem, Lucifer expresses his own vulnerability as he mourns the 
memory of his angelic existence which is now impossible to regain. In particular, he 
implies that the ability to sympathize with humans might save him: 
   Le Tentateur lui-même était Presque charmé, 
   Il avait oublié son art et sa victime, 
   Et son cœur un moment se reposa du crime. 
   Il répétait tout bas, et le front dans ses mains: 




Lucifer nearly repents and the text asserts that he might have been saved if only Éloa 
would have heard him. Does she not hear him because modesty has separated her 
from her natural instincts? In any case, the moment is too brief and Lucifer returns to 
his artful ways which continue to contrast directly with the natural spontaneity of 
sincere emotion. Éloa finally agrees in the last stanzas to “exile” herself from heaven 
in order to follow her lover. It is only after she completely gives herself to him that 
Lucifer shows his true face as Satan. Still, her last concern is if she makes him happy. 
She remains above all the consoler, even if her efforts are in vain.  
In Vigny’s unfinished sequel to Éloa, entitled Satan sauvé, Éloa and Satan experience 
the end of the world as a happy moment because it releases Satan from Hell. 
According to God, Satan’s  ability to feel love for Éloa allows him to enter heaven: 
“Tu as été punis pendant le temps; tu as assez souffert, puisque tu fus l’ange du mal. 
Tu as aimé une fois: entre dans mon éternité. Le mal n’éxiste plus” (Journal 260). 
Despite the hopelessness felt at the end of Éloa, then, Vigny did imagine that 
sentiment might be sacred in some alternate version of Christianity existing outside of 
the boundaries of time. As we will see in Ahasvérus, to a generation who saw 
multiple regimes and ideologies swept away in time, the challenge was to find 
something enduring on which to build a new society. In an 1833 journal entry, Vigny 
concurs: 
Plus je vais, plus je m’aperçois que la seule chose essentielle 
pour les hommes, c’est de tuer le temps. Dans cette vie dont 
nous chantons la brièveté sur tous les tons, notre plus grand 
ennemi, c’est le temps, don’t nous avons toujours trop. A peine 
avons-nous un Bonheur, ou l’amour, ou la gloire, ou la science, 
ou l’émotion d’un spectacle, ou celle de la lecture, qu’il nous 
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faut passer à un autre. Car que faire? C’est là le grand mot. 
(74) 
 
Vigny envisioned his religion of honor to be one in which God would not fade away 
with a changing regime but would remain present in man through his conscience: “La 
religion de l’honneur a son dieu toujours présent dans notre cœur” (93).  
 
Rachel in Ahasvérus 
Edgar Quinet’s Ahasvérus likewise highlights the lack of pity and consolation in 
modern Christianity. Ahasvérus travels the world for centuries as the Wandering Jew, 
seeking to repent to a God he cannot find. Quinet, like Vigny, shows God to be absent 
and through God’s conspicuous absence the characters inevitably cultivate doubt. 
Moreover, as a historian Quinet uses the passage of time to emphasize the idea that no 
one regime can remain in power forever. Time drives humanity toward renewal and 
regrowth. All symbols and ideologies are subject to it. Reading Ahasvérus, it is 
difficult not to think of Jouffroy’s 1825 Comment les dogmes finissent as Quinet 
narrates the fall of regimes and cults through the ages. Ahasvérus’ world is one of 
pitiless evolution. The one being who offers pity to Ahasvérus is Rachel, an 
archangel. The tear she sheds for Ahasvérus, however, causes her fall. Thus, we are 
reminded of de Maistre’s unjust and unfeeling God whose kingdom is more of a 
pitiless bureaucracy than a compassionate human family. Rachel’s role in Ahasvérus 
is to bring pity and consolation through her companionship and, as Simone Bernard-
Griffiths points out, to transform pointless wandering into a pilgrimage (100).  
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In his Histoire de mes idées, Quinet describes himself as feeling like a lone wanderer 
after the fall of the Empire left him without an emotional link to society: 
Quelle fatale découverte pour moi! Je compris que je marchais 
seul. Quelque chose s’était brisé entre le peuple et moi. J’entrai 
dans la jeunesse en rompant avec les masses et cette 
communauté primitive de sentiments populaires qui avait fait la 
force de mes premières années. Était-ce la faute des masses? 
était-ce la mienne? Et qu’importe? il est certain qu’il avait fallu 
se séparer pour avancer. (140) 
 
This sense of separation is ironically the very thing that Quinet finally recognizes as a 
part of a common experience shared with his countrymen. Just as in the case of 
Ahasvérus, the youth of the Restoration required a separation and an individualized 
internal journey to come to grips with the Empire’s fall. Nevertheless, the common 
experience of human nature brings society back together: 
Combien de fois faudra-t-il rompre ainsi avec ses 
propres racines ? Je sentis que la voie serait douloureuse.  
J’ai insisté sur cette histoire intérieure, parce qu’il me 
semble que beaucoup de nos contemporains y retrouveront la 
leur. Je ne comprends guère le plaisir de répéter à satiété : 
« Voyez ! admirez ! je suis le seul de mon espèce ! » 
Au contraire, mon vrai bonheur, ma force est de 
retrouver en moi à chaque pas la bonne vieille nature humaine. 
(Histoire 141) 
 
By joining with Ahasvérus to become the new Adam and Eve in a rebirth of 
humanity, Rachel is this glimmer of hope that some compassionate link remains 
among people after their institutions and ideologies have fallen away. 
The prologue to Ahasvérus establishes the drama as a mystère produced by God to 
explain the story of the universe with which he became disillusioned. In the case of 
Ahasvérus, it is God who is afflicted with the desire for the ideal. His own creation 
becomes his victim in the quest for perfection. The epic is introduced as a “spectacle” 
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ordered by God to illustrate the 6,000 years of Earth’s existence. Quinet’s premise, 
like Vigny’s, allows the author to create his own fictionalized past regarding the 
origins of man in a time when political and religious debates centered on the future of 
humanity. Speaking to a group of Catholic saints, Le Père Éternel explains in the 
Prologue: 
C’est une longue histoire qui m’oppresse moi-même. Mes Séraphins 
vont célébrer devant vous ce terrible mystère… Venez, troupe d’élus, 
comme l’herbe fauchée, vous entasser autour de moi ; penchez-vous 
sans rien craindre chacun sur vos nuages, regardez dans l’abîme et 
soyez attentifs ; le spectacle va durer approchant six mille ans. (5) 
 
From the prologue, Ahasvérus is set in a universe in which God’s detachment from 
his creation is such that human suffering is a source of entertainment. No pity or 
consolation is offered directly by God for the sufferings of mankind.  
L’Ange Rachel first appears as an angel of consolation at the birth of Christ. She is 
playing a viola with three “silver cords." She explains to the Christ Child that “la 
première est pour lui dans la nue,” “la seconde est pour votre mère sous son voile” 
and “la troisième est pour vous chanter un Noël dans votre crèche” (58). The chief 
purpose of Rachel’s visit, however, is to make the child stop crying. She implores 
him to dream instead, encouraging illusion as a form of consolation: “rêvez 
doucement que votre étable est une nef toute d’or” (58).  
Whereas in Vigny’s Éloa it is Satan who creates illusion as consolation, Quinet shows 
illusion to be the work of an angel. Rachel’s consolation is necessary because God is 
already the absent father. The Christ Child does not see his heavenly father. Turning 
to the Virgin Mary, he inquires: “Ma mère, êtes-vous seule? Où est donc allé mon 
père? Je ne l’ai encore jamais vu” (61). 
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Given Ahasvérus’ role as an inverted double of Christ, Rachel’s pity for Ahasvérus 
seems inevitable but pity (though presumably a Christian value) is transformed into 
blasphemy when the object of pity is one who is cursed by God. In pitying Ahasvérus 
and forgetting Christ for a moment, Rachel doubts the absolute authority of God. Her 
pity on the judged is a critique of God’s judgment. Rachel’s choice to follow her 
sentiment rather than coldly follow the rules of the heavens is a moment of truth. For 
Quinet, truth is “le seul bien desirable” (Histoire 132). Having experienced his own 
fall from what he describes as “ma religion pour Napoléon,” Quinet understood the 
growing pains involved in an individual’s shift from idolatry to reason. In his Histoire 
de mes idées, he describes himself as a young man under the Restoration struggling to 
come to terms with his growing liberal sympathies: 
D’abord, je ne voulus rien céder de mon héros. Ce qu’il avait 
fait, il avait dû faire; je niais, je m’obstinais; tout ce que l’on 
racontait n’était qu’inventions de chouans. Cependant, même 
en débattant, je recevais l’impression des choses. Pour la 
première fois, je sentis un violent combat intérieur, lorsque, 
pressé par des autorités que ma raison reconnaissaient, je dus 
me poser cette question: comment concilier ma religion pour 
Napoléon avec ce ferment d’idées libérales qui m’arrivaient de 
tous côtés, et que j’étais bien décidé à ne pas abandonner? 
(138) 
 
Rachel’s character experiences a comparable interior struggle. While still espousing 
Christian rhetoric, the fallen angel is no longer internally in touch with God. She has 
replaced God with Ahasvérus. In the scene where she is attempting to pray for 
example, her mental concentration on prayer cannot change what she feels in her 
heart: “Oh! Cela est sûr. Je suis trop distraite à présent. Il n’y a que mes lèvres qui 
prient, mais mon esprit est ailleurs. Ma bouche prononce des mots; mon cœur en dit 
d’autres. Cela ne peut pas durer ainsi” (180). 
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Rachel’s punishment shows that there is little room for individualized thoughts or 
feelings in Christianity. An angel, being a messenger of and attendant to God, only 
exists to express his will. Furthermore, though Christianity is touted as the religion of 
pity, Quinet creates a world where very little pity is expressed by the Christian God 
for humans, thereby emphasizing the lack of pity for humanity in Christian society. 
Whereas Éloa seemed to gain her penchant for compassion from Jesus, the Jesus in 
Ahasvérus becomes just as unfeeling and vengeful as the Old Testament God. He also 
becomes nearly as elusive. When Christ curses Ahasvérus, he explains: “Toi, tu 
n’auras plus ni siège, ni sommeil. C’est toi qui ira me demander de temple en temple, 
sans jamais me rencontrer” (91). Ahasvérus’ mission to constantly search for the 
Christ he never encounters is not unlike the fate of any man who strives to believe in 
a religion that offers no positive proof of its legitimacy: one is bound to lose faith. 
Quinet believed that France’s regime changes were steps in a process of 
enlightenment through which humanity would ultimately achieve unity through 
reason (Crossley 155). Ahasvérus’ journey is a comparable process. The love he 
receives from the fallen angel Rachel is the beginning of the end of this journey. As 
Charles Magnin explains in his 1833 article in response to Ahasvérus: 
 
… si Rachel déchue n’est plus la foi céleste, elle est sur la terre 
l’amour idéal, la foi éternelle, le complément d’Ahasvérus. 
Ceci n’est pas seulement la vie ; il est la matière, le doute, la 
douleur ; Rachel est l’espoir qui console, l’amour qui guérit : il 
fallait ces deux éléments pour compléter l’humanité ; Rachel 
est une âme d’ange exilée dans un corps de femme ; c’est un de 
ces êtres tombés tout exprès d’en haut pour la réhabilitation de 
l’homme ; une essence presque divine, qui doit passer par 




The details surrounding the exact moment of Rachel’s fall are left unexplained. After 
the fall, Rachel has become a servant to Mob, an old woman who personifies the 
angel of death. Rachel’s moment of doubt has permanently exiled her from heaven. 
According to Mob, this transformation goes hand in hand with the intellectual and 
spiritual changes that accompany the fall. She reveals to Rachel that there is no point 
in praying because it is not only her wings that she has lost: “ton cœur aussi n’est plus 
ce qu’il était” (148). Mob views Rachel’s exit from heaven as a shift from fantasy to 
reality. “Tu ne rentreras plus dans ce monde des rêves. […] La vie réelle, ma chère, 
est un peu différente de ces fantaisies de jeune fille” (147). Rachel has exited the 
aloof world of the heavens and joined humanity on earth. Mob also reveals that 
Rachel is now a woman and subject to human emotions linked to the flesh: “Tu es 
femme, et ton sein tremble comme le sein des femmes” (148). Rachel has thus exited 
the idealistic Christianity of the Church and joined the people. 
Mob’s prediction foreshadows a love relationship that blooms between Rachel and 
Ahasvérus who she does not recognize and who introduces himself as “Joseph.” The 
cultivation of a love relationship in the context of a critique on religions allows 
Quinet to add the cult of romantic love to his list of unsustainable religions. 
Ahasvérus’ divinisation of Rachel is not unlike the mystical rhetoric of romantic 
literature that often combined religious imagery with passion love themes. Ahasvérus, 
for example, refers to Rachel on numerous occasions as “mon ange,” a term which 
she rejects. In fact, shortly after entering into the romantic pursuit of Rachel, 
Ahasvérus becomes a caricature of the romantic poet. The Wandering Jew reveals to 
Mob that he has tried poetry as a means for curing the empty feeling in his soul (188-
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9). Mob enthusiastically approves this pastime of beautiful illusions but Ahasvérus 
responds that he is in search of something “more real” (189). Achieving a solid sense 
of reality – discovering Truth – becomes the goal of the wanderer’s quest. In his 
Histoire de mes idées, Quinet reveals that the pursuit of truth was also his personal 
life quest. For Quinet, truth was the ultimate possession: “La vérité m’a toujours paru 
le seul bien desirable” (Histoire 132). Quinet’s personal experience living through 
multiple regime changes in France influenced his thinking from an early age but he 
also highlights love as being one of the necessary disillusions in life.  
Comment finirent de si belles amours? Elles ne pouvaient 
augmenter ; elles ne devaient pas finir ; elles 
m’accompagnèrent dans les deux premières années d’un 
apprentissage douloureux de la vie ; elles semèrent sous mes 
pas des fleurs mêlées de larmes. Aujourd’hui quand je me 
représente notre doux, ineffable printemps de Certines, avec 
son parfum de mauves et de seigles en fleurs, je vois encore 
errante au fond de quelque taillis, comme le bon génie du lieu, 
cette figure bocagère qui sourit et qui passe. (128) 
 
 
Having lived through so many disappointments, Ahasvérus concludes that what he 
needs, what he is now searching for, is a new religion (195). Mob suggests love as 
this new religion: “Si, à toute force, il vous faut une religion, l’amour, quand il est 
pur, en est une à sa façon” (196). Later, in the “Intermède de la troisième journée,” 
Quinet even adds dialogue between a poet and a Greek-style chorus on the topic of 
love. The poet affirms romantic clichés on eternal love that echo Ahasvérus 
relationship with Rachel : “Éternellement nous nous chercherons à l’endroit où tout 
renaît, sans jamais nous reconnaître” (260).  
Rachel’s inability to remember the circumstances surrounding her fall is the source of 
various misunderstandings throughout the drama. The fallen angel’s separation from 
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her past recalls the post-Revolution estrangement from France’s past. Rachel 
remembers that she was an angel and remembers bits and pieces of her life in heaven, 
such as songs that the angels used to sing. She does not however grasp the gravity of 
her offense and is unaware that God has essentially abandoned her on Earth. In the 
absence of God on Earth, Rachel must rely on faith as her guide. As a beacon of faith, 
she is incapable of criticizing God. Ahasvérus, in contrast, remains hyper aware of his 
punishment. Furthermore, Rachel realizes that she and her lover are inseparable but is 
too naïve to see that it is because of God’s curse on them and not his blessing that 
they must be together. Rachel recognizes Ahasvérus as her savior while, ironically, he 
is the reason for her fall: “Qu’étais-je sans lui? Avant lui? Dis-moi. Le ciel, je le 
regardais sans amour, et la terre sans désir… À present, au contraire, je prie avec 
délice pour lui; il y a des moments, pendant que l’orgue joue, où c’est le ciel qui 
m’environne” (208). Clearly, Rachel sees Ahasvérus as someone who brings her 
closer to God. More specifically, her concern and devotion for another is something 
she believes is holy. Rachel has faith in her conscience believing that it is in tune with 
God. Rachel’s blind faith (in both her lover and her God) causes her to grossly 
misinterpret Ahasvérus’ behavior toward Christ as devotional passion rather than see 
it as the frustrated anguish it really is. She eventually reveals that her love for 
Ahasvérus is greater than her love for God. Ahasvérus has replaced God in her heart. 
Rachel shows to what extend humans create their faith based on feeling. Logic never 
determines her beliefs. Nevertheless, the development of internal connections to the 
conscience is the eventual path to reason. Despite all of the intellectual 
207 
 
misunderstandings she suffers along the way, the compassion she offers is not 
misplaced and is justified by the couple’s union in the end. 
In the last part of the mystery, la Quatrième journée, the reality of religion begins to 
unravel. The people Ahasvérus meets along the way now no longer believe in gods 
but rather in nothingness, le néant. The ocean has been abandoned by humanity since 
their kings have fallen. In scene VII, Rachel offers to sacrifice everything – even her 
belief in God and Christ – to live peacefully for eternity with Ahasvérus (who she still 
refers to as “Joseph”) in a deserted valley (323). She understands, however, that even 
Ahasvérus’ love for her has passed in time. Ahasvérus is still haunted by unknown 
desires proclaiming:  
Le mal ne vient pas de moi, sois-en sûr; mais, ici, je ne peux 
pas guerir. Quand je suis le plus à toi, et que je sens mon cœur 
respirer dans ton cœur, c’est précisément alors que mes oreilles 
tintent, et qu’il y a une voix qui me crie: Plus loin! plus loin! 
va-t’en jusqu’à ma mer d’amour… C’est là la maladie de mon 
âme… et, quand je te presse sur mon sein, mon sein me dit: 
Pourquoi n’est-ce pas la vierge infinie qui demeure au ciel?  
(324-5) 
 
Like the nineteenth century poète maudit, Ahasvérus’ true curse is thus revealed to be 
an obsession with the beau idéal that makes him unable to enjoy earthly realities or 
live in the moment. Ahasvérus concludes that it must be divine love that he is 
searching for and proposes a double suicide. Rachel argues that he should follow 
Christ with her and that he will never want for anything again. Ahasvérus’ 
desperation for an absence of desire becomes his motivation to finally find Christ. 
Towards the end of the judgment day, after Ahasvérus has been shunned by Rome, 
Babylon, Athens and even the mountain, the forest and the rivers, the wanderer 
briefly rejoins his family among the dead. His brother Joel notices Rachel and 
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recognizes her role in the life of any man: “Une femme vous suit, comme un esprit 
suit pas à pas chaque homme dans sa vie” (370). As the couple travels on, Rachel 
encourages Ahasvérus to look up in the sky where she sees angels who take pity on 
them (371). Ahasvérus, however, only sees traces of the suffering Christ. Where 
Rachel sees the divine ideal, Ahasvérus sees only mortal suffering in the form of 
Christ. Still, Rachel’s value as a companion is one of the few things that endure at the 
end of the drama. Ahasvérus and Rachel are the beginning of something new after the 
fall of all of the universe’s religions and institutions. Though the details of this new 
direction are not explained in the text, it is clear that no one man can create the future 
alone. Rachel is the second Eve just as Ahasvérus is the second Adam. She balances 
the universe (personified in the story) who concludes that: “Une femme m’a perdu, 
une femme m’a sauvé” (379). In Ahasvérus’ new voyage, which he takes on willingly 
“au bout de l’infini et à des cieux meilleurs,” Christ proclaims Rachel to be “L’ange 
qui t’accompagne et ne te quitte pas” (380). Ahasvérus’ enduring gift from heaven is 
companionship born of compassion.  
Despite the ephemeral nature of institutions and ideologies, Ahasvérus and Rachel 
show some glimmer of hope as the only survivors in a tabula rasa universe. Rachel 
and Ahasvérus conquered their individualism and became proactive in the future of 
society. In the 1820s, Quinet too dreamed of conquering his own solitude while 
helping to heal France.  
La France allait renaître, je n’en pouvais douter. Et qui nous 
empêchait de servir à cette renaissance ? Pourquoi, moi aussi, 
n’y porterais-je pas mon grain de sable ? A peine cette idée 
m’avait-elle apparu, je me sentais transformé. Quelle force 
pour tout endurer ! quel aiguillon ! Dans ces instants, je me 
croyais et j’étais vraiment capable de quelque chose. Je voyais 
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Lamartine’s 1838 La Chute d’un Ange, like Éloa and Ahasvérus, is structured as a 
sort of sacred literature. The Récit preceding the story establishes the tale as a series 
of “visions” experienced by a prophet. Lamartine seems to view the fall as a process, 
as a challenge orchestrated by God and necessary to the angel’s spiritual growth. In 
his Avertissement, Lamartine explains that the poet, presumably like the angel cannot 
simply pass his time in a divine stupor ignoring the reality of the world around him. 
In modern times, there must be a blending of art and life: 
Je porte envie à ces natures contemplatives à qui Dieu n’a donné que 
des ailes, et qui peuvent planer toujours dans des regions éthérées, 
portées sur leurs rêves immortels, sans ressentir le contre-coup des 
choses d’ici-bas, qui tremblent sous nos pieds. Ce ne sont plus là des 
hommes, ce sont des êtres privilégiés qui n’ont de l’humanité que les 
sens qui jouissent, qui chantent ou qui prient: ce sont les solitaires 
ascetiques de la pensée. Gloire, paix et bonheur à eux! Mais ces 
natures ont-elles bien leur place dans notre temps? l’époque n’est-elle 
pas essentiellement laborieuse? Tout le monde n’a-t-il pas besoin de 
tout le monde? Ne s’opère-t-il pas une triple transformation dans le 
monde des idées, dans le monde de la politique, dans le monde de 
l’art? (4-5) 
 
Lamartine’s language in the above passage clearly likens aloof artists to those angels 
who remain disconnected from Earth and show no pity on humanity. The fallen angel 
is special because he noticed the suffering outside of heaven, he felt compassion and 
he sacrificed himself for another. Just as Mme de Staël had proposed in her De la 
littérature, for Lamartine, the time has come for a religion that is with the people 
rather than being above the people. 
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Lamartine envisions that various social roles were previously in harmony with each 
other in the idealized past of les anciens and should be again:  
Philosophes, politiques, poètes, citoyens, tous vivaient du même 
aliment; et de cette nourriture plus substantielle et plus forte se 
formaient ces grands genies et ces grands caractères, qui touchaient 
d’une main à l’idée, de l’autre à l’action, et qui ne se dégradaient point 
en s’inclinant vers d’humbles devoirs. (6) 
 
Despite being cursed by God, the fallen angel in Lamartine, then, is actually a 
positive role model for man since he falls from his divine but indulgently aloof state 
of grace in order to come to the aid of another being. In order to avoid falling into 
another tyrannical political regime like the Empire, sentiment was a necessary 
foundation. For Lamartine, Napoléon’s reign oppressed compassion in favor of exact 
sciences resulting in the demoralization of the nation (Descotes 118-28). His 
correspondence in the 1830s traces his disillusion with the restoration government as 
well. In an 1834 letter to le comte de Virieu, Lamartine confirms “Ma devise est 
conscience du pays” (39). The fictionalized biblical setting allows Lamartine to 
introduce compassion as a founding principle of ancient religion that was lost in the 
course of time and that should be reincorporated into the rebirth of society. 
In the Avertissement to his second edition, Lamartine responds to religious critics 
who have accused him of pantheism and atheism. In doing so, he reveals his own 
philosophies on religion that are not strictly in line with traditional Christian thought. 
In particular, Lamartine outlines a monotheistic belief system in which man possesses 
“liberté morale.” God would communicate with man not through clergy or the Bible 
but rather through his own conscience: “Je crois à la liberté morale de l’homme, 
mystérieux phénomène dont Dieu seul a le secret, mais dont la conscience est le 
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témoin, et dont la vertu est l’évidence” (13). The author goes on to explain that he 
believes in humanity “comme être collectif” and furthermore that man is in a process 
of gradual spiritual perfection and the creation of a new kind of religion, “ce grand 
mouvement organique de l’homme vers une connaissance plus compète de son 
Créateur et vers un culte plus spiritualisé” (13). Above all, Lamartine’s second 
Avertissement proposes that only a balance between faith and reason will produce 
truth. He shows faith and reason to be dependent on one another, ideally keeping each 
other in check to create a balanced society: “vouloir que la raison soit religieuse et 
que la religion soit rationnelle, est-ce là attaquer le christianisme, ou n’est-ce pas 
plutôt lui préparer un règne plus unanime et plus absolu?” (18). 
The first lines of the poem’s “Première vision” establish God’s role as that of “le 
souverain Juge,” reminiscent of the judging God championed by the ultramontanes 
(43). Cédar’s God, like the Gods in Éloa and Ahasvérus, is unfeeling in the tradition 
of the Old Testament but also reminiscent of a monarch who is out of touch with his 
people. The choice to portray God as a judge rather than as a protector immediately 
removes him from the sentimental sphere. A judge makes decisions based on the law 
and cannot be swayed by compassion or pity. In contrast, the angels’ most 
distinguishing emotion is pity – the only emotion that they share with their human 
“brothers.” 
  De ces esprits divins dont sont peuplés les cieux, 
  Les anges étaient ceux qui nous aimaient le mieux. 
  Créés du même jour, enfants du même père, 
  Que l’homme en les nommant peut appeler mon frère ; 
  Mais frères plus heureux dont la sainte amitié 




The angels here, like in Éloa, are described as travelling in groups and their primary 
activity is to praise God (54). Cédar, again like Éloa, wanders from the angel group to 
pursue an interest that is unrelated to God. Cédar believes that heaven is not a place in 
the sky but rather the state of sentiment caused by contact with his beloved: “Il n’est 
plus pour mes yeux de ciel où tu n’es pas!” (57). 
Lamartine’s Cédar is perhaps the fallen angel with the most freedom of choice in his 
fall compared to Éloa and Rachel. While the female angels trespass against God 
almost accidentally by being carried away in an emotional moment, Cédar’s fall 
might be judged as more “pre-meditated” in legal terms. Cédar, unlike the other two 
angels, explicitly wishes to become mortal (58). He consciously chooses a physical 
existence (in which the individual must bond with another individual through love to 
become whole) over a purely spiritual existence (in which the being is automatically 
whole without need for love or attachment to others besides God). Choosing a 
physical existence is choosing to join humanity : 
  Mais aimer, être aimé, d’un mutual retour! 
  Ah ! l’ange ne sait pas ce que c’est que l’amour ! 
  Être unique et parfait qui suffit à soi-même, 
  Non, il ne connait pas la volupté suprême 
  De chercher dans un autre un but autre que lui, 
  Et de ne vivre entier qu’en vivant en autrui ! (58) 
 
The angel goes on to describe the heavens as “mon ciel solitaire,” emphasizing the 
loneliness caused by the inability to feel and the separation from humanity that would 
make him whole. In Éloa, as we mentioned earlier, the inability to feel is the same 
problem plaguing Lucifer after his fall. It is interesting that Lamartine’s Cédar 
expresses the same frustration in heaven that Vigny’s Satan feels in Hell. In Cédar’s 
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case, there is no mention of God’s love being returned to the angels. Even in heaven, 
God does not seem to be accessible. 
At the actual moment of Cédar’s fall, the innocent Daïdha  receives no sign of aid 
from God. God, as usual, is absent. Cédar therefore takes on the role of protector that 
would be carried out by the heavenly “father” if he were indeed using his power for 
the good of humanity. God’s absence in Daïdha’s time of need is in large part what 
forces Cédar to sacrifice himself. Here, Cédar demonstrates a “courage of 
conscience” that Lamartine wished to see integrated into French society. In an 1835 
letter, he explains: “Le courage de conscience est ce qui manqué le plus en ce triste et 
beau pays. On brave une batterie de canons, mais on meurt devant une raillerie de 
journal” (86). Lamartine supports following one’s conscience against the tide of 
popular opinion but the unforgiving laws of heaven do not recognize the authority of 
the conscience. The pitiless heavens explain to Cédar as he falls that an irreversible 
judgment has been passed: 
  Il avait dans son âme entendu retentir 
  Ce cri : « L’arrêt divin n’a point de repentir 
  Tombe, tombe à jamais, créature éclipsée ! 
  Périsse ta splendeur jusque dans ta pensée ! 
  Savoure jusqu’au sang le bonheur des humains ; 
  Tu déchires ta gloire avec tes propres mains ; 
  Ta vie au fond du cœur n’aura pas l’espérance ; 
  Tu n’auras pas comme eux la mort pour délivrance ; 
  Au lieu d’une ici-bas tu subiras cent morts ; 
  Dieu te rendra ta vie et la terre ton corps, 
  Tant que tu n’auras pas racheté goutte à goutte 
  Cette immortalité qu’une femme te coûte ! » (75) 
 
Repentance is explicitly out of the question. Moreover, the first effect of his new 
mortal status is that the fallen angel forgets his divine origins, including the 
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circumstances of his fall. Like Rachel in Ahasvérus, Cédar is cursed without knowing 
why and so he could not repent even if repentance were an option.  
Truth, in Lamarine’s “liberté morale,” is not established by laws but by conscience. 
The conscience is regulated internally by sentiment, not externally by laws imposed 
by a higher power. According to the poem, the tribal laws (in the primitive times in 
which the story is set) are based on instinct and the poet implies that these instincts 
are close to the divine truth : “Les lois n’étaient alors que ces instincts sublimes” (82). 
Women are shown to possess more of this instinct than men. When the men want to 
follow man-made laws and kill Cédar because he is a stranger, the women 
instinctually know that this would be wrong and that God would punish them for 
killing (86). Cédar in an ultimate sacrifice allows himself to be chained and turned 
into a slave because he loves Daïdha (89-90). Unlike God, the fallen angel proves his 
love through actions by continually coming to Daïdha’s aid and making sacrifices for 
her. The couple’s decision to stay together despite the laws of Daïdha’s tribe also 
show that the lovers, through their sentiment for each other, rightfully reject man-
made laws that conflict with an inner truth that they instinctively know is right. Based 
on feeling, the couple decides that their love is sacred. Daïdha proclaims “Nous irons 
nous aimer dans le ciel des amants!" and Cédar finds paradise uniquely in his lover : 
"Cheveux de Daïdha, soyez mes seules plantes !/ De mon terrestre Éden vous 
ombragez la fleur !" (137-9). 
Lamartine further uses sentiment as a way of approaching truth through his insistence 
on the superiority of nonverbal language between lovers. Throughout the poem he 
continually insists on the couple’s ability to communicate without words, “un muet 
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langage” that is implied to be more pure than human language which has been tainted 
by exterior influences. Cédar, who is naturally capable of communicating nonverbally 
with Daïdha (by making his presence known as her ideal even before the fall, for 
example), must be taught to speak human language which is described as somewhat 
vulgar in comparison to heavenly language. True communication is achieved through 
feeling rather than through words. The idea that human language is imperfect was 
certainly not new. Ballanche had already used the argument for the divine origins of 
language as the basis for his argument supporting society as a divine institution
18
. The 
inability to express emotions through words is a common theme in romantic 
literature, implying that sentiment is actually the original divine language. A similar 
idea can be found in the writings of Emmanuel Swedenborg whose works were well-
known in 1830s France. Writing on angels, Swedenborg explains : 
 
In the other life, especially in the heavens, all thought and 
hence all speech are carried on in an impersonal sense, and 
therefore thought and speech there are universal, and are 
relatively without limit; for so far as thought and speech are 
associated with persons and their specific qualities, and with 
names, and also words, so far they become less universal, and 
are associated with the actual thing, and there abide. On the 
other hand in so far as they are not associated with persons and 
what is connected with them, but with realities abstracted from 
them, so far they are dissociated from the actual thing, and are 
extended beyond themselves, and the mental view becomes 
higher and consequently more universal. (104) 
 
Lamartine seems to agree with Swedenborg that communication through words 
separates people whereas a more internal communication through mutual compassion 
brings them together. The beginning of the end for Cédar and Daïdha is the loss of 
                                                 
18
 See La Théorie du langage de Pierre-Simon Ballanche by Alan J. L. Busst. 
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their ability to communicate nonverbally. Miscommunication weakens the bond with 
the other and creates doubt. Doubt is, in the end, what dooms the couple to failure as 
they carry out their last moments together in the desert: “Sur chacun de leurs pas le 
doute retombait;/ Sans cesse un repentir ramenait en arrière/ Leurs pieds, dont les 
erreurs centuplaient la carrière” (411). The need for another person in order to feel 
whole and connect with the divine is crucial. In their delirium, the couple’s nonverbal 
communication no longer works. They had been communicating through their eyes.  
 
   En vain des plus doux noms conjurant ce délire, 
   Cédar cherchait ses yeux, leur parlait du sourire; 
   Ses plus tendres regards n’inspiraient que terreur, 
   Elle n’avait pour lui que geste et cri d’horreur! 
   […] 
   Mais n’être plus connu de cet œil fixe et somber, 
   Du seul point lumineux qui restât dans son ombre! 
   Ne pouvoir rappeler du regard, de la voix, 
   Ce rayon dont l’amour l’inondait autrefois! 
   Frapper de sa parole une Oreille de pierre, 
   Ne trouver qu’un abîme au fond de sa paupière! 
   Que dis-je? Être soudain devenu pour ses yeux 
   L’objet le plus étrange et le plus odieux! (445) 
 
Unable to bond with Daïdha, Cédar loses his internal connection to the divine: “A 
l’horrible lueur de ce torment supreme,/ Cédar douta de lui, d’elle, de Dieu lui-
même;/ Comme un homme qui sent finir tout sentiment, Son âme eut du néant 
l’évanouissement” (416). Knowledge of the divine on earth is thus shown to be 
directly linked to mutual compassion between human beings. 
When Cédar and Daïdha meet the elderly pre-Christian prophet, Adonï, the holy man 
describes the most damning quality of the people in the neighboring society to be 
their indulgence of the senses leading to a decadent numbing of the natural capacity 
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to feel (206-7). The prophet claims to possess spiritual truths in a book that has been 
handed down to him by his mother. According to his mother, the book was dictated 
by God to a mortal man: “C’est le germe enfoui de toute vérité” (215). This concept 
of a holy book or doctrine which is constantly reworked throughout the generations 
recalls the évangile éternel in George Sand’s Spiridion and it not unlike the 
palingenesis theories put forward by Ballanche and Saint-Simon. Lamartine uses the 
holy book scenario to create a religion where reason and faith are in harmony. In the 
Huitième vision, “Fragment du livre primitive,” a portion of the holy book is revealed 
to the reader. The holy book reveals that evil does not actually exist because 
everything is in God’s plan which cannot be understood by man (not unlike Quinet’s 
ideas that all historical events have value because they allow for the evolution of 
society): “Et le sage comprit que le mal n’était pas,/ Et dans l’œuvre de Dieu ne se 
voit que d’en bas!” (228). Reminiscent of Saint-Simonianism, the chosen people are 
those who “sentent le plus”: “Les enfants, les vieillards, les maladies, les femmes” 
(233). The book is even complete with a list of commandments like those handed 
down to Moses. The list is a mix of laws meant to promote harmony between man 
and nature and also harmony among men. The last and most important commandment 
speaks of man’s obligation to show mercy to his fellow man: 
   En retour du pardon que le ciel nous accorde 
   Le plus beau don de l’homme est la miséricorde: 
   Il la doit à son père, à soi-même, à celui 
   Qui seul a droit de juge et de vengeur sur lui; 
   La vengeance ou l’erreur inventa le supplice: 




Perhaps the most striking revelation in the holy book, however, is that God 
communicates directly with man through his inner voices of reason. Lamartine uses 
the book to present the concept of “la liberté morale” in which man’s conscience and 
the inner voices that he uses to reason are in fact more in tune with God than any 
other laws. 
Le seul livre divin dans lequel il écrit 
   Son nom toujours croissant, homme, c’est ton esprit ! 
   C’est ta raison, miroir de la raison suprême, 
   Où se peint dans ta nuit quelque ombre de lui-même. 
   Il nous parle, ô mortel, mais c’est par ce seul sens ! 
   Toute bouche de chair altère ses accents. 
   L’intelligence en nous, hors de nous la nature, 
   Voilà les voix de Dieu, le reste est imposture ! (221-2) 
 
Faith does still play an important role in Cédar and Daïdha’s existence but the 
meaning of faith is adjusted to mean faith in one’s own conscience. The faith that 
lends strength to the couple throughout their journey is not faith in an absent God but 
rather faith in their feelings for each other.  
*** 
The use of the fallen angel in a biblical setting to introduce the importance of 
compassion in the modern world might seem backward in a time when France was 
pulling away from traditional religious beliefs and moving toward the cult of science. 
Why did these authors choose to use traditional Christian motifs as a means for 
criticizing traditional Christian beliefs and what is it about the figure of the fallen 
angel that would have struck a chord with the reading public of the 1820s and 1830s? 
The attempt to create a secular society in France after the Revolution had been a 
failed experiment that was widely blamed on a lack of morality. Shifting spiritual 
authority from an impersonal God to the divinized conscience puts morality in the 
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hands of the people which ideally balance politics and religion. Individuals in 
humanity coming together to form the spiritual base of a religion is the divine 
equivalent of a republic. Perhaps these authors felt that the only way to achieve a 
responsible republican government was to shift both religious and political power to 
the people. Under the monarchy, religion and government were one power emanating 
from one person but in the ideal republic, religion and government would be 
combined in each individual. Conscience would serve to keep individuality in check 
and produce the compassion necessary to bond society together. 
Although elements of the republic, such as the Rights of Man, needed to be 
incorporated into modern French society, the purpose of ideas like “liberté” and 
“individualisme” were being reconsidered in the liberal sphere. In an 1835 letter to 
Martin Doisy, Lamartine explains his conception of liberty as a path to a just 
government in harmony with the divine: 
La liberté est conquise, elle est assurée, elle est inviolable, 
quels que soient le nom et la forme du pouvoir ; mais la liberté 
n’est pas un but, c’est un moyen. Le but, c’est la restauration 
de la dignité et de la moralité humaine dans toutes les classes 
dont la société se compose ; c’est la raison, la justice et la 
charité appliquées progressivement dans toutes les institutions 
politiques et civiles, jusqu’à ce que la société politique, qui n’a 
été trop souvent que l’expression de la tyrannie du fort sur le 
faible devienne l’expression de la pensée divine qui n’est que 
justice, égalité et providence. (167) 
 
For Lamartine, politics and God are inseparable and charity joins reason and justice in 
an ideal government but none of this is achievable without awareness of conscience 
on an individual level. The individual becomes a single tool in the service of 
humanity which in turn serves the will of God.  Vigny’s preoccupation with the 
nobleness of sacrifice echoes the concept that the good man considers his life as being 
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in service to others. Quinet agreed that the individual should be more in harmony 
with humanity but, as a historian, he saw humanity as not simply composed of one’s 
contemporary society but of all humans from the beginning to the end of time. 
Consequently, time itself takes on a divine quality. According to Ceri Crossley:  
By turning to history Quinet sought an ethical underpinning for 
individual action, a way out of the negation of nature and the 
denial of value to other selves. How was the exercise of 
freedom to be made meaningful? Quinet began by reminding 
individuals that their actions were part of a general history of 
striving. Self-conscious freedom had meaning in virtue of its 
relationship to a history of individual and collective struggles. 
Freedom was not therefore circumscribed to the pursuit of 
individual goals, and the individual, despite his acute sense of 
separateness, remained part of mankind. (145) 
 
As we have seen, God’s most negative trait in these works is his jealous 
individualism. The negative portrayal of God is used however as a means for 
rethinking the divine, not simply abandoning it. The personification of God does for 
the Almighty what the personification of the Emperor does for Napoleon in Vigny’s 
Servitude et grandeur militaire or in Lamartine’s Bonaparte. It demystifies him to the 
point that ordinary men can pass judgment on the judge. Glorifying the fallen angel 
then allows the author to show that it is not one’s status that makes a person noble but 
rather his actions. The fallen angel is a hero despite the curse that he bears and God is 
unjust despite his role as judge. Furthermore, the biblical setting and the theme of 
forgetting as the fallen angel moves forward in time serves as a reminder that 
Christianity had changed since its beginnings and can and will continue to change 




Éloa, Ahasvérus, and Cédar ou la chute d’un ange each emphasize a perceived need 
for compassion in modern society. The religious context of these works suggests that 
these authors associated religion with the concept of compassion. Within the stories, 
an often angry masculine God character stands in contrast to an angel whose works 
show compassion for humanity and who ultimate sacrifices his or her privileged 
divine status. The angels overwhelming desire human companionship which speaks 
to a desire for religion which is less associated with the classic fire and brimstone 
religiosity and more in tune with humanity. 
The angel in Alfred de Vigny’s Éloa ou la sœur des anges is half human and half 
divine.Although the love and pity which dominate Éloa’s existence may seem 
incompatible with Vigny’s “mâle religion de l’honneur,” Vigny’s journal suggests 
that he was developing sentiment and pity as honorable, masculine traits. The poet 
even considered a “divinisation” of the conscience comparable to Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s conscience-based spirituality in the Vicaire savoyard. Éloa is motivated 
by her conscience. She acts on emotion and offers compassion in spite of the fact that 
compassionate behavior is discouraged by her own angelic “society.” The example of 
the angel’s social context emphasizes the distinction between humanity (which is 
inclusive to all people) and society (which is potentially exclusive depending on 
opinions and norms). Éloa’s refusal to conform to social expectations supports a 
philosophy which values humanity over society. Éloa offers consolation to Satan out 
of pity for him because he, as a cursed creature, is in the most need of pity. Éloa’s 
sentiment, however, is shown to have both positive and negative effects. It allows her 
to take on a heroic role, boldly coming to the aid of one who needs it most. Her 
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generous sentiment is also taken advantage of by Lucifer the tempter and 
manipulator. Vigny’s emphasis on self-sacrifice hints at his conviction that man’s 
ability to sacrifice himself renders him potentially more heroic than God himself who 
is incapable of sacrifice. Weakness thus becomes strength through heroic opportunity.  
 
Éloa provides consolation through compassion and sacrifice while Satan offers 
consolation in the form of flattery and denial. Lucifer’s temptations are based in 
illusion. Vigny associates Éloa’s weakness for flattery to her femininity. Éloa gives in 
to the temptation to project false modesty in place of her natural innocence. Through 
Éloa’s vanity, Vigny illustrates the superiority of natural sentiment over crafted 
manners. He appears to agree with Ballanche, Chateaubriand, and Hugo that 
innocence is divine. Nevertheless, in contrast to Ballanche and Chateaubriand, 
Vigny’s fallen angel also exhibits the dangers of ignorance and the injustice in 
supposedly infallible dogma. His Satan, like the sympathetic criminals found 
throughout Hugo’s works, deserves pity despite his trespasses – as does Éloa. 
 
Éloa willingly chooses to fall, acting as an individual rather than following accepted 
doctrine. Éloa’s act of defiance might be seen as indicative of Vigny’s opposition to 
tyranny, such as the tyranny experiences under the reign of the Empire. Although an 
individual, Éloa employs her individuality in service to others. Even after discovering 
Satan’s ruse, she perseveres as the selfless consoler, concerned with the happiness of 
her abuser, reflecting the doctrine of “love thy enemy.” Vigny’s unfinished sequel to 
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Éloa, entitled Satan sauvé, imagines Satan pardoned from Hell due to his love for the 
angel, thereby suggesting that sentiment might actually be sacred. 
 
Edgar Quinet’s Ahasvérus, like Éloa, emphasizes the need for pity and consolation in 
a religion of humanity. Quinet shows God to be absent while Ahasvérus tirelessly 
searches for salvation. Through Ahasvérus’ long journey across time and space, the 
author develops the idea that the universe is consistently driven towards renewal and 
growth. Again like Ballanche and Saint-Simon, Quinet insists that change is 
inevitable. Humanity and God alike must adapt to the currents of time. 
 
The angel Rachel’s mission is to provide pity, consolation, and companionship to the 
cursed Ahasvérus. Like the French people who were forced to come together through 
tragedy. Rachel and Ahasvérus join together in their despair thus creating hope for 
future regeneration. Since God is depicted as pitiless, men must create their own 
consolation amongst themselves. Like Éloa, Rachel challenges the infallibility of the 
almighty by daring to pity a cursed soul. Rachel’s fall, her punishment, emphasizes 
intolerance for individualized thought in Christianity. Rachel ultimately chooses 
fraternity over religiosity. 
 
Most of Rachel’s story is driven by her inability to remember her past life. Unable to 
recall the circumstances of her fall or even the fact that she was once an angel, she 
completely misunderstands her relationship with God placing blind faith in an 
authority figure who has damned her. She likewise misconstrues her relationship with 
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Ahasvérus, seeing him as her savoir rather than as her tempter or her downfall. 
Rachel’s misplaced faith is completely driven by sentiment and also completely out 
of sync with the realities of religion as they are presented in the context of the story. 
Ahasvérus becomes disillusioned with both religion and romantic love which is 
especially significant since love in general was so often proposed by Quinet’s 
contemporaries as the foundation of any veritable spirituality. Vigny had envisioned 
Satan redeemed by his love for Éloa and Lamartine’s Cédar sacrifices everything for 
the love of Daïdha. Ahasvérus, however, becomes the caricature of the romantic poet 
seeking the divine in ephemeral passion love. Ahasvérus’ process of disillusionment 
is part of his ongoing quest for ultimate truths. Everything, even love, is shown to 
evolve or die in the course of time. Ahasvérus comes to believe that what he needs is 
a new religion but by the end of his journey we understand that the entire universe is 
in a constant flux of eternal destruction and renewal. By the end of Ahasvérus, it is 
clear that human companionship is actually the only enduring consolation in life but 
Quinet is careful to distance the reality of companionship from the romantic beau 
idéal.  
 
Lamartine’s Cédar ou la chute d’un ange imagines a scenario in which a divine being 
leaves the realm of the ideal and joins humanity on Earth, suggesting that religion 
could be with the people rather than above them. The poem’s fictionalized biblical 
setting, not unlike Chateaubriand’s American wilderness, allows the author to 
introduce compassion as a spiritual principle which has eroded over time. Lamartine’s 
concept of “moral liberty” is a conscience-based religious theory. Lamartine’s theory, 
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however, distinguishes itself from Rousseau’s natural religion in that, for Lamartine, 
God alone knows universal truths and man can only look to his conscience as a 
“witness” and virtue as “evidence” of God’s secret. For Lamartine, then, the 
conscience proves the existence of God. The proof of God’s existence is unnecessary 
in the Vicaire savoyard since the conscience is perceived as the ultimate authority, as 
“God” himself rather than as a witness to some other higher authority. Nevertheless, 
both Rousseau and Lamartine suggest a diversion from rote doctrine and a movement 
towards spiritual liberty. Lamartine’s Cédar furthermore explores the possibility of 
perfectibility and a balance of faith and reason reminiscent of Mme de Staël. 
 
Cédar’s God, like Ahasvérus’ God, is above all portrayed as a “judge.” God, from the 
point of view of the poem, is too removed from humanity to be influenced by human 
sentiment. Cédar, like Éloa, is moved to act upon his sentiment despite religious law 
and the norms of his angelic society. His decision to rebel is conscious. Cédar 
chooses a physical existence. His yearning to be like humans, to experience what it is 
to be mortal, is reminiscent of Vigny’s conviction that mortal sacrifice is in fact 
superior or more heroic than divine infallibility . Lamartine glorifies sentiment, 
instinct, and conscience as the paths to discovering universal truths. These “natural” 
human elements are depicted as innocent or pure. Feeling is the catalyst for true 
communication. This ability to communicate through pure feeling in Cédar is shown 
to wear away with time as the characters become increasingly affected by impure 
external influences. Lamartine also presents the idea that Christian ideas predated the 
arrival of the Christian messiah. The biblical prototype discovered in Cédar supports 
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the concept of religious palingenesis later found in George Sand’s references to the 
Évangile éternel in her Spiridion. Both suggest that Christian law is in a state of 
continual evolution.  
 
In all three of these works, conscience emerges as a means for keeping individuality 
in check. External religion is consistently viewed as an outmoded system of 
judgment, inconsistent with liberty, justice and equality. Although the use of the 
angel emphasizes the persistence of religious imagery in discussions of morality, the 
defiance of these angels indicates a spirit of liberty in an atmosphere of doubt. The 
truly divine is increasingly associated with good works towards fellow men, 




Chapter 11: George Sand’s Spiridion and the Doctrine of L’Évangile éternel 
In view of the fact that conservative Catholic critics overwhelmingly based their 
position against democracy on the assumption that it lacked historical and religious 
foundations, Lamennais’ Paroles d’un croyant proved that a revised analysis of early 
Christian philosophy as a liberal doctrine had the potential to bolster support for 
liberal values as part of the western religious tradition. The popularity of the Saint-
Simonian movement amongst 1830s intellectuals showed that Lamennais was not 
alone in his efforts to establish a historical foundation for a new Christianity. In the 
decades that followed, Alphonse Esquiros’ 1840 L’Evangile du peuple, and Ernest 
Renan’s 1863 Vie de Jésus continued rewriting religious history by reimagining the 
personage of Jesus himself, emphasizing the human side of the man-god whose goal, 
they said, was not to found a Church but to unify society. 
This growing interest in researching diverse Christian philosophies prompted a surge 
of curiosity surrounding a thirteenth century radical Franciscan doctrine known as the 
Évangile éternel. The basis of the Évangile éternel is that Christianity, as part of the 
universal story of religion, is a temporary stage in an ongoing spiritual cycle. 
According to the doctrine, the reign of Christ’s gospel would be surpassed by a 
subsequent gospel of the Holy Spirit, bringing humanity into a final stage of spiritual 
enlightenment which would surpass Christianity and prepare the world for a new 
religion. With its ever-changing socio-political landscape, it is easy to imagine that 
nineteenth century France would have known spiritual and political growing pains 
which may have been perceived as comparable to those experienced by thirteenth 
century Franciscans. Xavier Rousselot’s 1867 essay, Étude d’histoire religieuse au 
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XIIe et XIIIe siècles: Joachim de Flore, Jean de Parme et la doctrine de l’Évangile  
éternel, depicts the thirteenth century as being on the cusp of a “new era” (Rousselot 
8). According to Rousselot, the thirteenth century was “une époque à la fois religieuse 
et agitée, mélange d’illuminisme mystique et d’esprit de révolte, d’audace 
philosophique et d’humilité chrétienne, de soumission pleine de foi et d’attaques 
contre le dogme et ceux qui en étaient les organes; attaques tantôt cachées sous 
l’enveloppe d’un catholicisme orthodoxe, tantôt hardiment hérétiques et rebelles” 
(Rousselot 8). For Pierre Leroux, a Saint-Simonian whose notable achievements 
include co-founding Le Globe and coining the term “socialism,” the nineteenth 
century was likewise in need of a “new religious era” in order to stabilize democracy 
(Du christianisme iii). In his Du christianisme et de son origine démocratique, Leroux 
proposes that a synthesis of all human knowledge is necessary to usher in true 
progress (48). Leroux briefly mentions the Évangile éternel in his De l’humanité, 
linking its origins to Saint John but affirms that John’s contribution was simply a 
small part of the greater “palingénésie cosmique” which he traces back to ancient 
times (De l’humanité  824). The doctrine of L’Évangile éternel, which focuses 
heavily on the importance of love, charity, and justice in society, would inspire 
George Sand to construct a fictional history of its principles in her 1839 novel, 
Spiridion. According to Marie-Reine Renard, “Les théories de George Sand prenaient 
appui sur certains courants religieux de l’époque romantique, dont sortira également 
le socialisme dit ‘utopique’” (25). Renard attributes Sand’s familiarity with the 
Évangile éternel to her association with Pierre Leroux and adds that the story likewise 
bears traces of Lamennais’ own “spiritual crisis” (30). Spiridion, which is dedicated 
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to Leroux, constructs a palingenesis based on the Évangile éternel from Saint John to 
Joachim de Flore to Jean de Parme and then connects the doctrine to contemporary 
times by extending the spiritual lineage to modern fictional clergymen: l’abbé 
Spiridion, Fulgence, Alexis, and Angel.  
Other Sand novels, such as Consuelo, had already incorporated commentary on 
religion and mysticism into the lives of her characters. According to an 1845 article 
on Sand’s Œuvres complètes in the North American View, even her American 
contemporaries recognized that “Her writings are affecting, not merely literary taste, 
but the political, religious, and social opinions of her countrymen” (106). While the 
article paints her in a negative light, comparing her “gloominess” to Rousseau, it is 
clear that Sand’s contribution to religious thought was significant.  
Palingenesis and Progress 
The concept of palingenesis in Sand’s Spiridion recalls Ballanche’s palingenesis and  
Mme de Staël’s “perfectibilité” in that it depicts human spirituality and intellect as 
one ongoing process in which advancements are made through the course of 
generations. The story of the young monk, Angel, unravels as a spiritual mystery, as a 
discovery of the self, and as a discovery of humanity’s destiny in the eternal course of 
time. Sand impresses the idea that justice, charity, and love are the keys to true human 
progress. These values form the foundation of a religion which exists not between the 
walls of religious institutions but in the hearts and minds of the people. Spiridion 
elaborates on the idea that all events throughout time – each social, religious, and 
political step in human history – moves humanity in the direction of God’s will. 
Regardless of the immediate repercussions of human events, all is progress.  
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Within Spiridion, the author tells multiple stories which come together as one, 
illustrating the process through which progress is born. Carrying through the religious 
concept of the trinity, Sand organizes characters and themes in Spiridion by groups of 
three. In his 1866 article, “Joachim de Flore et l’Évangile éternel,” Ernest Renan 
traces similar patterns of three to a 1254 introduction to the Évangile written by 
Joachimite brother Gérard de Borgo-San Donnino (287). As the inheritor of l’abbé 
Spiridion’s intellectual legacy, Angel compiles the knowledge of three monks who 
came before him: Spiridion, Fulgence, and Alexis. All of these men started out as 
simple penitents who became tools for change through intellectual development as 
well as through a balance of heart and mind.  
Throughout Spiridion, Sand develops the idea that belief systems are limited by the 
time periods in which they exist. Knowledge must therefore be passed on to the next 
generation in order for its potential to be realized: “Comme chaque génération de 
l’humanité, chaque homme a ses besoins intellectuels, dont la limite marque celle de 
ses investigations et de ses conquêtes” (262). Previously gained knowledge nourishes 
the new knowledge that grows out of it forging unity amongst human generations: 
“de même que chaque souffle intellectuel entretient, par une invisible communion, le 
souffle éveillé par lui dans un sanctuaire nouveau de l’intelligence” (263). When 
intellectual unity binds humanity, knowledge becomes sacred. Blasphemy, from 
Spiridion’s point of view, is thus redefined as the claim that one person might know 
all that there is to be known about the universe (269). The infallibility which he once 




Sand’s description of the process by which all three men arrive at enlightenment 
through self-analysis and a gradual casting off of individualist desires implies that 
truth is constantly within man but one cannot access the truth through meditation 
alone. The idea that truth can be found through examination of the self is expressed 
by the motto inscribed on Spiridion’s tomb: “Hic est veritas,” “Here is truth.” The 




   Sunt nempe falsa et frivola, 
     quae mundiali gloria                 
     ceu dormientes egimus: 




According to Gerard O’Daly’s analysis of the hymn in his 2012 book, Days Linked by 
Song: Prudentius’ Cathemerenon,  
The awakening to virtue includes reflections on our past lives, 
as well as on persistent temptations: forgetfulness, vacuous 
dreams, the sleep-walking of worldly glory, wealth, pleasure, 
esteem, success [...] By contrast with their worthlessness and 
emptiness (frivola, l. 89; nil, l. 96), there is the waking state, 
the light of day in which truth is discerned: vigilemus, hic est 
veritas, ‘Let us wake up! Here is truth!’ (l. 92)... (53) 
 
“Hic est veritas” is a call to awaken the innate knowledge of truth which lies dormant 
in every man. The novelist adds dimension to the search for truth by extending the 
concept of “reflections on past lives” to include the past lives of others, of a collective 
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 Sand’s extensive knowledge of religious music in Consuelo gives reason to believe she was likely 
familiar with the common hymn. 
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 Hymns for the Christian’s Day, “Hymnus ad galli cantum” (“Hymn at Cock 
Crow”), translated by R. Martin Pope into English as: “Bound by the dazzling world's 
soft chain/'Tis false and fleeting gauds we gain,/Like those who in deep slumbers lie:-




human experience rather than simply a personal experience. The sharing of human 
knowledge gradually brings truth to light because the true gospel in Spiridion is a 
gospel of humanity. As Xavier Rousselot reminds us in his 1867 essay, the Évangile 
éternel was above all a social doctrine but Joachim’s writings insist that God, which 
he refers to as the Eternal, must first be found in the self (Rousselot 42-50). Sand’s 
use of palingenesis emphasizes the eternal by tracing a collective human experience 
within a personal experience.  
Visualizing eternity as the unification of past, present, and future, Sand also explores 
the idea that progress does not erase the great works of the past. In accordance with 
the Évangile éternel, Spiridion asserts that the efforts of a lifetime can endure in their 
influence on subsequent generations creating “l’immortalité sur la terre” (397). 
Similar ideas are put forth by both Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte 
asserting that eternal life is achieved through the legacy one leaves behind on earth to 
influence subsequent generations.  
L’abbé Spiridion’s life story creates the impression of a palingenesis in that three 
different identities evolve out of the individual. Spiridion’s progress is driven by his 
studies of western religious traditions. Cerebral knowledge evolves into spiritual 
awakening. Born into a Jewish family, Spiridion began life as Pierre Hébronius 
before he converted from Judaism to Protestant Christianity and then to Catholicism.  
At each stage of spiritual conversion, Hébronius
21
 changes his name. As a protestant, 
he is known as Samuel and as a priest he is Spiridion. The priest’s own life mirrors 
                                                 
21
 Hebron, Hebronius’ namesake, is the location of a burial cave known as the Tombs of the 
Patriarchs. In Genesis 23:17-20, Abraham buys the land and buries his wife, Sarah, in the cave: “So 
the field and the cave in it were deeded to the Hittites as a burial site” (Genesis 23:20).  
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the Évangile éternel in that each of the three stages of his spiritual growth builds upon 
the last according to the lessons learned in those stages.  
According to Alexis, Spiridion initially moved from Judaism to Protestantism 
because he perceived Christianity as a more inclusive religion (250). His interest in 
religion remains centered on a desire to develop human unity. He recognizes that the 
emphasis on unity and eternity found in both Protestant and Catholic Christianity is 
rooted in Judaism, unifying the three traditions or the past and present of religious 
trends (251). The Christian emphasis on equality, love, charity, devotion to others, 
and renouncement of the self attracts young Hebronius to a protestant conversion 
(252). Ever-evolving, he goes on to prefer Catholicism for its dogma of infallibility; 
for its strong historical foundation (“l’aspect du caractère sacré d’antiquité”) and for 
the poetic nature of “la pompe et l’éclat” (252). Catholicism is described as having an 
aura of strength and beauty which appeals to Spiridion’s aesthetic sensibilities. Alexis 
recounts that, as a Catholic, Spiridion then sought to build an idyllic community by 
bringing intelligent and virtuous monks together to seek “faith through science” 
(253). When his monks eventually ceded to vice, Spiridion secretly turned against his 
own creation and quietly worked alone (254). Even after death, he only connects with 
a chosen few.  
All in Due Time 
Throughout Spiridion, intellectual progress is described as a slow process which 
germinates throughout the centuries: “Le travail des siècles modifie la nature de 
l’esprit humain: il arrive avec le temps à la transformer” (302). According to the 
doctrine described in Spiridion, man can only accomplish a limited number of tasks in 
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a lifetime. Each generation must connect with the next generation in order to bring its 
efforts to fruition: “Ainsi un même homme ne renferme pas en lui-même à des degrés 
semblables le passé, le présent et l’avenir des générations” (303). The past and the 
future of humanity are linked through present works but not completed. Sand evokes 
Pierre Leroux’s plea for a synthesis of knowledge in Alexis’ assertion that truth is 
found through inclusion of diverse thought processes. According to Alexis, Catholics 
are disjointed from the past because the works of great non-Catholic thinkers have not 
been passed down to them (304). Catholicism has existed in solitude, isolated from 
outside philosophies which would have ushered in progress. Moreover, Alexis asserts 
that catholic isolation has kept its followers from joining the whole of humanity. The 
preoccupation with a utopian afterlife, he reasons, prevents Catholics from 
recognizing the world as their homeland and finding comfort in unification with 
humanity (305).  
Nevertheless, as part of the history of spirituality, Sand does show Catholicism to 
possess some truths for Alexis in regards to personal spiritual development. Alexis 
finds that intellectual studies need to be balanced by the spiritual. In particular, he 
longs for the healing power of prayer (306). “Le grand œuvre du christianisme est 
donc le développement de la force intellectuelle par celui de la sensibilité morale, et 
la prière est l’inépuisable aliment où ces deux puissances se combinent et se 
retrempent sans cesse” (307). Alexis asserts that his “new God” is too vast to be 
accessible (308). His concept of the universe expanded in such a way that he began to 
view himself as insignificant in comparison. Alexis thus ceased his efforts to 
communicate with God because he believed that a prayer from one small human 
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being would be almost impious (308). In spite of his heretical convictions, a human 
need for prayer and love remained. Alexis admits to falling back on catholic formulas 
to fulfill these needs (308). His new concept of God lacked sympathy, even more so 
than the Old Testament’s Jehovah: “Les colères et les vengeances du sombre Jéhovah 
m’effrayaient moins que l’impassible silence et la glaciale équité de mon nouveau 
maître” (309). Jehovah was an angry god but he retained a human-like display of 
passions which rendered him accessible to man. Quiet Eternity, in contrast, provides 
no familiarity with humanity, no hope for communication. With the same zeal which 
he employed to arrive at a state of near-atheism, Alexis takes the same philosophical 
path and reads the same books in an effort to support spirituality by reinvigorating 
new religion with an air of mystery: “revêtir la Divinité de son mystère sublime, avec 
la même persévérance que j’avais mise à l’en dépouiller” (403). 
Cultivating Doubt in the Quest for Truth 
After the failure of his utopian experiment, Spiridion began to associate organized 
religion with corruption. This deception, however, delivers the priest from the bonds 
of organized religion and allows him to freely pursue his spiritual studies as an 
individual. He begins to think outside of the traditional dogma, a process which Sand 
describes as a natural extension of his research:  
L’idée de la corruption et de la bassesse vint se mêler à toutes 
ses méditations théologiques, et s’attacher, comme une lèpre 
honteuse, à l’idée de la religion. Il ne put bientôt plus séparer, 
malgré sa puissance d’abstraction, le catholicisme des 
catholiques. Cela l’amena, sans qu’il s’en aperçût, à le 
considérer sous ses côtés les plus faibles, comme il l’avait jadis 
considéré sous les plus forts, et à rechercher, malgré lui, les 
possibilités mauvaises. Avec le génie investigateur et la 
puissante faculté d’analyse dont il était doué, il ne fut pas 
longtemps à les trouver; mais, comme ces magiciens téméraires 
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qui évoquaient des spectres et tremblaient à leur apparition, il 
s’épouvanta lui-même de ses découvertes. (255) 
 
Spiridion’s disillusion becomes the gateway to his enlightenment and his successors 
will follow similar paths, absorbing doubt as a means for analysis and arriving at 
truths. The vestiges of superstition continue to inhibit the priest from realizing perfect 
enlightenment but this is a challenge which follows his successors for generations. 
Spiritual and intellectual enlightenment is shown to be a continuous work in progress. 
Spiridion’s principal contribution to spiritual knowledge was to replace religion with 
“une sorte de raison instinctive” which would lead to truth:  
Il n’avait plus de règle certaine ni de loi absolue; mais une 
sorte de raison instinctive, que rien ne pouvait anéantir ni 
détourner, le guidait dans toutes ses actions et le conduisait au 
juste. Ce fut probablement par ce côté qu’il se rattacha à la vie ; 
en sentant fermenter ces généreux sentiments, il se dit que 
l’étincelle sacrée n’avait pas cessé de brûler en lui, mais 
seulement de briller ; et que Dieu veillait encore dans son cœur 
bien que caché à son intelligence par des voiles impénétrables. 
(259) 
 
A return to instinct as a source for truth brings Spiridion closer to the divine by way 
of a reconnection with human sentiment. Spiridion finds that the sacred is found 
within the self. This new approach to spirituality also addresses the relationship 
between the heart and the mind. Sand shows that discord between heart and mind 
stunt growth in both spirituality and intelligence. According to Ernest Renan, the 
Évangile éternel sought to remove the abstractions customarily employed by 
Christianity  in order to disseminate religious philosophy to a general public and 
usher in a more literal (and therefore less superstitious) age of spirituality (Joachim 
287). Through her portrayal of l’abbé Spiridion, Fulgence, and Alexis, Sand shows 
that harmony between spirit and mind are necessary for preparing future men for this 
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new more straightforward gospel. Instead of relying on superstition as a false support 
for the conscience, they grow to rely on their intelligence and their ability to 
recognize truth through reasoning. 
At first, Angel does not understand the monastic culture because of a divide between 
the brotherly love which Christianity claims to represent and the coldhearted behavior 
of his companions and superiors. Soon after joining the community, Angel finds 
himself in a reversed moral system in which goodness and piety are punishable acts 
of deviance (189-91). In the eyes of his fellow monks, Angel is allegedly guilty of 
some crime against “God’s justice.” As the story unfolds, however, the laws of 
organized religion are increasingly exposed as mundane. With the exception of Angel 
and his three predecessors, the religious brothers are uniformly depicted as selfish and 
unjust. Their goal is to erase the feeling of justice in others, forcing their peers to 
conform to a corrupt society (209). The corrupt monastery is indicative of a general 
loss of justice on earth. Superstitions surrounding religion remain but the ability to 
form true brotherhood through an understanding of justice is completely lost. 
According to Alexis, “la foi est perdue sur la terre, et le vice est impuni” (210). 
Alexis nevertheless teaches that the goal of life should not be to live better than other 
men but to strive to live with them (210).  
 
Alexis explains that the monastery was once a haven for those called to follow “le 
culte de l’esprit” (212). Religious communities contributed greatly to the body of 
human wisdom (212). The decadent modern monks are shown not only to lack 
knowledge but to also distance themselves from genuine sentiment, rendering them 
unsympathetic to the point of seeming inhuman. The monks actually fear holiness and 
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discourage virtue. Alexis reveals to Angel that his superiors actually hope to curb the 
novice’s reverence by encouraging his scholarly activities: “de peur que tu ne 
deviennes un saint, on cherchera à faire de toi un savant” (217). Alexis further reveals 
that the monks fear “l’esprit de justice et la droiture naturelle” (208). The disparity 
between the injustices committed by the religious community and Angel’s instinctual 
integrity creates doubt which grows to be the foundation of his spiritual evolution. 
Alexis initially leads Angel away from rote doctrine and closer to humanity by 
inspiring him to consider his religious environment with a critical eye: “Alexis 
m’avait soufflé l’esprit de révolte contre mes supérieurs, contre ces hommes que je 
devais croire et que j’avais toujours cru infaillibles” (203). By stripping religious 
authorities of their divine facades, Alexis is finally able to judge them as men rather 
than accept them as representatives of God. Doubt thus becomes a means for 
progress. Actions and feelings replace ceremony and sacraments as the foundations of 
truth. 
Because the monks’ interpretation of divine justice has reversed, Alexis resolves to 
pray to an alternative God. Angel observes that Alexis diverges from Church law 
while still professing love for God: “Le père Alexis ne me semblait pas croire en Dieu 
selon les lois de l’Église chrétienne. Il y a plus, il me semblait parfois qu’il ne servait 
pas le même Dieu que moi” (219). Alexis’ concept of God is more rooted in personal 
spirituality than it is in any kind of ceremony or official doctrine. Angel notes early 
on that Alexis invokes “l’Esprit” without preceding it with “Saint,” recognizing the 
authority of spirit and mind developed independently of the Church (203). Angel’s 
first move towards the acceptance of “L’Esprit” is his decision to stop listening to his 
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worried conscience and to support Alexis as a friend and a fellow human being (238). 
The follower of “l’Esprit” is thus a charitable friend of humanity who trusts his heart 
over his superstitions. 
Alexis reveals to Angel that he began his philosophical investigations where his 
mentor left off, extending his research to heretical literature. His search for 
knowledge outside of the Church marks a loss of innocence, as indicated by the Dante 
quote on the door to the secular library, “Per me si va nell’eterno dolore” (297). The 
first step in Alexis’ transformation is to learn for the sake of enriching himself: 
“J’éprouvais le besoin de m’instruire pour moi-même, et, la science catholique 
épuisée pour moi, j’étais poussé vers des études plus complètes, par l’amour de la 
science, et non par l’ardeur de la prédication” (298). He reads Abelard first, followed 
by other twelfth and thirteen century heretics (298-9). Above all, Alexis appreciates 
the freedom of self-discovery and the replacement of dogma with conscience (299). 
Alexis elects to only accept useful articles of faith which he understands (299). In his 
own words, he transforms into “un hérétique passioné” but looking back, Alexis 
admits that he was not conscious of the fact that he was no longer Catholic (299-300). 
Alexis’ unawareness of his trespass against religion attests to the idea that his 
spiritual evolution is in harmony with his conscience and is therefore a natural step in 
the progression of his spiritual and intellectual growth. His lack of guilt implies a first 
step towards the erasure of superstition. 
Alexis recognizes his intellectual progression as parallel to the intellectual 
progression of humanity itself (300-1). After studying protestant literature, he reaches 
a point at which it would be impossible to return to pure Catholicism. Religion for 
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Alexis takes on “une forme toute philosophique” (301). Alexis equates his 
transformation to a coming of age. Like a child growing first into an adolescent and 
then into a young man, Alexis went from Catholic to reformist and from reformist to 
philosopher (301). He also expanded his world view to consider more than the 
western tradition: “L’Inde ne se montrait certes pas moins éclairée dans l’idée de la 
Divinité que la Judée.  Jupiter [...] ne me semblait pas un dieu inférieur à Jéhovah” 
(302). The idea of various Gods constituting one Eternity recalls the spirit shared 
amongst St. John, Spiridion, Fulgence, Alexis and others as representatives of a 
unified humanity according to the Évangile éternel as it is revealed at the end of the 
novel. From comparative religious studies, Alexis embraces religious tolerance 
among other liberal ideals: “Je gardai pour toute religion une croyance pleine de désir 
et d’espoir en la Divinité, le sentiment inébranlable du juste et de l’injuste, un grand 
respect pour toutes les religions et pour toutes les philosophies, l’amour du bien et le 
besoin du vrai” (302).  
Modern Religion as a Balance of Heart and Mind 
In his quest to join together with a sympathetic soul, Angel approaches the elder 
Alexis who likewise lives in solitude. Sand highlights the idea that great works cannot 
be accomplished on one’s own. Moments of significant growth in Spiridion occur as a 
direct result of sympathetic human relationships. Knowledge detached from humanity 
is fruitless. Through Alexis’ testimony, Sand depicts the monastery as having slipped 
into a sort of Dark Age where truth struggles against a reign of ignorance due to the 
lack of brotherhood: 
Où est le temps où les hommes s’y chérissaient comme des frères et y 
travaillaient de concert, en s’aidant charitablement les uns les autres, à 
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implorer, à poursuivre l’esprit, à vaincre les grossiers conseils de la 
matière? Toute lumière, tout progrès, toute grandeur, doivent y périr, si 
quelques-uns d’entre nous ne persévèrent dans la lutte effroyable que 
l’ignorance et l’imposture livrent désormais à la vérité. (212) 
 
Traditionally, the monk separated himself from humanity so that he could study and 
preserve religion as history handed it down to him. In doing so, however, he actively 
separates religion from the people it applies to, widening the gap between the secular 
and the divine. A tool for religion, the monk sacrifices his freedom and his fertility. 
As Alexis increasingly rebelled, he recognized the power that religion had wielded 
over him. The superstitions which accompanied his belief in God had hindered his 
growth as a man: “Pour avoir été catholique, ne me sera-t-il jamais permis d’être un 
homme, et dois-je, à la moindre langueur d’estomac [...] être en butte aux terreurs de 
l’enfance” (337). Alexis’ story is the story of a monk turning back into a man and 
seeking that brotherhood through an alliance with humanity. The development of 
doubt as the gateway for a new way of thinking would be the first step in Alexis’ 
personal transformation. 
Conscience, and particularly the ethical responsibility to help mankind through one’s 
intellectual growth, is increasingly stressed as Alexis recounts his dwindling 
connection to sentiment due to his obsession with amassing cerebral knowledge. Jean 
Deprun points out that Sand’s reasoning here may have been inspired by a familiarity 
with Leibnitz’s religious philosophy “qui ressemble beaucoup à la religion du Vicaire 
savoyard” and which strays from “tout l’appareil logique et métaphysique” (574). 
Deprun summarizes this spiritual theory as “l’idée que la vraie foi doit être 
accompagée de la lumière” (574). Knowledge without conscience leads to ugly pride, 
as illustrated in Alexis’ nightmare in which Spiridion declared: “c’est un orgueilleux, 
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et l’orgueil l’a rendu sourd à la voix de sa conscience” (338-9). The nightmare ends 
with priests standing over a man’s coffin trying unsuccessfully to rip the man’s heart 
out (348-9). Alexis is guilty of a trespass against his conscience in the dream because 
he chose to save himself rather than come to the victim’s aid (349-50). The victim, 
however, proves that saving another is akin to saving oneself. Alexis recounts that he 
watched as the man changed into Christ, then into Abelard, and subsequently into 
Jean Huss, into Luther, into Spiridion, into Fulgence, and finally into Alexis himself 
(349-50). No man stands alone as their fates are dependent on each other. The vision 
exposes the history of all prophets of religious innovation as being a part of the 
Évangile éternel palingenesis. It is their destiny to be sacrificed in service to 
humanity – which they are attached to through the heart, “martyrs de la vérité 
nouvelle” (352).  
Alexis’ reaction to the dream, however, is to combat superstition by closing off his 
imagination, “de refroidir mon imagination, comme j’avais réussi à refroidir mon 
cœur” (353). He began to lean towards an atheistic world view which fostered 
emotionless analysis. Atheism and sensibility are, according to Alexis’ story, 
mutually exclusive. Even in his days as an unbeliever, Angel’s mentor describes 
himself as conserving a concept of justice despite his atheism (360). Regardless of the 
form it takes, religion for the elder Alexis is perceived as a necessary component to 
being human and therefore religious sentiment is considered to be a building block of 
justice. Reason alone is not compassionate enough to be just without sentiment to 
counterbalance it. By the same token, sentiment turns to fanaticism when unchecked 
by reason (356). The novel avoids addressing the question of whether or not there is a 
243 
 
true religion. Instead, the author focuses on the persistent human need to feed the soul 
through some form of spirituality. Alexis concludes that man needs a God but leaves 
the identity of that God up to individual interpretation: “Sans doute il ne lui faut (à 
l’homme) ni tyrans ni fanatiques, mais il lui faut une religion, car il a une âme, et il 
lui faut connaitre un Dieu” (400). 
Alexis’ previous relationship with another young monk, Christophe, and his dog, 
Bacco, teaches him that some knowledge is acquired through the heart rather than 
through the mind. The death of Christophe further enlightens him on the valuable 
lessons learned through human suffering: “je compris par le cœur les douleurs de 
l’humanité” (361). His own pain brings him closer to all men who likewise inevitably 
experience pain. The human connection that Alexis forged through his feelings for 
Christophe finally reveals to him the importance of love: “L’homme est fait pour 
aimer” (363). Through love, the founding principle of the Évangile éternel, Alexis 
discovered that there was still a spark of spirituality within him which persisted in his 
ongoing appreciation for beauty and a “desire for the ideal” (364). Consequently, 
Alexis became more sensitive to his environment, finding comfort in the 
contemplation of nature which in turn allowed him to rediscover poetic sentiment in 
spirituality: “je redeviens sensible à la poésie du cloître” (366). Sensibility teaches 
lessons which neither religion nor science can communicate: “En un mot, la vie prit à 
mes yeux un caractère sacré et un but immense, que je n’avais entrevu ni dans les 
religions ni dans les sciences, et que mon cœur enseigna sur nouveaux frais à mon 
intelligence égarée” (368) 
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Alexis’ relationship with the hermit continues to develop his notion of spirituality by 
offering an entirely different model of the holy man. The hermit sees himself as a 
divine tool, carrying out God’s will through good deeds. Alexis had already 
envisioned a new concept of God as Eternity. The hermit’s rejection of material 
goods and his practical application of love and charity prompt Alexis to consider new 
ways in which men might be able to serve such a God by serving humanity. The 
hermit follows Church doctrine but cares more for the human connection in religion 
than he does for ceremony (376). From the hermit, Alexis understands brotherly love 
and altruism, “la vie de l’âme en un mot” (377).  
Alexis’ experience with the hermit inspires him to join humanity in the present which 
he recognizes as in flux according to “le mouvement éternel des choses” (382). The 
priest is drawn to join the movement of humanity: “oubliant que j’étais moine... je me 
sentais homme” (382). As part of his effort to join humanity, Alexis realizes that he 
must somehow fertilize the earth. It is his duty to create, even if that creation is 
intellectual rather than physical in nature. Fertilization gives birth to the next 
generation and creates eternity: “...le but de la vie est de transmettre la vie” (422). 
After having believed that philosophy had accomplished its task through social 
change, Alexis realizes that nothing is ever definitively accomplished because the 
universe is forever in process: “Les grandes époques engendrent les grands hommes; 
et, réciproquement, les grandes actions naissent les unes des autres” (382). 
Reminiscent of later Lamennais, Alexis considers the Revolution as the result of 
humanity obeying its divine plan: “aujourd’hui je crois qu’il y a une action 
providentielle, et... l’humanité obéit instinctement et sympathiquement aux grands et 
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profonds desseins de la pensée divine” (383). Considering the Revolution, Alexis sees 
more than a present problem. He sees, like Lamartine and later Lamennais, a 
movement towards the “liberty of conscience” which would free humanity from 
artificial morality: “Ce travail gigantesque de la révolution française, ce n’était pas, ce 
ne pouvait pas être seulement une question de pain et d’abri pour les pauvres; c’était 
beaucoup plus haut... [...] elle doit... achever de donner la liberté de conscience au 
genre humain tout entier” (399). 
The Trinity as an Enduring Symbol of Unity 
Selflessness is one of the final stages of Alexis’ spiritual growth. Eager to contribute 
to humanity, he finally desires the knowledge contained in Spiridion’s manuscript. 
His desire to instruct himself has grown into a desire to benefit others through his 
knowledge (408). Alexis further realizes that he lacked the balance between reason 
and sentiment which is necessary to perceiving the truth (413). Though Alexis’ 
lifetime is marred by ethical imperfections and misunderstandings, the story of his 
trials becomes his contribution to the next generation. His journey also reveals an 
independent discovery of various principles of the Évangile éternel. According to 
Jean Deprun, Sand may have been influenced by Pierre Leroux’s concept of a 
“sensation-sentiment-connaissance” trinity of experience which was loosely based on 
Leibnitz’s idea that the celestial trinity may be mirrored in human “power, 
intelligence, and love” (576). From his personal experiences with knowledge and 
religion, reason and sentiment, Alexis devises a three-word motto: “croire, espérer, 
aimer” (416). From this trinity of belief, hope, and love, the priest layers other 
corresponding trinities. He says the Church, for example, failed to apply its three 
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theological virtues, “la foi, l’espérance, la charité,” which kept Catholicism from 
achieving “la sagesse, la justice, la perfection” (417). The Church instead embraced 
“Dieu implacable et la damnation éternelle,” thus losing all “heart” or compassion for 
humanity, surrendering itself to sophisms and ambition (417). Alexis affirms his 
belief in Divinity, again evoking the trinity: “Nous croyons en la Divinité... et Dieu 
lui-même est une trinité sublime dont notre vie mortelle est le reflet affaibli” (417-
18). For Alexis, there are no atheists among men. A glimmer of the divine resides in 
all human beings (418). His philosophy unites all people of all faiths and belief 
systems throughout time by recognizing their efforts to discover divine knowledge as 
one united human effort: “c’était du moins des cris de l’âme élévés vers ce Dieu que 
toutes les générations humaines ont proclamé sous des noms divers et adoré sous 
différent symboles” (420). In the end, Alexis reassesses Jesus’ true place in human 
history as simply “a friend of humanity” and “a prophet of the ideal” (420). As men 
advance in time, it is their duty to continue the work of past prophets (421). In a 
continual evolution towards the achievement of perfection, man advances into the 
future (421). Alexis learns that balance is the key to truth. One must reject extremes 
and live without atheism or superstition (422). 
Alexis’ research reveals that the Pythagorean, Platonic, and Christian philosophies are 
simply continuations of each other, “un dogme continué et modifié, et dont l’essence 
lui semblait le fond de la vérité éternelle; vérité progressive, disait-il, en ce sens 
qu’elle était enveloppée encore des nuages épais, et qu’il appartenait à l’intelligence 
humaine de déchirer ces voiles un à un, jusqu’au dernier” (423). Continuing the 
pattern of trinities as a template for the combination of various philosophies and 
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ideals, Alexis’ concept of “Dieu-Perfection” combines science, justice, and love. 
Science, he says, reveals the greatness of the creator. For Alexis, man’s social instinct 
and natural sympathy prove the sovereignty of justice. A continual attraction to the 
ideal attests to man’s love of God as the father figure of the great human family in the 
“sanctuary” of human conscience (424). The conscience in this scenario replaces the 
Church as man’s place of worship. Spirituality thus grows ever more internal as the 
good deeds which spring from that spirituality are turned increasingly outward toward 
humanity. Man’s three duties in life, according to Alexis, are to educate himself in the 
sciences, to establish institutions which promote the unity of the human family, and to 
continually research in an effort to discover truth, wisdom, and virtue, “de chercher 
sans cesse pour soi et pour les autres les voies de la vérité, de la sagesse et de la 
vertu” (424). 
The Final Stage: The Dawn of a New Religion 
It is only in the final pages of the novel that Sand makes an explicit connection 
between Spiridion and the Évangile éternel. The discovery of Spiridion’s legendary 
manuscript reveals one packet composed of three different texts: a copy of the Gospel 
of John written in the hand of Joachim de Flore, L’Introduction à l’Évangile éternel 
by Jean de Parme, and lastly, Spiridion’s own prophetical writings. Emphasizing the 
importance of the analytical process made possible through collaboration across the 
ages, Alexis explains: “L’ordre dans lequel Spiridion a placé ces trois manuscrits sous 
une même enveloppe doit être sacré pour nous, et signifie incontestablement le 
progrès, le développement et le complément de sa pensée” (430). Understanding the 
genesis of spiritual ideas finally becomes an important step in accepting those ideas.  
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The web of threes is further enriched by associating each time period with a particular 
mood, an apostle, and a reformer (434). The first stage, the reign of the Father is 
associated with the apostle Peter and with Grégoire VII. It is the period associated 
with the development of a religious hierarchy and a militant missionary agenda. 
According to Spiridion’s vision, it lasted from the creation of the Church until 
Hildebrand, “le Saint Pierre du onzième siècle” (434). The reign of the Son is 
associated with the apostle John and the originator of the Évangile éternel, Joachim 
de Flore. It is the “reign of sentiment,” spanning the time from Abelard to Luther 
(434). The reign of the Holy Spirit is associated with the apostle Paul and with Martin 
Luther. It was the reign of “libre examen” (434). Alexis’ own life mirrors each of the 
stages, having gone from being an obedient member of the Church hierarchy to 
becoming a free-thinking humanist. The completion of these three stages marks the 
dawning of a new religion: “Là finit le christianisme, et là commence l’ère d’une 
nouvelle religion” (435). 
As Alexis and Angel examine the documents, they come to understand that the 
upcoming era, the nineteenth century, will be this age of a new religion: “Le règne du 
Saint-Esprit a été prédit par saint Jean, et c’est ce règne qui va succéder à la religion 
chrétienne, comme la religion chrétienne a succédé à la loi mosaïque” (431). Within 
the Gospel of John, de Flore is said to highlight Jesus’ proclamation: “Vous êtes tous 
des dieux,” emphasizing equality among men (429). Sand explains that Jean de 
Parme’s Introduction à l’Évangile éternel divides religion into three time periods, “le 
règne du Père,” “le règne du Fils,” and “le règne du Saint Esprit” (430-1). Angel cites 
Jean de Parme’s text, highlighting a prediction by Saint John that during the reign of 
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the Holy Spirit “les hommes n’auront plus besoin de sacrements, et rendront à l’Être 
suprême un culte purement spirituel” (431). Religion, it seems, will be released from 
the binds of the Church. Sand goes on to explicitly link France’s political liberation to 
its religious liberation by evoking liberty, equality, and fraternity as the fruits of 
spiritual maturity. Alexis exclaims in a moment of revelation confirming the end of 
the ancien régime as the dawn of a new religious epoch: “Oui, la doctrine de 
l’Évangile éternel! Cette doctrine de liberté, d’égalité et de fraternité qui sépare 
Grégoire VII de Luther, l’a entendu ainsi.” (430-1). 
At the end of his life, Alexis realizes that “sterile” erudition cannot yield truth for 
humanity (436). The most valuable lessons in his life are learned through the heart by 
way of friendship, charity, and brotherhood (436). Moreover, the religious cloister is 
no longer the place for research. Spiridion was the last true monk. It is time to leave 
the cloister, to follow the movement of time. The religious community, according to 
Alexis, is “une race finie” (437). Leaving the monastery, where time and knowledge 
have long been suspended by the limits of superstition, is analogous to going from the 
past into the future. As the monastery is finally invaded by Napoleon’s troops, 
crushing all that was holy, Sand reminds the reader of the brutality that accompanies 
major change. The story ends abruptly after Alexis is sacrificed by a soldier on the 
“Hic est” rock, announcing that suffering and sacrifice remain a necessary component 
of social evolution. In the final scene, Alexis goes fearlessly into death, proving that 
he has achieved a state of selfless devotion to humanity. The jarring violence of the 
final scenes, especially after the joyous revelation of hope, creates a shadow of 
uncertainty in Alexis’ doctrine of love and in the feasibility of “liberté, égalité, 
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fraternité.” This lingering skepticism serves as a reminder that the progress they had 




The thirteenth century doctrine of the Évangile éternal, as described in Spiridion, 
suggests that Christianity is an unfinished stage of spirituality in an ongoing cycle of 
religious evolution. Christianity, according to the doctrine, would be surpassed by the 
gospel of the Holy Spirit. In Spiridion, all events in the course of time move towards 
the fulfillment of God’s will and man’s destiny. Following this line of reasoning, 
Spiridion develops the idea that knowledge is limited to the present time period as 
man awaits the next spiritual revolution. In order for this evolution to occur, 
knowledge must be passed on and built upon from generation to generation. The 
rapport amongst Spiridion, Fulgence, Alexis, and Angel illustrate this growth of 
knowledge through shared information. The motto “Hic est veritas,” inscribed on 
Spiridion’s tomb, calls for the awakening of innate knowledge of universal truths, not 
unlike the knowledge alluded to by Lamartine in Cédar ou la chute d’un ange or in 
Rousseau’s Vicaire savoyard. In Spiridion, however, the emphasis on sharing 
knowledge implies that this knowledge cannot be discovered purely through 
individual meditation. Spiridion’s gospel unites individuals in the past, present, and 
future. In accordance with saint-simonian doctrine, Spiridion shows that one’s 




Intellectual progress in Spiridion is therefore depicted as a slow process which takes 
centuries to mature. Progress in this scenario included diverse thought processes 
including consideration of the sacred as well as the profane. Rather than exclude 
certain ideas in order to simplify doctrine, as the Church had traditionally done, 
Spiridion includes a web of divergent schools of thought throughout time which 
intersect to form a more complicated yet more comprehensive body of knowledge 
rather than one infallible truth. Some Catholic elements of religion, such as prayer, 
are therefore preserved even as Alexis moves forward on his spiritual journey. The 
disillusion and the cultivation of doubt in Spiridion also allow its characters to grow 
into new spiritual stages of understanding. The sacred is found in the spirit as well as 
in the mind. All of the main characters learn to recognize truth through reasoning, not 
solely through sentiment. 
Sand uses the backdrop of the corrupt monastic community as a microcosm of the 
Church in which the true meaning of justice is threatened by unreasonable doctrine 
and a culture of superstition. The monks lack both knowledge and sympathy and are 
therefore removed from the pathways to human progress and unity. Alexis is only 
able to progress spiritually and intellectually by doubting his superiors and judging 
them as men. Disillusioned with the monks’ reversal of justice, Alexis elects to pray 
to an alternative God, separating his personal religious practice from formal Church 
practices. He refers to this God as “l’Esprit,” evoking the unity of spirit and mind as a 
spiritual authority. The reign of the Holy Spirit is also the final stage of Christianity 
according to the Évangile éternel. Alexis reveals that he was able to arrive at a higher 
spiritual state by refusing to limit his knowledge to the boundaries enforced by the 
252 
 
Church. He opened his mind to heretical literature. Breaking free from the innocent 
ignorance advocated by Ballanche, Chateaubriand, and de Maistre is thus part of the 
necessary process of progression. Alexis’ lack of guilt surrounding this loss of 
innocence attests to the idea that knowledge is not evil. Alexis recognizes his own 
progress towards knowledge and away from superstition as parallel to the intellectual 
progression of the entirety of humanity. His willingness to “fall” through sin is not 
unlike the fallen angels in Vigny, Quinet, and Lamartine who also seek a more 
complete worldly experience as a vital step in their quests for truth. 
Modern religion is thus ideally presented as a balance of heart and mind. Human 
relationships in Spiridion are essential to the development of the heart. For Sand, an 
excess of knowledge without fraternity to keep that knowledge in check leads to an 
imbalance in the soul which threatens to render man unjust. In Alexis’ story, atheism 
and justice are shown to be completely incompatible. Although Sand, like Mme de 
Staël, refrains from prescribing a specific religion, it is clear in Spiridion that the 
retention of some kind of religion is necessary to the preservation of justice because it 
nourishes human sympathies. Love emerges as a central doctrine of religion, just as it 
did for Saint-Simon, Lamennais, Lamartine, Quinet, Hugo, and others. 
Especially in the conclusion to Spiridion, the trinity surfaces as en enduring symbol 
of unity for humanity. Alexis’ three-word motto, “faith, hope, charity,” and the three 
religious goals of the new doctrine, “wisdom, justice, perfection,” emphasize the 
plurality of interwoven truths. There is not just one trinity but a palingenesis of 
convergent truths. Alexis’ “Dieu-Perfection” ultimately combines science, justice and 
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love, three themes which we have already seen reworked in some form in all of the 
considerations on religion throughout this dissertation.  
The final pages of Spiridion make an explicit connection between l’abbé Spiridion 
and the Évangile éternel. The discovery of Spiridion’s manuscript packet reveals that 
the three stages of Christianity, “the reign of the Father, “the reign of the Son,” and 
“the reign of the Holy Spirit” (which correspond to time periods associated with 
religious hierarchy, sentiment, and “libre examen”) are complete. It is the dawn of a 
new, unknown religious era corresponding with the dawn of the nineteenth century. 
Religion, as prophesized by John the Evagelical and Jean de Parme, is due to be 
released from the Church and controlled directly by the people. Sand links this 
spiritual liberation to France’s own political liberation. Liberty, equality, and 
fraternity are presented as the products of spiritual maturity. In the following chapter, 
we will see that Victor Hugo’s Le Pape further envisions this return to a religion of 
the people. 
 
Chapter 12: Hugo’s “Dream Pope”: Religion versus Republican Ideals in Le 
Pape 
 
Victor Hugo’s relationship with religion and spirituality is famously complex. The 
poet’s belief in some kind of higher power, of souls, and of some mystical afterlife is 
unmistakable in the Contemplations, for example, which opens with a prayer-like 
poem evoking images of man’s destiny spurred on by God
22
. Hugo’s biographers 
seem to disagree on whether or not the young Victor Hugo was raised in the Church 
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 “La mer, c’est le Seigneur, que misère ou bonheur,/ Tout destin montre et nomme;/ Le vent, c’est 
le Seigneur; l’astre, c’est le Seigneur; Le navire, c’est l’homme” (31). 
254 
 
traditions. In the opening chapter to Géraud Venzac’s  Les Origines religieuses de 
Victor Hugo, Venzac lists over twenty authors who have researched Hugo’s religious 
background, categorizing them with a “oui” or “non” according to whether or not 
they accept the popular belief that Hugo was raised Catholic (10-11). Maurice 
Levaillant, who published his La Crise mystique de Victor Hugo in the same year 
(1954), confirms in the first sentence of his book that “Contrairement aux légendes, 
l’enfance de Victor Hugo ne fut point chrétienne; ni, davantage, son adolescence et sa 
jeune maturité” (13). For Levaillant, Hugo’s brief flirtation with Catholicism begins 
and ends in the early 1820s when he was briefly drawn to the ultramontane circle 
“sous la double influence de Chateaubriand et de Lamennnais” (15). Levaillant 
concedes nevertheless that, though he never embraced organized religion, “l’âme de 
Victor Hugo était sincèrement religieuse” (Levaillant 17). Hugo’s work leaves no 
room for doubt on this point. 
Venzac concludes that the only constant in Hugo’s spirituality is his fidelity to the 
conscience: “La conscience élément stable, dans sa vie spirituelle orageuse” (15). 
Throughout Hugo’s body of work, the conscience is indeed unmistakable and 
Republican ideals of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity are consistently upheld as 
conscience-based universal truths. The value of religion for Hugo, it seems, rests on 
the conscience which one brings to it. It is not necessarily any particular religion 
which is good or bad, according to Hugo, but rather the sincerity of the individual 
who follows that religion. While Hugo’s depiction of Claude Frollo in Notre Dame de 
Paris seems to condemn the decadence of the Church, for example, Bishop Myriel in 
Les Misérables provides a ray of hope that Christianity might still be interpreted as a 
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doctrine of love. The difference is not in the religion but in the individual. At the 
conclusion of Religion et religions, Hugo indicates that God’s existence, like the sun, 
revolves around the Conscience and in the application of Justice, Equality, and 
Liberty which are truly the light of the world: 
   Il est! il est! Regarde, âme. Il a son solstice, 
   La Conscience; il a son axe, la Justice; 
   Il a son équinoxe, et c’est l’Égalité; 
   Il a sa vaste aurore, et c’est la Liberté. (253) 
 
 
In the last line of the poem, the poet urges men to stop “creating the sun.” Organized 
religion is thus a pale imitation of the truth.  
Hugo’s spirituality might be compared to Rousseau’s in that the source for truth is 
conscience-based. In agreement with Lamartine, however, Hugo goes beyond simply 
accepting the authority of the conscience to suggest that innate knowledge of 
goodness proves the existence of God. Whereas the Vicaire savoyard’s faith chooses 
morality over mysticism, Hugo’s work professes a sort of moral mysticism in which 
the two concepts are intertwined. Denis Saurat explains that Hugo’s view of the 
infinite as unified with the individual is precisely what makes his spirituality unique: 
“pour lui, Dieu est le monde, mais Dieu est aussi une personne. Dieu est aussi vague 
que le Dieu du panthéisme, et, en même temps, aussi individuel que le Dieu du 
catholicisme” (10). 
Hugo’s Le Pape, published in 1878, uses this rapport between the individual and the 
infinite to guide its readers from religious orthodoxy to the discovery of a religion of 
justice, liberty, equality and fraternity through the personage of the “Pope.” The 
poem, which recounts the dream of an unnamed pope, is structured as a dramatic 
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series of dialogues and monologues as the main character embarks on a quest to 
discover religious truth. In his biography of Victor Hugo, Graham Robb asserts that 
the pope character is Pius IX who died in February of 1878 but who was the reigning 
pope in 1874when the poem was written (500). Hugo, however, does not indicate 
within the poem that his character portrays any particular pope. Given the universal 
nature of the poet’s critiques, I am inclined to conclude that the poem is more of a 
commentary on the state of the Church in general than it is an attack on any particular 
pontiff.   
 
The “pope,” who serves as the hero of the epic falls asleep at the beginning of the first 
act, embarking on a discovery of religion in the world which is part revelation, part 
conscience. As the pope begins his slumber, mysterious “words in the sky,” 
unattributed to any being but easily identifiable with the divine, suggest that man 
must be tired from “hating” his fellow man (5). The words seek to remind man of his 
innate knowledge of justice: “Homme ne te crois pas plongé dans l’inconnu;/ Tu 
connais tout, sachant que tu dois être juste” (6). Justice is thus established from the 
very beginning as the most essential foundation for humanity. Hugo’s justice, 
however, is not the reason-based, purely secular “masculine” justice of 
contemporaries Michelet and Renan. The romantic softens his justice with sentiment, 
especially pity, and sprinkles it with traces of mysticism reminiscent of Lamartine or 
Saint-Simon “Heureux l’homme qui sent à travers son sommeil/ Que les étoiles sont 
sur la terre levées/ Pour protéger le faible et l’humble et leurs couvées” (6). Faced 
with the kings of the world, the pope character declares equality among men: 
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“L’homme à l’homme est égal” (9). He also establishes Christianity as a doctrine of 
love, just as other romantics had already done (11). For Hugo, this doctrine of love is 
directly related to pity, charity, and justice. His idyllic pope in this dream is 
associated with the best, most pure state of the human conscience. The dream pope 
endorses simplicity in spirituality: “Il n’est sous le grand ciel impénétrable et doux/ 
Qu’une pourpre, l’amour; qu’un trône, l’innocence” (13). Note that Hugo’s innocence 
differs from the concept of innocence in Chateaubriand in the Génie du christianisme. 
Whereas Chateaubriand’s concept of innocence was closely related to obedience and 
an absence of doubt, Hugo’s concept of innocence is more closely associated with the 
poor, the downtrodden, and the child-like regardless of their religious affiliation.   
Hugo’s sanctification of love and innocence as the only true royalty on earth suggests 
that this projection of the pope is simultaneously an anti-pope and yet more in tune 
with the true religion of humanity. Hugo’s dream pope epitomizes the ideal holy man. 
He is selfless, sincere, and wholly dedicated to humanity. The pope comes to realize 
that justice is a gift from God which should not be abused by men (14).  
 
The People’s Pope 
Hugo humanizes the pope, bringing him closer to the concept of justice and 
subsequently reminding readers that the actual pope in the Vatican is too separated 
from humanity to truly understand the flock he leads. The poet shows the pope in this 
lucid dream to be confused by his own separation from humanity. He suddenly seeks 
to rejoin mankind. He bonds with his fellow men in admitting the human weaknesses 
they share: “Je suis comme vous tous, aveugle, ô mes amis!” (14). Such a confession 
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negates the pontiff’s infallibility. Yet, in casting off his false pretense to perfection, 
the pope comes ever closer to the universal truth of equality. His declaration of 
solidarity with man is followed by a second confession of his general ignorance of the 
universe, a recognition of his weakness as an individual (and especially as an 
individual shielded from the rest of the world): “J’ignore l’homme, Dieu, le monde” 
(14). The pope is ignorant as to how or why he attained his role as supreme religious 
leader. He cannot understand why he would be superior to any other man. Embracing 
his conscience, he is transformed into a humble spiritual seeker: “La conscience 
humaine est ma sœur.../ ... je ne suis plus qu’un moine” (14). Like the doubting 
clergymen in George Sand’s Spiridion, the fallen angels in Vigny, Quinet, and 
Lamartine, or Zola’s Abbé Mouret or Pierre Froment, Hugo’s pope simply wishes to 
rejoin humanity: “Que de marcher parmi l’humanité profonde,/ Que de créer des 
cœurs, que d’accroître la foi,...”/ [...]/ “Et je rentre chez Dieu, c’est-à-dire chez 
l’Homme./ Laisse-moi passer, peuple. Adieu, Rome” (15). God thus lives amongst 
the people and not above them. The pope, in leaving his throne, embarks on a quest to 
find the true God amongst humanity. 
Hugo’s pope then embarks on a mission eastward, disguised as an ordinary man, he 
begins by endeavoring to convince “le patriarche d’orient
23
” to renounce his power. 
In a moment reminiscent of Lamennais’ Paroles d’un croyant, the pope reminds the 
bishop that his wealth has been amassed at the expense of the poor (17). The pope’s 
understanding of God, as explained by Hugo, is that God is immense and uniquely 
concerned with ruling the universe. This immense and inconceivable God is therefore 
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nothing like the bureaucratic God suggested by Church law. The common Christian 
concept of God, in comparison to the reality of God, is exposed as ridiculously 
limited and false: “Un Jésus de carton! un Éternel de cire!” (21). The Eastern bishop 
uses a familiar ultramontane argument recalling Ballanche’s divine plan, 
Chateaubriand’s glorification of ignorance, and de Maistre’s unforgiving divine 
justice, all of which argue for inaction in matters of the Church: “Nul n’y peut rien 
changer, pas même toi, mon père” (24). The religious authority pardons inaction by 
insisting that nothing can be done. A chorus of bishops erupts and their responses 
multiply in opposition to the good pope’s perceived heresy. The first voice is again 
reminiscent of de Maistre: “Il faut que l’homme souffre afin que Dieu prospère” (24). 
Another seems to echo the likes of Ballanche and early Lamennais: “Le temple a 
Dieu pour base et pour cime les rois;/ Dieu croule si les rois tombent” (24). The 
bishops’ voices continue, evoking the feeling of an ignorant mob. Education is their 
enemy: “Le royaume des cieux est aux pauvres d’esprit;/ Donc peu d’écoles, point de 
science, un seul livre” (25). Above all, the Patriarch opposes liberty, equating it to 
“l’abîme” (26). 
Although asleep, the pope declares himself awakened in the spiritual and intellectual 
sense since he is no longer duped by the Patriarch’s lies. The pope describes his 
awakening in terms of feeling. He feels “the immense weight of souls,” the spirit of 
humanity itself, and voices a realization that the true order of spirituality is the 
reverse of the present state of the Church. The only true pope, then, is an anti-pope: 
“Et je suis descendu, sachant que je montais” (28). The bishop tries to remind the 
pope of the “Dieu vengeur,” the fire and brimstone God brandished by the 
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ultramontanes who judges rather than sympathizes (28). The pope counters this 
outmoded image of God with the love-based figure of the martyred Christ (29). The 
Roman pontiff then frankly declares that his position neither represents God nor the 
people: “Je ne suis plus qu’un prince obéissant aux princes” (29). 
Leaving the Eastern bishop, the pope heads for the dwellings of the people where he 
expects to find God. He first joins an impoverished family and attempts to be 
charitable according to his out-of-touch expectations. He discovers that his charity is 
insufficient. The pope offers bread to the poor man but finds he needs more to feed 
his family. He offers money for bed sheets but finds that they still need more for 
firewood. Finally, the holy man gives the needy everything they need to live, 
including work. Only then can the man declare his faith with a simple “J’y crois” 
(33). Through this scene, the poet shows that the poor would be inclined to believe in 
a God who reaches out to humanity through its priests. 
The passage that follows this scene of goodwill depicts an inspired pope amongst the 
crowds of people. He gives a speech in which he calls the most miserable to join him, 
“Les damnés, les vaincus, les gueux, les incurables” (35). The scene is reminiscent of 
Luke 14:13-14 when Jesus invites the downtrodden to share in his feast and directly 
associates the miserable with the “just
24
.” The pope recognizes himself as one with 
the people. He connects to them through sympathetic feeling: “Je suis à vous, je suis 
l’un de vous, et je sens/ Dans mes os votre fièvre immense, agonisants!” (35). Again 
reversing the Catholic hierarchy, he recognizes his role as being in service to 
humanity (35). The concept of leaders serving their people rather than the people 
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 “13. Mais lorsque vous faites un festin, conviez-y les pauvres, les estropiés, les boiteux et les 
aveugles; 14. Et vous serez heureux de ce qu’ils n’auront pas le moyen de vous le rendre; car Dieu 
vous le rendra lui-même au jour de la résurrection des justes.” 
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serving their leaders seems to represent a republican interpretation of religious 
structure. The pope here is reminiscent of the fallen angels we saw the works of 
Vigny, Lamartine, and Quinet in that he longs to come to Earth to experience 
authentic human sentiment. He brings the heavenly down to a human level where it 
can do the most good on Earth: “Je veux avoir ma part de toutes les douleurs;/ [...]/ Je 
suis l’universel étant le solitaire;” (36). This statement of universality through 
solitude is also reminiscent of Rousseau and Mme de Staël, as well as the general 
romantic trend towards meditation, in that personal internal reflection yields an 
external universal connection to humanity through the recognition of shared 
sentiment. 
Infallibility 
The section entitled “L’infaillibilité” has no listed speaker, unlike the previous 
sections. This unidentified voice opposes the liberated pope with familiar 
conservative arguments that God’s knowledge is superior to scientific knowledge 
(39). This “infallibility” depicts God as jealous, irrational, and unjust: “Il damne 
l’univers pour le vol d’une pomme” (39). Man, who is able to perceive the fallacies in 
traditional divine reasoning, thus becomes more intelligent than God: “Donc son 
chien est le pape, et je comprends qu’en somme,/ L’aveugle étant le dieu, le 
clairvoyant soit l’homme” (40). 
Again, the clergy is accused of degrading the divine by incorporating God into 
mundane law: “...imposant leur néant au mystère,/ Et tâchant d’ajouter à Dieu le ver 
de terre!” (42). The unidentified speaker goes on to condemn a system in which the 
laborer does not have the right to the fruits of his efforts. Comparing the people (the 
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working class) to “des brebis tondus,” he asserts that the role of the priest is that of a 
shepherd and asks “Où donc sont ces bergers qu’on appelle les prêtres?” (44). The 
priests thus seem absent to the flock they are tasked with leading, turning a blind eye 
to the suffering of mankind. 
In the section entitled “Pensif devant le destin,” a still unidentified speaker states that 
everything asks for grace. Man’s destiny is to suffer blindly at the hand of God: “...le 
sort des neveux de Japhet
25
,/ C’est de souffrir...” (47). This exclamation exposes the 
dark side of religion. God was meant to comfort men (to guide through his 
representative shepherd-priests) but man is actually doomed to suffer according to 
popular religion: “Homme, il est Prométhée; ange, il est Lucifer” (48). The 
construction of the Church is depicted as a mission to intimidate rather than comfort 
men because, as the bishop explains, “nul ne doit sans crainte approcher l’Éternel” 
(49). The pope reminds the bishop, however, that the true purpose of the Church 
(again, in the spirit of Lamennais’ Paroles d’un croyant) is to save the people, to be 
charitable. For Hugo’s pope, the purpose of the Church is to house the poor, not to 
promote empty but glorious notions of God (151). 
On Love and War 
Returning amongst humanity, the pope’s journey moves towards an examination of 
human law. “En voyant une nourrice” begins by recognizing women as the sacred 
givers of life (53). This is a theme which reverberates throughout the nineteenth 
century and we will visit it again in a later chapter on Auguste Comte and Emile Zola. 
Women, as the bearers of life, are depicted as proof of natural law. Human law, 
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however, goes against natural law by passing judgment on human lives through the 
death penalty which Hugo asserts is not sanctioned by divine authority. The poet 
illustrates this concept with the example of a woman sentenced to death (55). The 
reader, like the pope character, experiences situational examples as he moves through 
humanity. Justice is mislabeled when it is left to be defined by men: “Attends qu’un 
enfant naisse, ordonne qu’on bâtisse/ Un tombeau sur sa tête, et dit: c’est la justice!” 
(56). A later section in Le Pape, entitled “Un échafaud,” finds the pope again as an 
onlooker at an execution. Witnessing the death penalty, the pope realizes that clearly 
“La loi commet un crime” (82). Human law is a reversal of divine law: “Mais vivants, 
votre loi, qu’est-elle et que peut-elle?” (85). Not only is human law useless in the 
eyes of Hugo’s pope, it is also destructive to humanity. The scene is reminiscent of 
Hugo’s famed criticism of the law, and especially of the death penalty, in Le Dernier 
jour d’un condamné and Les Misérables. For Mario Vargas Llosa, the ultimate 
purpose of Hugo’s sympathetic depiction of the poor in Les Misérables is to prove the 
existence of a higher power outside of the imperfect justice systems on Earth: “Et 
dans sa description de la société, ce que le roman tente désespérément de décrire, ce 
sont les traces d’une présence qui, sans se montrer jamais tout à fait, est la plus 
importante du livre, son contexte essentiel, le ciment de ces épisodes: la mystérieuse 
main de Dieu” (105). This same “hand of God” seems to push the pope along in his 
dream, presenting the pope with situations which provoke meditation, allowing his 
conscience to unfold.  
Continuing this theme of injustice surrounding violence in humanity, Le Pape moves 
to the battlefield. War is depicted as incomprehensible when one is removed from the 
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automatic acceptance of its necessity. The poet forgets the meaning of war and 
remembers the true law of Christianity, which is essentially a law of love: “Pour le 
plaisir de qui vous exterminez-vous?/Tous n’avez qu’un seul droit, c’est de vous 
aimer tous” (58). He recognizes that war is actually a waste of humanity. Humanity 
was supposed to be the Creator’s greatest work and yet man destroys himself by 
warring against his brother (58). According to the poet, humanity, in creating an 
angry God and arbitrary laws, has degraded its own intended greatness. By blending 
the monarchy with the Church, the people are subject to a system in which patriotism 
takes on sacred notions, convincing men to sacrifice their lives. These men are 
actually dying for a king, another man, who cares nothing for them. The entire system 
is a misunderstanding: “Vous mourrez pour vos rois. Eux, ils ne sont pas là” (60). 
Kings control men and take away their humanity, transforming them into animals 
(60-1). 
The absurdity of war is even more pronounced in “La Guerre civile” (63). Public 
streets are described as a battle field. Humanity is meant to be unified as one man. In 
killing each other, they kill themselves: “Vous vous entr’égorgez, fils de la même 
France!” even though “vous êtes le même homme” (63). Being human, however, is 
described as experiencing joy, work, and love: “L’homme a pour droit, devoir et 
fonction la joie,/ Le travail et l’amour...” (64). Man, according to the poet, has the 
right to happiness. It is his duty to work and his ultimate purpose is to love. He 
finishes “La Guerre civile” by reminding men that they are all nourished by the same 
mother, evoking the imagery of the mother put to death in “En voyant une nourrice.” 
His final appeal to them is a call for brotherhood: “Arrêtez! Arrêtez! Fraternité!” (65). 
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One stanza, emphasized through spacing which separates it from the rest, shows 
solitude as the way to regain perspective. Among the crowds, the madness is too close 
to perceive. The apostle removes himself in order to connect with “the night,” to 
understand the universe outside of the bounds of the present: 
    Tout fait. 
   Mais l’apôtre se sait écouté par la nuit; 
   Et n’est-ce pas qu’il doit parler aux solitudes, 
   O Dieu, les profondeurs étant les multitudes? (67) 
 
A God-like voice seems to speak back to man in the beginning of the second part of 
the first act entitled “Parle devant lui dans l’ombre” (69). He calls man into action to 
bond with his fellow men: “Vivez, marchez, pensez, espérez, aimez-vous./ Nul n’est 
seul ici-bas. Tout a besoin de tous” (69). He condemns religious violence and war in 
general, distancing violence from the concept of liberty: “La liberté n’a pas l’assassin 
pour ministre” (71). Justice, he says, must be kept pure and clearly defined as an 
extension of goodness: “Jamais, non, même ayant la justice pour soi,/ On ne peut la 
servir par le deuil et l’effroi” (72). Justice, then, cannot be attained through the fear 
that high clergy hopes to inspire with its grandiose representations of the almighty. 
Goodness is meaningless without innocence: “L’aube est blanche; et le bien n’est le 
bien – qu’innocent” (72). 
Christianity and the Church: A Blessing and a Curse 
Part II, “Malédiction et bénédiction,” opens with a voice announcing that “Les 
malédictions sont sur les multitudes” (73). Priests, despite the fact that they 
administer blessings in God’s name, are described as part of the curse: “Les prêtres 
sont pareils à des gouffres ouverts;/ Qui regarde dedans voit des choses affreuses” 
(73). The voice questions humanity which it views as forever ignorantly grappling 
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with life (74). Somehow man has lost the concept of life as a blessing: “La vie est une 
dette et la mort un paiement,/ Satan règne; le mal fait loi; l’enfer, c’est l’ordre” (74). 
He categorizes all organized religions together including those of India, Greece, 
Africa, Egypt, and the Vatican: “Tout menace. Partout les peuples sont maudits” (74). 
Seeing terror and grieving everywhere, the voice finally cries out for hope: “Oh! 
Disais-je, où donc est l’espérance?” (75). Jesus is then introduced as a figure of 
comfort, as a symbol of the religion of love and fraternity: “Il me semble sentir 
quelqu’un de secourable,/ Et je vis un rayon sur l’homme misérable,/ Et je levai mes 
yeux au ciel et j’aperçus,/ Là-haut, le grand passant mystérieux, Jésus” (76). Jesus 
thus appears as a sort of revelation announced by a feeling
26
. 
This moment of hope ushered in by the sight of the messiah of love is followed by yet 
another monologue unattributed to any particular character, entitled “En voyant un 
petit enfant.” Carrying through with the theme of hope, the child represents innocence 
and renewal: “Il est le regard vierge, il est la bouche rose;/ On ne sait avec quel ange 
invisible il cause” (77). The presence of a child provokes self-reflection in adults: 
“Dès qu’un enfant est là, nous nous examinons” (78). Innocence is presented as 
eternal but also associated with childhood which is a temporary state: “Cette 
blancheur sans ombre et sans fond, l’innocence” (78). Youth is the mythical golden 
age that humanity hopes for. It is, in many ways, unattainable since youth is forever 
in the past as all people grow older. Yet, youth is also eternal because young people 
are continuously created through the life cycle, continuously providing hope for a 
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 In poem XVIII of Voix intérieures, Hugo suggests that Christianity as a looming sentiment existed 
before Jesus’ philosophy. “Dans Virgile parfois, dieu tout près d’être un ange,/ Le vers porte à sa cime 
une lueur étrange./ C’est que, rêvant déjà à ce qu’à présent on sait,/ Il chantait presque à l’heure où 




better future. Consistent with Hugo’s veneration of children’s connection to the 
divine in poems such as “La vie aux champs,” children in Le Pape thus become the 
spiritual ideal, the new model for man’s imitation: “Restez, notre prison par vous 
devient un temple./ Rayonnez, innocents, et donnez-nous l’exemple,...” (79). 
Meditation and Enlightenment 
“Pensif devant la nuit” leads the reader again into contemplating the value of 
meditation. The pope’s journey throughout the dream illustrates the power of internal 
contemplation to find truth in the face of social and religious situations which 
regularly obscure reality by promoting human law over divine law which is defined in 
the poem as centered around love, work, and justice. The nameless voice in this 
contemplation begins by explaining the different roles assigned to religion and 
science. Religion and science, the voice says, are not mutually exclusive: “La prière 
contemple et la science observe” (89). Science and progress thus work together 
towards a common goal of discovering and understanding universal truths. Justice, 
however, is the only immovable force in the universe: “La justice, dit l’Ombre. 
Aucun vent ne l’emporte” (90). Change is portrayed as part of God’s plan, as it was 
according to Ballanche, Saint-Simon and others. The role of the priest is not to resist 
change but to guide man through it: “C’est pourquoi, nous pasteurs, nous devons faire 
en sorte/ Que l’homme reste bon et sincère au milieu/ De tous les changements 
d’équilibre de Dieu” (90). 
“Entrant à Jérusalem” manages to sanctify France’s “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” as 
divine ideals: “Plus d’échafaud. Devant le ciel bleu Liberté, Égalité devant la mort, 
Fraternité/ Devant le Père. Aimons. Force, aide la faiblesse” (91). The poet 
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incorporates the national motto into a general plea to love one’s enemy
27
: “Éclairez 
qui vous nuit, guérissez qui vous blesse./ Paix et pardon, soyez cléments aux 
criminels” (91). He pleads for love, hope, and brotherhood (92). In a rather confusing 
conclusion to this section, a voice speaks to the pope which also seems to be the voice 
of the pope himself. Could it be that the voice of conscience and the voice of the 
Eternal are one according to the poet? The pope addresses the Church proclaiming 
that Jerusalem is the true holy city: “Je prends Jérusalem et je vous laisse Rome,/ 
Jérusalem étant le véritable lieu” (92). The spirit of Christianity, then, is not in Rome 
with the Church but in Jerusalem where the sacrifice of the messiah was made: 
“L’ombre est au Capitole et l’âme est au Calvaire” (92). 
In the final moments before the end of the revelatory dream, God speaks out against 
the kings and their “pourpre” (93). Eternity is depicted as man’s invisible judge; 
“d’invisibles yeux” (93). The pope’s succinct response sums up Christianity’s simple, 
ideal message: “Peuples, aimez-vous. Paix à tous” (93). Man responds to the pope for 
the first time, blessing him: “Sois béni, père” (93). God then replies with a reciprocal 
blessing: “Fils, sois béni” (93). Simple love and peace are all that is sacred.  
The entirety of the second scene is just one line from the pope. Upon his waking, the 
pope fails to take his dream to heart, exclaiming: “Quel rêve affreux je viens de 
faire!” (95). Without a conscience, the pope’s place in the world is useless or, worse, 
destructive. Moreover, the role of any formal religious leader is nullified when the 
dogma can be reduced to a common denominator of “love” and “peace” which 
require no instruction, no external ceremony. Jules Michelet argued in the Bible de 
l’humanité that the true “bible” is in man’s actions, in the history of humanity. For 
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 Compare to Matthew 5:44 
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Hugo, God’s book is indeed written in man, as he explains in “Les Mages
28
,” but one 
must be willing to read not only his own “book” but the stories written in the lives of 
others. As the poet writes in “La Vie aux champs”: “tout homme est un livre où Dieu 
lui-même écrit./ Chaque fois qu’en mes mains un de ces livres tombe,/ Volume où vit 
une âme et que scelle la tombe,/ J’y lis” (43). According to Hugo, then, man learns 
universal truths not just through the conscience but through his contact with other 
human beings. Le Pape alleges that the pope’s failure in his real life – outside of the 
dream – to connect with humanity inhibits him from internalizing divine revelation, 
rendering him completely ignorant to God’s message of liberty, fraternity, and 
equality. For Paul Bénichou, Hugo therefore presents the poet, blessed with the gift of 
sympathizing with both the divine and humanity, as the ideal replacement for the 
priest as “mage” or divine intermediary to the people. The function of this 
intermediary is both spiritual and political: “La mission humaine du Mage a plusieurs 
noms, Science, Progrès, Liberté, mais elle a pour objet en toutes choses de mettre les 
peuples debout, de les instituer peuples” (Les Mages 1462). 
Conclusion 
Hugo’s Le Pape imagines the pope on a voyage, undertaken through a prophetic 
dream, which reveals Christianity to him as a doctrine of love which ideally supports 
justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity. Hugo’s pope is humanized, transforming into 
a pope of the people. He proves himself to be dedicated to the liberty of mankind and 
in doing so liberates himself from the Vatican walls which hindered his own personal 
                                                 
28
 “Pourquoi donc faites-vous des prêtres/ Quand vous en avez parmi vous?/ Les esprits conducteurs 
des êtres/ Portent un signe sombre et doux./ Nous naissons tous ce que nous sommes,/ Dans les 
ténèbres des berceaux;/ Son effrayant doigt invisible/ Écrit sous leur crâne la bible/ Des arbres, des 
monts et des eaux” (477). 
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growth as well as the growth of Christianity itself. Among the people, the pope is 
faced with his ignorance of the universe. Like the fallen angels depicted by Vigny, 
Quinet, and Lamartine, or the doubting clergymen in George Sand’s Spiridion and 
Zola’s Trois villes, Hugo’s pope sheds the illusions of religiosity and joins humanity 
on Earth in order to truly discover the mysteries of the universe through reason, 
sentiment, and valuable human interaction.  
Along the way, the pope confronts the “patriarche d’orient” who takes on the role of a 
sort of mirror image of the pope himself before his conversion. The pope’s interaction 
with his doppelganger is almost an interior dialogue. Having experienced authentic 
revelation, the pope finally sees God as Hugo does. The true God, according to Le 
Pape, is immense and absolutely incomparable to the jealous God championed by the 
Church. The “patriarche” and his army of bishops attempt to refute Hugo’s 
enlightened pope with familiar ultramontane arguments charging that man is 
incapable of comprehending God’s reason. The pope, however, awakened to the 
“truth” of the force presented by the spirit of humanity, remains unswayed by faulty 
logic. Humbleness emerges as the truly divine state. The pope’s greatest realization is 
that he has no power and is simply a “prince obeying princes.” Recognizing himself 
as one with the people, the pope connects with his fellow man through sympathy and 
charity. The true purpose of the Church, he says, is not to glorify God but to house the 
poor. 
Examining the unnecessary violence committed by human law, the pope comes to 
realize that justice on earth, as it is interpreted by governments, too often destroys the 
very people that it is supposed to protect. Similarly, on the battlefield, human life is 
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shown to be needlessly wasted at the command of kings who, like the pope before his 
conversion, are absent to their people. 
Hugo’s pope receives wisdom through observation and meditation, illustrating the 
power of solitude to offer perspective on life and the universe. As a result of this 
meditation, many of the revelatory messages within the poem are delivered by 
disembodied voices. Among these revelations are calls to goodness, justice, and 
innocence, as well as a plea to the maddening crowd to keep liberty free of violence 
so that “goodness” might preserve its innocence. A voice also delivers blessings and 
curses upon the people, cursing the priests for failing to protect humanity but blessing 
the innocent, especially the children, through the introduction of the messiah as a 
messenger of love. Yet another voice confirms science and progress as integral to the 
divine plan, reconciling the long fought battle between reason and faith.  
In the second act, the pope’s waking rejection of all he has experienced is one short 
line. Nevertheless, Hugo’s condemnation of the pope’s conscious refusal, and the 
consequences of this denial on the people he betrays, speaks volumes in the space of 
the empty page. As Graham Robb has observed, Hugo’s dream pope essentially 
transforms into Hugo’s own vision of himself (500). The poet-pope thus emerges as 





Chapter 13: The Gospel of Renan: Imagining the Historical Jesus in Ernest 
Renan’s Vie de Jésus 
 
As we have seen in the works of Saint-Simon, Lamennais, and George Sand, mid-
nineteenth century religious thought increasingly considered the idea that religion 
might be able to progress with the times alongside modern science. In his 1863 Vie de 
Jésus, Ernest Renan explains that Jesus founded a “religion dans l’humanité” in much 
the same way that Socrates founded philosophy and Aristotle founded science (461). 
Renan explains that religion, like the sciences, is forever in the process of being 
discovered (461). Moreover, for the historian, religion can be perfected through the 
scientific lens: “Par notre extrême délicatesse dans l’emploi des moyens de 
conviction, par notre sincérité absolue et notre amour désintéressé de l’idée pure, 
nous avons fondé, nous tous qui avons voué notre vie à la science, un nouvel idéal de 
moralité” (451). In Vie de Jésus, Renan attempts to apply modern research methods to 
create an exclusively human portrayal of Jesus. His work seeks to systematically 
debunk the legends which contributed to Jesus’ supernatural legacy. For Renan, 
religion is an entirely human phenomenon made up of “les manifestations du Dieu 
caché au fond de la conscience humaine” (LIX). By focusing on the personage of 
Christianity’s founder, Renan sets out to reconnect the “religion de l’humanité” with 
its humble human origins. The author approaches the historical Jesus through a 
meticulous critique of the New Testament informed by other holy books (most 
notably the Old Testament and the Talmud), studies written by fellow historians and, 
273 
 
perhaps most interestingly, Renan’s own experience living in Galilee from 1860-1861 
(LIII).   
Biography rather than Theology 
For Renan, the principle weakness of the four gospels is that they all rely on the 
memory and the personal point of view of their respective authors: “La plus belle 
chose du monde est ainsi sortie d’une élaboration obscure et complètement populaire” 
(xxi-xxii). Moreover, the memories which make up the gospels were, according to 
Renan, conceived in an environment where the impression of events was more 
important to the authors than the authentic retelling of the events themselves: 
“L’Esprit était tout; la lettre n’était rien” (xxii). For Renan, Mark and Matthew are 
working from unreliable memories and Luke is an “interpreter” who reworks the 
gospels of Mark and Matthew (XL).  Memory and perception are often cited 
throughout the book as influences on the story of Jesus. Renan’s interpretation of 
Jesus’ legend is that he was different men to different people: sometimes the “Son of 
Man,” sometimes the “Son of God,” the “Son of David” or simply the “Son” (251-2). 
Even these multiple identities, however, are for Renan a sign of humanity’s 
involvement in the shaping of its heroes: “Il n’est pas de grande fondation qui ne 
repose sur une légende. Le seul coupable en pareil cas, c’est l’humanité qui veut être 
trompée” (254). The people make religion possible by willing their own deception. 
Throughout Vie de Jésus, the author shows the involvement of the people in shaping 
their own savior, highlighting the legends they invented, the miracles they wanted to 
believe in, and the savior who wanted nothing more than to be a part of humanity 
rather than be above it. Renan explains that when first approaching his work, he set 
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out to write about doctrine but soon understood “que l’histoire n’est pas un simple jeu 
d’abstractions, que les hommes y sont plus que les doctrines” (LIV). It was not 
theory, he says, that created religious innovations. Rather, it was men like Moses, 
Mohammed, Jesus, the saints, Luther, and Calvin who changed the course of religious 
history (LIV, 45-6). People make history and, therefore, the study of those people is a 
study of the doctrines to which they contributed: “Faire l’histoire de Jésus, de saint 
Paul, de saint Jean, c’est faire l’histoire des origines du christianisme” (LV). 
Although Renan considers his biographical approach to be scientific, the book is also 
clearly influenced by his own imagination. In his introduction, Renan presents this 
first volume of the Histoire des origines du christianisme as the antithesis of the 
subjective accounts of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. It soon becomes clear, 
however, that the biographer is in essence writing his own gospel. From the secular 
historian’s point of view, the New Testament is a collection of fictional biographies 
meant to manipulate history in order to provide a virtuous model for society through 
the legend of the man-god Jesus: “On comprend maintenant, ce semble, le genre de 
valeur historique que j’attribue aux évangiles. Ce ne sont ni des biographies à la façon 
de Suétone
29
, ni les légendes fictives à la manière de Philostrate
30
; ce sont des 
biographies légendaires” (XLIV). While Renan concedes that “En un sens, de telles 
histoires populaires vaudraient mieux qu’une histoire solennelle et officielle,” his 
work is obviously meant to correct the misconceptions perpetuated by popular 
legends and to prove that the historical Jesus was a mortal man, whose story was 
                                                 
29
 According to Larousse, Caius Suetonis Tranquillus was a Roman historian who lived from 69 to 122 
A.D.  
30
 According to the Encyclopédie de la littérature, there were four sophists who were known as 
Philostratus. Renan is possibly referring to the Athenian Flavius Philostratus (born around 170 and 
died around 245 A.D.)  who wrote adventure stories with moral and spiritual overtones. 
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transformed by various interpretations (XLV). Renan suggests that the Bible ignores 
Jesus’ existence as a human being, focusing solely on his role as a spiritual leader: 
“Uniquement attentifs à mettre en saillie l’excellence du maître, ses miracles, son 
enseignement, les évangélistes montrent une entière indifférence pour tout ce qui 
n’est pas l’esprit même de Jésus” (XLV). For Renan, it was Jesus’ personal charm as 
a “fils de l’homme” that secured his reputation as a prophet, not the miracles he 
allegedly performed (162). According to Renan, Jesus’ greatest religious innovation 
was that he used man’s sense of humanity to promote a lasting conception of the 
human relationship with God as a father-son relationship (87). Jesus, he says, 
appealed to the people through universally accessible metaphors which reduced man 
to the role of a child dependent on a heavenly father (191). 
 
The Holy Land 
The physical setting of the gospels stands out for Renan as an essential but forgotten 
tool for analyzing the New Testament. During his two-year stay in Galilee, he 
recounts that he visited nearly all of the important places associated with the story of 
Jesus and claims that physically being in those places solidified his comprehension of 
Biblical accounts: “L’accord frappant des textes et des lieux, la merveilleuse 
harmonie de l’idéal évangélique avec le paysage qui lui servit de cadre furent pour 
moi comme une révélation” (LIII). Renan reveals an underlying idea that his own 
“revelation” elevates his work to a “fifth gospel.” Through a combination of exposure 
to the physical setting and his research, Renan describes having “seen” the real Jesus:  
J’eus devant les yeux un cinquième évangile, lacéré, mais 
lisible encore, et désormais, à travers les récits de Matthieu et 
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de Marc, au lieu d’un être abstrait, qu’on dirait n’avoir jamais 
existé, je vis une admirable figure humaine vivre, se mouvoir. 
Pendant l’été, ayant dû monter à Ghazir, dans le Liban, pour 
prendre un peu de repos, je fixai en traits rapides l’image qui 
m’était apparue, et il en résulta cette histoire. (LIV) 
Renan’s analysis of Christianity’s place in society is sometimes contradictory. While 
he works to highlight Jesus’ advancements in morality and demystify his legacy by 
debunking miracles and emphasizing Jesus’ naiveté, he also feels the need to defend 
Jesus against the speculation of the philosophes and scientific-minded contemporaries 
who, he says, only appreciate Jesus as “un grand moraliste, un bienfaiteur de 
l’humanité” (124). Renan explains that he supports a certain level of secularity (for 
example, he does not believe in the existence of a “soul”) but he wishes to distinguish 
himself from those who would discount religion altogether: “mais ne croyons pas 
qu’avec les simples idées de bonheur ou de moralité individuelle on remue le monde” 
(125). 
Throughout Vie de Jésus, the growth of Christianity is attributed to a variety of 
situational influences. Because Jesus’ story grew out of popular legend, Renan makes 
the case that popular beliefs exaggerated the deeds that their messiah actually 
performed in his lifetime (XLVI). For Renan, miracles only happen in the times and 
places where people are subject to believing in them and first century Galileans, he 
claims, did believe strongly in the supernatural (L). As a historian, Renan’s goal is to 
strike a balance between truth and inevitable error: “le devoir de l’historien est de 
l’interpréter et de rechercher quelle part de vérité, quelle part d’erreur il peut recéler” 
(LII-III). The author walks the line between fulfilling his duties as a rational 




Pour faire l’histoire d’une religion, il est nécessaire, 
premièrement, d’y avoir cru (sans cela, on ne saurait 
comprendre par quoi elle a charmé et satisfait la conscience 
humaine); en second lieu, de n’y plus croire d’une manière 
absolue; car la foi absolue est incompatible avec l’histoire 
sincère. (LIX) 
 
These two sides of the balance are evident in Renan’s approach which aims to 
maintain respect for Jesus’ teachings while challenging the portrayal of the man 
himself. Reluctant to discredit the usefulness of Christianity as a basis for secular 
morality, Renan makes a point to reinforce the value of legend despite its errors. He 
appreciates the Bible as a historical document (XLViii). At times, he even seems 
touched by the “superior truths” found within Christian philosophy and is quick to 
defend the Bible’s place in history despite his own criticisms: “Ces détails ne sont pas 
vrais à la lettre; mais ils sont vrais d’une vérité supérieure; ils sont plus vrais que la 
nue vérité, en ce sens qu’ils sont la vérité rendue expressive et parlante, élevée à la 
hauteur d’une idée” (XLViii). By the same token, “Les traditions même en partie 
erronées renferment une portion de vérité que l’histoire ne peut négliger” (XLiX). 
 
Renan’s Historical Jesus: Historical Context or Historical Fiction?  
Vie de Jésus attempts to put Jesus’ life into perspective in relation to early 
Christianity’s place in the world and Jesus’ place in his own society. Renan begins 
the first chapter with an insistence on the importance of the shift from ancient 
polytheistic religions to a monotheistic religion of unity (1). He defines religion as the 
belief in some kind of existence beyond mortality and explains that man has long felt 
the need for religion: “L’homme, dès qu’il se distingua de l’animal, fut religieux, 
c’est-à-dire qu’il vit, dans la nature, quelque chose au delà de la mort” (2). He faults 
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ancient Eastern religions for their superstitions and claims that they lack an emphasis 
on morality and liberty (4). For Renan, even if Christianity is faulty, it is still “la 
religion de l’humanité” and he credits the Torah for planting the “germes d’égalité 
sociale et de moralité” (6). Jewish culture, he says, had already created an ideal 
environment for a sacrificial savior. Commenting on the Old Testament, Renan notes: 
“Des accents inconnus se font déjà entendre pour exalter le martyre et célébrer la 
puissance de l’homme de douleur” (8). Popular sentiment favored social change. 
Renan’s descriptions of the utopian dreams shared by ancient Israeli society recalls 
the numerous social theories of eighteenth and nineteenth century France (10). Renan 
describes ancient Israel’s Law as making up its “patrie” (10). While most ancient 
laws had been overwhelmingly abstract, Jewish law, he says, dealt directly with 
human happiness and morality (11). For Renan, Judaism’s great innovation was that it 
placed the hope for paradise in the future creating the possibility for hope: “Toute 
l’antiquité indo-européenne avait placé le paradis à l’origine [...] Israël mettait l’âge 
d’or dans l’avenir” (11). According to Vie de Jésus, Judaism had already made 
progress towards removing superstition and materialism from religion and promoting 
pity as a virtue (12-14). Renan further praises Judaism for being a religion free from 
theology or mystical doctrines, noting that the most orthodox were the first to reject 
these “imaginations particulières” (16). What Renan seems to appreciate most about 
Judaism is its concreteness: “Nul credo; nul symbole théorique” (17).  
Despite the historian’s insistence on resisting imaginative interpretation, Renan’s 
description of Jesus’ life often borders on historical fiction and occasionally reveals 
traces of romantic influences on the author. He highlights, for example, an alleged 
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sensitivity and melancholy looming over Biblical times which recall the mal du 
siècle: “la grande ère de paix où l’on entrait et cette impression de sensibilité 
mélancholique qu’éprouvent les âmes après les longues périodes de révolution, 
faisaient naître de toute part les espérances illimitées” (18). At times, the researcher 
takes liberties in describing the prophet’s personal thoughts and feelings. In Renan’s 
commentary on Jesus’ Passover pilgrimages to Jerusalem, the historian refrains from 
his usual list of scholarly citations and simply asserts “Quoique Jésus attachât dès lors 
peu de valeur au pèlerinage, il s’y prêtait pour ne pas blesser l’opinion juive, avec 
laquelle il n’avait pas encore rompu” (205). Moments like these remind the reader 
that Renan, despite his sometimes detailed research trail, interprets Jesus’ life in much 
the way the apostle’s did – despite the historian’s criticisms of their dubious 
attestations. He again makes conclusions based on his own imagined historical Jesus 
in chapter XVI where he explains that miracles were a social expectation. For Renan, 
Jesus performed miracles reluctantly: “Les miracles de Jésus furent une violence que 
lui fit son siècle, une concession qui lui arrache la nécessité passagère” (268). 
Commenting on Jesus’ stay with Mary Magdalene and Martha, Renan again cannot 
resist adding his own details to the narrative asserting that this was the place where 
Jesus “oubliait les dégoûts de la vie publique” (342). Renan’s analysis of Jesus’ 
feelings systematically serve to support the author’s opinion throughout the book that 
Jesus only wanted to be human, not supernatural.  
Renan similarly shapes the reader’s concept of Biblical society by adding details 
which create an atmosphere of revolution and frame the author’s theory that the first 
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century was an “incubation” period which prepared Galilee for the moment when 
someone would step into the role of the “Son of God”:  
Ce mélange confus de claires vues et de songes, cette 
alternative de déceptions et d’espérances, ces aspirations sans 
cesse refoulées par une odieuse réalité, trouvèrent enfin leur 
interprète dans l’homme incomparable auquel la conscience 
universelle a décerné le titre de Fils de Dieu, et cela avec 
justice, puisqu’il a fait faire à la religion un pas auquel nul 
autre ne peut et probablement ne pourra jamais être comparé. 
(18) 
 
The historian even takes some poetic license in describing daily life at the time, in all 
of its idyllic simplicity, emphasizing that it was the perfect atmosphere for dreaming 
and happiness (25-6). For example, Renan indulges in a moment of appreciation for 
the beauty of Jewish women. He goes so far as to imagine a somewhat sensual scene 
describing the simple beauty of Mary carrying her water urn (27).  
Renan repeatedly returns to an emphasis on the pastoral setting of Galilee as a strong 
influence on Jesus. The author notes that Jesus always preached outdoors and in fields 
and that he despised the city (165-6). He notes that Jesus’ most inspired moments 
took place in the mountains (64-5). Galilean society was a peaceful “peuple 
agricole...peu soucieux de luxe” (65). For Renan, Jesus’ setting gave the entire 
Christian faith an aura of pastoral sentimentality: “Toute l’histoire du christianisme 
naissant est devenue de la sorte une délicieuse pastorale” (67). Renan ends the fourth 
chapter, focused on Jesus’ youth, by implying that Jesus found God in nature and that 
Christianity is therefore, at its core, a form of natural religion (70).  
In Vie de Jésus, sentiment emerges as a central theme of early Christianity.  The 
power of sentiment allowed Christianity to connect morally with the people: “en 
morale, la vérité ne prend quelque valeur que si elle passe à l’état de sentiment...” 
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(92). Renan presents Christianity as the first religions founded on the heart, a true 
“religion de l’humanité”(223). According to Renan, Jesus “dédaignait tout ce qui 
n’était pas la religion de cœur” (224). To illustrate Christianity’s sentimental 
foundation, Renan insists on the enthusiasm of female followers who influenced the 
religion (73). In chapter IX, “Les Disciples de Jésus,” Renan points out that women 
seemed especially welcoming to the prophet when he arrived in Bethsaida (151). 
Fellow historian, Jules Michelet, had previously denounced feminine influence in 
Christianity as a negative impact on human reason in his 1845 Du prêtre, de la 
femme, de la famille. Renan, in contrast, judges that the lack of female influence on 
ancient Jewish society prevented “tout développement délicat” and that feminine 
influence enhanced Christianity’s human bond (515). Here, Renan’s interpretation 
recalls Mme de Staël’s description of the influence that women had on Roman society 
versus the less sensitive Greek society. According to Renan, “Elles apportaient dans 
la secte nouvelle un élément d’enthousiasme et de merveilleux, dont on saisit déjà 
l’importance”(151).  He highlights Mary Magdalene’s role after Jesus’ death as 
someone who promoted faith in the resurrection and mentions the support given to 
Jesus by Joanna, Suzanna and others (151-2).  
 
Jesus, “the Young Jewish Democrat” 
By bringing Jesus closer to a mundane existence, Renan makes him a man of the 
people. Although Renan’s analysis discredits the mysticism surrounding the religious 
figure, he also creates a new myth that brings his historical Jesus closer to the people 
and thus closer to the modern spirit of justice. Renan is able to rewrite Christianity 
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from the beginning, strengthening the focus on morality and social reform while 
playing down the mysticism which tends to make religion more abstract. Renan 
recounts, for example, that Jesus’ education was not formal. Rather, it was a moral 
education transmitted through the bonds of a close-knit society which Renan views 
positively compared to modern individualism (31). He makes a point of illustrating 
the idea that Jesus would have had no Greek or Roman influence whatsoever (32-3). 
Renan describes Jesus as charmingly naive with a worldview limited to his idyllic 
pastoral setting: “Les charmantes impossibilités dont fourmillent ses paraboles, quand 
il met en scène les rois et les puissants, prouvent qu’il ne conçut jamais la société 
aristocratique que comme un jeune villageois qui voit le monde à travers le prisme de 
sa naïveté” (39). Everything the man learned, according to Vie de Jésus was through 
society and conscience. 
Renan also recounts that the people expected the messiah to perform miracles: “Quant 
aux miracles, ils passaient, à cette époque, pour la marque indispensable du divin et 
pour le signe des vocations prophétiques” (256). Miracles, he says, were also often 
exaggerated (259). Renan calls into question the definition of a miracle by defending 
Jesus’ belief that he had the power to cure the sick. According to Renan, Jewish 
society at the time overwhelmingly considered diseases as being caused by moral 
deficiencies. Since Jesus considered himself morally superior, Renan reasons that the 
prophet would also have thought himself able to cure the sick (260-1). Following this 
line of reasoning, the definition of a miracle changes depending on man’s 
understanding of the universe. Jesus’ lack of knowledge about positive science, he 
says, kept the Nazarene from doubting certain popular superstitions (40). Renan 
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describes a people steeped in the supernatural, so much so that miracles were 
considered commonplace: “Le merveilleux n’était pas pour lui exceptionnel; c’était 
l’état normal” (41).  
Renan emphasizes the foreignness of first century Jewish culture in an effort to 
convince modern day readers that the conditions through which Christianity came 
about were extraordinarily different from modern Europe and, what is more, that 
these conditions (which seem extraordinary in retrospect) were commonplace for 
Biblical Jews. Jesus was created by his environment: “le philosophe serait mieux 
placé qu’en aucun lieu du monde pour contempler le cours des choses humaines” 
(29). Society’s values were changing and for Renan, Jesus became a tool for 
expressing those changes on behalf of the people. He did not bring the change. 
Rather, he voiced it. Jesus thus emerges as a product of his environment, as an 
interpreter of the collective conscience of his time. The first few chapters of the 
biography are devoted to establishing Jesus’ banality and the idea that any mystical 
qualities that might have been attributed to his early life were likely invented by his 
followers. He makes a point of noting, for example, that even the name “Jesus” is 
completely insignificant and was a common name despite the fact that some have 
read unnecessary significance into the name (21).  
As the story advances, Renan increasingly fixes upon the revolutionary aspect of 
Jesus’ life, depicting him as a social reformer. From Renan’s point of view, Jesus’ 
success as a prophet came from his determination to “créer, affirmer, agir” (458). He 
compares Jesus’ plight to that of other great philosophers such as Socrates and 
Spinoza noting: “L’opposition fait toujours la gloire d’un pays. Les plus grands 
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hommes d’une nation sont ceux qu’elle met à mort” (49). His description of Jesus at 
times depicts the prophet as a rabble-rouser who took pleasure in breaking rules and 
upsetting society (187). Jesus was not a reformer of Judaism, he says, but a 
“destructeur de judaisme” (221). Multiple times throughout the book, the author 
refers to Jesus as a “révolutionnaire.” 
Jesus’ main concern, he says, was to establish “un ordre nouveau” to govern 
humanity (117). For Renan, Jesus’ movement was above all a “révolution morale” 
above all: “C’est sur les hommes et par les hommes eux-mêmes qu’il voulait agir” 
(120). Renan, like Lamennais and Saint-Simon, regards Jesus’ doctrine as a doctrine 
of liberty (121-2). The historian even occasionally waxes poetic about the freedom 
enjoyed by the disciples, implying that part of the draw of Christianity in modern 
times is the distant collective cultural memory of the freedom enjoyed by these 
ancient people: “Dans nos civilisations affairées, le souvenir de la vie libre de Galilée 
a été comme le parfum d’un autre monde, comme une ‘rosée de l’Hermon,’ qui a 




Renan, however, criticizes Jesus for diminishing the important role that citizenship 
plays in bonding a community because Jesus’ concept of the “Kingdom of God” was 
a social model which devalued civic duty: “Le christianisme, en ce sens, a beaucoup 
contribué à affaiblir le sentiment des devoirs du citoyen et à livrer le monde au 
pouvoir absolu des faits accomplis” (122). Because recompense is expected in the 
afterlife, not enough emphasis is placed on man’s duties towards humanity in the here 
and now. Conversely, Renan praises Christianity for expanding man’s social 
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 In Psalms 133:3 the “dew of Mount Hermon” is associated with eternal life. 
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awareness to include all of humanity rather than simply focusing on his own country: 
“...il a révélé au monde cette vérité que la patrie n’est pas tout, et que l’homme est 
antérieur et supérieur au citoyen” (123). 
According to Renan, Jesus’ true mission was a complete reversal of the hierarchical 
social system: “une immense révolution sociale où les rangs seront intervertis” (128-
9). Like Lamennais, he emphasizes the “bonne nouvelle annoncée aux pauvres” as 
Jesus’ most crucial moral message (128-9). Renan points out that the use of the term 
“brother” by Jesus’ disciples supports the idea that the group had no hierarchy (157). 
Moreover, Renan’s Jesus preaches that God’s followers were supposed to ignore their 
earthly needs, “de regarder les soucis de la vie comme un mal qui étouffe en l’homme 
le germe de tout bien” (170-1).  This emphasis on physical sacrifice as a sign of 
holiness made it easier to reverse the social order so that the poor could be considered 
the most loved by God (171). Renan sees in Jesus’ approach “un élément 
communiste” (172). Although he notes that the Old Testament is full of passages 
which support charity for the poor, Renan actually criticizes Jesus’ intense focus on 
the poor as a flaw in the durability of his doctrine: “On entrevoit sans peine, en effet, 
que ce goût exagéré de pauvreté ne pouvait être bien durable” (180-2). He links the 
extreme focus on poverty to thirteenth century brotherhoods, such as certain 
Franciscan orders, who rallied behind “le banner de l’Évangile éternel” and took 
vows of extreme poverty (182)
32
.  For Renan, these otherwise impractical dreams of 
“la religion nouvelle” at least served to teach humanity that man “does not live on 
bread alone” (184). Such doctrines provided hope to the destitute. According to Vie 
de Jésus, Christianity’s most progressive quality is that it is built upon promoting 
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hope in the power of humanity: “... le christianisme réunit les deux conditions des 
grands succès en ce monde, un point de départ révolutionnaire et la possibilité de 
vivre” (127).   
Renan’s interpretation of Jesus focuses on the potential for social change which 
fueled Christianity’s doctrine of hope. Although Renan sees nothing original in the 
prophet’s belief in the apocalypse, he points out that Jesus’ prophecy is unique in that 
it promoted a message of renewed life. Jesus’ apocalyptic dream “recélait un germe 
de vie, qui, introduit grâce à une enveloppe fabuleuse, dans le sein de l’humanité, y a 
porté des fruits éternels” (282). Eternity, and Christianity as a religion which 
acknowledges eternity, again emerges as an important theme for Renan. Renan’s 
Jesus is the founder of the kind of palingenesis explored in George Sand’s Spiridion. 
According to Renan, “il a conçu la réelle cité de Dieu, la ‘palingénésie’ véritable,... la 
réhabilitation de tout ce qui est humble, vrai et naïf” (282). Renan’s interpretation of 
the definition of “the Kingdom of God” is a reordering of justice and liberty – a better 
social order than what already existed (284). For Renan’s Jesus, the Kingdom of God 
was a concrete state of being, not an abstract idea. He directly applies these ideas to 
modern French politics: “...les tentatives ‘socialistes’ de notre temps resteront 
infécondes, jusqu’à ce qu’elles prennent pour règle le véritable esprit de Jésus, je 
veux dire l’idéalisme absolu...” (287-8). Nevertheless, Renan does seem to find 
beauty in Jesus’ less concrete moments of idealism describing his vision as “un vague 
sublime” which encompasses “divers ordres de vérités” (289). For Renan, Jesus is the 
founder of the “grande ligne intellectuelle morale” but men can move beyond strict 
interpretation and still benefit from the founding ideals of Christianity without buying 
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into the mystical tradition (447). He insists that it honors Jesus’ legacy to remember 
him as a mortal man (449). 
 
The Application of Christian Philosophy in Modern France 
For Renan, an understanding of Jesus’ social revolution could shed light on a post-
revolutionary French society which still struggled to define their ideals of justice, 
liberty, fraternity and equality. Renan refers to Jesus as “le jeune démocrate juif” 
(227). He also emphasizes the idea that early Christianity was a religion of inclusion. 
It was a unifying element in a diverse society even between Christians and “pagans.” 
Renan uses the story of the Good Samaritan as an illustrative example: “Jésus conclut 
de là que la vraie fraternité s’établit entre les hommes par charité, non par la foi 
religieuse” (232). In Jesus, Renan found a personage who could serve as the founder 
of modern political ideals and an inspiration for modern social change:  
À la fois théocratique et démocratique, l’idée jetée par Jésus 
dans le monde fut, avec l’invasion des Germains, la cause de 
dissolution la plus active pour l’œuvre des Césars. D’une part, 
le droit de tous les hommes à participer au royaume de Dieu 
était proclamé. De l’autre, la religion était désormais en 
principe séparée de l’État. (439) 
 
Spirituality, he says, became a source of power for Christians after Jesus’ death but 
that this power was misused by the Church (440). In order for Jesus’ moral ideals to 
come to fruition, his message must be released from Church control and given back to 
the people:  
L’empire prétendu des âmes s’est montré à diverses reprises 
comme une affreuse tyrannie, employant pour se maintenir la 
torture et le bûcher. Mais le jour viendra où la séparation 
portera ses fruits, où le domaine des choses de l’esprit cessera 




According to Renan, Jesus also served as a unifier. He claims that Jesus invented the 
idea of uniting people through a Church congregation (296). Jesus’ ultimate message 
was one of brotherly love (443).  
Nevertheless, Renan describes Jesus as growing distant from humanity in his last 
days. By the end of the book, both Renan and his portrayal of Jesus pull away from 
the spirit of unity. Renan believes that Jesus’ obsession with the “Kingdom of God” 
inspired him with a repulsion for the mundane and “la haine du genre humain” (311). 
For Renan, Jesus’ constant contact with humanity somehow tainted his superior moral 
status: “Les hommes en le touchant l’abaissaient à leur niveau” (320). Renan 
contradicts his exaltation of the “religion de l’humanité” and his  dream of unity by 
ultimately revealing his own prejudices. The last quarter of the book abounds in 
sweeping negative stereotypes of the Jewish people as the persecutors of an innocent 
man. Like John the Evangelist, Renan goes to great pains to portray Pontius Pilate as 
the reluctant enforcer of antiquated Jewish law (402-11). Renan’s insistence on 
blaming the Jewish people for Jesus’ downfall casts a shadow of doubt on his entire 
work. His failure to produce an objective analysis reminds the reader that the 
historian’s interpretation is perhaps no more informative than the revelations of the 
original disciples. 
Conclusion 
Ernest Renan’s Vie de Jésus considers the historical Jesus as the founder of a 
Christian philosophy which, like the Évangile éternel in George Sand’s Spiridion, is 
constantly undergoing a process of evolution. Religion remains subject to the research 
and continual study we typically reserve for the sciences. According to Renan, the 
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Bible’s weakness lies in the subjectivity of its sources. The people, he says, created 
Christianity out of a desire to believe. The historian insists on the human influence 
that shaped religion and, in doing so, he argues for the use of biography as the path to 
uncovering the truth about Christianity. For Renan, Christianity as a religion was not 
created by the theory presented by Jesus but rather, it was created by the dynamic 
characters of the men who brandished that theory. Renan’s work seeks to correct the 
misconceptions perpetuated by the legend of Jesus as it is presented in the Bible. 
In Vie de Jésus, the setting stands out as essential to analyzing the New Testament. 
The author’s personal travel experiences inform his perception of the holy land. 
Renan considers the intersection of his travels in Galilee with his textual research as a 
sort of “revelation,” elevating his work to the status of a “fifth gospel.” The historian 
describes the purpose of his work as an attempt to balance historical truth with 
religious belief. He depicts Christianity as a still useful philosophical foundation for 
social morality when its message of love and justice are extracted from the limits of 
legend and superstition. 
Vie de Jésus seeks to understand Jesus’ life and philosophical message in the context 
of first century Jewish society. According to Renan, Jewish culture created the 
expectation of a messiah – a role which was bound to be filled by someone. He also 
describes biblical Israel as teeming with popular sentiment in favor of social change. 
Despite Renan’s criticism of subjectivity in the Bible, the author takes liberties in 
imagining scenes to illustrate his historical assertions. Renan focuses on Galilee’s 
pastoral setting as a strong influence on Jesus’ philosophy. This pastoral setting, he 
argues, contributed to Christianity’s sentimental overtones. Renan suggests that 
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because Jesus found God in nature, Christianity is essentially a “natural religion.” 
Christianity, he says, is thus a true “religion de l’humanité.” For Renan, female 
influence on Christianity through disciples such as Mary Magdalene allowed the 
religion to grown by enhancing the internal spiritual bond. 
Renan’s historical Jesus is depicted as living closer to the people. As a result, the 
historical Jesus is also portrayed as being closer to the modern concept of justice. 
Renan’s Jesus is not an individual. He is a product of society and conscience, a 
harmonization of internal and external influences. Renan distances the historical Jesus 
from the miracles alluded to in the Bible. Superstitions were commonly believed and 
Renan’s Jesus is depicted as naively following customs and popular superstitions. The 
Christian messiah in Vie de Jésus is the result of Jesus’ interpretation of the social 
expectations of his environment. Jesus’ main objective, according to Renan, was 
social reform. Throughout the book, Jesus is referred to as a social activist who 
sought to revolutionize Jewish law. Jesus, he says, was mainly concerned with 
reforming government to better support the people. He concedes, however, that Jesus’ 
concept of the Kingdom of God did not place adequate emphasis on civic duty. 
Nevertheless, Renan does praise Christianity for expanding man’s worldview to 
include all of humanity. 
All in all, Renan evaluates Jesus’ mission as a reversal of the social hierarchy. 
Consistent with Republican values, Christianity was meant to support equality and 
brotherhood. Renan goes so far as to note traces of communism in Jesus’ utopian 
vision. Although Renan criticizes Jesus’ extreme emphasis on providing for the poor, 
he admits that Christianity’s most progressive aspect is the hope it places in the power 
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of humanity. Christianity in Vie de Jésus is conceived as a continual palingenesis of 
society moving towards the improvement of the social order, towards justice and 
liberty. For Renan, Jesus founded this movement but society is faced with the task of 
continuously interpreting and perfecting his philosophy. It is therefore not infallible.  
Renan’s interpretation of the origins of Christianity supports post-Revolution French 
ideals of justice, liberty, fraternity, and equality. Renan seems to support religion 
when it is a religion of inclusion, with the goal of unifying a diverse society. With 
later Saint-Simon, later Lamennais, Hugo, and others, he emphasizes the idea that the 
original Christian message was one of brotherly love. In the end, however, Renan’s 
insistence on the importance of humanity and equality ironically breaks down as he 
reveals his own prejudices against the Jewish people and in favor of the Romans. The 
“science of history” thus shows its inevitable flaw – that history too is subject to the 
biases of its interpreter. In the following chapter, we will observe a comparable 
phenomenon in Jules Michelet’s Bible de l’humanité. 
Chapter 14: Nature and Gender, Justice and Grace in Jules Michelet’s Bible de 
l’humanité 
 
Critiquing Renan’s Vie de Jésus, Jules Michelet states in his Bible de l’humanité that 
he “regrets two things” in his peer’s work: that Renan focused more on the story of 
Jesus than he did on Christian doctrine and that the biographical nature of Renan’s 
work left no room for the “petits Évangiles populaires
33
” which he believes 
“caractérise fortement ce monde de femmes” (Bible de l’humanité 439).  Michelet’s 
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 Michelet is likely referring to the gospels in the apocrypha which include the books of Judith, 
Esther, and Susanna, among others. In Ernest Renan’s 1899 essay, L’Église chrétienne, Renan does 
address these books, and for the most part dismisses them as a “basse littérature chrétienne, 
empreinte d’un esprit tout populaire” adding that they were generally “l’œuvre des sectes 
judaïsantes et gnostiques” (L’Eglise 516). 
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1864 Bible de l’humanité therefore focuses on the history of the doctrine rather than 
on the history of Biblical characters themselves. Continuing familiar themes already 
touched upon in his 1845 essay, Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, the Bible de 
l’humanité often focuses on the role of women and the family in the formation of 
organized religions. In 1845, Michelet’s work suggested that Catholic control over 
women and children created a rift in the home which distanced men from their 
families. He alleged that the resulting loss of harmony caused a breakdown in the 
family unit, the cornerstone of humanity. Women, he says, have become tools of the 
clergy whose persuasive tactics appeal to feminine weaknesses (Du prêtre 27). 
According to the author’s description, these women, planted in homes like spies, 
immerse the family in religious propaganda which keeps the entire society at the 
mercy of the Church. According to Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, “Nos 
femmes et nos filles sont élevées, gouvernées, par nos ennemis” (6). Bible de 
l’humanité proceeds to cloak an argument in favor of social liberty and justice while 
excluding women from society as tools of the Catholic conspiracy. Michelet’s 
reasoning throughout the work is often difficult to follow as it flows from 
romanticizing ancient religious history to promoting justice and alternately 
denunciating women and the clergy while glorifying female idols of fertility. 
Not content to limit his research to modern European history, Michelet endeavors to 
make the Bible de l’humanité a testament to an alleged phenomenon of 
demasculinization through religious doctrine from ancient history to the modern era. 
Looking to ancient traditions as a source for spiritual purity, Michelet reaches back 
into humanity’s religious past in an effort to debunk modern Christianity. His work is 
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unique in that he is not content to simply challenge the doctrine as other skeptics had 
done since Rousseau. Michelet retells the story of human religion which for him is 
the story of humanity itself. Through his work, he tries to show that a culture’s 
religion shapes its concept of Justice. Often associating organized religion with 
women, however, the end result is (as it was in Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille) 
an argument which characterizes Christianity’s flaws as “feminine” and the ideal 
religion of humanity as “masculine.” Notably the doctrine of grace and messianism 
are characterized as feminine while reason, justice, and work take on masculine 
connotations. The modern age is “l’âge du travail” (Du prêtre 92). For Michelet, 
Justice is God and the traditional human family is the true divine trinity. 
Michelet’s Bible de l’humanité challenges the Christian concept of the sacred by 
presenting Christianity as a degeneration of the human ideals on which all religion is 
founded. Tracing the path of religious traditions back to ancient India and following 
the evolution of religious practices through the ages, Michelet evaluates each 
society’s religious practices according to its support of Goodness and Justice. In his 
preface, he defines the human experience as “une Bible commune,” a continuing 
compilation of spiritual works and philosophies (i). This concept of religious 
compilation is comparable to the various theories of palingenesis we have already 
studied in this dissertation in authors ranging from Pierre-Simon Ballanche to George 
Sand. For Michelet, the human soul is not contained in a physical holy book. Rather, 
it can be discovered in the actions of the people: “Un Dieu parfois, une Cité, en dit 
beaucoup plus que les livres, et, sans phrase exprime l’âme même” (i). His emphasis 
on action stands in contrast to the Christian emphasis on the creative power of the 
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“word.” Through his comparison of world religious literatures, Michelet looks to 
human history for a more authentic source for eternal truth: “Il se trouve souvent que 
c’est le plus profond qu’on oublia d’écrire, la vie dont on vivait, agissait, respirait” 
(ii). Michelet meticulously combs through history in order to make connections with 
the ancients which explain modern religious practices. The retelling of historical 
events relating to religion gives the author the chance to demystify those events.  
Michelet describes the nineteenth century as a pinnacle moment in history for 
progress. Modern advances in “sciences, langues, voyages, découvertes en tout 
genre,” he says, have created new possibilities which were previously unimaginable 
(ii). For Michelet, these advancements have finally facilitated the possibility of 
human harmony through a synthesis of world cultures (ii-iii). While Renan sought to 
document and correct religious history through his portrayal of the historical Jesus, 
Michelet frames his work in the context of ancient traditions, as a foundation for the 
great living “Bible” continuously added to from generation to generation (iv-v). The 
Bible de l’humanité introduces doubt in the Catholic claim to infallibility by 
presenting religion not as a divine doctrine prescribed by the heavens but as a creation 
of humanity. Man, not God, is the original “creator.” From this point of view, man 
has control over his religious beliefs which are expressions of the human experience.  
The Fall of Man 
The Bible de l’humanité begins with the author’s analysis of the Indian Ramayana, 
highlighting the ancient text’s focus on nature. For Michelet, India is the origin of 
humanity (15). He refers to the book as divine (1). For the historian, a return to the 
past has the potential to restore human spirituality by connecting man with the 
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refreshing “grandes sources vives” of eternity (2). In Indian legend he finds an 
“immense poème, vaste comme la mer des Indes, béni, doué du soleil, livre 
d’harmonie divine où rien ne fait dissonance” (3). The “discovery” of ancient Indian 
texts, he says, teaches “un grand résultat moral”: all men throughout time have shared 
similar experiences. It is these shared experiences that unite humanity: “On a vu que 
l’homme en tout temps pensa, sentit, aima de même. – Donc, une seule humanité, un 
seul cœur, et non pas deux” (13). For Michelet, the Ramayana, which he refers to as 
“la Bible de la bonté,” is a testament to Fraternity (3). The goal of the Bible de 
l’humanité is, according to the author, “uniquement les grands résultats moraux” (56). 
India’s history in this context is thus the history of humanity itself (44-5). He claims 
that India’s religious history went through a process which is common to all religions. 
Religions are constantly created out of a human need for spirituality, he says, and 
then they are corrupted in time through the invention of laws and clergy: “cette loi va 
se chargeant de prescriptions tracassières, vexatoires. Ce sacerdoce devient tyrranique 
et stérile” (45). Throughout the Bible de l’humanité, Michelet attempts to follow this 
phenomenon of sterility in ancient religions as a result of formal doctrines which he 
presents as precursors to Christianity. 
In Michelet’s interpretation of the Ramayana, the fall of man and the origins of evil 
result from the inevitable contradictions in Rama’s struggle between earthly existence 
and the desire to achieve a divine state (64). Rama and Sita are, for Michelet, a pre-
biblical Adam and Eve (65). They share the desire to hunt the gazelle – a practice 
which is foreign to their compassionate culture (66). Abandoned by both humanity 
and divinity after Sita’s seduction, the animal kingdom comes to the hero’s aid “pour 
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la cause de la bonté, de la pitié, de la justice” (69). Masculinity is thereby associated 
with nature, reason and justice while women represent sensuality, the most prominent 
human weakness. Throughout the Bible de l’humanité, Michelet consistently returns 
to humanity’s connection with nature, the family unit, gender roles and the 
development of abstract doctrine. In Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, the author 
alleges that modern women still play the role of Eve in man’s demise: “Ève trahit 
encore Adam” (66). The alleged destruction of the family unit by deluded women 
resurfaces in the Bible de l’humanité. Doctrine, he says, eventually corrupts religion 
by obscuring human nature and women are the agents who embed religious doctrine 
into the social fabric.  
 
Religion and Justice, Church and State 
For Michelet, a society’s religious convictions define its justice system. Church and 
State are inevitably intertwined. He evokes ancient Persia as an example of a society 
where equality reigned: “La Perse n’a point de caste. Tous sont égaux chez elle au 
point de vue religieux. Tous également sont et s’appellent les purs. Chacun, pontife 
en sa maison, officie et prie pour les siens” (77-8). Returning to the concept of the 
family as the common cultural denominator, Michelet describes the Persian family as 
a society within itself in which the husband-father fulfilled the dominant religio-
political role: “Point de caste, point de mages, point de royauté encore. Le père, dans 
chaque maison, est roi-mage” (85). The ideal priest is the husband-father who is a 
part of the family. Michelet portrays the Catholic priest, in contrast, as a foreign 
297 
 
influence on the family, referring to the clergy as “ennemis de la liberté” and “sujets 
d’un prince étranger” (283).  
The second half of the Bible de l’humanité begins with Michelet’s analysis of the cult 
of Isis in ancient Egypt. According to the author, ancient Egypt’s female-centered 
culture marked a shift in gender roles. In Egypt, “la femme reignait” (287). He 
describes the Egyptian woman as reigning over her household similarly to Indian and 
Persian women but with the added power to also reign over the nation (287). Michelet 
depicts Egypt as the most feminine of all cultures but its continuing connection with 
nature prompts him to admire the culture as fertile (288). He emphasizes, for 
example, the humanness of the Egyptian trinity in contrast to other ancient religions 
(289). The ancient Egyptians venerated a holy family (mother, father, and child) 
dominated by a mother who is not a virgin (289). The non-virgin holy mother 
celebrates fertility: “c’est bien une femme, une vraie femme, pleine d’amour, sein 
plein de lait” (289-90). The result is an emphasis on truth and positivity (290). For 
Michelet, femininity is only positive when it is supported by fertility, with the 
specific purpose of the eternal rejuvenation of humanity.  
Michelet marks the downfall of spirituality in Egypt as the shift from the natural 
religion of Isis (a religion of “Goodness” and fertility) to the dogma-ridden religion of 
Thoth: “Par lui, cette religion de bonté, sortie d’un cœur de femme, change et devient 
système, un système laborieux, chargés de dogmes, de pratiques, une scolastique de 
prêtres” (301). According to the author, this pull away from nature inspired women to 
seek comfort in death: “De son côté, la femme, cultivant seule avec son fils, ne pense 
à autre chose; par ses jeûnes, elle amasse le petit pécule de la mort” (301). In his 
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analysis of Thothism, the parallels with Catholicism are obvious. The religion of 
Thoth, he says, is the beginning of a medieval style of religion in which demons are 
opposed to saints and man is forced to appeal to various divine representatives for 
protection (302-3). In Du prêtre, Michelet similarly describes the seventeenth century 
as a culture which looked to death as its only hope: “Spinosa, Hobbes et Molinos, la 
mort en métaphysique, la mort en politique, en morale!” (119).  
Moving on to Syria, Michelet continues tracing the degeneration of male power. 
Ancient Syria, he says, “eut pour idéal le poisson et le Poisson-Femme”: “Voilà la 
Vénus de Syrie, c’est Dercéto, c’est Astarté ou Astaroth, mâle et femelle, le songe de 
la génération” (311). Michelet notes that Adonis represents male weakness. God’s 
first man is made to die (319). While Michelet praised Egypt for at least conserving 
“le mariage saint,” he cites “l’amour impur” as the poison which leads Syria towards 
a “progrès de faiblesse” (319). In Syria, sensuality replaces pity as the dominant 
female characteristic, altering the meaning of love and the equality between men and 
women (314). “La pitié amoureuse, la mollesse et les pleurs, la contagieuse douceur 
des Adonies amenèrent dans le monde le grand fait, terrible et mortel: 
l’évanouissement de la force mâle” (319). According to Michelet, the ancient Syrian 
male never comes to fruition and therefore does not contribute to the regeneration of 
humanity: “En Syrie, le mâle n’est plus qu’un faible adolescent qui ne fait que 
mourir. Point de paternité” (319). In the Bible de l’humanité, the loss of defined 
gender roles seems to signify the loss of the natural order of humanity. Michelet 
briefly refers to the modern European women,“ce fier demi mâle qu’on appelle 
femme en Europe,” as comparably genderless (287). 
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The Judeo-Christian tradition follows as the spiritual inheritor of a growing trend 
towards sterility and a reaction against reason and justice. According to Michelet, 
doctrines become increasingly obscure and less “natural.” “Love” and “Grace” 
replace “Justice” and take on definitions which distance the concept of love from pity 
and goodness. Michelet claims that most of the wisdom contained in the Old 
Testament was short-lived and did not lead to social progress: “Tout le progrès des 
Juifs aboutit à la stérilité profonde” (382). Michelet describes Judaism as the ultimate 
extreme in prescribed religious law. In particular, he associates Jewish law with “the 
word”: “l’excentricité étrange d’un culte de grammaire, l’adoration de la langue et la 
religion de l’alphabet” (383). He thereby contrasts language and the human heart. 
The “word” in Judaism, he says, differs from the Persian “word” in that the Persian 
concept of “the word”is associated with the “Tree of Life” while Jewish law is, 
according to Michelet, concerned with the actual pronunciation of the name of God 
(384). The Jewish focus on concrete language, he claims, led to a divinization of the 
alphabet itself (385). The historian tries to illustrate that this focus on the word, on the 
translation of God’s word, endures in Christianity’s miscomprehension of Jesus’ 
philosophy. Michelet describes early Christianity as plagued by a complete loss of 
reason and justice through misunderstandings of Jesus’ words. He notes, for example, 
that the mystics translate Jesus’ “Ma grace te suffit” as “En te péchant on glorifie 
dieu” (447). By the same token, he says Saint Paul interprets Jesus’ “Rends à César
34
” 
quote as “Obéis même aux mauvais maîtres” (451). It stands to reason, then, that 
                                                 
34
 Mark 12:17: “Jésus leur répondit: Rendez donc à César ce qui est à César, et à Dieu ce qui est à 
Dieu. Et ils admirèrent sa réponse.” 
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these misconstrued messages have formed the foundation of Christianity since the 
establishment of the Church. 
Getting Back to Nature 
Throughout the Bible de l’humanité, Michelet reconstructs the past in an effort to 
discover truths which have been lost to modern French society. Progress thus 
necessitates a step backwards, a renaissance to rediscover certain truths and cast away 
false progress which has thrown humanity off of its natural course. In Michelet’s 
analysis of the Ramayana, he stresses the work’s movement from a focus on the 
individual (the lives of Rama and Sita) to a focus on the universal through the story’s 
natural setting which represents the power of nature in general (55-6). Rama’s story, 
according to Michelet, is completely engulfed by its natural environment: “Autour de 
ce fond, se tisse comme un tapis délicieux, toute nature, montagnes, forêts, rivières, 
tous les paysages, toutes les saisons de l’Inde, tous les bons amis de l’homme, 
animaux et végétaux” (55). In contrast to this organic landscape, Michelet frames 
Sita’s capture as a manipulation of nature affected by art. In retelling Sita’s seduction, 
the author presents the demon Ravana as the power to create art and desire, “de faire 
par la magie une anti-nature qui trompe, des êtres éphémères, charmants, terribles à 
volonté,” in contrast to nature (74). Evil is falsity, the opposite of nature. Rama, from 
Michelet’s perspective, is anti-art, responding with rugged nature: “Et contre tant 
d’art, Râma n’amène avec lui que des simples, des êtres grossiers, sauvages” (74). 
Masculinity is thereby associated with some true, lost, natural religion of humanity 
while femininity has been corrupted by artistic conjurers and vain sensuality. 
301 
 
The Bible de l’humanité therefore revolves around a return to nature which Michelet 
associates with authentic sentiment. Nature is assumed to have the power to restore 
humanity. In his references to the Ramayana, Michelet repeatedly cites man’s rapport 
with the animal kingdom as the source for his goodness and justice. The author 
claims that the Indian emphasis on pity for animals, for example, gave birth to the 
concept of poetry (63). Faith was created through the heart (64). Chapter VI, 
“Rédemption de la nature,” explains man’s rapport with the animal kingdom in Indian 
mythology (61). Michelet uses the comparison of man to the animal kingdom as an 
opportunity to highlight the notion of pity as an ancient spiritual concept (62-3). He 
shows pity to be the source of the divine poetry in the Ramayana: “Ce fleuve 
immense d’harmonie, de lumière et de joie divine, le plus grand qui coula jamais, il 
part de cette petite source, un soupir et une larme” (63). This harmony attests to the 
unifying power of pity inspired by human connectivity with nature. The lesson for 
modern France is that the cultivation of a sense of pity through connections with 
nature will result in the republican ideal of fraternity.  
Michelet endeavors to trace a similar process of degeneration from natural to 
unnatural religious practices in Persia and Greece. According to Michelet, the Persian 
God was just and man followed his example. Since then, man has increasingly 
cultivated the idea of a vengeful God along with an irrational fear of evil (96-7). In 
Persian religion, as in Indian religion, Michelet tries to illustrate the idea that formal 
religion fails to capture the original spiritual goals of the people. From Michelet’s 
perspective, the Avesta (a collection of prayers and rituals) does not convey the 
original sense of unity in Persian spirituality and is diluted with “magisme médique et 
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chaldéen” (114). For Michelet, Muslim legends, like Christian legends, obscured their 
moral undertones with an excess of magism and rituals (129). Similarly, Michelet 
explains that Greek fables responded to human realities and Greek people did not 
actually believe the stories to be true. Rather, they used the stories as inspiration for 
interior reflection (160). By Byzantine times, however, people no longer understood 
the nuances of Greek mythology (168). The “clair-obscur” in which the fables 
“flottaient entre le dogme et le conte” was lost (168). He goes on to condemn the 
concept of jealous gods which eventually spread throughout Greece and negated the 
idea that gods represent supreme justice (180). Michelet manages to compare this 
same “magie du clair-obscur” to Eve, suggesting that feminine influence, which he 
associates with “the orient,” dealt the final blow to justice in Greece: 
Mais l’Orient s’avance, invincible, fatal aux dieux de la 
lumière, par le charme du rêve, par la magie du clair-obscur. 
Plus de sérénité. L’âme humaine, cette Ève curieuse, fouillant 
dans l’inconnu, va jouir et gémir. Elle trouvera là sans doute 
d’étranges approfondissements. La force et le calme? Jamais. 
Elle aura la joie, - violente, souvent insensée, âcre, et sombre. 
Elle aura les pleurs (que de pleurs!), le contraste de ces deux 
choses, leur lutte et l’impuissance, et la mélancolie qui suit. 
(277) 
 
In the Bible de l’humanité, the substitution of sentiment for justice is the true fall 
from Eden. Michelet’s “Eve,” however, is a vague notion of misguided feminine 
influence, a triumph of woman’s stereotypical hysteria over male reason. 
 
Women, Family and, Work 
In the conclusion to Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, Michelet insists on the 
trinity of the family as truly holy for humanity: “L’homme, la femme, l’enfant, l’unité 
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des trois personnes, leur méditation mutuelle, voilà le mystère des mystères” (323). 
The opening chapters of the Bible de l’humanité focus especially on the family unit in 
India as the source of this ancient culture’s social harmony. Michelet establishes the 
primitive model of the family as “le premier culte” and considers the primitive role of 
women in relation to their husbands (25-30). Women in this tradition, he says, are 
initially like children to their husbands, then they are like sisters, and finally they 
fulfill a motherly role (30). Above all, Michelet envisions woman as the keeper of the 
“fire,” responsible for creating and protecting life (33). According to Michelet’s 
account of the law of Manu
35
, man is not fulfilled until he has united into the 
“homme-femme-enfant” trinity (43). Women are socially superior to men, he says, 
because motherhood is sacred (43). 
In Persian culture too, he says, women became the guardians of sacred traditions. 
Thanks to women, Persia’s ancient soul lives on beneath its modern exterior. Women 
thus become like gods because of their connection to the past: “Elle était reine et 
maîtresse au foyer, et pour son fils un Dieu vivant” (121). The chapter entitled “La 
Femme forte” establishes women as the guardians of Persian tradition: “La femme, 
c’est la tradition elle-même” (121). Michelet’s assertions about ancient Persian 
women are similar to his ideas concerning the role of women in the Indian family. 
The home is a maternal institution and the wife-mother is only outranked by her 
adored son, under whom she rules (121). Reminiscent of the Virgin Mother, the 
Persian homemaker is described as perfectly pure: “L’idéal de la pureté est, non-
                                                 
35
 According to Indian tradition, Manu was the “creator god” whose laws “gave divine sanction to the 
social system” including “the inferiority of women and the low valuation of manual labor” (Stearns 
43). Curiously, Michelet does not choose to argue against the low ranking of the most hard working 
members of the Indian caste system despite his insistence that a corruption of this system in modern 
European society is to blame for Europe’s devaluation of working men. 
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seulement la fille enfant, la vierge, mais la chaste et fidèle épouse” (121). It seems 
that all Persian women, unlike Christian women, had an equal opportunity to be 
considered divine. Michelet’s praise for the ideal ancient Persian and Indian woman 
as the fertile “maîtresse au foyer” stands in dramatic contrast to his later assessment 
of women as agents of sterility corrupted by sensuality. In these ancient cultures, 
Michelet views women as actively engaged in the trinity of the family unit. The 
breaking of that trinity due to Church loyalties transforms women into heretics 
against the family institution.  
Michelet praises ancient Greek liturgy which he says preserved the family unit by 
taming the feminine imagination (170). The Greek liturgy is described as the opposite 
of the state of literature in the Middle Ages which allegedly promoted the destruction 
of the family unit: “La Grèce présente exactement l’envers du Moyen âge. Dans 
celui-ci, toute littérature (ou presque toute) glorifie l’adultère; poèmes, fabliaux, 
noëls, tout célèbre le cocuage” (170). Here, Michelet’s view of history clearly 
contradicts the romantic idealization of the middle ages in favor of an Enlightenment-
style glorification of Hellenic ethics. The historian lauds the strength of the ancient 
Greek family, presumably made possible through the role of women as mothers and 
wives (171). For Michelet, Homer illustrates the “vrai rôle de la femme” as an equal 
to her husband and as the “maîtresse de maison” (172). Ancient Greece, however, is 
presented as a turning point in the traditional role of women. According to the Bible 
de l’humanité, the arts are largely responsible for woman’s transformation from 
fertile mother to sterile hysteric. Michelet cites the popularity of Bacchanalian 
adoration as the moment in history when women’s loyalties to the family unit began 
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to change. He describes a period of time in ancient Greek culture when “the flute and 
the lyre” dominate society and women follow Bacchus in a hysterical fervor (220). 
Bacchus is the anti-Hercules, “le féminin, le furieux” (220). Michelet refers to the 
freedom of Greek women as a danger to their society which led to human 
disharmony: “Elle ne put jamais suivre l’homme, et resta sombrement à part” (272). 
This view of women is reminiscent of his insistence in Du prêtre, de la femme, de la 
famille that women are easily misled by priests because of their lack of inclusion in 
healthy “male” activities (Du prêtre 290). His ultimate conclusion on ancient Greek 
culture is that Greece’s strength came from its masculinity. “Feminine” gods like 
Bacchus introduced an unreasonable element into society which resulted in discord: 
“C’est un regret pour nous. La Grèce, mâle et pure, très-lucide, avait seule le droit, le 
pouvoir de nous mener, comme un autre Thésée, au double labyrinthe où l’on se perd 
si aisément. Les dieux efféminés d’Asie, mutilés, énervés, nous y menèrent très-mal, 
par les sentiers de l’équivoque” (276). The “Orient” for Michelet is synonymous with 
femininity, dreaminess, and magic – the “clair-obscur” which he establishes as the 
opposite of enlightenment (277). Throughout the text, this supposed illogical 
“femininity” grows as society progresses, pulling man increasingly farther from his 
simple work ethic and natural religion.  
Michelet continues to blame the “feminine” cult of Dionysis for the downfall of 
Justice and Liberty in Syria calling the god of wine “le faux Médiateur, le faux 
Libérateur, dieu des Tyrans, dieu de la mort” (329). His description of Dionysus 
recalls Sita’s temptation by Ravana. Michelet portrays women falling into a similar 
sensuality trap throughout history, often dragging humanity with them away from 
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reason. Michelet traces the Passion back to ancient Greek Bacchus festivals whose 
traditions lived on through a Syrian festival he refers to as “le spectacle des 
Pathèmata” (331). He describes Bacchus as offering bread in a sort of pagan mass in 
which the messiah-like god “prétendait mourir pour nous” (332). Bacchus, he notes, 
also acted as a mediator between the people and God in a culture that did not believe 
humans could directly communicate with their God, Mithra (332-3).  For Michelet, 
Bacchus was actually feminine or, at least, represented negative female 
characteristics: “le vrai Bacchus, la femme grasse, immonde et poltronne, qui pour un 
rien se meurt de peur” (336). He depicts the god as an “ennemi surtout du travail, 
Ivresse et Paresse incarnées” and therefore a tyrant (337). Liberation begins to take on 
a new meaning: the liberator frees men (slaves) from work, but Michelet points out 
that this freedom is an illusion (337). The slave hopes for the freedom of “la vie sans 
loi,” which never becomes a reality (337). To women, Bacchus grants the freedom of 
emotions, “la liberté des larmes, des larmes sensuelles, ‘la douceur de pleurer’” (338). 
According to Michelet, these tears are however completely useless (338). The women 
cry for one being (Adonis) instead of crying for their nation, for humanity, thereby 
limiting their power of goodness and pity by projecting it onto a fetish object (338). 
In Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, Michelet’s description of the devotion to the 
Sacred Heart of Jesus describes a comparable fetish,”la sanglante expiation 
mithriaque, le culte du sang” which endures in modern France (172). For Michelet, 
the emphasis on the heart targets women above all since “chez elles la vie du cœur est 
tout” (Du prêtre 174). The Sacred Heart, in a parallel with the cults of Bacchus and 
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Adonis, is described as purely sensual, “la charnelle et sensuelle dévotion du Sacré 
Cœur” (Du prêtre 183). 
The Bible de l’humanité ultimately seeks to forge a rapport between Judeo-Christian 
religious customs and femininity in an effort to argue a tendency towards irrationality 
in the occidental religious tradition. As the majority of the most important figures in 
these traditions are men, Michelet tries to show, just as he did with the pagan gods 
Adonis and Bacchus, that many of these men displayed feminine characteristics. His 
description of Jacob, “le type et le nom consacré du peuple (Israë),” depicts the 
shepherd as someone whose cunning calculations go hand in hand with his appeal to 
the opposite sex. Jacob himself, he says, “seems surprisingly female”:  
Le vrai Juif, le patriarche, est le berger spéculateur, qui sait 
augmenter ses troupeaux par un soin intélligent d’acquisition et 
de calcul. Il plaît à la femme (sa mère Rebecca), et il semble 
étonnement femme, plus que prudent dans ses soumissions, ses 
adorations au frère Ésaü, auquel si subtilement il a ravi le droit 
d’aînesse. (366-7) 
 
Michelet also compares the male lover in the Song of Songs to a woman, referring to 
him as the “féminin jeune homme” (391). He complains that the text, in comparison 
to the Ramayana, is impure. According to Michelet, the canticle’s references to balms 
and perfumes attest to the falsity of this kind of adoration (395). In a footnote, he 
refers to the proliferation of references to these substances as “une complète 
pharmacie” (395). True love’s own natural “ivresse” is lost in such artificial 
sensualities. In Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, the author makes a very similar 
connection between perfumes and false religious principles which he refers to as “un 
nauséabond mélange de musc et d’encens” (298). This loss of sense in the face of an 
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overabundance of sensation is analogous to the loss of Reason which allowed Grace 
to take root. In the Bible de l’humanité, Grace is equated with sensuality and 
imagination. Michelet connects Judaism to the romanesque, for example, through the 
concept of Grace: “L’amour est une loterie, la Grace est une loterie. Voilà l’essence 
du roman” (Bible 403). He refers to the Jewish holy books as “novels” claiming that 
they exploit feminine power (407-8). In books like Judith, Ruth, and Esther, he sees 
the fall of masculinity and the glorification of feminine charms (405-6). 
In his commentary on Rome, Michelet blames female ownership of property for the 
Empire’s downfall (424-5). The historian compares these Roman laws to post-
Revolution laws which guaranteed inheritance rights for women
36
. Without 
education, he says, wealthy French women set out to destroy a law that they did not 
fully understand: “Lui donnant la fortune sans lui donner l’éducation, la faisant riche 
sans la faire éclairée, sans la mettre au niveau de la lumière du temps, la Loi mit en 
main des armes pour détruire la Loi” (425). Women, he says, brought religion back to 
society after the Revolution by using their newfound wealth to financially support the 
construction of Catholic Churches (425). The implication is that female influence led 
to the fall of the Republic just as female influence contributed to the fall of Rome. 
Rome, like Israel, supposedly cultivated a “feminine” society. Michelet compares the 
poet Virgil to a woman, “aux longs cheveux de femme,” and generally emphasizes 
the disappearance of gender differences accompanied by a looming sense of sterility 
in the Roman Empire (428). In Michelet’s interpretation of Christianity’s “feminine” 
culture, the family is broken into two camps: the woman and child are united while 
                                                 
36
 “In March 1793, the National Convention declared equal inheritance of all in equal line of 
succession” (Caine & Sluga 18). 
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the father/husband is separate and inferior (471). “La mère et le fils sont un peuple, 
l’homme un peuple inférieur” (471). The “feminine” man in Christian times becomes 
the figure of the priest who, like Jacob, is at once demasculated and adored by 
women. In Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, Michelet often presents the 
relationship between women and priests as scandalously intimate, plotting against the 
husband. The separation of the family endures because of the “invisible” priest who is 
forever coming between male and female family members (282). 
Liberty and Justice : A Religion for and by the People 
In the Bible de l’humanité, Michelet asserts that greater liberty leads to greater justice 
(ix). According to Michelet, his research tracing religious history from India to Persia 
to Europe follows the path of Justice because “Dieu est la Justice même” (485). Thus, 
liberty leads to God. Chapter V, “Les profondes libertés de l’Inde,” traces the concept 
of Liberty to ancient India. Michelet points out that the beauty of the Ramayana is 
indeed that it celebrates a man, not a god or a saint (52). Michelet stresses the idea 
that Rama’s humanity in the Ramayana, his lack of awareness that he is in any way 
divine, adds to the nobility of his actions and the value of his “passion”: “La passion 
du jeune dieu perdrait de son mérite s’il avait la moindre idée qu’il est dieu et fils de 
Dieu” (67). Rama acts freely, in “liberty” if you will, and in doing so he approaches 
the divine. The Ramayana likewise promotes an ideal model of equality: “personne 
n’est excepté de la miséricorde divine. Tous sont sauvés” (53). This concept of a 
achieving a superior moral state through human vulnerability is reminiscent of 
Vigny’s idea that man’s ability to sacrifice himself actually gives him a moral 
advantage over the immortal. Michelet adds that the Ramayana was written for the 
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“people” (52). The people, he says, actually created their gods. He explains that the 
“Indian soul” is built on the idea that man, as the creator of his own gods, has the 
power to undo them (51). As inventions of the soul, the gods are a reflection of 
humanity. Rama’s dual nature represents Liberty (49). He is a combination of two 
casts. He is part soldier, part holy man: “En Râma se réunit le double idéal des deux 
castes... – ce guerrier-brahme” (56). According to Michelet, Rama’s humanness 
allows him to reach a more holy state than the pure brahma because he has the ability 
to sacrifice himself (56). In modern times, this “sacrifice” translates to a willingness 
to join the labor force, to contribute to society through work. Indian myth provides an 
unexpected model for Liberty to a French public traditionally divided by social casts. 
Labor becomes an increasingly important masculine element of human justice in the 
Bible de l’humanité. In Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, Michelet establishes the 
idea that women in particular fall victim to their imaginations precisely because they 
do not have enough physical and intellectual activity in their lives (290-1). Like 
Rousseau, Michelet considers idleness to be the downfall of human morality. Persia 
emerges in the Bible de l’humanité as an example of a perfectly active masculine 
society free from the imagination associated with women. The author describes 
ancient Persia as an example of a paradise of laborers where people create goodness 
and avoid evil through their work (95-6). Persia, according to Michelet, is a more 
positivist society than India because it is less affected by the imagination: “Point de 
mythologie. Nulle poésie imaginative. Tout vrai, positif, grave et fort” (78). He 
attributes Persia’s positivity to their no nonsense work ethic and strong belief in 
justice: “c’est l’agriculture héroïque, le courageux effort du Bien contre le Mal, la vie 
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de pure Lumière dans le Travail et la Justice” (78). He describes ancient Persian 
philosophy as one which stresses physical activity (78). Persia, according to Michelet, 
managed to spread power to all social casts, “dans le moindre laboureur,” in contrast 
with India which limited this power to kings (85). He goes on to note that the 
shepherd, “le pasteur,” so revered in Christian symbolism, was considered “le 
maudit” by the Persian laborer (88). Ancient Persia emerges as a model in which 
work, order, and justice existed in perfect harmony (91). Michelet describes the 
population as blessed by their work ethic, a “peuple travailleur, d’esprit très-positif” 
(90). He sees in the sharing of resources, the equal distribution of water in Persia, 
government order which supports justice (92). This justice, he says, is cultivated 
within the family or tribe but extends to the entirety of humanity: “Dans cette Perse 
qui semble exclusive, où la parenté, la pureté du sang, l’orgueil de famille, de tribu, 
semblent très-forts, l’inconnu n’est point un hostis, comme Rome qualifie l’étranger. 
La fille errante, inconnue, qu’on amène, est protégée et garantie” (92). 
In his analysis of ancient Greek culture, Michelet directly links the concept of Liberty 
to Greek genius: “laissée à son libre génie, toutes les facultés de l’homme, - âme et 
corps, - instinct et travail, - poésie, critique et jugement, - tout a grandi, fleuri 
d’ensemble” (159). He describes ancient Greek religion as “une religion de la vie” 
based upon “la liberté de tous les êtres” (180). Greece humanizes its gods, 
transforming them into “dieux justiciers” and glorifying wisdom (165). Greece, 
improving upon India’s Earthly gods according to Michelet, established a system 
through which man could earn the status of a god through the merit of his labors 
(166).  For Michelet, Greece’s Hercules – the advent of the human hero – is the 
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ultimate humanist religious figure (222-3).  Michelet’s revival of Hercules as 
representative of humanity’s power recalls similar usage of Hercules symbolism 
during the First Republic: “Hercules represented a higher stage in the development of 
the Revolution, one characterized by the force and unity of the people, rather than by 
the sagacity of its representatives” (Hunt 102). Whereas the Revolutionary image of 
Hercules was largely related to political liberty, Michelet extends his significance as a 
religious figure. Hercules distinguishes himself from more frivolous gods such as 
Apollo through his association with human challenges such as love, work, and death 
(218). Hercules’ story goes beyond art and incorporates the human soul. Again 
associating work ethic with liberty, Michelet describes the man-god as “le type même 
de la liberté” (416). Hercules’ mission is one of peace. He brings peace to Greece 
and, for Michelet, aspires to bring peace to the world (227).  Hercules’ stands out as a 
symbol of truth contrary to the dangers of imagination: “Le ciel du cœur détruit le ciel 
de fantasie et d’imagination. Enfer, Olympe, tous les deux ont croulé. Reste une 
chose: le grandeur de l’homme” (235). It is Hercules’ role as an active human being 
which makes him a god and encourages activity, rather than passivity, in all humans:  
D’autres sauveurs ont pu varier le grand thème de la Passion 
[...] Mais leur Passion passive, loin de nous donner force, a fait 
nos découragements, et leur fatale légende crée l’inertie stérile. 
C’est dans la Passion active, herculéenne, qu’est la haute 
harmonie de l’homme, l’équilibre, la force qui le rend fécond 
ici-bas. (238) 
 
All of the Olympian gods, even those who did not share Hercules’ status as a man-
god, remained grounded because of their continuing association with humanity. Their 
personalities took on human qualities and they lived amongst the people (247). It is in 
313 
 
fact their humanity that makes them divine: “Les dieux humanisés, ou, disons mieux, 
divinisés par l’âme” (247). Justice is thus bound to the concept of the human soul.  
Love, Adoration, and the “Messianic Epidemic” 
In Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, the author bemoans a perceived loss of 
sincerity in the emotions of misguided women: “Le cœur de femme, de mère, 
l’invincible instinct maternel, qui est le fond de la femme, cherche à se tromper” (24). 
In the Bible de l’humanité, Michelet elaborates on this kind of ephemeral love as 
foundational for Christian admiration. Love subject to whim is the opposite of Justice 
(Bible 442). He refers to Christian law as “la Folie de Dieu” and reiterates the idea 
that love is too “vague,” too “obscure” of a concept to replace justice (455, 453). 
Without Justice, Love becomes dangerously unpredictable (455). This capricious 
divine love evolves into the doctrine of Grace. 
According to Michelet, slavery in Israel created the necessity for a vengeful God 
since the slave needed to believe that the master would be punished (370). 
Desperation gave way to an environment in which chance, or Grace, was the only 
source of hope. Belief in Grace, he says,  diminished the value of Reason: “Il veut le 
hasard de la Grâce, le salut par un coup de dés. Tendances aléatoires qui corrompent 
profondément le jugement de l’esclave, lui font haïr la Raison, désespérer de l’action” 
(373-4). From this desperate need for divine intervention came “l’esprit Messianique” 
(374). Messianism is explained as the culmination of misguided adoration: “La 
lassitude extrème, l’atonie et le désespoir ont pour effet de produire en ce monde la 
maladie qu’on peut nommer: l’épidémie messianique” (348).  He describes Judaism 
as favoring the weak over the strong, the feminine over the masculine: “Au fier Juda 
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il préfère Joseph, au vaillant Ismaël, au fort Ésaü Jacob, fin est doux comme une 
femme” (374). The elected are saved and “Le genre humain est rejeté” (374). 
According to Michelet, the apostle Paul’s sole mission was to speak out against Greek 
Reason: “Son unique combat est contre l’esprit grec, et comme il le dit bravement, 
contre la Raison” (445). He also characterizes Paul as “belonging to women” noting 
that he was often amongst women in various Bible scenes (445). The privileged status 
of the worker, which Michelet so fervently praises in ancient cultures, is supposedly 
lost in Judaism: “Il (Dieu) choisit l’oisif Abel contre le travailleur Caïn” (374). 
Election becomes stronger than Justice (375). “La miséricorde gratuite,” or mercy for 
the undeserving, is used to illustrate God’s power (375). 
For Michelet, the system of Grace negates all of the masculine Jewish figures such as 
Moses and Isaiah (376). He describes Grace as “la fantaisie féminine, du caprice de la 
femme” (376). He insists that it “discourages” effort on the part of the people and 
destroys justice (377). Grace excuses God from acting justly, he says. It allows people 
to assume that divine justice is incomprehensible, thereby excusing injustice (377). 
Here, Michelet refutes conservative Catholics such as Chateaubriand and de Maistre 
who used the mystery of divine justice as the foundation for their arguments against 
critiquing the Catholic Church. By comparing this kind of God to an unreasonable 
woman, he completely reverses the image of the Church as stable and paternal. Like 
Renan, Michelet sees in messianism a long tradition established well before the first 
century (429). Michelet’s description of the Virgin Mary as “une mère stérile” 
supports his claim that mysticism tended towards sterility (429). For Michelet, the 
doctrine of the Immaculate Conception succeeds in nullifying the male role in 
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society, erasing man from creation: “Une longue incubation de femme en femme, un 
enfantement continué, amena cette création, qui ne doit rien à l’homme, comme on le 
dit en toute vérité, sortant uniquement de la Femme et de son Esprit” (431). 
Michelet concludes that the Gospel of Mary was suppressed because it made Jesus 
seem too real, too human (435). By dehumanizing the child Jesus, he says, Mary is 
denied the true human role of a mother (468). In essence, the mother of God is denied 
the chance to be Isis, to be celebrated for her fertility. By the same token, she betrays 
her gender by rendering biological fertility an impure act. She may be divinely sterile, 
but humanity’s growth is also stunted as a result (468). Following this line of 
reasoning, Jesus’ supernatural birth distances Christianity from the most basic 
elements of humanity.  
Michelet, as a sort of modern prophet of secularism, foresees that the future of 
humanity is not in the hands of a messiah but in the “second coming” of Justice (480). 
Doubt in religion, he says, is the path to positive progress towards Justice which can 
only be realized through a revolution (480). The Bible de l’humanité closes with the 
idea that the home should be restored as the cultural center of society (485-6). In Du 
prêtre, de la femme, de la famille, Michelet proposes that men share their activities 
with women in order to keep women thinking and creating and to rekindle harmony 
between the sexes (290). When the home is not divided, fraternity will be 
accomplished through “la grande Église de Justice” (486).  Through knowledge, 
humanity will find peace: “la profonde paix de la lumière” (486). Ultimately, the goal 
of the Bible de l’humanité is to explore the concept of a religion of humanity in which 
Justice is society’s collective goal. The author links modern science to ancient faith: 
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“La science marche, et la lumière avance. La foi nouvelle se confirme en trouvant 
sous la terre ses solides racines dans la profonde antiquité” (157). A religion of justice 
would necessitate a move towards positive science and a rejection of superstition. 
Michelet criticizes belief in miracles as harmful to human progress: “L’obstacle 
insurmontable à l’éducation orientale, sacerdotale, c’est le miracle. Le miracle et 
l’éducation sont deux mortels ennemis” (194). Heavenly miracles negate the 
necessity for men to actively labor for their own benefit (195). The Hercules myth 
represents an alternative ideal situation in which human activity motivates progress. 
The historian prescribes forgetting religious superstitions as the way forward (483). 
He proposes education as a substitute for religion in the advancement of human 
progress: “Marchons aux sciences de l’histoire et de l’humanité, aux langues 
d’Orient. Interrogeons le genius antique dans son accord avec tant de récents voyages. 
Là nous prendrons le sens humain” (283).  
Conclusion 
Michelet’s Bible de l’humanité distinguishes itself from Renan’s Vie de Jésus in that 
Michelet insists on the importance of religious doctrine rather than dwelling on 
biographical information. The Bible de l’humanité alleges that history has seen a 
gradual demasculinization of European society through organized religion. Michelet 
attempts to prove that this femininity, often in the form of the doctrine of Grace, is 
contrary to the “masculine” spirit of justice. Michelet’s concept of the “Bible 
commune” traces religious traditions back to ancient India and through the ages into 
modern times. For Michelet, the human soul is expressed throughout history not 
through literature but through the actions of the people. Although their methods and 
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subject matter differ, both Michelet and Renan look back on history as a source for 
truth. Both historians furthermore agree that religion was originally created for and by 
the people. 
The Bible de l’humanité begins with an analysis of the Indian Ramayana. Through 
the discovery of ancient religions, Michelet hopes to reunite modern man with his 
spiritual origins proving that all men throughout time are unified through common 
experience. Moreover, Michelet uses India’s religious history as an example of 
religious evolution which he says is common to all cultures. The fall of man in the 
Ramayana is likened to the fall of Adam and Eve. Feminine weakness or female 
refusal of justice is, in this scenario, to blame for humanity’s disconnection with 
nature and divinity alike.  
For Michelet, a nation’s religion is inevitably reflected in its government. He uses 
ancient Persia as a model of culture in which a religious doctrine of equality 
supported social equality as well. Persia is also notable for Michelet because its 
ancients considered the family to be a sacred unit in which fathers acted as priests to 
their wives and children. Feminine influence in religion is only acceptable for 
Michelet when it is associated with fertility. For example, in the Bible de l’humanité, 
Michelet bemoans Egypt’s shift from a religion built around a fertility goddess to a 
dogma-centered religion emphasizing the afterlife. He goes on to criticize the loss of 
specific gender roles in ancient Syrian culture and the weakening of male “force.” For 
Michelet, sterility is a growing problem throughout human history. He defines 
sterility as the abandonment of humanity by a society which increasingly turns away 
from justice, pity, and goodness – from the elements of culture which he categorizes 
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as either masculine or motherly. Michelet particularly attacks Jewish law as being 
overly focused on “the word” rather than privileging action. This emphasis on the 
word, which he contends is misguided, supposedly extended to early Christianity and 
led to messianism followed by a general misunderstanding of foundational Christian 
doctrine. 
Throughout the Bible de l’humanité, Michelet contrasts this false doctrine with the 
reality of nature, suggesting that society must first take a step backwards in order to 
eventually progress. Michelet’s proposed step backwards differs from 
Chateaubriand’s, for example, because the purity Michelet seeks would introduce 
doubt in religious doctrine. Whereas Chateaubriand’s Génie glorifies a childlike 
innocence associated with the blind acceptance of Christian doctrine, Michelet 
proposes a reconnection with nature which would expose the fallacies of Christian 
doctrine. The Bible de l’humanité associates masculinity with some true, lost natural 
religion which has been overshadowed by feminine precociousness. The Bible de 
l’humanité therefore proposes a return to nature as the authentic source of sentiment. 
The family emerges as sacred and women’s role in the family is defined by their 
supposed duty to protect traditions and fulfill their destinies as mothers. Women, he 
says, have the potential to become socially superior to men when they fulfill their 
destinies as fertile life-givers. The feminine imagination, however, is depicted as a 
danger to the family unit. Literature is cited as a source of degeneration because, 
Michelet says, it introduced women to desire. He portrays women as continually 
falling into destructive patterns of sensuality throughout ancient history. Michelet 
links this sensuality to modern religious practices which he categorizes as 
319 
 
destructively feminine. In particular, he mentions the devotion to the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus which he says romanticizes the heart of the messiah. Devotees allegedly misuse 
their passionate energies towards the adoration of an imaginary idol rather than 
channeling religious energy into positive actions which would improve the human 
condition. Female social domination is blamed for the anti-justice system of grace. 
“Feminine” religious culture, he says, succeeds in dividing rather than unifying 
humanity by driving women and children away from their male head-of-household 
and replacing his authority with the Church patriarchs.  
The Bible de l’humanité associates liberty with justice and justice with God. For 
Michelet, in fact, “Justice is God.” Liberty is therefore the path to God. Labor is 
shown to be necessary to keep man free since it renders humanity self-sufficient. 
Labor also provides an action on which man can rightfully be judged depending on 
his contribution to humanity. Michelet celebrates labor as a foundational to 
“masculine” culture. He identifies ancient Persia as the model of a working society 
uncorrupted by idleness and imagination. He also attributes Greek genius to the 
development of liberty in Hellenic culture. Hercules, for Michelet, becomes the 
ultimate male symbol of the power of liberty through labor. For Michelet, humanized 
gods, like the Olympian divinities, are made divine through their humanity. In the 
following chapter, these themes of fertility, labor, and liberty as elements of a religion 




Chapter 15: Pierre Froment and the Prêtre Positiviste: Reconsidering Zola’s 
Trois villes in Light of Auguste Comte’s Catéchisme positiviste 
 
Towards the end of Lourdes, published by Emile Zola in 1894, the novel’s 
main character, father Pierre Froment, comes to see Bernadette Soubirous as a 
“misérable,” exiled from the very cult that she helped to establish. Able to separate 
the progressive element of Bernadette’s legacy from the mystic craze that she 
inspired, Pierre is driven to discover a “religion nouvelle” through his experiences in 
the three cities that make up the novel trilogy: Lourdes, Rome, and Paris. 
Elle restait à ses yeux l’élue, la martyre ; et s’il ne pouvait plus croire, 
si l’histoire de cette malheureuse suffisait pour achever de ruiner en lui 
la croyance, elle ne l’en bouleversait pas moins dans toute sa fraternité, 
en lui révélant une religion nouvelle, la seule dont son cœur fût encore 
plein, la religion de la vie, de la douleur humaine. (417) 
  
More than forty years before the publication of Lourdes, another man of 
science, Auguste Comte, had also envisioned a “religion nouvelle.” Although 
Comte’s religion can hardly be categorized as a religion of “la douleur humaine,” it 
was certainly a “religion de la vie” similarly focused on uniting humanity. The 
renowned mathematician’s positivist religion sought to combine the logic of positivist 
philosophy with the motivational power of sentiment in order to establish a science-
based religion that would recognize the human desire for faith and love. Comte was 
not unique in his mid-century search to bridge the gap between science and faith. 
Charles Fourrier, Henri de Saint-Simon, Prosper Enfantin, and others had also 
imagined utopias based on fraternity and an approach to religion that would substitute 
justice for the Catholic doctrine of grace. In this dissertation, we have also already 
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studied a number of authors, such as Lamartine, Lamennais, Sand, and Hugo, who 
likewise promote religious ideas founded on a doctrine of love. As Paul Benichou 
points out in Le Sacre de l’écrivain, Comte was one of the many utopian 
“reconstructeurs” who promoted “une foi nouvelle” focused on fraternity, equality, 
goodwill, utility, love, and family (43). 
Comte stands out among these thinkers, however, as a particularly surprising 
contributor to religious thought. In publishing his Catéchisme positiviste in 1852, he 
does something rare. He reconsiders his own positivist system that became so 
fundamental to the scientific thought of the era – and he corrects himself. The same 
man who confidently declared “l’Ordre et le Progrès” as the ultimate formula for 
humanity’s success in his Discours sur l’esprit positif, adds the word “amour” to this 
formula twenty years later. The Catechism’s motto “l’Amour pour principe, l’Ordre 
pour base et le Progrès pour but" posits the theory that love, or sentiment, is actually 
the motor that powers order and progress. This new trinity provides the basis for 
Comte’s positivist religion which proposes scientific laws as its dogma but borrows 
its structure from the Catholic Church. The Catéchisme  positiviste details the plan for 
Comte’s church, complete with a new goddess figure to replace the Virgin Mary, a 
priesthood, temples, and an obsession with organizing all ideals into interwoven 
trinities based on the three stages of religion: “le culte,” “le dogme,” and “le régime .” 
For Comte, “le positivisme chemine entre le mysticisme et l’empirisme,” ideally 
closing the gap between faith and reason (Catéchisme 151).  
Comte’s recourse to a religious system as the answer to France’s social, 
political, and moral woes may seem strange in light of the anti-theology stance firmly 
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asserted in his earlier writings but, as John Laffey points out, Comte’s intellectual 
development was a blend of influences from enlightenment philosophers like 
Montesquieu and Condorcet to Catholic theocrats, namely de Bonald and de Maistre 
(46). Comte especially admired Bonald’s scientific approach to organization which 
for him contrasted sharply with the lack of organization he saw in the Nouveau 
Christianisme proposed by Saint-Simon (Laffey 46).  
Zola’s decision to devote the last decade of his life to writing about religion 
was no less surprising. As Sophie Guermes points out, despite the persistence of 
religious themes throughout Zola’s work, research focusing on religion in Zola is 
noticeably limited and the “troisième Zola” (Zola after the Rougon-Macquart) is 
largely ignored (17). In Andrew Wernick’s Auguste Comte and the Religion of 
Humanity, Wernick likewise describes the “second” Comte as a topic that has been 
forgotten by researchers, noting that “In practical terms, Comte’s founding religious 
project was a complete, even preposterous failure” (5). Wernick argues however that 
Comte’s positivist religion, which was “fashioned both as a scientific systematization 
of science and as humanistically demystified religion,” is noteworthy in the 
nineteenth century quest to reconcile faith and science (20). Although Comte was 
certainly not original in the concepts he promoted, he was arguably “the first to think 
out, systematically and self-consciously,” the integration of science and religion 
(Wernick 20). 
In Paris, the last book of Zola’s Trois villes, Pierre Froment recognizes Comte 




D’où soufflait le vent, où allait la nef de salut, pour quel port fallait-il 
donc s’embarquer ? Déjà il s’était dit que le bilan du siècle était à faire, 
qu’il devrait, après avoir accepté l’héritage de Rousseau et des autres 
précurseurs, étudier les idées de Saint-Simon, de Fourier, de Cabet lui-
même, d’Auguste Comte et de Proudhon, de Karl Marx aussi… (1266) 
 
In a sense, Pierre’s journey from Lourdes to Rome and, finally, to Paris is a 
retrospective on the same spiritual, social, and scientific movement that inspired 
Comte. Looking back on the variety of failed utopian schemes, Pierre determines that 
they all share some common principles that might be the foundation of a new 
religion: 
Dans les évangiles de ces messies sociaux, parmi le chaos des 
affirmations contraires, il était des paroles semblables qui toujours 
revenaient, la défense du pauvre, l’idée d’un nouveau et juste partage 
des biens de la terre, selon le travail et le mérite, la recherche surtout 
d’une loi du travail qui permit équitablement ce nouveau partage entre 
les hommes. N’était-ce donc pas puisque tous les génies précurseurs 
s’entendaient si étroitement sur ces vérités communes, qu’elles étaient 
le fondement même de la religion de demain, la foi nécessaire que le 
siècle léguerait au siècle suivant, pour qu’il en fît le culte humain de 
paix, de solidarité et d’amour ? (OC 1559) 
 
His analysis then is that the previous philosopher’s error was not in their 
ideals but in the presentation of their ideas, which Zola often refers to as their 
“systèmes.” Zola’s treatment of these same ideas through the form of the novel might 
be interpreted as an attempt to remove the system from the concept. The presentation 
of ideas in the form of a novel replaces the explicit organization of Comte’s 
Catéchisme with the implicit organization of the novel, presenting similar concepts in 
a more natural, less overtly systematic way. As expressed in Zola’s Roman 
expérimental, “Il faut modifier la théorie pour l’adapter à la nature, et non la nature 
pour l’adapter à la théorie“(Roman expérimental 1197).  
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Despite Zola’s respect for Comte’s humanitarian ideas, his most scathing 
critique of Comte is that his order eventually took precedence over his ideas. He 
shows his irrational support for Louis-Napoléon’s regime to be directly related to a 
need for order in the face of truth:       
Comte lui-même avait fini par le plus trouble des mysticismes, les grand 
savants étaient pris de terreur devant la vérité, les barbares enfin menaçait le 
monde d’une nuit nouvelle, ce qui le rendait presque réactionnaire en 
politique, résigné d’avance à la venue du dictateur qui remettait un peu 
d’ordre, pour que l’instruction de l’humanité s’achevât. (Paris 1314)  
 
The truth that Comte is suggested to fear in this passage is what Zola believes 
to be the root of the “banqueroute de la science.” According to Zola, people were 
disillusioned with science because they had expected it to make them happy but, as 
Zola pronounced in an 1893 discourse: “...la science est incapable de repeupler le Ciel 
qu’elle a vidé   [...] Elle a promis la vérité, et la question est de savoir si l’on fera 
jamais du bonheur avec le vérité” (Guermès 329). By introducing the concept of love 
into positivism, it might be said that Comte attempted to put happiness back into 
science by trying to control love in a system that would subordinate it to order and 
progress. 
In this chapter, I propose a comparison between the experiences of l’abbé 
Pierre Froment in Zola’s Trois villes and the doctrine preached by the positivist priest 
in Comte’s Catéchisme positiviste in order to (1) better understand the ways in which 
Zola’s “religion nouvelle” continued to address social, spiritual, and scientific 
problems previously confronted by Comte and also to (2) contrast the differing 
methods that Zola and Comte used to express similar ideas.   
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Comte’s Catéchisme and Zola’s Trois villes are not completely dissimilar in 
terms of organization. Though the catechism and the novel are two very different 
genres, both authors choose to include a priest as the character who guides the reader 
through the ideas presented in each book. The Catéchisme positiviste is structured as 
a dialogue between a priest and a woman. The woman asks questions about the 
positivist religion and the priest answers those questions, carefully controlling the 
conversation in order to systematically reveal truths through dialogue, which he 
considers a form of “communication réelle” accessible to his target audience, women 
and proletariats (Catéchisme 18). 
Throughout the dialogue, Comte’s positivist priest is a source for answers. He 
is confident and convinced that his religion is the true religion, justifying its 
universality with its goal of synthèse and unité: 
Il n’existe, au fond, qu’une seule religion, à la fois universelle et 
définitive, vers laquelle tendirent de plus en plus les synthèses 
partielles et provisoires, autant que le comportaient les situations 
correspondantes. A ces divers efforts empiriques succède maintenant le 
développement systématique de l’unité humaine, dont la constitution 
directe et complète est enfin devenue possible d’après l’ensemble de 
nos préparations spontanées. C’est ainsi que le positivisme dissipe 
naturellement l’antagonisme mutuel des différentes religions 
antérieures, en formant son propre domaine du fond commun auquel 
toutes se rapportèrent instinctivement (44)   
 
In a word, the positivist priest has faith in his system. His goal is to educate 
the woman by methodically revealing the “truth” to her so that she too can accept 
positivist doctrine. The positivist priest is rational. Though he preaches the 
importance of sentiment as a motivational tool in the positivist religious system, the 
dialogue forma leaves no room for an analysis of the priest’s own emotions as an 
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individual. Unlike Pierre Froment, he has no story. The reader is not privy to the 
process by which the priest has arrived at this belief system. As if to emphasize his 
total absorption into the role of priest, he also has no name. He is simply referred to 
as “Le prêtre.” The woman, too, is denied any personalizing details. Labeled in the 
dialogue as “La femme,” she seems to represent every woman. She too is absorbed by 
her social role, presumably in an attempt to universalize the application of the text.  
Zola’s priest character, in contrast, is humanized by the novel. The reader 
bears witness to his struggles with doubt. Instead of assuming the role of guide and 
educator of women, he finds himself constantly guided by women: first by his 
mother, then by Marie de Guersaint in Lourdes, and finally by another woman name 
Marie in Paris. Although he observes and analyzes exterior situations like a scientist, 
he is also incredibly sensitive, acutely aware of human suffering and easily moved by 
emotion. Rather than explaining the importance of emotion to the reader, Zola gives 
the reader a chance to feel Pierre’s emotions in context. Unlike Comte’s nameless 
priest, the narration regularly refers to Pierre not as “l’abbé Froment” but by his first 
name, separating the man from his vocation and providing the reader with a sense of 
intimacy with the character. 
Whereas Comte’s priest represents a finished religious system of universal 
truths ready to be applied to society, Zola’s priest represents the process of arriving at 
those truths. Pierre refers to his experiences in each city as if they are experiments: 
D’abord, pour retrouver la croyance perdue, il avait tenté une première 
expérience, il était allé à Lourdes chercher la foi naïve de l’enfant qui 
s’agenouille et qui prie, la primitive foi des peuples jeunes… et il 
s’était révolté davantage devant la glorification de l’absurde, la 
déchéance du sens commun, convaincu que le salut, la paix des 
hommes et des peuples d’aujourd’hui ne saurait être dans cet abandon 
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puéril de la raison. Ensuite, repris du besoin d’aimer, tout en faisant la 
part intellectuelle de cette raison exigeante, il avait joué sa paix 
dernière dans une seconde expérience, il était allé à Rome voir si le 
catholicisme pouvait se renouveler, revenir à l’esprit du christianisme 
naissant, être la religion de la démocratie, la foi que le monde 
moderne… attendait pour s’apaiser et vivre ; et il n’y avait trouvé que 
des décombres, que le tronc pourri d’un arbre incapable d’un nouveau 
printemps, il n’y avait entendu que le craquement suprême du vieil 
édifice social, près de crouler. (1178) 
 
 
The experiment begins with doubt and, through trial and error, ends with a 
tested result that produces faith through personal experience and first-hand 
knowledge. As Michel Butor notes in his introduction to Zola’s Roman expérimental, 
“tout le raisonnement expérimental est base sur le doute...” (1176). This spirit of 
doubt is a shared phenomenon in the more liberal representations of holy men studied 
in this dissertation, such as the portrayal of the dissident monks in George Sand’s 
Spiridion or Hugo’s Le Pape. In contrast, Comte’s priest does not allow the woman 
(or the reader) to discover truths for herself. Instead, he explicitly guides the woman 
through pre-determined logic. 
 
Lourdes 
In Lourdes, the aspect of Catholic worship that Pierre experiences is 
comparable to the stage of religious discovery that Comte terms “le culte.” Equated 
with l’Amour, the mother, the past, theology, and even poetry in Comte’s 
interconnecting trilogies, the main redeeming quality of the “culte” as a stage of 
learning through “fiction” is to provide an accessible way for simple-minded people 
(such as children) to begin to understand universal truths (Catéchisme 331). It also 
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provides the sentimental base on which the “dogme” and the “régime” will be 
dependent. 
Using Pierre as a witness to events at Lourdes, Zola offers the reader scenes 
that consider the current state of the cult of the Virgin while including Pierre’s 
memories of the stages of his own life which recall his own personal “cult” stage as a 
boy dominated by his irrational, theological mother. Though Zola does not make the 
explicit connections claimed by Comte, he does tell a story that implicitly links the 
mother with sentiment, theology, and a distant past.  The narrator reveals that the 
priest’s familial base was unstable from the beginning. The family unit that Zola 
constructs for Pierre is a house divided between religion and science. His mother 
actively sought to hinder his knowledge of science by locking away his deceased 
father’s scientific library. Pierre’s mother, in comtean terms, represents a negative 
force that hinders advancement to the positive dogma of science. Pierre’s experience 
in Lourdes is tied with settling disharmonies that have grown out of his past and the 
Trois villes can be viewed as a process of reuniting the Froment family. For Comte’s 
positivist priest, “la véritable Eglise a toujours pour base primitive la simple Famille” 
(104). For Zola, as well, the Family is the cornerstone of Humanity: “le grand 
mouvement des nationalités était l’instinct, le besoin même que les peuples avaient de 
revenir à l’unité. Partis de la famille unique, séparés, dispersés en tribus plus tard, 
heurtés par des haines fratricides, ils tendaient malgré tout à redevenir l’unique 
famille" (OC 1008). Pierre’s mother provides the sentimental background endorsed 
by the Catéchisme’s positivist priest but she does it in a negative way that disrupts the 
harmony between the “cult” and the “dogma” and later causes Pierre’s spiritual crisis. 
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Pierre is only able to access his father’s knowledge (what becomes his “dogma”) after 
his mother has already pushed him into the priesthood. Pierre cannot grow beyond his 
religious vows. He is trapped in a state that the positivist refers to as “une éternelle 
enfance” (Comte 116). In Lourdes, the faithful are also described as childlike. Pierre 
is constantly drawn to the idea of Bernadette Soubirous as a child-like woman. Marie 
is even physically frozen in time in what the narrator repeatedly describes as the body 
of a child. 
Lourdes is furthermore entrenched in the doctrine of the Immaculate 
Conception which, declared by Pope Pius IX in 1854, officially declared the Blessed 
Virgin Mary “preserved free from all stain of original sin” (Pius IX 1). Though 
viewed as progress in the eyes of the Church, since an “age of Mary” was supposed to 
precede the second coming of Christ, Thomas A. Kselman argues that “The doctrine 
of the Immaculate Conception can be viewed, from the perspective of the history of 
the Church, as another move designed to counter the rationalism and irreligion 
believed to be characteristic defects of the modern world” (90). For Zola, who valued 
fertility as a nearly sacred concept, such a doctrine is perversely contrary to nature: 
Ce dogme de l’Immaculée Conception, que son rêve de fillette 
souffrante était venu consolider, souffletait la femme, épouse et mère. 
Décréter que la femme n’est digne d’un culte qu’à la condition d’être 
vierge, en imaginer une qui reste vierge en devenant mère, qui elle-
même est née sans tâche n’est-ce pas la nature bafouée, la vie 
condamnée, la femme niée, jetée a la perversion, elle qui n’est grande 
que fécondée, perpétuant la vie ? (586-7) 
  
Through rational observation of humanity participating in a primitive religious 
activity, Pierre experiences an equivalent of the fictional or theological first stage of 
religious education outlined in the Catéchisme. At times, he even envies the divine 
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ignorance of the faithful, showing that he feels the inability of science to produce 
happiness: “Il aspirait à la foi, de toute le joie de sa jeunesse, de tout l’amour qu’il 
avait eu pour sa mère, de toute l’envie brûlante qu’il éprouvait d’échapper au 
tourment de comprendre et de savoir, de s’endormir à jamais au fond de la divine 
ignorance” (Lourdes 39). But ultimately, though the doctrine of the Immaculate 
Conception seems to hinder spiritual and intellectual growth for its believers, it 
actually helps sow the seed of doubt in Pierre whose indoctrination into the cult of 
reason has taught him to weigh evidence with a critical eye. Through doubt, Pierre is 
able to perceive important truths that will germinate in his mind throughout the 
trilogy. Pierre witnesses the flaws of fetishism while actually experiencing the 
“contemplation” phase that the positivist priest recommends in place of it. The 
Catéchisme teaches that instead of seeking spiritual satisfaction in an external object, 
the positivist should develop truths from the inside out: “Car le positiviste ferme les 
yeux pendant ses effusions secrètes, afin de mieux voir l’image intérieure; tandis que 
le théologiste les ouvrait pour apercevoir au dehors un objet chimérique” (Comte 83). 
In a sense, Zola’s method of presenting the “religion nouvelle” through the novel 
actually comes closer to achieving the positivist goal of approaching the world from 
the inside out through Comte’s own systematic Catéchisme.  
Rome 
In Rome, Marie de Guersaint, who was so central to Pierre’s quest for faith in 
Lourdes, seems dead to his present life. She is barely mentioned in the book. Love 
that does not pass to order and progress (fecundity) cannot survive. What Pierre 
retains most from the Lourdes experience is the understanding that faith in miracles is 
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infantile, deciding that all mysteries are “des rites nécessaires à l’enfance de 
l’humanité” because of the severity of human misery (525). Upon discovering a 
statuette of the Lourdes grotto in the papal gardens, Pierre seems to want to forget the 
part of his life spent at Lourdes like a man who has grown out of his childhood toys. 
Pendant quelques minutes, Pierre resta immobile, silencieux, devant 
cette reproduction, ce joujou enfantin de la foi. Des visiteurs, par zèle 
dévot, avaient laissé leurs cartes de visite [...] Et ce fut pour lui une très 
grande tristesse,..., la tête basse, perdu dans une rêverie désolée sur 
l’imbécile misère du monde. (678) 
 
Pierre, who once sought childlike “divine ignorance” at Lourdes, has evolved into a 
man who seeks genuine understanding. 
 The system laid out in the Catéchisme positiviste is likewise a process of 
gradual enlightenment that operates from the inside out. According to the positivist 
priest, the unity of sentiment and esprit is achieved when “l’ordre extérieur peut 
devenir l’objet du sentiment intérieur” (47). Consequently, the positivist religious 
system begins with an interior foundation (le culte/l’Amour), through a childhood 
bond with the mother, for example, and gradually moves to a dogma that is taught 
from exterior sources, namely science and literature books in the “Bibliothèque 
positiviste.” As the meticulously organized Catéchisme illustrates, order is the core of 
positivism. Harmony between order and progress are essential in positivism since “le 
Progrès est le développement de l’Ordre (209). 
Pierre’s second stage in the Trois villes, his excursion to Rome, also deals 
with dogma. In contrast with the atmosphere in Lourdes dominated by the sentiment 
of human suffering and the female figurehead of the Virgin, Rome is equated to the 
“croyant intellectual, l’esprit qui a besoin de certitude, qui se satisfait, en goûtant la 
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haute jouissance de ne plus douter” (582). If Lourdes represented sentiment and 
femininity, Rome is its masculine, more intellectual counterpart. Pierre, who is 
hungry for certitude, attempts to come to terms with his own belief system by writing 
a book, La Rome nouvelle, which exposes ideas that have grown inside him out of his 
previous experience of doubt: 
En deux mois, il écrivait ce livre, qu’il préparait depuis un mois sans 
en avoir conscience, par ses études sur le socialisme contemporain. 
C’était en lui comme un bouillonnement de poète, il lui sembler parfois 
rêver ces pages, tandis qu’une voix intérieure et lointaine les lui dictait 
(525) 
 
Reminiscent of Lamennais’ real life attempt to reform the Church through his 
writings, Pierre endeavors to present the ideas in this book to the presumably 
progressive Pope Leo XIII, nicknamed “the people’s pope” for his support of the 
working class and for championing Catholic socialism. Pierre hopes to help 
modernize the Church by promoting support for the Pope’s socialist rhetoric. What he 
discovers in Rome, however, is that nothing has changed. Leon XIII’s “people’s 
pope” persona is a scheme designed to make himself popular with the masses. Rome 
itself is presented as a closed city, completely detached from and uninterested in the 
outside world that it seeks to control. Pierre finds that Rome cannot progress because 
its dogma, or order, is restricted from development, hopelessly rooted in the past. 
Throughout his stay in Rome, Pierre is met with resistance from clergy and other 
Romans. In response to Pierre’s suggestion that everything evolves and the world 
must change, the cardinal Boccanera, in denial, seems to speak for all of Rome and 




Et si, comme ses ennemis le prétendent, le catholicisme est frappé à 
mort, il doit mourir debout, dans son intégralité glorieuse [...] Mais, le 
soir où le ciel croulerait, je serais ici. Au milieu de ces vieux murs qui 
s’émiettent, sous ces vieux plafonds dont les vers mangent les poutres, 
et c’est debout, dans les décombres, que je finirais, en récitant mon 
Credo une dernière fois. (583) 
 
 
In keeping with the theme of sterility criticized in the doctrine of Immaculate 
Conception in Lourdes, Rome depicts the Church itself as infertile. Rome’s potential 
as a center for intellectualism is crushed in a willful decline. Given the choice 
between regeneration and death, the Church chooses death. Rome’s decadent suicide 
is like the virgin Benedetta Boccanera who dies in a carnal embrace with her lover 
near the end of the novel. Reminiscent of the Church’s refusal to evolve, Benedetta 
defends her virginity, waiting for the wedding day that never comes, and ends up 
simply throwing her naked body on her dying lover, Dario. Here, death replaces 
orgasm in a sterile cycle of degeneration instead of the regeneration intended by 
nature. The couple never consummated their love because Benedetta was waiting for 
a Church annulment of a failed first marriage before she could marry Dario. This is 
but another example of man-made systems blocking nature with unnecessary 
bureaucracy. Here, Zola seems to be in agreement with Victor Hugo who, as we saw 
throughout Le Pape, contrasted human law with the higher authority of natural law. 
Throughout Rome, Pierre is increasingly occupied with the concept of charity. 
Becoming aware of “l’inutilité dérisoire de la charité” due to the suffering he has 
witnessed, Pierre dreams of rebuilding society on a justice-based system (522). 
Benedetta, as the most notable female character in the novel, is used as an example of 
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the impotence of charity. Just as Our Lady of Lourdes seemed to bless only a select 
few with her grace, Benedetta’s minor acts of charity are useless against Rome’s large 
population of poverty-stricken people. Pierre suspects that Benedetta, like Rome, has 
the potential to be charitable: 
 
Une idée continuait à l’enflammer, celle qu’il catéchisait l’Italie elle-
même, la reine de beauté assoupie encore dans son ignorance, et qui 
retrouverait sa grandeur ancienne, si elle s’éveillait aux temps 
nouveaux, avec une âme élargie, pleine de pitié pour les choses et pour 
les êtres [...] Puisqu’elle avait des yeux si profonds de tendresse, 
puisque d’elle entière émanait le bonheur d’aimer et d’être aimé, 
pourquoi donc ne reconnaissait pas avec lui que la loi d’amour était 
l’unique salut de l’humanité souffrante, tombée par la haine en danger 
de mort ? [...] Et, en somme, l’élevé ne faisait guère de progrès, elle 
n’était réellement touchée que par la passion d’aimer qui brûlait si 
intense chez ce prêtre, et qu’il avait chastement détourné par la 
créature, pour la reporter sur la création entière. (713)  
 
All of Benedetta’s potential power of charity is wasted. Benedetta is barely 
able to shed a tear to advance humanity but is capable of dramatic self-sacrifice to her 
lover, who has become a sort of idol for her. Benedetta’s dying vow “Nous serons 
morts. Nous serons mariés tout de même et pour toujours” echoes cardinal 
Bocanerra’s vow to die with Catholicism reciting his Credo (OC 903). The stagnant 
state of Rome is again the opposite of what the Catéchisme prescribes for the 
“dogma” or “order” in the positivist system. According to the positivist priest, this 
second stage should be devoted to preparing for reproduction. Positivist priests are 
actually required to get married during this phase of their education (270). In the 
“trois lois d’animalité” outlined by the positivist, “dogma” and “order” are linked to 




 While Rome refuses to evolve, Pierre undergoes an important evolution in the 
reorganization of his priorities as a result of his experience in Rome. The question of 
charity versus justice becomes Pierre’s most pressing preoccupation in Paris, the final 
installment of the Trois villes. Having established in Rome that a hybrid Catholic 
socialist dogma is impossible without the cooperation of the Church, Pierre resolves 
to retract his hope in the Church and put his faith in the poor. 
C’était alors, rendu au doute immense, à la négation totale, qu’il était 
revenu à Paris, rappelé par l’abbé Rose, au nom de leurs pauvres, pour 
s’oublier, pour s’immoler, pour croire en eux, puisque eux seuls 
restaient, avec leurs effroyables souffrances ; et c’était alors qu’il 
s’était heurté, depuis trois ans, à cet effondrement, cette banqueroute 
de la bonté elle-même, la charité dérisoire, la charité inutile et bafouée. 
(OC 1178) 
  
It is not surprising that Pierre focuses on charity and justice in the final stage of his 
enlightenment since, for Comte’s priest too, this third and final part of the cycle (“le 
régime”) is dedicated to actions, specifically to achieving the ultimate goal of 
positivism: “vivre pour autrui.” The Catéchisme’s “régime” or “progress” phase is 
centered on actions: reproduction and good works. Suppressing egotism is vital to 
progress. “L’unité morale reste donc impossible, même dans l’existence solitaire, 
chez tout être exclusivement dominé par des affections personnelles, qui l’empêche 
de vivre pout autrui” (48). 
 It is also notable that Pierre’s journey ends in Paris since Comte’s priest 
establishes Paris as a Mecca of positivism. 
Il faut donc que toutes les parties de la planète humaine, les temples du 
Grand-Être soient dirigés vers la métropole générale, que l’ensemble 
du passé-fixe, pour longtemps, à Paris. Le positivisme utilise ainsi 
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l’heureuse ébauche de l’islamisme envers une précieuse institution, 
qui, par la commune attitude de tous les vrais croyants, fait mieux 
ressortir la touchante solidarité de leurs libres hommages. (126) 
 
 
 Zola and Comte seem to choose Paris, however, for opposing reasons. Comte 
appreciates its rich history as a location where the future can progress from the past. 
Zola, who would rather move towards progress without being held back by the past, 
seems rather to choose Paris as a setting because of its immensity and potential for 
growth. At the end of the first chapter, Pierre “rêvait d’un grand soleil de santé et de 
fécondité, qui ferait de la ville l’immense champ de fertile moisson, où pousserait le 
monde meilleur de demain” (1191). This image of a sun nourishing a fertile land is a 
recurring dream of Pierre’s throughout the novel. Such an enlightened, healthy and 
fertile place would stand in direct contrast to Lourdes and Rome precisely because it 
is less entrenched in archaic religious practices.  
The basilica of Sacré-Cœur, however, looms over Paris as a reminder of the 
opposition to reason that has characterized France since the “bankruptcy of science.” 
Ironically, in the shadow of a monument that is supposed to express Jesus’ mercy on 
humanity, Pierre and l’abbé Rose must covertly participate in acts of charity since 
charity is actively discouraged by Church officials. According to Raymond A. Jonas, 
however, the basilica was also a powerful political symbol for monarchists 
subscribing to the Moral Order, a plan for restoration with its roots in the writings of 
de Maistre, de Bonald and early Lamennais (Jonas 483). Interestingly, these are the 
same Catholic theocrats whose organizational theories were admired by Comte. Like 
Comte, Moral order sought to synthesize the past as a foundation for the present: 
“Moral order was a historiosophy: a logically consistent and internally coherent 
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vision of the past” (Jonas 487). “The basilica of Sacré-Cœur holds a special place in 
the history of the era of Moral Order. Indeed it is arguably Moral Order’s most 
enduring accomplishment and certainly its most tangible” (Jonas 484). 
 In the post-commune political scene, the basilica of the Sacré-Cœur represents 
the failure of the commune and the triumph of the bourgeoisie. In a pivotal moment 
near the end of the novel, Pierre (who is pondering the merits of le travail, hoping 
that one day the working classes will be rewarded with justice and happiness) passes 
by the basilica with his brother. The basilica seems to crush Pierre’s hopes and incite 
a quiet rage in his brother: 
Tout d’un coup, comme les deux frères gravissaient le flanc 
raide de la Butte il s’aperçurent, en face d’eux, au-dessus d’eux, 
la basilique du Sacré-Cœur, souveraine et triomphale. Ce 
n’était plus une apparition lunaire, le songe de la domination, 
dressé devant le Paris nocturne. Le soleil la baignait d’une 
splendeur, elle était en or, et orgueilleuse, et victorieuse, 
flambante de gloire immortelle. 
 
Guillaume... la regarda de ses yeux brûlants, il la condamna. 
(1501) 
 
Zola repeats several times that the anarchist revolutionaries have arrived at 
desperation because they put their faith in so many utopian systems that sought to 
replace traditional religion in French society. The anarchists, who began by imagining 
an ideal anarchy of brotherly peace, end up resorting to terrorism in order to male 
their minority voices heard by the self-absorbed, insulated bourgeoisie who rule Paris. 
The depiction of Parisian bourgeoisie is comparable to that of the Catholic elite in 
Rome, steeped in egotistical decadence.  
 Pierre’s brother, Guillaume, is eventually driven mad by his own anarchist 
desire to clear the world of a decadent humanity and start society over tabula rasa. 
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Pierre is able to break through to his brother to see the error of his illusion precisely 
because Pierre himself has experienced the loss of faith in religion – the original 
illusory ideal. Through the opposite but comparable faith crises of the clergyman and 
the scientist, Zola is able to show that faith in any system is an erroneous path setting 
man up for disappointment since no system can achieve the ideal and all systems are 
eventually replaced. Each of Guillaume’s anarchist friends subscribe to more than one 
utopian system but no system is capable of satisfying Guillaume: “Théophile Morin, 
avec Prouhon et Comte, Bache, avec Saint-Simon et Fourier, n’avaient pu satisfaire 
son désir d’absolu, tous les systèmes lui apparaissent imparfaits et chaotiques, 
s’exterminant les uns les autres, aboutissant à la même misère de vivre” (1540). 
 The fear that anarchy will replace Christianity as the new extremist opposition 
to logic is reflected in the Christ-like persona of the anarchist Salvat whose 
martyrization inspires his disciples with meaningless acts of vengeance rather than 
with any constructive sense of true justice. The question of Charity versus Justice 
resurfaces throughout the book, calling attention to the failure of both. Christians 
have failed to provide the charity they promised and France has failed to provide the 
justice promised by democracy. Guillaume, in his moment of madness, admits that he 
wishes to destroy the Palais de Justice for its failed justice system along with frivolity 
embodied by the Opera and the vain glories of war symbolized by the Arc de 
triomphe (1539). Ultimately, Guillaume settles on targeting Sacré-Cœur because he 
views the church as an offense to a city that has long supported the sciences. From a 
scientific point of view, Paris is a sacred city. Guillaume’s act of terrorism suggests a 
sort of religious war:   
339 
 
Je te l’ai souvent dit, on n’imagine pas un non-sens plus imbécile, 
Paris, notre grand Paris, couronné, dominé par ce temple bâti à la 
glorification de l’absurde. N’est-ce point inacceptable, après des 
siècles de science, ce soufflet au simple bon sens, cet insolent besoin 
de triomphe, sur la hauteur, en pleine lumière ? Ils veulent que Paris se 
repente d’être la ville libératrice de vérité et de justice. Non, non ! [...] 
Et que le temple croule avec son dieu de mensonge et de servage ! Et 
qu’il écrase sous ses ruines le peuple de ses fidèles, pour que la 
catastrophe, telle qu’une des anciennes révolutions géologiques 
retentisse aux entrailles de l’humanité, la renouvelle et la  change ! 
(1593) 
 
 For Comte, Guillaume would have embodied the unsettling trend of 
disorganization that he condemned in his utopian contemporaries. In the preface to 
the first edition of the Catéchisme, Comte explains why he felt compelled to invent 
“la théorie la plus systématique de l’ordre humain”: 
Depuis trente ans que dure ma carrière philosophique et sociale, j’ai 
senti toujours un profond mépris pour ce qu’on nomma, sous nos 
divers régimes, l’opposition, et une secrète affinité pour les 
constructeurs quelconques. Ceux mêmes qui voulaient construire avec 
des matériaux évidemment usés me semblèrent constamment 
préférables aux purs démolisseurs, en un siècle où la reconstruction 
générale devient partout le principal besoin. Malgré l’état arriéré de 
nos conservateurs officiels, nos simples révolutionnaires me paraissent 
encore plus éloignés du véritable esprit de notre temps. Ils prolongent 
aveuglément, au milieu du XIXe siècle, la direction négative qui ne 
pouvait convenir qu’au XVIIIe siècle, sans racheter cette stagnation 
par les généraux sentiments de rénovation universelle qui caractérisent 
leurs prédécesseurs. (4) 
 
In light Pierre’s horror in the face of violent anarchy, one must wonder if Zola 
too harbored a desire to find the perfect order that would harmonize dogma and 
nature. After having experienced the madness of the two extremes of the hyper-
organized Catholic Church and the violent destruction of anarchy, Pierre is finally 
able to advance to accepting a balanced existence.  
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In a jarring shift from chapter IV to chapter V of the last book of Paris, 
Guillaume’s aborted terrorist attempt is followed by the utopian final chapter, 
supposed to take place fifteen months later. By the end of Paris, Pierre establishes “le 
concours intime et continu des deux sexes... du cœur et de l’esprit” envisioned by 
Comte (244). Guillaume recognizes that Pierre has finally managed to reconcile the 
opposing forced represented by his parents: 
“Ah! petit frère, dit Guillaume doucement, te souviens-tu, quand je te 
disais que tu souffrais uniquement du combat de ton cœur contre ta 
raison, et que tu retrouverais la tranquillité lorsque tu aimerais ce que 
tu comprendrais ? Il te fallait réconcilier en toi notre mère et notre 
père, dont la querelle, le douloureux malentendu continuait au-delà de 
la tombe ; et c’est fait, les voilà qui dorment en paix, dans ton être 
pacifié. “ (1563) 
 
 
Pierre’s reconciliation with his past is a process of putting them behind him in 
order to grow into a new philosophy (“tu aimerais ce que tu comprendrais”). In the 
course of the book, Pierre reconciles with his politically radical, atheist, scientist 
brother; marries a perfect, atheist woman named Marie (who is not the Marie from 
Lourdes), learns a trade, and has a child. The new religion must be a system of 
creation instead of a system of destruction: “Ce n’est pas en détruisant, c’est en créant 
que vous venez de faire acte de révolutionnaire!” (1565). The family is living in 
sublime harmony now that they have supposedly broken free of the constraints 
previously imposed on them by Christianity:  
 
Pendant deux mille ans, la marche en avant de l’humanité aura eu pour 
entraves cette odieuse idée d’arracher de l’homme tout ce qu’il a 
d’humain, les désirs, les passions, la libre intelligence, la volonté et 
l’acte, toute sa puissance. Et quel réveil joyeux, lorsque la virginité 
sera méprisée, lorsque la fécondité redeviendra une vertu, dans 
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l’hosanna des forces naturelles libérées, les désirs honorés, les passions 
utilisées, le travail exalté, la vie aimée, enfantant l’éternelle création de 
l’amour ! (1560) 
 
The final chapter implies that Pierre, after having played the role of “priest” 
for the Church, finally achieves a legitimate status as a “holy” man only after he 
secularizes his lifestyle and belief system and moves on. Even some Parisian 
Christians do not entirely discredit Pierre on account of this self-defrocked status. In 
general, Pierre is still socially accepted and still called “l’abbé Froment” by certain 
characters as he greets them in his street clothes. L’abbé Rose, at the end of this life, 
in bequeathing his “pauvres” to Pierre, recognizes that Pierre’s charitable nature is 
more important than his standing in the Church (1553). Putting his faith in Pierre, 
l’abbé Rose furthermore implies consent to Pierre’s new beliefs, putting good actions 
above dogma and reinforcing the theme that the concept is more important than the 
system. 
After having spent so many chapters decrying the dangers of substituting 
systems for other systems, however, Pierre’s final vision for “une religion de science” 
still contains elements of the old utopians. In a way, Zola himself seems to fall into 
the very trap that he has so thoroughly warned the reader against: 
Une religion de la science, c’est le dénouement marqué, certain, 
inévitable, de la longue marche de l’humanité vers la connaissance. 
Cette dernière y arrivera comme au port naturel, à la paix mise enfin 
dans la certitude, lorsqu’elle a passé par toutes les ignorances et tous 
les effrois. Et déjà cette religion ne s’indiquait-elle pas, l’idée de 
dualité, de Dieu et de l’univers, écartée, l’idée de l’unité, du monisme, 
de plus en plus évidente, l’unité entraînant la solidarité, la loi unique de 
vie découlant, par l’évolution, du premier point de l’éther qui s’est 
condensé pour créer le monde ? Mais, si des précurseurs, des savants, 
des philosophes, Darwin, Fourier et les autres, ont semé la religion de 
demain, en confiant au vent qui passe la bonne parole, que se siècles il 
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faudra sans doute pour que la moisson lève ! On oublie toujours que le 
catholicisme a mis quatre siècles à se former, à germer en un long 
travail souterrain, avant de croître, de régner au plein soleil. (1561) 
 
Faith in evolution, then, is what justifies the inclusion of old utopian ideas into the 
new religion of science. Instead of perceiving the new religion as held back by 
history, the final chapter of Paris hypothesizes that the religious history of the world 
was simply evolving towards this final stage, just as Ballanche, Saint-Simon, Sand 
and others had already suggested earlier in the century. Even though the old systems 
have been proven ineffective, Zola attempts to place hope in the idea that these 
imperfect concepts were building blocks in a long and slow revelation. But Zola’s 
vision at the end of Paris is arguably quite similar to Comte’s own dream of harmony 
in which Humanity is the global family. 
[L’homme] s’en croit d’abord redevable à sa seule famille, qui le 
nourrit, le soigne, l’instruit, etc. Mais il ne tard point à distinguer une 
plus haute providence, dont sa mère n’est envers lui que le ministre 
spécial et le meilleur représentant. La seule institution du langage 
suffirait pour la lui révéler. Car une telle construction surpasse tout 
pouvoir individuel, et résulte uniquement du concours accumulé de 
toutes les générations humaines, malgré la diversité des idiomes. 
D’ailleurs, l’homme le moins doté se sent continuellement redevable à 
l’Humanité d’une foule d’autres trésors matériels, intellectuels, 
sociaux, et même moraux. (276) 
 
 
The positivist’s prophecy of Humanity’s bountiful future anchored in the stabilizing 
force of the mother is repeated in the final scene depicting Pierre’s family at the end 
of Paris. Marie, as the ideal mother, is the center of a household of men. Her child, 




Despite the fact that Comte is criticized in Paris as the creator of a female-
oriented system
37
, a closer analysis of the Catéchisme reveals that Comte’s vision for 
the role of women in society is very similar to Zola’s. Despite Comte’s radical stance 
against the institution of marriage, which he saw as keeping women “entre la misère 
et la prostitution,” women in the positivist religion are only venerated as symbols of 
certain principles (love, order, and progress) and as necessary tools for the 
regeneration of humanity. Comte’s system remains a patriarchy with male priests as 
the bearers of instruction and a reading list of male authors and scientists constitute 
the dogma. Women are purposely kept limited in their instruction. The priest in the 
Catéchisme explains: “Dispensées de la vie active, les femmes doivent se borner, en 
mathématique, à une étude plutôt logique scientifique...” (262). 
In the positivist religion, venerating women becomes a convenient way to 
remove them from power. Even though progress is created through them, they are 
prevented from participating in it. As sentimental guardians of past tradition and 
physical bearers of the future, they are recognized by positivist religion but only on 
the condition that women submit to being controlled by men. Comte insists on a 
presumably charitable motto that “l’homme doit nourrir la femme” but such a system 
keeps the woman dependent on men, regardless of her “divine” status (Catéchisme 
33). Comte’s attempt to subordinate women and love to male-dominated order is a 
prime example of a system that imposes the kind of unnatural constraints on 
humanity that Zola passionately rails against throughout most of the Trois villes. The 
female ideal in Zola’s “religion nouvelle” nevertheless exists to serve the family and 
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 “Comte, qui créait la méthode et mettait la science à sa vraie place en la déclarant l’unique 
souveraine, ne soupçonnait même pas pas la crise sociale dont le flot menaçait de tout emporter, 
finissait en illuminé d’amour, terrassé par la femme” (1559). 
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produce offspring in much the same way that Comte had envisioned. Pierre’s utopian 
family is only possible because Marie accepts a rather comtean contract to fulfill her 
destiny as a fertile woman and pursue revolution through creation.  
The positivist priest aims to convince the woman that positivism will 
“ennoblir et consolider toutes les affections domestiques en les rattachant toujours à 
leur destination social.” The positivist religious system is dependent on the woman’s 
willingness to cooperate in self-sacrifice. From the beginning of the Catéchisme, the 
priest begins an argument that will eventually arrive at requiring women to accept 
subordination, despite the fact that they are venerated as the highest minsters of 
positivism. From the introduction, the priest introduces the concept of a partial 
sacrifice as a rejection of selfishness: “l’unité altruiste n’exige point, comme l’unité 
égoïste, l’entier sacrifice des penchants contraires à son principe, mais seulement leur 
sage subordination à l’affection préponderante” in the service of “vivre pour autrui” 
(49). By the end of the Catéchisme, the positivist priest reveals that the priesthood 
(men) in service to the family (Humanity) will inspire women to subordinate 
themselves: 
Telles sont les familles au sein desquelles un sacerdoce librement 
vénéré de tous leurs membres s’efforcera sans cesse de prévenir ou de 
réparer les conflits mutuels résultés des mauvaises passions. Il y fera 
sentir aux femmes le mérite de la soumission, en développant cette 
admirable maxime d’Aristote : « La principale force de la femme 
consiste à surmonter la difficulté d’obéir. » (295)  
 
 
Until the introduction of Paris’ Marie, the Trois villes is consistently 
populated with women who have chosen to obey some other force than the 
reproductive role that Zola is so centered on praising. They participate in sacrifice but 
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to the wrong principles, the wrong “God.” Marie in Lourdes sacrifices her 
reproductive power for what she believes is a great cause, the possibility of 
regenerating Pierre’s faith. She is able to “vivre pour autrui” but her childish 
devotions hinder her from progressing. Benedetta in Rome sacrifices her life and her 
pudeur for her lover (who she also adores as a cult-like figure) but this is a selfish 
sacrifice with no charitable goal. She has also made the mistake of not giving in to 
Dario’s sexual advances. The preservation of her virginity, in the end, is shown to be 
useless and ridiculous. Finally, in accordance with Comte’s plan for women, the final 
Marie in Paris sacrifices her freedom in order to care for the future of humanity. Most 
importantly for both Zola and Comte, she reproduces and is therefore participating in 
human progress. 
Conclusion 
Although the two works are distinctly different in form and message, Zola’s Trois 
villes and Auguste Comte’s Catéchisme positiviste both capture the nineteenth 
century trend towards a focus on love in religious thought as well as the growing 
desire to reconcile science and faith. In the Cathéchisme, Comte modifies his “Order 
and Progress” motto of the Discours sur l’esprit positif to include love. Comte’s 
conception of a positivist Church is founded on “l’Amour pour principe, l’Ordre pour 
base et le Progrès pour but.” Although the author touts his religion of humanity as a 
progressive alternative to Catholicism, familiar Church structures, notably the clergy 
and the trinity, are left intact. 
The final installment of Zola’s Trois villes, Paris, looks back on similar spiritual, 
social, and scientific themes explored by Comte. Zola, however, in choosing the 
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novel as his tool for exploring those themes, addresses them implicitly rather than 
explicitly. His approach is a much less systematic one than Comte’s structured 
trinities in the Catéchisme. Zola’s characters, for example, are significantly more 
humanized than the “priest” and the “woman” dialoguing in the Catéchisme. In the 
spirit of scientific experimentation, Zola allows his religious ideas to be subject to 
more vulnerability. Comte’s religion, in contrast, presents itself as a tried and true 
system of universal truths. Like other depictions of “reformed” clergy and “fallen” 
angels we have explored in this dissertation,
38
 Zola’s Pierre Froment cultivates doubt 
as a path to truth. Rather than simply switch from one ready-made system to the next, 
he discovers his own personal truth through experience.  
Zola’s Lourdes, which centers on the popular nineteenth century cult of the Virgin 
Mother, portrays Pierre Froment as experiencing a stage of religious discovery 
analogous to the “cult” stage of Auguste Comte’s religious system. In the cult stage, 
children or other naive people begin to understand universal truths through “fiction” 
or legends which teach foundational spiritual ideas through simple symbolic 
representations. For Comte, the cult stage is associated with motherly love and it thus 
provides a sentimental basis for the positivist trinity: “cult, dogma, regime.” 
Throughout Lourdes, Pierre’s frequent memories of his childhood and his mother 
support this connection between early life, tenderness, and mysticism. Pierre is only 
able to reach Comte’s dogma stage by destroying some of innocence when he reads 
forbidden books in his father’s library which had been locked away by his mother. 
This scene is reminiscent of the discoveries made by Alexis in George Sand’s 
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 See, for example, chapters on “Fallen Angels in Restoration Literature,” on George Sand’s Spiridion, 
or on Hugo’s Le Pape. 
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Spiridion when he dared to enter the monastery’s library of heretical texts. Zola, 
however, adds to the conflict by associating religious mysticism with feminine 
influence while associating positivism with the masculine father. In this way, the 
scene is reminiscent of Michelet’s conclusions in the Bible de l’humanité which 
blames women for society’s failure to embrace reason. The fanaticism inspired by the 
Virgin Mother and her largely female supporters seems to warn against the influence 
of feminine imagination. The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is depicted by 
Zola as an unnatural perversion. For Zola, Comte, and Michelet alike, fertility is 
sacred and the perpetuation of humanity is woman’s destiny.  
In Rome, Pierre is shown as having grown spiritually and intellectually as a result of 
his experience in Lourdes. He is prepared to seek genuine knowledge rather than 
faithfully accept divine ignorance. In this stage, the priest turns away from the 
glorification of ignorance which we have seen in the works of Ballanche, 
Chateaubriand, and de Maistre. The positivist priest in the Catéchisme likewise calls 
for the unity of “sentiment” and “esprit” which has surfaced in liberal religious 
thought since Mme de Staël. Pierre’s second stage in Trois villes parallels his stages 
of progress as a young man as he grew from believer to thinker. Similar to the true 
story of Lamennais, however, Pierre discovers, that Rome’s dogma is stunted because 
it is wholly rooted in the past, refusing to progress. Rome, like Lourdes, is infertile 
because it embraces a doctrine of death, a culture in which the afterlife overshadows 
life on Earth. 
Throughout Rome, Pierre, again reminiscent of later Lamennais and Hugo’s Le Pape, 
is increasingly concerned with charity. Bernedetta, though generous, is depicted as 
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providing her generosity within a system of grace reminiscent of Our Lady of 
Lourdes. Zola, like Michelet, seems to draw a comparison between Christian grace 
and the fickle favors of desirable women. Bernadetta’s willingness to sacrifice herself 
to the lover she idolizes but not to the whole of humanity is furthermore reminiscent 
of the messianism condemned in the Bible de l’humanité. Because Froment’s Rome is 
stagnant, it cannot progress according to Comte’s system whereby “dogma”or “order” 
leads to a progressive “régime.” In the Catéchisme, these stages ideally foster 
reproduction – an activity which is impossible for the Catholic clergy. 
In Paris, Pierre continues his meditations on charity but expands his outlook to 
include a consideration of justice. Again like Lamennais, the priest breaks with the 
Church in order to place more effort on helping the poor. This third and final stage of 
Pierre’s growth corresponds to Comte’s Catéchisme in that Comte’s third stage, “le 
régime,” likewise emphasizes reproduction and good works or the concept of living 
selflessly in service of humanity. The basilica of Sacré-Cœur looms over Paris as a 
symbol of the reactionary opposition to reason in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. The basilica represents the triumph of the Moral Order promoted by the 
ultramontanes whose sense of structure was actually admired by Auguste Comte 
despite a their obvious conflict in philosophy. The differences in Comte and Zola’s 
approach to a religion of humanity are apparent. Whereas Comte’s Catéchisme is, in 
structure, the positivist version of Moral Order, Zola’s Trois villes rejects all order 
imposed upon man outside of his natural life cycle. Faith in any system, even faith in 
science, Christian charity, or democratic justice, ends in disillusion. Despite what 
seems like a condemnation of utopian ideals, however, Paris ends with a scene 
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which, in the spirit of Comte, harmonizes man and woman, heart and mind. Pierre’s 
new philosophy is the very definition of philosophy – a love of knowledge. The 
portrait of the atheist family emphasizes liberty and creation. Pierre, like Comte, 
envisions a “religion of science” which also incorporates some elements of utopian 
systems seen throughout the century. Evolution surfaces as the justification for 
incorporating old ideas into new theories. As Ballanche, Saint-Simon, Sand, Hugo 
and others had suggested, the world in Paris is evolving towards a final stage of 
human history. Both Comte and Zola rely on women for this regeneration. In both 
systems, love, charity, and reproduction – progress itself – is dependent on woman’s 






Chapter 16: Conclusion 
 
I began the research for this thesis on a hunch that references to religion which I had 
noticed in nineteenth century French literature might be indicative of some larger 
dialogue concerning the role of religion in nineteenth century society. My research 
throughout the dissertation process has shown that indeed notions of religion were 
being redefined by a variety of authors united by common themes such as justice, 
love, and progress as well as the virtues celebrated in the French Republic’s motto, 
“Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.” Although the authors’ interpretations of these themes 
were often contradictory, their shared interests indicate a unified effort to respond to 
the increasingly divergent paths of organized religion and modern society.  
A discussion of whether or not authentic religion originates inside the individual (in 
his “soul,” or his “conscience”) or outside of the individual, in the form of an external 
religion remains constant throughout the century. With few exceptions, the general 
trend in these texts shows a march towards a valorization of sentiment and 
individualized spirituality. Beginning with Rousseau, knowing oneself and living in 
tune with the conscience despite society becomes the key to a moral lifestyle. For the 
Savoyard Vicar, internal sentiment brings man back into touch with what it means to 
be human and consequently connects the individual with the whole of humanity 
through shared human sentiments which are presented as universal truths. The 
individual thus becomes a more sympathetic and charitable member of society. Mme 
de Staël likewise looks to sentiment as an internal regulator of morality. In Corinne, 
spiritual sentiment, which is often associated with artistic expression, is shown to be a 
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unifying power. Recognizing the palingenesis of religions which historically 
contributed to Christianity, Corinne is comforted that sentiment itself remains a 
constant throughout the evolution of religious systems. 
Although Ballanche insists on the necessity of external religion, he nevertheless relies 
on sentiment, which he defines as an innate knowledge of God, in his attempt to 
prove the veracity of Christianity in Du Sentiment. His Essai sur les institutions 
sociales, however, condemns individualism as dangerously subjective. The Essai 
insists that society itself is a divine institution responsible for man’s moral education. 
Chateaubriand, too, rejects solitude and promotes the Church as a regulator of 
dangerous human passions, notably in Atala and René. For Chateaubriand, the 
conscience is reinforced through social duties and external religious structure. In 
these stories, individuals without external spiritual support fall prey to their own 
destructive emotions. Despite their support of the Church as a necessary moral 
institution, Ballanche and Chateaubriand nevertheless incorporate sentiment into their 
religious reflections and depict Christianity as hopeful and even forgiving.  Joseph de 
Maistre, in contrast, insists on Christianity as a wholly external. The dialogues in his 
Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg argue for the doctrine of Original Sin which renders 
man incapable of judging morality for himself. 
The romantic authors studied in this thesis tend to support the power of the individual 
conscience as a source for authentic moral truth. As we have seen, Vigny’s journal 
considers the idea that the conscience was divine. His Éloa exercises free will, 
sacrificing herself for the noble cause of compassion for another being – even though 
that being is depicted as unworthy of her charity. Lamartine’s Cédar likewise falls 
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willingly, exercising “moral liberty” by following his conscience to support humanity 
on Earth.  
Lamennais’ incredible transformation from ultramontane clergyman to anti-Catholic 
poet serves as a dramatic illustration of the changing nature of religious thought in a 
century characterized by progress and revolution. The anti-individualism expressed in 
De la religion is comparable to the extreme conservative thought found in de 
Maistre’s writing. For early Lamennais, any individual religious interpretation is 
deemed dangerous. He insists on the pope’s necessary role as a dominant spiritual 
guide and as a unifier of the people. In Paroles d’un croyant, Lamennais completely 
reverses his stance on the Church, demonizing its leaders as decadents who have 
twisted the true Christian message of charity in order to support tyrannical 
monarchies. Interestingly, however, Lamennais still upholds social unity over 
individualism, even in his new liberal religious thought. Along with Saint-Simon, he 
promotes charity and unity but without appealing to the conscience of the individual 
as Rousseau and Mme de Stäel had done. Saint-Simon’s creation of the Nouveau 
christianisme confirms that for him and his followers an external system was 
necessary for the organization of religion in cooperation with society. For Saint-
Simon, love, which is obviously associated with internal sentiment, is the supreme 
and universal law. Nevertheless, the Nouveau christianisme reinforces the idea that 
this love must be supported and promoted by religious institutions. Clearly, 
individualized interpretations of love are insufficient for Saint-Simon who envisions 
social unity and harmony as his goal. The industrialist nevertheless reveals 
throughout his work that religion should make people feel happy.  
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Auguste Comte’s positivist religion, obviously somewhat inspired by his familiarity 
with Saint-Simon’s work, likewise insists on external religious structure as essential 
to the application of morality in society. Though his ideas are purely secular, the 
system he proposes in the Catéchisme grafts secular thought onto a Catholic structure. 
While Comte’s system views individuality as a necessary foundational building block 
in the “cult” stage of his system, the individual ideally grows to give himself over to 
humanity in a completely selfless existence aimed towards the continuation of the 
human race. It must be noted, however, that even the liberal systems which insisted 
upon community stressed love and charity towards humanity, sentiments which 
undoubtedly originate the hearts of individuals. 
Towards the end of the century, Zola’s Pierre Froment serves as an illustration of the 
progressive movement away from organized religion and towards a natural religion of 
humanity which likewise revolves around the regeneration of the human race. 
Individual meditation in the Trois villes creates doubt in existing faith systems which 
in turn leads to liberation from superstition. Froment’s concern with charity, however, 
and his participation in humanity through procreation in the end suggests that unity, 
not individualism, is the path to progress. 
The concept of the evolution of religion seems generally appealing to a good number 
of the authors studied in this dissertation. Mme de Staël’s perfectibilité in De la 
religion envisions humanity as improving from generation to generation as people 
become ever more in tune with their sentiments. The theory of perfectibility provides 
hope for social progress by negating the ultramontane insistence on primitive man as 
ideal. The idea that human spirituality could be perfected also denied the doctrine of 
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infallibility upheld by the Catholic Church. Ballanche, despite his ultraconservative 
leanings, supported the idea that Christianity is a religion in flux, constantly adapting 
to changing times. The Essai sur les institutions sociales maintained, however, that 
these changes should take place in step with God’s will. Ballanche’s notion of 
palingenesis, which argued for the continual rebirth of society, influenced Saint-
Simon’s progressive social system in the Nouveau christianism. Saint-Simon, 
however, further embraced progress by proposing a religion supported by science. By 
casting philosophers, moralists, and metaphysicians out of the utopian society, 
scientists, artists, and intellectuals would become the new spiritual leaders. 
George Sand’s Spiridion imagines spiritual progress according to the Évangile éternel 
which hypothesized that Christianity would undergo a series of three different stages 
of growth. In accordance with Saint-Simonian notions of religious progress, the 
radical monks in Spiridion look for truth in knowledge. By opening their minds to 
both sacred and profane texts and by sharing knowledge from generation to 
generation, the monks achieve a state of enlightenment which prepares them to 
embrace the final state of spirituality coinciding with the turn of the nineteenth 
century in which faith is placed back into the hands of the people. Hugo’s Le Pape 
likewise imagines the possibility of humanizing the Church by removing the pope 
from his isolation and placing him amongst the people. Through the experience of 
fraternity, Hugo’s “dream pope” realizes that liberty of the people is the will of the 
Infinite. Like later Lamennais, Hugo’s pope concludes that democracy is a part of the 
divine plan.  
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By the same token, Renan’s portrayal of the historical Jesus in Vie de Jésus depicts 
Christianity’s founder as a social reformer who was decidedly a man of the people. 
Renan, like Ballanche and Sand, imagined Christianity as a continual movement 
towards justice and liberty. For Renan, the science of history would serve to advance 
religion through continuous research on the history of religious figures. Renan 
equated the knowledge he gained through research to a sort of revelation made 
possible through the miracle of scientific advancement. This insistence on faith in 
truth though science, however, is weakened by the author’s prejudices which show 
through in his subjective analysis of the role of the Jewish people whom he blames 
for the crucifixion of the Christian messiah. Renan expressed confidence that positive 
science would prove Christianity’s true message of justice but his inability to uphold 
unbiased judgment in his own analysis rocks the foundation of faith in science. 
Michelet, too, expressed a belief in history as the gateway to discovering the truth 
about religion. His Bible de l’humanité, in contrast to Renan’s biography, focused on 
the broad scope of the history of world religious doctrines rather than on the lives of 
individual religious figures. For Michelet, justice and reason will only triumph when 
the “feminine” force of Christianity is defeated. While Renan saw female influence 
on Christianity as a positive reinforcement of the sentimental bond which unites 
humanity, Michelet characterizes the doctrine of grace as a feminine perversion of 
justice. By gendering the justice versus grace debate, Michelet brings his religious 
politics into the intimacy of the home where, he claims, the Church has crushed the 




Michelet’s association of Christianity with femininity was not new and, in fact, 
gender issues are frequently woven into the religious debate. In De la religion, Mme 
de Staël defends female influence on Roman society as morally constructive and 
argues that the Christian sacrament of marriage contributed to the development of 
equality of the sexes. In Corinne, Corinne’s spiritual adaptability, which is also 
associated with her femininity, ultimately allows her to achieve a state of wisdom 
which remains impossible for the austere and unimaginative Oswald. Although Saint-
Simon does not explicitly favor any particular gender in his Nouveau christianisme, 
followers of his work under the guidance of Prosper Enfantin would interpret Saint-
Simon’s doctrine of love as favorable to female leadership since women were 
commonly associated with sentiment. Vigny and Quinet uphold this association of 
femininity and sentiment by portraying their fallen angels as women. Although 
Lamartine’s Cédar is male, he, like the young priest in Jocelyn, seeks universal truth 
through the unification of the sexes. In these poems, man’s contact with a female 
counterpart serves as the catalyst to the discovery of universal truths. Even at the end 
of the century, Comte and Zola, who turn away from the mysticism traditionally 
associated with female power, nevertheless insist on women as essential to any 
religion of humanity since women hold the power to procreate. The propagation of 
humanity becomes sacred as the people are increasingly considered as a unified force, 
replacing destiny, or the will of God, with the concept of the voice of the people. 
As we have seen, the overwhelming concern in all of these texts is the reconciliation 
of religion and modernity. The law of 1905, which officially separated Church and 
State in France, seems to respond to the debate with the invention of a secular nation. 
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Whether or not any of these texts had a direct impact on the law of 1905 remains to 
be studied. As liberal religious thought moved ever closer to matching political ideals, 
the ongoing dialogue perhaps fostered a social environment which was more 
receptive to the concept of secularism. Alternatively, it is conceivable that the 
dialogue simply reflected social changes which were already underway. For John 
Warner Monroe, French secularism was “a crucial process of redefinition – one that 
did not take place at the command of a single thinker or politician, but that occurred 
gradually, across a vast range of different forums, in response to a constellation of 
specific events” (151-2). The authors studied in this essay represent some of the many 
participants in that “process of redefinition.” The very existence of a plurality of 
religious conceptions provides the foundation for an argument in favor of “the 
freedom of conscience” and the necessity of secular law which ideally unifies the 
people through common nationality rather than dividing them by excluding religious 
minorities.  
*** 
In celebration of the one-hundredth anniversary of the “loi du 9 décembre 1905,” 
France’s Assemblée nationale re-released a copy of Aristide Briand’s Rapport fait au 
nom de la commission relative à la séparation des églises et de l’état. In the avant-
propos by Jean-Louis Debré, who at that time served as President of the Assemblée 
nationale, Debré emphasizes the necessity of the separation of Church and State in 
order to support the French Republic. In this text, Debré reaffirms the idea that the 
law exists to benefit all French citizens: “Un siècle après son adoption, la loi de 1905 
figure au nombre des grands lois de la République, de notre République” (paragraph 
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3). Debré notably commends the law for its adaptability to a changing society: “la 
laïcité française, loin d’être un dogme intangible, sait parfaitement s’adapter aux 
évolutions de notre société” (paragraph 14). I found this phrasing especially powerful 
since the question of adaptability, the idea that religion must be able to withstand the 
inevitable revolutions of society, is repeatedly addressed in a number of texts in this 
dissertation. Especially in the works of Ballanche, Saint-Simon, and Sand, 
Christianity itself is envisioned as a dynamic philosophy. According to Debré’s 
statement, this desire for adaptability is addressed in the secular solution. By the same 
token, the “liberty of conscience” cited in the first article of the law implies a sort of 
mobility of thought which, although secular, continues to affirm the existence of the 
conscience as a moral authority. In her book Reclaiming the Sacred, Suzanne Desan 
explains that in the 1790s, Christianity as a whole came to be seen as a rival cultural 
system that prevented people from becoming true citizens of the new Republic” (7). 
John Warner Monroe’s study of spiritism and politics in the early Third Republic 
shows that the idea endured amongst 1870s republicans who increasingly viewed any 
kind of spirituality (not necessarily just Catholic) as a possible threat to Republican 
ideals (121, 142-3). In the 1870s, “Leftists previous willingness to take political 
discourse into the register of metaphysics became much less pronounced. Instead, 
writers and speakers expressed their visionary aim in the language of positivism” 
(121)
39
. The writers studied in this dissertation are perhaps the dying embers of a 
French political discourse which included notions of spirituality. The details of how 
the legal separation of Church and State continued and continues to interplay with the 
                                                 
39
 According Graham Robb, even Victor Hugo was not immune to the criticisms of spirituality on the part of 
Republicans: “Even in Republican circles, it was unfashionable to pay homage: Hugo was tainted with bizarre 
spiritual beliefs” (496). 
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nation’s literature is a topic which remains to be studied. After definitively deciding 
on national laïcité, for example, is the process of redefining religion still necessary in 
French literature? Is it possible that the morals and traditions which we term 
“religion” have evolved to a point in contemporary times that another term (perhaps 
“justice” or “human rights”) has finally taken its place in the secular dialogue ? 
Moreover, contrary to Debré’s insistence that the hundred-year-old law has succeeded 
in adapting to social change, secularism in France has come under fire in recent 
decades for its inability to sufficiently adapt to the needs of an increasingly diverse 
French population
40
. Drawing on data collected in international census reports, Greg 
Urban’s 2008 article, “The Circulation of Secularism,” suggests that a nation’s legal 
definition of “freedom of religion” impacts the way that people express their religious 
beliefs or lack thereof. The French dialogue surrounding religion and spirituality must 
inevitably have evolved (and continues to evolve) since 1905.  This continuing 
dialogue in twentieth and twenty-first century French literature has yet to be explored 
but it should be of great interest to American scholars who are certainly familiar with 
the impact of religious issues on our own politics and society. Studying the history of 
changing religious thought in France, which in many ways is our sister democracy, 
could provide valuable insight into our own country’s struggle to define the role of 
religion in society. 
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 See, for example, Susan J Palmer’s 2011 book, The New Heretics of France which details the 1996 
Guyard Report designed to curb “cult” (secte) activity in France or Jennifer A. Selby’s 2012 
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